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Networks, malandros and social control: exploring the connections between inequality and 
violence in Venezuela 
 
This thesis looks at the connections between inequality and violence in Venezuela by exploring 
how people’s relationships might mediate or mitigate these connections. It is often assumed 
that people’s relationships can provide motivations for engaging in violence, or that they provide 
informal social controls that can keep them from violence. Venezuela is an interesting case study 
because traditional indicators suggest violence might not be related to inequality in this context, 
justifying a focus on lower-level mechanisms that might be responsible for the often found 
correlations in different contexts. This thesis shows that historical inequalities provide the distal 
conditions for the institutionalisation of el malandreo, a Venezuelan gangster identity. 
Nevertheless, violence between malandros –people that identify with el malandreo– itself is the 
proximate cause of the deadly violence that holds Venezuela in a venomous grip.  
 
The research is based on data collected during a year’s fieldwork in the barrios, poorer areas of 
Venezuela’s cities where the majority of violence occurs, of two different cities. I collected both 
qualitative observation and unstructured interview data, as well as more quantifiable personal 
network data that were analysed with E-net and SPSS. A large part of the thesis is also based on 
ethnographic observations as well as interviews with malandros.  
 
The findings show that many barrio residents feel disadvantaged and may be motivated to use 
violence, nevertheless, there is little evidence that there is a lack of informal social control in 
these areas. Instead, the absence of formal authorities and dense interaction networks open the 
barrio up to much more ambiguous forms of informal social control. Such observations 
emphasise that el malandreo can be seen to provide existential meaning as well as informal 
social control, through violence. Overall, the thesis argues for a relational understanding of the 
connections between inequality and violence and for seeing violence itself as a form of social 
control particularly in areas where authority is ambiguous and social networks are dense. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION; EXPLORING THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN INEQUALITY AND 
VIOLENCE IN VENEZUELA 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis explores a much debated relationship between inequality and violence, with a case 
study of Venezuela, a country on the northern coast of South America. Traditional indicators of 
inequality and violence show a counterintuitive evolution in Venezuela, with a declining Gini 
coefficient going hand in hand with dramatically increasing homicide rates. This evolution 
contradicts an extensive body of research that has found positive correlations between these 
indicators. Nevertheless, theoretical explanations for these correlations do not suggest direct 
connections between inequality and violence. It is assumed people’s interactions and 
relationships mediate and mitigate these connections. This thesis is aimed at a better 
understanding of these connections through an exploratory analysis of primary data on people’s 
interactions and relationships collected during a year’s fieldwork in Venezuela between May 
2009 and December 2012.  
 
This thesis shows that an understanding of these interactions, using qualitative and personal 
network data, offers a privileged view on the connections between inequality and violence. The 
homicidal violence that holds Venezuela in a venomous grip is a function of the historical 
absence of formal opportunities and formal social control agencies, coupled with dense 
interaction patterns in the barrio, where the majority of Venezuela’s deadly violence occurs. 
These patterns have led to the institutionalisation of ‘el malandreo’, a gangster identity that 
provides young men with existential meaning and importantly but contradictorily, protection. 
Deadly violence between ‘malandros’, young men that assume the identity of el malandreo, 
spreads through fear and retaliation in dense interaction networks. This thesis argues that 
inequalities in access to opportunities, and, importantly, formal social control, have everything 
to do with the continued attractions of el malandreo, though little more with the violence it uses. 
This violence itself is the proximate cause of further violence, whereas historically grown 
inequalities provide the distal conditions in which this violence can take hold. 
 
This chapter first positions the thesis within a growing awareness of the dramatic effects of 
homicidal violence in the development literature. It then evaluates some aggregate statistics on 
Venezuela, making the case for investigating in more detail the interactions and relationships 
2 
 
that might influence these aggregate statistics. It summarises the research questions and 
provides an outline of the thesis, taking in the contributions it makes to the literature.  
1.2 Homicide in Development Studies 
Lower levels of violent crime are generally related to 
higher levels of development, as well as to lower levels of 
income inequality.  
(UNODC, 2014) p. 78 
 
The interdisciplinary field of Development Studies aims to understand and explain vast 
disparities in indicators of development between the more developed countries of what has 
become known as the global North, and less developed countries of the global South. Where at 
its origins, development was conceptualised as material wealth and economic growth, it has 
come to encompass notions of human development, a much broader concept that looks at the 
lives people lead and the freedoms they enjoy as measures of development (Desai and Potter, 
2002; Nafziger, 2006; Sen, 1999). In this vein, scholars have started looking at different aspects 
of well-being, over and beyond material well-being, including freedom from fear and security 
(Luckham, 2009; World Bank, 2011). Non-state, interpersonal violence, as reflected in 
intentional homicide rates, is increasingly seen as a development concern (Diprose, 2007; Moser 
and McIlwaine, 2006). 
 
Figure 1-1 validates this concern. It shows elevated homicide rates are disproportionately 
concentrated in countries of the global South.  
Figure 1-1 Homicide rates by country or territory, 2012 or latest available year (UNODC, 2014) 
 
Venezuela 
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The accompanying ‘Global Study on Homicide’ (UNODC, 2014) talks of the polarisation of 
homicide. It states that ‘Intentional homicide caused the deaths of almost half a million people 
(437,000) across the world in 2012. More than a third of those (36 per cent) occurred in the 
Americas, 31 per cent in Africa and 28 per cent in Asia, while Europe (5 per cent) and Oceania 
(0.3 per cent) accounted for the lowest shares of homicide at the regional level’ (p.11). Fox and 
Hoelscher (2012) state ‘that annual deaths due to homicides worldwide outnumber those due 
to organized armed conflict by a factor of roughly 3 to 1’, but that the question of why some 
countries are more prone to this type of violence than others has ‘received little attention from 
conflict and development specialists in recent years’ (p.431).  
 
Studies that have paid attention to these regional and cross-national differences frequently see 
inequality as an important, if not most important1, contributory factor to elevated homicide 
rates (Heinemann and Verner, 2006; UNODC, 2014; WHO, 2002; World Bank, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the mechanisms by which inequality contributes to these homicide rates are not 
as clear as often assumed, as I will explore in detail in Chapter 2. Further, the vast majority of 
research that has investigated these connections in more detail and on lower levels of analysis 
has been done in the global North. The case of Venezuela casts doubts over these links. 
According to the homicide data visualised in Figure 1-1, it is now the second most violent country 
in the world (UNODC, 2014). It carries this gloomy reputation in spite of recent improvements 
in a number of development indicators, as the next section explores.   
1.3 The Venezuelan paradox  
Donde hay desigualdad hay violencia  
Where there is inequality, there is violence  
Hugo Chávez, cited in Zubillaga (2009, p.8) 
 
In contrast to its late president’s words in the introductory quote, Venezuela is a poignant 
illustration of the complex relationship between inequality and violence. In terms of its income 
distribution, Venezuela is traditionally seen as one of the more egalitarian countries on a highly 
unequal continent (De Ferranti et al., 2003; ECLAC, 2011; Gasparini et al., 2009). This tradition 
gained impetus with the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998, against the background of detrimental 
effects of structural reform and adjustment that affected many poor and middle-class Latin 
                                                          
1 The ‘Spirit Level’, an influential book by Wilkinson (2009) identifies inequality as the main cause of 
various social ills, including homicide, without critically evaluating the mechanisms or any evidence to the 
contrary, such as Venezuela. See also (Runciman, 2009) 
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Americans in the eighties and nineties. He was elected on a platform of poverty reduction and 
redistribution and soon started implementing progressive reform programmes (Ellner, 2010; 
Wilpert, 2011). These programmes had marked effects on a wide number of aggregate 
development indicators. A couple of these indicators are shown in Figure 1-2, contrasting them 
to an increasing homicide rate.  
Figure 1-2 Evolution of national Gini coefficient, household poverty and homicide rates 1997-2012 
(Data source: INE, CICPC) 
 
 
The percentage of households living in poverty decreased by half (51%) in the space of 15 years, 
from 57% in 1997 to 27% in 20122(INE; PROVEA, 2012). Relative poverty, or income inequality, 
declined substantially too. The income Gini coefficient3 decreased by almost a fifth (18%), from 
0.49 in 1997 to 0.40 in 2012 (Gonzalez Plessmann, 2008; INE, 2013).  
 
                                                          
2 These figures are based on (first semester) data from the National Statistics Office (INE)’s 6 monthly 
household survey, as reported on their website in 2014. These data are highly contested. Some question 
the validity of this poverty line measurement, based on the price of an essential foods basket, questioning 
whether these data represent real income changes. With high inflation and food subsidies, it is difficult to 
appreciate how real incomes have evolved. Further this survey is not designed to capture incomes as such 
(Bujanda and Torres, 2008). It is not very sensitive to capturing different types of income data, e.g. wages, 
mixed incomes (from e.g. informal employment) and transfers. Nevertheless, this is more an issue of 
degree than presence, almost all commentators do acknowledge a substantial reduction of absolute 
poverty during the Chávez government (España, 2009; Ponce, 2010, 2013; Riutort, 2009). More 
multidimensional, basic necessities poverty also shows an, albeit less dramatic, decline. Further, figure 
1.2 shows this was not a steady decline, poverty went back up in 2002-2004 due to a national strike.  
3  See Chapter 2 p.32, a measure of inequality that calculates differences between each pair of 
observations. It ranges from 0, no differences, to 1, where 1 case has all resources. For Figure 1-2, I 
adjusted this by multiplying it by 100, to align it with the Y-axis scale. The Gini coefficient is also based on 
abovementioned INE survey with its limitations.  
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These trends would intuitively suggest violence should decline too. Chávez himself always 
assumed his reforms would have a direct effect on violence as indicated by the quote that 
introduced this chapter4. In sharp contrast, and under his presidency, aggregate homicide rates5 
increased by 184%; from 19 per 100,000 inhabitants before he was elected in 1997, to 54 in 
2012. Based on this homicide rate, Venezuela is considered one of the most violent countries in 
the world today (Romero, 2010; Sanjuán, 2008; UNODC, 2014).  In the decade between 2003 
and 2012 alone, more than 126,000, predominantly young barrio men, lost their lives to 
homicidal violence, making an investigation of the determinants of this violence a timely 
concern. 
 
In all, these data do not support a positive relationship between aggregate income inequality 
and homicidal violence. Many authors have used these data to refer to Venezuela as a paradox,  
suggesting Chávez’ policies were misconstrued, have not benefited the poor, or that his policies 
undermined state institutions that can keep people from violence (Briceño-León et al., 2009; 
Sanjuán, 2008; Zubillaga, 2013). These suggestions are often based on a rational-actor view of 
violent offenders. In this view, people are seen to use violence because they lack the necessary 
controls or institutional guidance to keep them from violence, or because they lack the resources 
to materialise their goals through legitimate means. Violence is conceived as an intentional 
decision, based on a weighting of external motivations and internal controls.  
 
Nevertheless, these authors often make two important attribution errors. First, they assume a 
rising homicide rate reflects more violent people. However, the homicide rate reflects deadly 
interactions, not violent people. As violence is inherently difficult to observe and measure, the 
homicide rate is the best available approximation of violent people within an abstract boundary, 
but it is not perfect (see Chapter 2 p. 16). From its homicide rate, it is clear that Venezuela has a 
disproportionate number of deadly interactions, but it is not clear whether more people are 
violent, or whether people’s interactions are deadlier. It may well be that just a few people are 
responsible for a large number of homicides. Further, even in Venezuela, homicide is still 
relatively rare. On average, in 2012, there were 45 homicides a day on the national level, but 
                                                          
4 He is also famously quoted for suggesting it is understandable people steal if made to go hungry by 
neoliberal policy (Briceño-León, 2012a). 
5 Investigative police (CICPC) data, see Chapter 3 and (Sanjuan, 2008) for limitations. The Venezuelan 
Violence Observatory also publishes figures on homicide. See (Kronick, 2014) for a discussion on the 
questionable validity of these numbers.  
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even in  the most violent barrios homicide is not a daily event, and even the most violent people 
are violent only a minority of their time (Collins, 2009). 
 
Second, these commentators assume that a declining income Gini coefficient reflects that less 
people would be motivated to use violence. Nevertheless, the national Gini coefficient reflects 
income differences between all people in Venezuela. These income differences do not tell us 
anything about people’s motivations. Theoretically, as we will see in chapter 2, these aggregate 
income differences are not seen to provide people with motivations directly. Instead, 
motivations are said to follow from a discrepancy between people’s opportunities and 
expectations; if people’s opportunities do not match their expectations, they may be motivated 
to use violence. Declining income differences may even generate more motivations, as people’s 
expectations may have risen faster than their opportunities as Chapter 3 explores in more detail. 
Further, some perspectives suggest people’s expectations are based on a reference group, they 
do not stem from comparison to everyone in their country. People may be even more motivated 
to use violence if people in their immediate surroundings have benefited from an aggregate 
decrease in income inequality whereas they have not.  
 
Further, neither a declining Gini coefficient nor an increasing homicide rate reflect that people 
are less subject to social controls, formal and informal sanctions aimed at maintaining 
conformity to established norms and rules, that can keep them from behaving violently (see 
2.2.2). Briceño-León (2012a) interprets the rising homicide rate as evidence that Chávez 
undermined Venezuela’s institutions. He suggests that a social contract between state and 
citizens, which normally keeps people from being violent, collapsed. In a different article (2012b) 
he uses an aggregate measure of institutional performance (the World Governance Indicator) to 
show this better explains changing homicide rates than the Gini coefficient, supporting his 
argument of institutional decline. Nevertheless, this aggregate measure does not offer much 
insight into how individuals might be subject to (informal) social control mechanisms. Further, 
Chapter 3 shows homicide rates have not increased continuously, nor homogeneously, across 
the country, suggesting national policy is not necessarily a driver of these homicide rates. It also 
shows recent policies are often a continuation of clientelist politics more than a radical change 
in how people relate to the state. This thesis argues there has not necessarily been a sudden 
decline, rather there is a protracted absence of state institutions, dating from well before Chávez. 
In terms of people’s relationships in particular, little may have changed. 
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Moreover, these interpretations ignore a more relational understanding of violence that does 
not see violence as an attribute of people, but of their interactions. In these perspectives 
violence itself is social control (Black, 1983). People do not use violence because they lack 
(informal) social controls or material means, but because the structure of their relationships is 
more conducive to confrontational conflict. These perspectives look at how inequality is 
reflected in the structure of people’s relationships; where people are confined to dense 
networks and have little access to formal authorities for conflict resolution, violent resolution 
becomes more likely. Violence itself can thus be seen as a form of social control.  
 
In light of these observations, the question of whether and how inequality relates to violence in 
Venezuela remains unanswered. Rather than evidence of a paradox, these observations suggest 
aggregate indicators inadequately reflect lower-level mechanisms, and particularly how 
people’s relationships might provide them with motivations to engage in violence, or social 
controls that can keep them from violence. Matching an aggregate individual-level measure 
(Gini coefficient) to an aggregate interaction-level measure (homicide rate) may be problematic 
and justifies the focus of this thesis on how people’s interactions and relationships might 
mitigate or mediate any connections between inequality and violence.   
1.4 Research questions 
These observations lead into a set of research questions that define the research approach. The 
underlying research question is: 
 
Can the Venezuelan paradox help clarify any connection(s) between inequality and violence?  
 
Sadly, the figures described above make Venezuela an apt candidate for a ‘deviant’ case study, 
a case that in light of the literature demonstrates a surprising value (Gerring, 2007). By looking 
at this case we may learn a great deal about the lower-level mechanisms that may be responsible 
for often found correlations between inequality and violence in different contexts. This research 
question translates into one primary question and three sets of sub-questions: 
 
1. (How) does inequality relate to violence in Venezuela? 
 
The fact the homicide rate and Gini coefficient do not correlate in Venezuela does not mean 
there is no relationship between inequality and violence. This thesis looks at lower-level 
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mechanisms that may influence this correlation. Chapter 2 takes an in-depth look at the 
theoretical assumptions behind frequently found correlations, showing that few theories 
suggest a direct relationship between inequality and violence. Instead, the literature suggests 
more indirect effects, often through people’s interactions and relationships. These relationships 
are seen to generate expectations that can motivate people to engage in violence, instil people 
with social control mechanisms that can keep them from violence, or even generate violence 
themselves if other forms of conflict resolution are unavailable. These relationships are not 
reflected in the Gini coefficient, and justify this thesis’ focus thereon.   
 
In order to explore the question of whether, and how, inequality might relate to violence in 
Venezuela, I argue that we need to understand, first, how inequality is expressed in people’s 
daily interactions and relationships, not in income differences between everyone within an 
abstract boundary, second, how people’s relationships might work in making them more or less 
prone to use violence, and third, what the characteristics of these violent interactions are.  
 
1.1. What are the characteristics of barrio residents’ interactions and relationships? What 
sorts of opportunities, expectations and informal social controls do these 
relationships offer? Can a personal network approach help us answer these questions?  
 
The first set of assumptions this thesis aims to disentangle is how people’s relationships, rather 
than abstract boundaries, reflect their opportunities and expectations, as well as informal social 
control mechanisms. This thesis focuses on barrio residents’ relationships, as this is where the 
majority of Venezuela’s deadly violence occurs (see Chapter 3). It looks at how personal network 
data can be used to look at barrio residents’ actual opportunities, expectations and informal 
social controls. Chapter 5 focuses specifically on these questions.  
 
1.2. What can an exploration of people’s relationships tell us about the effects of 
inequality on violence at the micro-level? Do more violent people’s relationships 
provide them with motivations to engage in violence, do they lack necessary controls 
to keep them from violence, or is the structure of relationships more conducive to 
violence? 
 
A second set of questions explores how people’s relationships might mediate or mitigate an 
effect of inequality at the micro-level. It will be explored whether people’s relationships might 
provide motivations to engage in violence through instilling a gap between their opportunities 
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and their expectations. It will also be explored whether people’s relationships can mitigate the 
effects of inequality, through providing them with informal social controls that can keep them 
from violence. Chapter 6 focuses on these research questions.  
 
1.3. What are the characteristics of deadly interactions? What are the meanings and 
characteristics of el malandreo, and why do malandros use such deadly violence?   
 
A third set of questions is influenced by an evaluation of the homicide rate in Chapter 3, which 
suggests many deadly interactions occur between malandros, people that identify with el 
malandreo, a Venezuelan gangster identity. It developed more clearly whilst I was on fieldwork 
and gained access to these malandros (how I did so is explained in Chapter 4), allowing me to 
explore in more detail the meanings of their identity as well as the violence they use. Chapter 7 
focuses on these research questions.  
 
The term malandreo stems from ‘mal andar’, meaning literally ‘go wrong, be wrong, be on a bad 
path or route’. It is a term that carries intrinsic meaning in the Venezuelan context and refers to 
a variety of illegal activities, often in groups of likeminded others, such as robbing, selling drugs 
and also killing. Here and throughout this thesis I use el malandreo to refer to a cultural identity, 
a set of qualities and beliefs that in this case revolves around illegal activities and associating in 
troublesome youth groups that are defined in other contexts as gangs (see also 2.2.1 for detailed 
discussion). I thus see it as a Venezuelan gangster identity that has evolved into a governance 
system, proscribing rules and norms for malandros, the people that identify with it.  
1.5 Thesis outline 
This thesis explores some connections between inequality and violence in Venezuela, looking 
particularly at how people’s interactions and relationships might influence these connections. It 
is exploratory and hypothesis-generating rather than quantitative and hypothesis-testing.  
 
This chapter outlines the general motivations and rationale behind the research approach. It 
questions claims of a Venezuelan paradox; that inequality does not relate to violence in 
Venezuela. Instead, it suggests correlating the Gini coefficient and homicide rate might not 
adequately capture the underlying mechanisms that might be responsible for correlations often 
found in different contexts. It puts forward the questions to be addressed and summarises the 
contributions the thesis makes to the literature. 
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Chapter 2 positions the research approach in the literature that has investigated connections 
between inequality and violence. It makes a distinction between perspectives that assume 
inequality generates motivations or meanings for violence, perspectives that stress the 
mitigating effects of social control and perspectives that see violence itself as social organisation 
and social control. Almost all of these perspectives make assumptions about the mitigating and 
mediating effects of people’s relationships, but often have difficulty operationalising them in 
empirical research. Because inequality is usually conceived as an aggregate variable, and data 
on violence are readily available at the aggregate level, most research has looked at this 
relationship at this level. Nevertheless, these macro-level data tell us very little of the underlying 
mechanisms that might be responsible for often found correlations between inequality and 
violence. This chapter makes a case for evaluating the role people’s actual relationships might 
have in connections between inequality and violence, and particularly for using a personal 
network approach that can capture these relationships but has not been used very often in the 
study of violence.  
 
Chapter 3 explores Venezuela’s administrative boundaries and sets out some parameters for 
methodological and empirical chapters that follow. It paints a paper picture of Venezuela’s 
internally divided worlds, the durable social inequalities reinforced by centuries of colonially 
imposed divisions between serviced centres and informally constructed barrios. Traditional 
political-administrative boundaries, and inequality measures calculated on the basis of these 
boundaries, do not reflect these differences very well. Further, recent changes in aggregate 
income inequality fail to tell us anything about the aspects of inequality that are often seen to 
be important in generating violence; people’s motivations or their social controls, making the 
case for exploring in more detail how people’s relationships might provide these. This chapter 
also evaluates limited available data on violence, showing that violence in Venezuela is uncannily 
deadly and homicide rates show a pattern of gradual spread across the country, rather than 
reflect a continuous and generalised increase.    
 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodological tools and strategies that were used to collect data on 
people’s opportunities, interactions and relationships, as well as experiences of and involvement 
in violence in two different cities, Catia and Cumaná. It pays particular attention to the strategies 
that were used to gain access to people involved in violence, through hospitals, prisons and on 
the streets, and the ethical issues related to this approach. Over the course of a year’s fieldwork, 
I collected both qualitative observation and interview data, through various unstructured 
11 
 
individual and group interviews, as well as more quantitative personal network data, through 
semi-structured interviews with 45 respondents. Qualitative interview records were transcribed 
and, together with fieldnotes of unrecorded interviews and observations, analysed through 
repeated reading, coding and making annotations. Semi-structured interviews were coded in 
Excel and analysed using E-net and SPSS. These data and analyses provide the basis for the 
empirical chapters to follow.   
 
Chapter 5, the first empirical chapter, explores barrio residents’ interactions and relationships 
making use of the personal network data collected for 45 respondents, and qualitative data to 
illustrate the findings. It focuses in particular on how these relationships provide opportunities, 
expectations, and informal social control. The barrio dwellers in this sample have relative little 
access to formal jobs in their networks and do not rate their quality of life very high on average. 
Nevertheless, they can earn relatively good money in informal professions and do not 
necessarily feel worse off than their interaction networks. Whereas these findings could be 
interpreted as tentative evidence that some barrio residents’ relationships do indeed provide 
motivations for violence, or reinforce the meaning of violent identities, there is little evidence 
that these relationships lack informal social controls. Barrio residents’ relationships are strong 
and dense, offering plenty of social control. This chapter questions the relevance of looking for 
evidence of informal social control on the neighbourhood level. It is argued that, in absence of 
formal institutions, violence is a form of informal social control in the barrio and el malandreo 
can be seen to provide it.  
 
Chapter 6 explores some effects of inequality at the micro-level using a number of measures of 
involvement in violence collected from the 45 people that completed the semi-structured 
network questionnaire, relating them to their interactions and relationships. One of these, a 
composite violence measure based on a number of conducts that involve guns and malandro 
behaviours, such as robbery and shoot-outs, is particularly well-suited to explore some potential 
determinants of the type of deadly violence this thesis is interested in. Nevertheless, this chapter 
shows that more violent people’s relationships do not necessarily provide them with more 
motivations than others in this sample. Further, there is no evidence they would be subject to 
less informal social control, on the contrary, violent people often see themselves as applying 
social control. In all, it is questioned whether looking for individual differences is a productive 
avenue for understanding this type of violence, and whether looking at the interactions in which 
this violence occurs is a much more fruitful approach for future research. It takes up this train 
of thought in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 7 draws on qualitative and observation data collected from malandros to explore the 
meaning and expressions of el malandreo, with particular attention for the deadly violence it 
uses. It shows how el malandreo developed into an institution, or a governance system that 
proscribes rules and sanctions, but also offers existential meaning, livelihood and respect. The 
rules of el malandreo revolve around an imaginary of random violence whereby malandros see 
themselves as protectors of the barrio against this random violence. The violence malandros use 
has important endogenous feedback effects, reinforced by the use of guns. It generates 
expectations for future behaviour, whereby violence becomes a pre-emptive response to future 
violence, continuously reproducing deadly cycles of violence that further legitimate this 
institution. This violence is no longer directly related to the inequalities that are at the basis of 
this institution, yet firmly rooted in the way malandros are connected in a conflictive network 
of fear and reciprocity.  
 
Chapter 8 draws these findings together in a conclusion. This thesis argues that historical 
inequalities in opportunities and formal social control facilitated the institutionalisation of el 
malandreo, but the deadly violence malandros use is no longer a direct function of these 
inequalities, but of interactions between malandros and the expectations these interactions 
generate. This chapter explores the reverse impact this violence has on inequality. By instilling 
fear, deadly violence locks people up in trusted networks of similar others, continuously 
reproducing the uncertainties and inequalities that are at the basis of this violence in the first 
place. This chapter also makes a case for a relational understanding of violence. Rather than 
embedding violence in individuals, or abstract communities, researchers should focus more 
frequently on the relationships and interactions that produce it.  
1.6 Contribution  
 
In all, this thesis makes some important contributions to the literature. 
 
 First, in looking at the case of Venezuela, it broadens the focus of a literature that remains 
heavily reliant on empirical research in the global North to a country that is 
disproportionally affected by deadly violence. Venezuela is a sad laboratory for 
criminologists; homicide remains a rare occasion in the global North, but is a daily reality 
in Venezuela. This thesis makes a contribution to a global literature on deadly violence, but 
also importantly to the Venezuelan literature itself. As will become clear throughout the 
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thesis, few researchers have studied this deadly violence, or its protagonists, in Venezuela. 
In making suggestions for future research and policy, it is hoped this thesis might inspire 
researchers as well as policy makers to devote more attention to a violence that has such 
an irretraceable and devastating impact on too many Venezuelans. Specifically, this thesis 
suggests this violence is driven by gun violence between malandros, and programmes that 
have been aimed at containing the spread of this type of violence in the US might be 
effective in dealing with violence reduction as a start. Mitigating the institutionalised 
networks of el malandreo will require interventions of an entirely different order and may 
entail involving malandros as capable actors in Venezuela’s security debate.  
 
 Second, in evaluating how people’s relationships might influence connections between 
inequality and violence, it makes an important contribution to a literature that is 
predominantly quantitative and macro-level in nature. This literature often focuses on 
testing the strength or direction of a relationship between abstract indicators, rather than 
exploring the underlying mechanisms. This thesis hopes to provide insights that can 
advance macro-level research, by exploring the lower-level mechanisms that might be 
driving often found correlations between inequality and violence. The findings reiterate the 
importance of incorporating indicators that adequately reflect the absence of formal social 
control institutions. They also suggest that understanding violence may imply making a 
distinction between different types of violence, the type of gun homicide that affects 
Venezuela may be driven by local interactional dynamics more than material inequalities. 
Further, researchers might need to step away from a rational-actor framework by seeing 
homicides as what they are; violent interactions, not violent people, and looking at how 
people’s interaction patterns rather than their attributes produce aggregate homicide 
rates. Macro-level research could incorporate indicators that reflect these dynamics better 
than the Gini coefficient. Advances in network theory and methodology offer perspectives 
on incorporating this type of data, bringing us to a third contribution.   
 
 Third, by using a personal network approach it makes a methodological contribution to the 
study of violence at the micro-level. Personal network research offers a distinct view on 
micro-level context, by looking at people’s interaction networks as the concrete source of 
their ideas, opportunities and behaviour. Many theoretical perspectives make assumptions 
about people’s relationships, but have difficulty exploring them in practice, often relying 
on static indicators of these relationships. A network approach captures some of the 
dynamics of social interaction; it takes a picture of people’s relationships that is not limited 
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by abstract boundaries. Perhaps the most interesting finding that emerges at the individual 
level is that there appears to be little difference in terms of strength or density of ties 
between the networks of people who have been involved in violence and those who have 
not, which is corroborated in the few previous studies that have looked at personal 
networks of violent offenders. Future research should evaluate these findings with much 
larger samples and in different contexts. This finding further suggests moving away from a 
rational-actor framework and looking at how people’s interactions rather than their 
attributes might influence their involvement in violence.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter engages with a considerable literature on a supposed relationship between 
inequality and violence. The proposed mechanisms behind this relationship are for the most part 
theoretically intuitive. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence for these mechanisms is not as clear 
as often implied. This chapter makes a distinction between theories that suggest inequality 
generates motivations and meanings for violence, theories that emphasise the mitigating effect 
of social bonds and conventional institutions through providing informal social control 
mechanisms, and theories that look at how violence itself can provide social control in 
interaction. Many of these perspectives make assumptions about how people’s relationships 
affect connections between inequality and violence, but have not frequently focused on these 
relationships. I thus make a case for a qualitative approach that incorporates insights from 
network theory to study the micro-level interactions and relationships that define inequality and 
how these might be related to violence.   
 
A large number of studies have evaluated correlations between aggregate indicators of income 
inequality (mostly the Gini coefficient) and violence (mostly homicide rates). The majority of 
these studies finds a positive relationship, especially at the cross-national level (Blau and Blau, 
1982; Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Fox and Hoelscher, 2010; Gartner, 2000; Hsieh and Pugh, 1993; 
Kick and LaFree, 1985; Ouimet, 2012; Pratt and Cullen, 2005; Unnithan and Whitt, 1992). 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to appreciate what these correlations might reflect, they allow us to 
conclude that where income differences between everyone in a population are larger on 
average, there tend to be more homicides. We can certainly not conclude this is because more 
people are motivated to use violence or lacking informal controls, and thus more likely to be 
violent. Moreover, a closer look at this empirical evidence reveals it is not as clear as is often 
assumed. A few cross-national studies have not been able to replicate this finding (Pridemore, 
2008; Uludag et al., 2009). Longitudinal designs are only rarely adopted, and have more difficulty 
reproducing this effect (Goertzel and Kahn, 2009). Subnational studies, most frequently 
conducted among US states, cities and neighbourhoods, also appear to produce less consistent 
findings (Kennedy et al., 1991; Land et al., 1990; Morenoff et al., 2001; Pridemore, 2011). The 
little available evidence from Southern hemisphere nations such as South Africa and Brazil is 
inconsistent (Demombynes and Ozler, 2005; Nadanovsky et al., 2009; Szwarcwald et al., 1999). 
As evaluated in Chapter 1, Venezuela is a case ‘par excellence’ where actually, these aggregate 
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indicators are not positively correlated, justifying a focus on the lower-level mechanisms that 
might influence this finding. 
 
This chapter first defines this thesis’ central concepts in more detail. The chapter then evaluates 
theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence, making the case for focussing on how people’s 
relationships might affect connections between inequality and violence.  
2.2 Conceptual discussion 
The core concepts of this thesis are thick concepts, subject to varying definitions, interpretations 
and extensive academic debate.  In this section I aim to clarify this thesis’ position within these 
conceptual debates.  
2.2.1 Violence, gangs and el malandreo 
Violence is inherently subjective, what is deemed violent in one context or culture might not be 
seen as such in another (Beirne, 1983; Black, 2011). Nevertheless, the figures discussed in 
Chapter 1 imply violence has very real, observable consequences, which can be compared, 
contrasted and analysed. The interest of this thesis is in the deadly, interpersonal violence that 
disproportionately affects countries in the global South, of which Venezuela is no exception 
(UNODC, 2014). Chapter 3 explores this violence in more detail, showing that the deadly violence 
that has Venezuela under its spell is a violence disproportionately enacted with guns and in 
public places. It often occurs between relative strangers, young males that know of each other, 
but do not interact on a regular basis. Further, a large proportion can be assigned to ‘malandros’, 
people that identify with ‘el malandreo’, a Venezuelan gangster identity. The characteristics of 
this violence show more similarities with gang gun violence that has been studied more 
extensively in the United States (e.g. Decker and Curry, 2002; Rosenfeld et al., 1999; Tita and 
Abrahamse, 2004) than it does with types of violence that have been of more concern in other 
contexts, violence that occurs in relationships, between people who share a common history 
(Miethe et al., 2004). This type of violence might thus be different from everyday violence that 
is often seen to pervade poor communities and expresses itself in verbal and physical aggression, 
whether in the household or public spaces (Romero-Salazar et al., 2009; Scheper-Hughes, 1993). 
It is a violence between armed actors, but should equally be distinguished from armed violence 
used by state actors in civil wars, as there is no contestation of traditional political-
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administrative powers1. It should also be distinguished from crime, acts punished by law. Many 
violent acts are indeed criminalised by law, but violence is not a necessary component of crime, 
and crime is not a necessary component of violence. Nevertheless, the literature on violence 
does not frequently distinguish between these different types of violence, crime in general, or 
even violent individuals, frequently using aggregate homicide or other crime rates as indicators 
of violence, or even violent people, potentially compromising their explanatory potential 
(Miethe et al., 2004).  
 
Violence is notoriously hard to measure, as its manifestation often remains hidden from view. 
Much violent behaviour is criminalised, and official crime statistics are thus frequently used to 
approximate violence. Nevertheless, these statistics carry important biases (Maguire, 2007; 
UNODC, 2011). The criminological literature refers in this respect to a ‘dark number’, denoting 
the incidents that are never detected, reported or recorded and thus never brought to trial or 
punished. Homicide statistics are frequently considered the most reliable indicators of violence. 
The severity of homicide, and difficulty to hide the consequences make it highly likely to be 
reported to, or discovered by, official institutions (Neapolitan, 1997). They are seen to be the tip 
of a violent iceberg, assuming that for each homicide there is a proportionally larger number of 
other violent crimes that do not become known (UNODC, 2011). Chapter 3 questions this 
assumption, suggesting violence in Venezuela is extremely deadly and homicide rates do not 
necessarily reflect a proportionally larger base of violent incidents (see p.73). The use of 
homicide rates as indicators of violence may thus be particularly problematic on the cross-
national level, where higher homicide rates may be a factor of less developed health systems or 
higher availability of firearms, reflecting higher mortality from violence, rather than more 
violence as such (Howard et al., 2000). Further, aggregate homicide rates reflect the number of 
homicides in a geographic area, not the number of offenders, let alone their internal motivations. 
That an area has high official homicide rates does not imply that the people that live there are 
more violent. Perpetrators do not necessarily live in the administrative areas where offences are 
recorded (Morenoff et al., 2001). Studies that look at these rates can often count on substantial 
variation, particularly on the cross-national level, but cannot account for individual differences 
in offending (Ponsaers et al., 2001). Victimisation and self-report surveys were developed to 
counter issues with crime statistics and offer distinct individual-level perspectives on violence. 
Victimisation surveys ask people about their personal experiences of crime and violence (Lupton 
                                                          
1 Although, as I will show below, it could be seen as an emergent form of social order that questions the 
monopoly of violence usually instilled in traditional political-administrative powers.  
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and Tulloch, 1999). Self-report surveys ask people about their involvement in various delinquent 
or criminal activities and allow for exploring individual variation in violence (Creighton et al., 
2003; O’Connor et al., 2001). The social and legal consequences of admitting to violence make 
these approaches highly sensitive and ethically difficult, particularly when it comes to more 
severe instances of violence (Lee and Stanko, 2003; Thornberry and Krohn, 2000). Nevertheless, 
they are able to illuminate the ‘dark number’ to some extent, avoiding biases associated with 
the functioning and effectiveness of the criminal justice system2.  
 
Where homicide rates are related to the characteristics of geographical areas, self-report data 
are matched with individual characteristics, ignoring that over and above a geographical space, 
violence occurs in a specific relational space (involving a perpetrator, victim and often third 
parties), and that even the most violent individuals are violent only a minority of their time 
(Collins, 2009). Violence is ultimately an interaction, not a fixed attribute of individuals. As will 
become evident throughout this thesis, this relational space is difficult to materialise in empirical 
research (Birkbeck and LaFree, 1993). Studies that evaluate the details of violent interactions 
are often qualitative and interpretive due to the need for intensive data collection. Homicide 
case files habitually contain information that conveys characteristics of the event and the people 
involved, but these are not always available or reliable, in Venezuela for instance police 
caseloads are so high that homicides are not frequently described or even investigated in detail 
until they appear before the courts, and the small percentage that do make it to the courts are 
subject to endemic delays (see Chapter 3 section 3.3.2.4). Qualitative interview data with people 
involved in violence can also offer interaction-level detail, but they need to be collected ad-hoc. 
Further, these people may be motivated to interpret violent events in a different light in an 
interview situation, justifying their actions post-fact (Jacobs and Wright, 2006). Research on 
violence, like the current project, is often inevitably reliant on individual accounts and reports 
or aggregated crime rates that cannot entirely do justice to the relationships in which it occurs. 
Its explanations are then also frequently sought in abstract community or individual 
characteristics, rather than interactions and relationships. It is here this thesis aims to contribute, 
by looking at communities and individuals as defined by their relationships rather than their 
attributes, and exploring how these relationships may be more or less conducive to violence.  
 
                                                          
2 Many issues remain, see (ICVS, 2011) for an elaborate overview. The use of survey data brings additional 
bias related to respondents’ honesty, memory and inclination to give socially desirable answers. 
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That these deadly interactions often involve malandros, or people that identify with the 
Venezuelan gangster identity of el malandreo, requires a consideration of the equally thick 
concept of gangs. Gangs have been something of a hot topic in academia over the last few 
decades. Nevertheless, there is very little consensus on what gangs actually are, how they are 
organised, or whether and why people join them. Extensive reviews of these debates are offered 
elsewhere (Decker et al., 2012; Esbensen and Maxson, 2011; Wood and Alleyne, 2010), I limit 
myself here to a gang definition, which in itself covers an extensive literature (Ball and Curry, 
1995; Esbensen et al., 2001). The influential Eurogang group has put forward a consensus 
definition that has allowed a productive strand of comparative research on the emergence of 
gangs, the people that identify with them, as well as the (often violent) activities they engage in. 
It defines a ‘youth gang, or troublesome youth group’ as ‘a durable, street-oriented youth group 
whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity’ (Esbensen and Maxson, 2011, 
p.5). The definition grew at least partly out of concern that the word gang provokes hyped 
connotations of hierarchical structure and organisation that are not usually observed in the field. 
This puzzle is more formally known as the ‘Eurogang Paradox’ (Klein, 2001). When authors 
started investigating violent youth groups in Europe they shied away from calling them gangs, 
because they did not fit a preconceived notion of gangs as highly organised and hierarchical. It 
was established that very few gangs, even in the US, exhibit the type of organisation that is often 
ascribed to them. The consensus definition then, does not assume any type of organisation or 
structure, apart from some durability with regards to the group identity, rather than its 
members (Klein et al., 2006).  
 
Some authors problematize the inclusion of illegal activity in a definition of gangs (Ball and Curry, 
1995; Short, 1990). They argue a definition that includes the behaviour that also needs to be 
explained is tautological. By only including those youth groups that engage in illegal activities, 
possible explanations for their activities that are more generally a consequence of group 
behaviour are obscured. Whilst I sympathise with these authors’ view of gangs as just another 
youth group, and agree that criminal or violent behaviours are only a minor part of gang 
activities, I also believe that the particular type of violence gangs use is what sets them apart 
from other groups. It will be argued in Chapter 7 that this violence helps legitimise the 
institutional structures of el malandreo. Without (lethal) violence between them, gangs might 
be criminal organisations, or indeed, any other youth group. The more fundamental problem 
with the definition above is the lack of clarification of what is understood by group (Fleisher, 
2006). Conceptualising gangs as distinct groups with shared identities implies group boundaries 
and suggests these are clear and relatively static. I argue instead, based on the data that shape 
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this thesis, that individual gang group identities are socially constructed, in interaction with 
other gang groups and the wider community. These interactions generate shared meanings that 
are reproduced through the cultural identity of el malandreo. Nevertheless, el malandreo is 
more than a cultural identity, it is a governance structure, an institutional framework that 
proscribes rules and generates expectations for the people that identify with it (Scott, 2005). 
Overall, I argue for understanding gang groups as local organisational expressions (‘franchises’ 
as Hagedorn (2008) calls them) of this institution. Rather than clearly defined groups, they are 
dynamic networks of interacting individuals (Morselli, 2009). The particular identities single gang 
groups in Venezuela might claim are spurious. Individual gang group identities or the broader 
identity of el malandreo are not essences of these groups or individuals, but a set of cultural 
values and norms that are recalled in particular interactions.  
 
This thesis thus navigates the complex tension field between violent interactions, violent 
individuals and violent identities through exploring deadly (gun) violence that is often enacted 
by individuals that assume the violent identity of el malandreo. For this study, I use both 
secondary data on violence, as well as primary data on violent interactions and self-reported 
violence, challenges of which will be discussed in appropriate methodological sections.  
2.2.2 Social control  
Notions of violence are inherently related to notions of social control, which can be defined as 
‘the mechanisms, in the form of patterns of pressure, through which society maintains social 
order and cohesion’ (Carmichael, 2012, p.1). The objective of social control is to maintain 
conformity to established norms and rules (Ibid., p.1). As violence is often seen as a 
transgression of the social order, a defiance of established norms and rules, social control is also 
aimed at discouraging and castigating violence. It is frequently assumed that appropriate social 
controls can avert propensities for violence. Social control can be applied through formal and 
informal sanctions, that can be positive as well as negative. Formal sanctions are embedded in 
law and applied by state institutions, such as prison sentences that are specified in countries the 
world over for various violent behaviours. Informal social control and sanctions emerge from 
informal institutions and exchanges such as education, family, religion, peer groups etc. Informal 
social control can be as varied as an unappreciative look from a friend to a positive endorsement 
from a parent or colleague, but is equally aimed at maintaining conformity. All perspectives on 
social control agree on the distinction between formal and informal social control, nevertheless, 
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there are differing views on what constitutes the social order which social control aims to 
maintain and protect.  
 
For the purposes of this discussion, I turn to the sociological distinction between macro- and 
micro-level perspectives on social order (Vincke, 2007) 3. Macro-level perspectives evaluate the 
social order from the top down, they look at the whole to explain constituent parts. Structural-
functionalist perspectives for instance, assume a broad consensus and solidarity on societal 
norms and rules. Conflict perspectives do not assume this broad consensus or solidarity, but 
suggest the social order is the product of class conflict. Both perspectives adopt a macro-
sociological approach to social control, and are ultimately based on classical enlightenment 
traditions suggesting there is a comprehensive social order which norms and rules are 
entrenched in a social contract between the state and its citizens, and formalised in law 
(Rousseau, 1920). Citizens (voluntarily or forcedly) give up some of their freedoms in exchange 
for protection by the state, and the state is the only entity able to use force to implement this 
social contract, through a monopoly on violence. Formal social control is then the enforcement 
of this contract through state institutions, whereas informal social control is based on citizens’ 
internalisation of the norms and rules embedded in this social contract. Violence by individuals 
whom do not represent the state is interpreted as an aberration of this contract, as the failure 
or inherent class-bias thereof, and sanctions aimed at reinstituting the social contract. In their 
focus on macro-level structures, these perspectives ignore different and emergent forms of 
social control and social order that arise from micro-level interactions and relationships.  
 
Micro-level perspectives depart from an overarching (whether cohesive or elitarian) social order; 
suggesting that social order, norms and rules are the product of, and constructed through, 
repeated interactions. These interactions, rather than an abstract social contract, define the 
forms of social control. These perspectives examine the micro-level processes and mechanisms 
by which rules and norms become established guidelines for behaviour (Scott, 2005). The work 
of Donald Black (1983, 1993, 2011) adopts such a micro-level approach. He develops a broad 
theory of social control, that does not make reference to an abstract social order, defining it as 
‘conflict management’, the handling of right and wrong (1993, p. xiii).  In Black’s view, conflict, 
clashes of right and wrong (2011), is everywhere, it is an inherent part of social life, but it is 
handled differently depending on the social positions of the people between whom the conflict 
                                                          
3 This is of course an abstraction of the many sociological perspectives that have written on the nature of 
social order.  
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exists4. Law, formal social control, is but one of the many forms of social control. Violence, in 
Black’s conception, is not an aberration of a social contract, but a form of (confrontational) social 
control that is particularly likely under certain social conditions. All forms of social control reflect 
the pattern of social relationships in which they occur, they vary according to their location in 
what he terms ‘social space’, which varies according to three dimensions, (a) vertical distance 
or status inequality, which reflects material or authority differences between people, (b) 
relational distance, the degree to which people participate in one another’s lives, and (c) cultural 
distance, the degree of diversity such as differences in language, religion, ethnicity etc. (Black, 
2011). In his 1993 contribution ‘The social structure of right and wrong’, Black identifies a 
number of elementary forms of conflict management, three of which (shown in Figure 2-1) are 
pertinent to this discussion; self-help (or confrontation), avoidance, and settlement5.  
Figure 2-1 Black’s (1993) elementary forms of conflict management (author’s own) 
 
Black contrasts self-help or confrontational social control with other forms of conflict 
management, suggesting the prevalence of self-help as social control is proportionate to these 
other forms. Where, given the structure of their relationships, people cannot easily turn to 
avoidance or rely on authoritative third parties to settle or resolve it, they will be more likely to 
use self-help. Avoidance is most likely where people are relative equals, but relationally distant, 
that is they lead relatively mobile lives in which they can easily evade each other. Settlement 
behaviours occur more frequently in conflicts between people of different status. Black devotes 
                                                          
4 Moreover, the interpretation of something as ‘wrong’ depends on social distance, people are more likely 
to be offended by a status challenge from relative equals than superiors. 
5 Black identifies many other forms, and includes negotiation and toleration as additional elementary 
forms. Nevertheless, a discussion of all these forms would unnecessarily confound the points made here. 
I feel these three forms succinctly summarise Black’s thinking, but refer the reader to his work for a much 
more detailed discussion.  
Self-help  
(confrontation) 
Third party 
settlement 
Avoidance     
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considerable attention to authoritative third parties that can further settlement between parties 
in conflict. Third parties can be, but are not necessarily formal or state agents. The 
authoritativeness of third parties varies according to the social distance between parties in 
conflict, among equals and intimates third parties are less likely to be authoritative than among 
people that differ in status, where the law is more frequently called upon. Black predicts that 
where authoritative third parties are absent, making reference to hunter-gatherer societies, 
little settlement behaviour will occur, and self-help will be more likely (Black, 1993).  
 
In all, where traditional perspectives see violence as emerging where social control has failed, 
Black sees violence itself as a form of informal social control. Violence is not a consequence of 
the failure of social control in maintaining an abstract social order, but is informal social control, 
maintaining conformity to rules and norms established in interaction. In this thesis I compare 
and contrast these frameworks by looking at how (informal) social control may be implemented 
to prevent violence, and how violence itself could be seen as a form of informal social control. 
Although the concept of social control is central to many theories discussed below, its 
operationalisation often remains vague, the effects of formal social control on violence are 
frequently ignored, whereas informal social control is often assumed from the mere presence 
of relationships, without exploring in detail how and when these relationships might provide 
informal social control.   
2.2.3 Networks, a relational perspective on inequality  
Inequality is often seen to generate violence through a number of mechanisms that will be 
explored below. Many scholars conceptualise inequality as a static distribution of resources that 
tends to be operationalised with the Gini coefficient 6  of incomes within an administrative 
boundary, such as a country, state or neighbourhood. A larger Gini coefficient is then interpreted 
as a more unequal distribution of resources and opportunities within this boundary. This 
strategy has a number of limitations. First, there are severe problems with the validity and 
reliability of income data, particularly in developing countries (Cramer, 2003; Seekings, 2007). 
Szekely and Hilgert (2007) evaluated income inequalities in Latin America and found these are 
                                                          
6 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality based on the sum of the differences between each pair of 
observations. It ranges from 0, where there are no differences, to 1, where 1 case has everything 
compared to nothing for the remaining sample.   
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influenced by discrepancies in data collection rather than underlying trends in inequality 7 . 
Second, the Gini coefficient is a vertical measure of inequality. It measures differences between 
all people within a certain boundary with little attention for the actual structure of relationships. 
It is not very sensitive to the polarisation of a distribution and does not necessarily indicate more 
people have less resources, it only reflects absolute differences between all observations8. Third, 
these perspectives are inherently limited because these aggregate administrative boundaries do 
not necessarily reflect people’s access to resources and opportunities, it is doubtful abstract 
boundaries represent the groups people actually interact and identify with, rely on or compare 
themselves to (Pedersen, 2004). Some studies look at lower levels of aggregation, arguing 
neighbourhood or city boundaries better reflect people’s communities. Nevertheless, these 
approaches still make an abstraction of the groups people interact with and compare 
themselves to. Wellman (1999) has argued quite convincingly that even people’s 
neighbourhoods no longer accurately reflect their communities. People’s access to 
opportunities, values and ideas is not defined by country, neighbourhood, nor even individual 
characteristics, but the relationships they have (Vertovec, 2009).  
 
Here, a more relational, micro-level interpretation of inequality is suggested, one that takes 
account of the interactions and relationships that constitute aggregate patterns of inequality. I 
see these aggregate patterns as the result of repeated interactions and exchanges within, but 
also across, social boundaries (Crossley, 2010; Tilly, 1998). However, people’s interactions are 
diverse and fluid. The wide variety of weak and loose interactions between people is difficult to 
capture. Network theory, a paradigm more than a theory (Carrington and Scott, 2011),  offers 
some conceptual tools to make sense of this diversity.  
 
Networks are seen as groups or systems of interacting individuals. Interactions that occur with 
some regularity develop into relationships. Both interactions and relationships are called ‘ties’, 
they reflect connections between individuals. These ties can be described in terms of their 
content (e.g. work, family, social support), durability, frequency and intensity. Network theory 
makes a useful distinction between bonds, bridges and links (Dudwick et al., 2006; Narayan, 
2002). Bonds refer to ties between similar people. Bridges and links refer to the ties that connect 
                                                          
7  Unreported survey incomes tend to be ignored in inequality calculations and substituting them 
dramatically alters rankings. These missing values vary substantially between countries. Venezuela has 
the highest percentage (23.3%) of missing incomes among 18 countries analysed.  
8 A similar Gini coefficient may represent quite different distributions, as we will see in the methodological 
chapter. For this project, I selected two areas that had similar coefficients, but quite differently shaped 
distributions.  
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dissimilar people within and across social boundaries, respectively (Lin, 1999; Smith, 2009). Links 
occur across ‘explicit, formal, or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society’ 
(Szreter and Woolcock, 2004, p.655). Bonds and bridges are important for social support, 
whereas links are important for access to new ideas and opportunities (Granovetter, 1973). An 
important network principle is homophily (McPherson et al., 2001). It states that people tend to 
interact and exchange more readily and comfortably with people similar to themselves; 
interaction is more frequent within than between social boundaries. Bonds and bridges between 
similar people thus tend to be stronger than links. Durable inequalities arise when different 
markers of similarity run along the same lines, when race for instance also reflects income 
inequalities (Lin, 2002; Tilly, 1998). In this thesis, we will see that in Venezuela, a salient 
boundary operates between people that live in barrios, informally constructed areas, and people 
that live in serviced centres. This distinction is not reflected very well in administrative 
boundaries (see Chapter 3), but intrinsically linked to people’s professional opportunities, 
perceptions of their quality of life and interaction patterns (see Chapter 5). Further, this 
boundary also reflects differential exposure to violence; Venezuela’s deadly violence occurs 
predominantly in the barrio (see Chapter 3).  
 
Network data can be collected, described and analysed through qualitative as well as 
quantitative methods (Edwards, 2010). A distinction is frequently made between sociocentric or 
whole networks and egocentric or personal networks (McCarty and Molina, 2010). Whole 
network research looks at interactions within a well-defined boundary such as a company, 
school or list of countries and evaluates the spread of information and ideas within these 
boundaries. Personal networks explore the interactions people have, from the egocentric 
perspective of these people, without imposing boundaries9. Personal network data enable an 
exploration of people’s daily interactions and how these reflect aggregate inequalities, they 
offer a unique connection between micro- and macro-level data by showing across and between 
which boundaries people’s daily interactions occur.  
 
In this thesis, I use both qualitative and personal network methods to explore the interactions 
and relationships people have and how they reflect aggregate inequalities. This methodology is 
explained in detail in Chapter 4, but a brief explanation is in order here. In personal network 
research people are asked to name a number of people they interact with, what sort of 
relationship they have with these people, and also whether the people mentioned know each 
                                                          
9 Apart from a limit on the number of significant others people can mention (see also 4.3.3.3). 
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other. This yields an interaction network which composition can be analysed for the types of 
relationships that are present (or absent), and the structure of which reflects how dense these 
interaction networks are. The composition of these networks reflects people’s access to ideas 
and opportunities, whereas the structure, relationships between people in the network, is 
important for the spread of information and ideas. In dense networks, where people’s significant 
others also know each other, information flows easily, which also constrains these people, as 
others find out quickly what they do.  
 
How people’s networks might be related to violence is a little explored but growing area of study, 
as we will see below (Papachristos, 2010). First, the research approach is positioned within 
current theoretical and empirical frameworks. 
2.3 Theoretical and empirical perspectives on the connections between inequality and 
violence  
This section explores a number of perspectives on the connections between inequality and 
violence. This overview is certainly not exhaustive but aims to engage with some, mainly 
criminological, perspectives that are frequently called upon when explaining correlations 
between inequality and violence. In comparison to an abundance of macro-level research as 
indicated by the studies that introduced this chapter, little research has explicitly explored 
connections between violence and inequality at the micro-level, partly due to the difficulties of 
obtaining data at this level. Official statistics show that violence is more likely to occur in 
deprived areas, and violent offenders, as well as their victims, are often young males of lower 
socioeconomic status (Aaltonen et al., 2012; Maguire et al., 2007). Nevertheless, most poor or 
deprived young men are never violent (Collins, 2009; Hoffmann, 2003; Sanjuán, 2008; Seekings 
and Thaler, 2011). Self-report studies, that ask people about their involvement in crime or 
violence, also often observe gender differences, but show that material deprivation (merely 
being at the bottom of an income distribution) is not a good predictor of violence (Birkbeck et 
al., 2010; Thornberry and Krohn, 2000). All of the perspectives discussed in this section offer 
explanations for these patterns, and propose mechanisms that mitigate and mediate 
connections between aggregate inequality and levels of violence.  
 
Although the differences between these perspectives are not always entirely obvious and they 
often overlap in their assumptions, I make a (for this discussion) necessary distinction between 
these perspectives based on the types of effects they attribute to inequality, and particularly the 
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effects they expect from people’s relationships. As already mentioned, an important 
shortcoming of all these perspectives is that they make very little conceptual distinction 
between different types of violence, crime and even the people that use it. We may well replace 
violence by crime, rape, gang violence, (motivations for joining) youth gangs, vandalism and 
even political violence, potentially limiting the conclusions that can be drawn. I dedicate some 
attention to studies that have looked at Venezuela in each section. Where quantitative research 
in Latin America in general and Venezuela in particular is scarce, more researchers have looked 
at violent identities and violence in this context. Nevertheless, these issues have received much 
less attention than they have in countries of the global North, although the rapidly urbanising 
cities of Latin America might be where the majority of today’s homicidal violence and gangs are 
to be found (Decker and Pyrooz, 2010; Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; Rodgers and Baird, 2014; 
Winton, 2004).  
2.3.1 Material motivations or meanings for violence 
This section looks at perspectives that suggest material inequality generates material or 
symbolic motivations and meanings for violence. These are the most intuitive and generally 
accepted explanations of correlations between inequality and violence.   
2.3.1.1 Anomie, strain and relative deprivation  
Most of these perspectives draw on the concept of anomie, that has a long tradition going back 
to Durkheim (1897), but was conceptualised more specifically in relation to violence by Merton 
(1938). Merton suggests that a macro-level gap between cultural aspirations and structural 
opportunities generates anomic conditions. Under these conditions, people that cannot achieve 
culturally projected values through legitimate means are motivated to use illegitimate means 
instead (Merton, 1938). Rather than objective inequality, it is the subjectively perceived gap 
between aspirations and the opportunities to achieve them that generates anomie, and 
pressures to achieve valued goals through violence10. Nevertheless, the disjunction between 
cultural aspirations and structural opportunities is quite hard to operationalise on the macro-
level and explicit tests of this perspective have been rare (Pratt and Cullen, 2005). Strain theories 
are the individual-level extension of anomie theories and have an equally long tradition in 
criminology (Agnew, 1992). The macro-level gap between cultural aspirations and structural 
opportunities, is said to lead to strain on the individual level, an inability to achieve the goals 
                                                          
10 Interestingly, anomie theories propose that periods of economic prosperity can lead to more violence, 
as aspirations may rise faster than people’s opportunities, widening the gap between these aspirations 
and opportunities (see also (Gurr, 1970)). 
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projected through a dominant culture. Strain is then said to lead to a number of adverse 
outcomes, including but not limited to violence; it can also lead to anxiety, lethargy and 
depression11. These theories were criticised for assuming people were influenced by a singular 
cultural framework and later strain theories moved away from looking at goals projected 
through a dominant culture to an inability to achieve positively valued goals, recognising that 
these goals are inherently subjective (not necessarily material) and may vary from one person 
to the next. Relative deprivation is a frequently cited mechanism by which inequality is said to 
cause strain; it implies that people base their expectations on a comparison to a reference group 
(Pedersen, 2004; Runciman, 1966; Webber, 2007). When people do not have the opportunities 
to achieve the expectations projected by this reference group, i.e. they feel deprived relative to 
these others, strain is said to result. This particular perspective thus assumes effects from 
people’s relationships over and above the aggregate distribution of resources. In all, anomie and 
strain theories focus on the material distribution of resources, but suggest people’s subjective 
interpretations of their opportunities, rather than objective opportunities as such, generate 
motivations to get involved in violence.  
 
Studies that have (correctly) evaluated strain and relative deprivation perspectives using self-
report measures at the individual level are few and far between. Apart from issues with violence, 
they have difficulty operationalising the many potential sources of strain, and particularly 
conceiving of an adequate reference group in evaluating relative deprivation, it remains most 
frequently conceived as a negative comparison to abstract identity groups. Smith et al. (2011) 
review studies that have evaluated the effects of relative deprivation and find many of them use 
aggregate measures. That is, they interpret aggregate inequality measures as evidence of 
relative deprivation making a grave attribution error 12  (Hojman, 2004). They conclude that 
studies that do measure relative deprivation correctly tend to find much stronger effect sizes 
than those that do not. Stiles et al. (2000) using data collected from 6,074 adults find that 
comparisons of respondents’ family income relative to friends and a national standard predict 
violent crime, but comparisons to neighbours do not. Baron (2004), in an investigation of 400 
homeless youth in Vancouver, finds a number of sources of strain, including these youth’s 
assessment of their quality of life on a scale of 0 to 10, predict self-reported violent crime. Burton 
et al. (1994) included several measures of strain in a postal survey of 447 US adults and found a 
                                                          
11 Gender differences in violence are often explained this way, women would be less driven by material 
success and goals in the first place, but also more likely to respond differently to strain, e.g. through 
depression and anxiety (O’Grady, 2014). 
12 Also known as ecological fallacy, making inferences about individuals on the basis of aggregate statistics. 
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significant effect of blocked opportunities and relative deprivation on self-reported offending 
that disappeared when controlling for other variables; self-control and social bonds. Some 
authors have also evaluated strain as a predictor for gang membership, with equally mixed 
results (Brownfield et al., 1997; Tsunokai and Kposowa, 2009). Importantly, many of these 
quantitative studies correlate reports of past involvement in violence to current levels of strain 
reversing the theoretical order (strain coming before violence). A rare qualitative study of 
relative deprivation among youth in an English suburb found that these youth’s involvement in 
crime can cause relative deprivation rather than the other way around (Webber, 2003). In all, 
though an intuitive and generally accepted explanation, the evidence for these perspectives is 
scarce.  
2.3.1.2 Subcultural identities, symbolic status and respect  
More interpretive interpretations of anomie do not look at inequality’s effects on individuals per 
se, but the meanings violence and violent identities generate in contexts of material deprivation. 
Subcultural identity perspectives argue that a lack of material means can reinforce the salience 
of violent identities (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967). They too have a long tradition in criminology 
(Cohen, 1955; Ohlin and Cloward, 1960). Similar to anomie theories they focus on the material 
distribution of resources and assume inequality limits people’s opportunities, nevertheless, it 
does not generate individual motivations but deviant subcultures where violence attains 
symbolic and existential meaning. Exclusion and rejection from mainstream society can 
strengthen identification with a deviant in-group that does provide belonging and self-esteem 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Early subcultural perspectives were criticised for developing ‘culture 
of poverty’ arguments, suggesting violence is an inherent normative framework of the poor 
(Lewis, 1971; Miller, 1958). Though often criticised, this type of argument remains active today, 
the gang literature in particular often attributes violence to a set of ‘unique’ cultural norms 
among gangs, that develops in exclusion from mainstream society and defines gang members, 
without questioning how these cultural norms guide behaviour on some occasions, but not 
others (Anderson, 2000; Brezina et al., 2004). Similarly, people that have few material assets are 
often seen to be more sensitive to perceived instances of disrespect and more likely to physically 
contest it through violence (Bourgois, 2003). The assumption that material deprivation leads to 
a higher valuation of symbolic means of achieving power, status, honour and respect13, through 
                                                          
13 These terms are frequently used interchangeably. Kemper (2011) argues for a clear distinction between 
status and power, where both refer to the extent that ‘a person may extract recognition, prestige, honour, 
privilege and compliance in interaction from others’, status allows people to do so voluntarily, power lets 
them extract these privileges against the will of others. Respect and honour can be seen as effects of 
status and/or power.  
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violence, runs implicitly or explicitly through many other theories. Critical perspectives, for 
instance, stress the inherent disempowerment of unequal social structures, violence and violent 
identities are forms of resistance that allow people to overcome the bleak reality of their daily 
lives (Wieviorka, 2009; Žižek, 2008).  
 
Qualitative research has described the symbolic meanings of violence and violent identities in 
many different contexts. They highlight the effects of structural disempowerment, especially 
among young men, who vie for respect and recognition through violence when their identity is 
challenged in material terms (Bourgois, 2003; Jones and Rodgers, 2009; Savenije and Van Der 
Borgh, 2004; Scheper-Hughes, 1993; Vranckx, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2009). In Venezuela, 
Zubillaga has explored the multiple meanings and dynamics of violence based on interviews with 
young (ex-)offenders (2011; 2008). In an article with Briceño-Leon (2001), she investigates the 
multifaceted links between exclusion and masculinity, and the search for power and respect 
through violent identities. Antillano (2010), describes the evolution of the Venezuelan malandro, 
from ‘Robin Hood’ type protector of the neighbourhood in the 1970s to one that kills for the 
sake of respect and status in current-day Venezuela. He sees the malandro as a resistance 
identity that inadvertently maintains the status quo; their violence ultimately reproduces 
existing power relations. Nevertheless, many of these perspectives have been accused of over-
emphasising material dimensions of inequality, normalising violence under conditions of 
deprivation, but have difficulty explaining why the vast majority of those deprived do not turn 
to violence, or even the most violent only do so a minority of their time. More relational 
interpretations of these perspectives do not over-emphasise the material distribution of 
resources, but evaluate the wider institutional context, and the absence of formal institutions in 
creating an existential life project. Violent values and identities are not seen as an inherent part 
of lower-class communities or identity groups, but as systems of meaning that provide scripts 
not just in interaction with (or exclusion from) material means, but daily interactions within and 
across social boundaries (Young et al., 2008). I will discuss them in more detail below because 
we first need an account of how studies on violence tend to conceive of this institutional context.   
2.3.1.3 Discussion  
Theories that stress the motivations and meanings of violence often focus on the material 
distribution of resources and argue that violence ‘makes sense’ when people cannot materially 
attain culturally projected expectations. Many of these perspectives assume people are 
influenced by general materialistic expectations and violence is a response to not being able to 
live up to these. Strain and relative deprivation theories were a response to these criticisms, 
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stressing subjective perception effects and many potential sources of strain, making it difficult 
to find adequate indicators of these intrinsically personal evaluations. In sum, although this is 
the most generally accepted explanation of connections between inequality and violence, there 
is little quantitative empirical evidence for these perspectives, partly due to difficulties in finding 
adequate data. The evidence on the meaning of violence stems overwhelmingly from qualitative 
research. These qualitative approaches have described in rich detail the processes of exclusion 
from mainstream society that can lead to violence and assuming violent identities, but they 
often focus on singularly material dimensions of inequality without taking into account the 
institutional context or the relationships in which violence occurs. In the next section I look at 
perspectives that look at potential mitigating effects of (in)formal social control.  
2.3.2 The mitigating effects of (in)formal social control 
This section looks at perspectives that assume conventional institutions and social controls can 
mitigate motivations for violence. These perspectives assume people are inherently violent if 
not constrained by adequate social control mechanisms. They are not necessarily interested in 
how or why people use violence, but try and explain why they do not. These perspectives all 
adopt a macro-level perspective on social control, as the implementation of an abstract social 
contract, and violence as a deviation thereof, however, the details of how people abide by or 
internalise this social contract often remain implicit.  
2.3.2.1 Conventional institutions  
It is frequently assumed that where the state has a legitimate monopoly on violence, embedded 
in a social contract, citizens are kept from engaging in violence (Briceño-León, 2012b). However, 
few theoretical perspectives on violence have adequately conceptualised this social contract or 
how people might abide by it, assuming that indicators of the functioning of conventional 
institutions reflect a proper internalisation of societal norms and values. Institutional anomie 
theory (Messner et al., 2008) adds an important institutional layer to previously discussed 
anomie theories by arguing that conventional institutions such as family, education, and religion, 
can channel a materialistic focus on success and material achievement. Where an economic 
emphasis on material success overshadows these conventional institutions, anomie, the gap 
between cultural aspirations and material opportunities, is exacerbated and people may be 
motivated to achieve success through illegitimate means. Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) find, in 
line with these assumptions, that the de-commodification of labour, as measured by various 
indicators of welfare expenditure, is a stronger predictor of cross-national homicide rates than 
the Gini coefficient. LaFree (1998) talks of institutional illegitimacy, arguing that ill-equipped 
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political, economic and family institutions generate motivations as well as opportunities to 
engage in violence. There is a subtle difference with institutional anomie; this perspective does 
not necessarily see economic values overriding those of conventional institutions, these 
economic institutions may be seen as illegitimate too. Savolainen (2000), in a cross-national 
study of the male/female homicide ratio finds the positive effect of income inequality on 
homicide is particularly pronounced in nations with weak social welfare institutions. Other 
studies have replicated this potential mitigating effect of well-developed institutions (Krahn et 
al., 1986; Lee and Bankston, 1999; Neumayer, 2003; Nivette, 2013). Briceño-León (2012b), 
analysing changes in homicide rates in Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil concludes the rule of law 
(as measured by Worldwide Governance Indicators) is a stronger explanatory variable of these 
cross-national changes than the Gini coefficient. He argues that violence is indicative of the 
breakdown of the social contract between state and citizens, without specifying how this social 
contract might operate. Nevertheless, in an explicit test of LaFree’s (1998) model of institutional 
illegitimacy in Venezuela, Crespo and Birkbeck (2009) do not find significant associations 
between indicators of the legitimacy of political, economic and family institutions and homicide 
rates across time.  
 
Few of these theories explore the role and legitimacy of formal social control institutions as 
contributory factors to violence. Some authors have talked of legal cynicism (Sampson and 
Bartusch, 1998), arguing that where people are cynical about the law and law enforcement 
agencies, perceive them as illegitimate and unresponsive, they resort to violence more easily. 
Not an absence of conventional institutions as such, but the perceived irresponsiveness of 
formal social control institutions is seen to be more important in generating differential degrees 
of violence. In a test of this perspective, Kirk and Papachristos (2011) find attitudes towards the 
legitimacy of the law explain why homicide persisted in certain Chicago neighbourhoods during 
the 1990s despite declines in poverty. Sampson and Bartusch (1998) report similar findings, also 
in Chicago neighbourhoods. Similarly, in a cross-national study of conflict resolution tactics 
including Venezuela, Fournier et al. (1999) find that attitudes towards the efficacy of law were 
some of the strongest predictors of violence against strangers.  
2.3.2.2 Social disorganisation and social control 
Social disorganisation theories are similarly based on an assumption that adequate social 
controls can keep people from violence. These theories no longer look at social institutions, but 
make assumptions about the informal social control mechanisms that can mitigate the effects 
of inequality at the community or neighbourhood level. Shaw and Mckay (1942) showed that 
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deprived communities had high crime rates over time, regardless of the coming and going of 
their residents. That is, crime rates seemed to be related to the characteristics of disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, rather than the people living there. They argued community attributes like low 
economic status, residential turnover, family disruption, and ethnic heterogeneity diminished a 
community’s potential to realise common values and exercise informal social control, monitor 
and control residents’ behaviour, opening it up to various deviant behaviours, violence as well 
as youth gangs. The social disorganisation perspective generated a vast research tradition 
exploring the characteristics of violent communities. Nevertheless, indicators of social 
disorganisation, an inability to implement informal social control, need to be obtained through 
community surveys and proved hard to collect. Many studies focussed on social cohesion, 
frequently operationalised as trust between neighbours, or interactions between neighbours, 
both seen as prerequisites for informal social control (Krohn, 1986), rather than operationalising 
informal social controls themselves. Sampson and Groves (1989), in what they see as a first 
adequate test of social disorganisation theory because, beyond structural characteristics they 
include actual measures of community disorganisation (sparse friendship networks, 
unsupervised teenage peer groups, and low organisational participation), found that bivariate 
correlations between neighbourhood socioeconomic status and victimisation and offending 
rates in 238 British communities disappeared when controlling for these measures. They 
conclude that communities with sparse ties among friends and neighbours generate a weakened 
system of informal social control, which, in turn, facilitates crime. They continued to equate the 
presence of neighbourhood relationships with informal social control, without adequately 
testing or conceptualising the link between relationships and informal social control (Kubrin and 
Weitzer, 2003). Some studies have replicated these findings in different contexts (Lowenkamp 
et al., 2003; Nieuwbeerta et al., 2008; Sampson and Wikström, 2008), although others obtain 
mixed results (Browning et al., 2004; Sampson et al., 2002; Warner and Rountree, 1997). Some 
studies find positive, rather than the expected negative, effects of community participation and 
neighbour relations on violence (Bellair, 1997; Bellair and Browning, 2010). Many qualitative 
studies have also found high degrees of participation and networking in neighbourhoods with 
high homicide rates (Bottoms, 2007; Caldeira, 2001; McIlwaine and Moser, 2001; Pattillo, 1998; 
Wilson, 1996). More recent perspectives have developed extensions to try and account for these 
findings. Sampson and his colleagues (1997) developed the concept of ‘collective efficacy’, 
arguing there needs to be social cohesion, trust among neighbours, but also a willingness to 
work towards common goals, to prevent violence in the community. This theory moved away 
from seeing strong ties as a prerequisite for informal social control, through focussing on a 
community’s willingness to implement informal social control, which may or may not be 
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facilitated by strong ties between residents (Browning et al., 2004). These perspectives thus no 
longer look at actual relationships as evidence of informal social control, with mixed support 
(Bruinsma et al., 2013; Morenoff et al., 2001; Sutherland et al., 2013). Another extension of 
social disorganisation theories, the negotiated coexistence perspective (Browning, 2009), aims 
to conceptualise the potentially negative effect of strong ties through acknowledging 
neighbourhood interaction may not only generate mutual trust and cohesion among neighbours, 
but also positively benefit offenders as they may be integrated in dense neighbourhood 
networks too. In a test of this perspective Browning et al. (2004) find that the regulatory effects 
of collective efficacy on violence are substantially reduced in neighbourhoods characterised by 
high levels of network interaction and reciprocated exchange. All these perspectives uncritically 
assume people’s relationships, and informal social control mechanisms, are contained within 
geographical communities.  
 
Social control theories are the individual-level extension of social disorganisation perspectives. 
These theories are not actually theories of social control, but theories of crime (including 
violence). They assume everyone has the potential for violence, but try and explain why people 
do not. They hypothesise that violence results from an absence of bonds (‘attachments’) that 
tie people to their community and conventional society (Hirschi, 1969). In their ‘general theory 
of crime’, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) move away from controls in people’s environments to 
the concept of self-control. They suggest early attachments, particularly to parents, instil people 
with the ability to control their impulses, which refrains them from engaging in violence. Gender 
differences are explained through diverging socialisation patterns, these perspectives assume 
that women are kept under closer supervision by their significant others, they are watched more 
carefully and thus less free to engage in violence (Rodríguez, 2010). In comparison to the 
evidence for strain and relative deprivation, there is slightly more consistent evidence for social 
control theories at the individual level, using self-report data. The absence of family and other 
bonds to conventional society are often seen as important risk factors, which mediate the 
relationship between social structural characteristics and violence (Hoffmann, 2003; Lanctot and 
Smith, 2001; Maimon and Browning, 2012; Marcus, 1996). Thomas and Shihadeh (2013) and 
McCall et al. (2010) have shown that young people who are not enrolled in school or college, 
and not in the labour force are more likely to engage in violence. Boers et al. (2010) on the basis 
of a panel study of German adolescents show how certain social milieus are the distal factors 
that predispose adolescents to violence, via more proximate effects of social bonds and 
exposure to hedonistic norms. Many studies, including in Venezuela, also find evidence for self-
control, people that are more impulsive and value short-term gratification over long-term 
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benefits, are more likely to engage in various deviant behaviours (Morillo et al., 2011; Pratt and 
Cullen, 2000; Rodríguez, 2010).  
2.3.2.3 Discussion 
Critics argue these perspectives are a-historical in ignoring the wider institutional context, 
particularly formal social control institutions, and embedding responsibility for violence firmly 
in violent communities and people (Collins, 2009; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003). Even theories that 
explicitly incorporate the functioning of institutions argue that ultimately an absence of 
conventional institutions has the effect that people are not adequately constrained from 
violence, these are normative assumptions about the superiority of these conventional 
institutions, norms and values, that see violence as a maladaptive trait of unrestrained people. 
It is also difficult to evaluate the causal direction of these assumptions; whether social 
disorganisation and a lack of institutions and social bonds lead to violence, or whether violence 
diminishes a community’s capacity to get together and exercise informal social control, 
undermines institutions or an individual’s bonds with society (McIlwaine and Moser, 2001; 
Messner et al., 2004). Further, these theories do not explain how (informal) social control works, 
the mere presence of conventional institutions or relationships is often seen as evidence of 
(informal) social control. In the next section I explore theories that depart from normative 
appraisals of conventional institutions and informal social control, by looking at the actual 
relationships in which institutions and social control emerge.  
2.3.3 Violence as social organisation and social control 
The wise have long taught that there is no such thing as 
an unambiguous human good. Like everything else people 
value, strong ties have an aspect that many would regard 
as less attractive. Violence is the dark side of community.  
(Cooney, 1998, p.149)  
 
A different set of theoretical explanations challenges the core assumptions of previous theories, 
through looking at the relationships in which violence and violent identities emerge. These 
perspectives challenge the long-engrained paradigm of the rational, utility-maximising offender. 
They see violence not as maladaptive behaviour that is a function of the weighting of constraints 
versus motivations, but as providing meaning in interaction and even social control itself. They 
turn traditional person-centred research on its head, looking at the actual structure of 
relationships that produces violence. 
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2.3.3.1 Differential social organisation 
Almost 70 years ago, Sutherland (1947) proposed a differential social organisation theory, 
arguing that identity groups can form around criminal activities just like others form around non-
criminal activities, but this concept found little following in criminology (Morselli, 2009; Triplett, 
2014). A growing body of work has picked up on these ideas by seeing violent identities not 
merely as providing meaning in contexts of material deprivation, but as institutions in and of 
themselves, forms of social organisation that prescribe rules and norms in interaction (Lea, 2004; 
Tilly et al., 1985). Masculinity theories see violence as ‘doing gender’, conveying 
(hyper)masculinity as a response to a lack of other opportunities for achieving status and respect, 
but shaped in interaction, they attain meaning in opposition to feared, weak and female 
identities (Messerschmidt, 2005; Vigil, 1988). They do not see people as entirely defined by 
masculine identities, yet conceive of its adoption as situationally contingent. Gang theorists in 
particular have conceived of gangs or violent youth groups as street institutions (Hagedorn, 
2008). Where traditional institutions are lacking, the street becomes an institution, instilling its 
own values and norms that are orientated towards being tough. These perspectives often 
explicitly address the absence of formal social control, suggesting that violent identities, in 
absence of formal institutions, can be seen as ‘governance from below’ (Lea and Stenson, 2007). 
A conceptualisation of violent identities as governance systems is also prevalent in political 
economy and anthropological traditions that explain how these identities negotiate and fill the 
spaces left by states that cannot claim a legitimate monopoly over violence (Cohen et al., 1981; 
Koonings and Kruijt, 2004; Tilly et al., 1985). These perspectives make an argument similar to 
perspectives that stress the absence of conventional institutions. However, they suggest violent 
identities are not a maladaptive response to disorder generated by an absence of state, on the 
contrary, they are emergent forms of social order.  
 
Primary research that has evaluated violent identities as social organisation and governance, is 
scarce but gaining prominence. Authors that study political violence and insurgencies have 
frequently conceptualised of rebel groups as governance structures emerging in the institutional 
voids left by neoliberal states (Cramer, 2006; Reno, 2000; Richards, 2005). ‘Neither war nor 
peace’, a collaborative project lead by Dowdney (2005), looks at youth involved in non-state 
armed violence in 11 different countries of the global South. The organisation of these non-state 
armed actors is part of their definition, describing them as ‘children and youth employed or 
otherwise participating in organised armed violence where there are elements of a command 
structure and power over territory, local population or resources’. Violent identities are seen as 
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armed organisation in conditions of poverty and state corruption. Vigil (1988) devotes 
considerable attention to the construction of violent masculinities in opposition to feared 
identities on the basis of ethnographic work with Chicano gangs in LA. He argues that young 
boys growing up among multiple deprivations, and an abundance of feared, female role models 
are socialised by the street. The street becomes an institution where others fail. Hagedorn (2008) 
based on his own work in Milwaukee and Chicago and a review of global research, similarly 
describes how violent youth groups institutionalised the world over in the social vacuums left 
by neoliberal policies. Venkatesh (1997, 2006), based on ethnographic research, describes in 
great detail how the informal structure of a Chicago ghetto flows almost seamlessly into the 
informal organisation of the Black Kings, a drug dispensing gang. Arias (2009) similarly describes 
the institutionalisation and informal organisation of gangs in Rio de Janeiro. Willis (2009) shows 
how gangs in São Paulo, Brazil have institutionalised to take over some of the state’s monopoly 
on violence and crime control. In Venezuela, Pedrazzini (2009) explores the meanings of el 
malandreo in a postcolonial world. In an article with Sanchez (1996) he explores the complex 
relationships of ‘urgency’ that tie the malandro to the barrio. They shift the focus from exclusion 
to how malandros generate inclusion; different rules and models of solidarity.  
 
A number of perspectives have looked at how these differential forms of social organisation may 
be more conducive to violence through exploring the actual relationships in which violence 
emerges, I discuss them below.  
2.3.3.2 Self-help, violence as informal social control 
Black’s theory of social control (see also 2.2.2) focuses exclusively on the micro-level structure 
of relationships to explain violence, as a form of informal social control (Black, 1983). Black’s 
proposition for a pure sociology (1995) aims to rid sociology from all psychology. He takes issue 
with perspectives that look at subjective and internal states to explain behaviour, suggesting all 
behaviour can be explained by its location in ‘social space’. Violence too can be explained by 
aspects of the interaction, not the internal motives of its antagonists, its shape and form depend 
on social distance between perpetrator, victim and any third parties. He argues violence is self-
help, a confrontational strategy of social control, where the structure of relationships is less 
favourable to other forms of conflict management, such as avoidance and settlement. This is the 
case in particular where people are densely connected and cannot easily avoid conflict nor turn 
to authoritative third parties to resolve it. Similarly, Gould (2003) argues deadly violence is a 
product of relationships where a formal hierarchy is not established. It is more likely among 
people that are relatively equal in social status, and have not established a dominance pattern, 
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balance of power, between them. Collins (2000) suggests violence is a form of situational 
stratification, it imposes a hierarchy in situations of status ambiguity. As in other perspectives, 
status and power are important concepts, but these authors make an important distinction; 
ambiguous status rather than a perceived lack or loss of status is more likely to lead to violence. 
They stress similarity, rather than material differences between people. This is a departure from 
previous theories that assume violence is a result of an inability to achieve one’s goals or a 
struggle for respect among material deprivations. Struggles for respect occur across the social 
spectrum (also among higher classes) but they are resolved differently according to the types of 
relationships in which they occur. Informal social control, including violence, is more likely 
among lower-classes, not because they are more likely to feel disrespected because of material 
deprivations or lack adequate controls, but because the structure of their relationships is more 
conducive to confrontational conflict. Rather than mitigate violence through generating 
informal social control, these perspectives suggest that dense ties may generate violence, 
because avoidance is more difficult where people are densely connected, but also because 
status and honour are more important. Again, this is not because of a lack of material resources, 
but because, where people can easily find out what you do, responding to status challenges is 
more important for your future reputation. Conflict is seen as a normal aspect of dense ties and 
an abundant social life; violent resolution is particularly likely where authoritative third parties 
and established rules for deference are absent, changing or vague (Tilly, 2007). These 
perspectives thus also acknowledge the absence of formal social control mechanisms with an 
important distinction, an absence of formal social control is not seen to free people to use 
violence, rather make informal social control more likely. 
 
A number of studies have explicitly looked at violence as self-help or social control. Baumgartner 
(1988) develops a theory of moral minimalism on the basis of her extensive study of a middle-
class suburb in the US. She studied this community for its apparent absence of violence. She 
argues there is plenty of conflict in this suburb too, yet people lead lives in which they can easily 
avoid confrontation. Further, they turn to authoritative third parties, such as community 
ministers or psychologists, and in last instance, the police to resolve any conflicts that cannot 
easily be avoided. The structure of people’s relationships in the suburb thus allows them to avoid 
confrontational social control. Cooney (1998, 2013) draws on a wide range of data from other 
studies to support his argument that societies that have many homicides usually have strong 
community and frequent interaction. He identifies proximity, sociability, immobility, publicity 
and loyalty as characteristics of interactions in violent communities. Gould (2003) similarly 
draws on secondary data on conflicts as diverse as vendettas in Corsica, homicides in the US and 
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tribal violence in Kenya to show deadly violence is much more likely between people that are 
similar in status. Phillips (2003) tests Black's model of violence as confrontational social control 
on the basis of interviews with prisoners in Texas. Comparing conflicts that ended in aggression 
and conflicts that did not, he finds only limited support for Black’s theory. Violence is indeed 
more likely between people that are not dependent on each other, but he does not find that 
conflicts between people equal in social standing are more likely to lead to violence. Norris et 
al. (2006) in a comparative study of the use of force by police officers in Mexico, Venezuela and 
the US, find that police officers’ inclination to use force is defined by the behaviour of fictional 
arrestees rather than their status. In other words, police officers’ reactions were not defined by 
social structural aspects of the interaction, but by behaviour in the interaction, questioning 
Black’s theory that all behaviour can be explained by its location in social space.  
2.3.3.3 The reverse effects of violence  
Where Black argues violence can be analysed and understood devoid of all meaning, other 
researchers attempt to incorporate meaning in their study of the actual interactions in which 
violence occurs. Fagan and Wilkinson (2007), explaining gun violence in particular, argue gun 
behaviours generate an ‘ecology of danger’, a complex environment where fear and deadly 
violence spread quickly. Their social contagion14 theory explains how fear and gun behaviours 
spread through dense networks of more or less susceptible people; gun behaviours generate 
scripts and expectations whereby gun violence becomes the norm to respond to previous 
violence (Fagan et al., 2007). Drawing on Burt (1987), and similar to previous theories, they 
suggest ‘structurally equivalent’ positions, where people are similar in status, facilitate the 
diffusion of gun behaviours. These perspectives similarly look at the actual relationships through 
which violence flows, but attribute additional explanatory power to previous violence. Prior 
exposure to violence through rumour or actual interactions is seen to provide scripts for future 
behaviour. Similarly, gang researchers have looked at interactions within and between gangs to 
explain the violence gangs use. However, they equally depart from Black’s assumption that all 
behaviour can be explained solely by the structure of relationships, through taking into account 
the norms that are learned from previous interactions. Group process theories investigate how 
retaliatory violence between gangs reproduces gang group boundaries and facilitates conflict 
spirals. Gang violence generates a normative structure by which violence becomes an expected 
                                                          
14 This is perhaps an unfortunate metaphor that compares the spread of violence with the spread of 
disease. This continues the criminological ‘illness’ (going back to 19th century skull measurements) of 
seeing the delinquent as ‘ill’. Talking about gang violence as if it were a medical condition that infects 
susceptible individuals muddies the waters. Gang members are not ill, they respond to interactional cues. 
Although I think diffusion may be a better word, I will use contagion to connect with the extant literature. 
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response to threats (real or perceived), fosters group cohesion and ultimately legitimates the 
gang itself (Decker, 1996; Hennigan and Spanovic, 2012). Figure 2-2 shows this ‘cycle of gang 
violence’ (Decker et al., 2012); loose gang bonds are mobilized through the identification of a 
threat, which leads to a violent event, that often reinitiates the process and results in counter-
retaliation. 
Figure 2-2 The cycle of gang violence ((Decker et al., 2012) 
 
Note: Solid lines represent expected pathways; Dotted lines represent potential pathways. 
 
Thrasher (1927), often seen as a pioneer of gang research, described early on how conflict 
between gangs in Chicago consolidates and strengthens individual gang groups. Papachristos 
(2006, 2009) has looked at the contagion of deadly violence in gang networks, also in Chicago. 
Crucially, he has access to victim, motive and perpetrator data on homicide and is able to 
construct a network of deadly interactions between gangs. He shows how just a few gangs 
account for the majority of these homicides, through retaliation and counter-retaliation. He 
concludes  that gang homicide is not so much the outcome of the differential distribution of 
individual attributes as it is ‘an interaction governed by patterns of social relations between 
people similar in stature and status’ (Papachristos, 2009, p.75). Zaluar (2001) describes the links 
of Brazilian gangs to the informal economy. She sees their organisation as ‘horizontal reciprocity 
networks’ that lack strict hierarchical structures but efficiently link various shanty towns and 
facilitate the trade of drugs, guns and counterfeit products, but also the spread of violence. In 
Venezuela, Bolivar (2012) gives an insightful historical account of el malandreo in his own 
Caracas’ barrio. He shows how malandro groups consolidated over time, describing an evolution 
from malandros as more or less solitary protectors of the barrio, to small groups of youth that 
generate deadly conflict between different sectors within the same barrio. Bolivar thus observes 
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the territorialisation of his barrio, people of one sector can no longer freely enter another. Over 
the decades conflict changed from being a personal affair to being socially ascribed, a group 
characteristic, based on territory and conflicts with other gangs; violent conflict and rivalries 
started to shape the gangs and reproduce their violence. 
2.3.3.4 Discussion  
These perspectives make fundamentally different assumptions to perspectives discussed under 
2.3.2, which suggest strong, dense ties can keep people from violence, suggesting instead that 
strong, dense ties can make violence more likely. There are subtler distinctions with perspectives 
that assume violence generates meaning where people’s status is challenged in material terms 
(2.3.1). More relational identity theories look beyond the material distribution of resources, at 
the wider structure of relationships to evaluate how violent identities are shaped in interaction 
and provide not just existential meaning but also social organisation. In Black’s conception, 
violence also stems from status challenges, but its meaning is irrelevant, arguing that it can be 
explained solely by structural aspects of the interaction. Further, status similarity and ambiguity 
are more important than status differences. In social contagion theories, structural equivalence 
or similarity, also facilitate the spread of violence, but the meanings generated through violent 
interactions (rather than material deprivations) are crucial in explaining the spread of violence. 
In these perspectives, the meaning of violence does not stem from status differences, but from 
rumour and expectations garnered in previous interactions. Nevertheless, these interaction-
level studies are more challenging because, as described above, data on violent interactions are 
difficult to come by.  
2.4 Summary and motivation for a network approach, conceptualising the role of people’s 
relationships  
In summary, the quantitative evidence on a relationship between inequality and violence is not 
as consistent, nor easily interpretable, as is often assumed. Aggregate correlations between 
homicide rates and Gini coefficients do not accurately reflect the mechanisms discussed above. 
Most of these perspectives make assumptions about how people’s relationships mediate or 
mitigate connections between inequality and violence. People’s relationships are seen to 
generate motivations, instil control mechanisms, or make violence a likely form of conflict 
management. Table 2-1 summarises the assumptions of these theories. It also summarises 
empirical evidence and translates these assumptions in terms of people’s networks and 
relationships.  
42 
 
 
 
Table 2-1 Summary of theoretical assumptions, empirical evidence and network operationalisation 
Theoretical assumptions  Empirical evidence 
Network 
operationalisation 
Anomie / Strain; blocked 
opportunities generate strain and 
can lead to violence Often uses abstract 
boundaries to approximate 
people’s opportunities and 
reference groups 
 
Inconclusive, not often 
adequately tested 
People’s relationships provide 
them with access to jobs and 
other material opportunities15  
Relative deprivation; comparison 
with a reference group generates 
expectations and strain if 
expectations do not match 
opportunities 
People’s personal networks, 
the people they interact with, 
can be conceived as a more 
meaningful reference group  
Subcultural identity/ 
Masculinities; material deprivation 
can lead to identification with 
violent identities that provide 
symbolic and existential meaning in 
interaction 
Strongly supported by 
qualitative research 
Violent identities and 
masculinities provide 
meaning and distancing from 
feared identities 
Social disorganisation/ Social 
control; people’s relationships 
instil informal social control 
mechanisms that can constrain 
people from violence 
Research often finds high-
violence communities have 
strong ties  
 
Control theories often 
supported at the individual 
level 
Strong, dense ties in people’s 
communities and /or 
networks provide informal 
social control  
Self-help; violence is informal 
social control where formal social 
control is absent and avoidance 
difficult  
Supported by descriptive 
research, not supported by 
quantitative research 
Strong bonds to relative 
equals can generate violence 
where there is little chance 
for avoidance or third party 
settlement 
Social contagion; interactions instil 
expectations for future behaviour, 
violence spreads quickly where 
people are densely connected to 
similar others 
Supported by qualitative and 
network research 
Similarity makes diffusion 
more efficient 
 
Anomie, strain and relative deprivation theories suggest a disjunction between people’s 
opportunities and expectations, an inability to achieve positively valued goals, generates 
motivations for violence. Empirical evidence remains inconclusive, because it is difficult to 
operationalise this disjunction. This is the case in particular for relative deprivation theories 
which suggest expectations are generated by comparison to a reference group. This thesis 
suggests that personal networks, the people one interacts with, can be seen as more concrete 
sources of people’s opportunities, as well as their expectations, a concrete reference group. 
                                                          
15 Also referred to as ‘social capital’, although this term is highly contested and I do not use it in this thesis. 
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Negative comparison to this reference group could lead to relative deprivation and violence. 
Subcultural identity and masculinity theories suggest violent identities provide existential 
meaning in contexts of deprivation. They have received strong support in qualitative research. 
This thesis engages with more relational interpretations of these theories that suggest violent 
identities attain meaning in interaction, by looking at the interactions and relationships 
embedded in people’s personal networks. Social disorganisation and social control theories 
make assumptions about the strength and density of people’s ties, and their presumed effects 
on informal social control, suggesting strong, dense ties can keep people from violence and 
mitigate the effects of inequality. Nevertheless, studies that look at people’s actual relationships 
at the neighbourhood level often find strong ties in violent communities. Self-help theories 
suggest strong ties and dense networks may provoke confrontational conflict resolution through 
violence, particularly where third party resolution is unavailable. These perspectives suggest the 
effect of inequality on violence depends on actual relational structures, where inequality is 
expressed in dense interaction networks, more violence might result. Finally, social contagion 
theories also make assumptions about the structure of relationships, suggesting violence flows 
more easily through dense networks of relative equals. The effect of strong, dense ties is 
particularly contested in these latter theories. Self-help and social contagion theories suggest 
they may lead to more violence under certain conditions, whereas social disorganisation and 
social control theories suggest they have a positive effect in keeping people from violence.  This 
thesis looks at people’s personal networks as concrete indicators of their relationships to 
evaluate whether they can be seen to provide informal social control or generate violence. 
 
This overview suggests that looking at people’s interactions and relationships can teach us a 
great deal about how inequality might be related to violence. Venezuela shows little evidence 
inequality is related to violence on aggregate levels (see Chapter 1). This thesis thus focuses on 
people’s relationships to evaluate whether these can shed light on any connections between 
inequality and violence over and beyond aggregate indicators, and clarify the assumptions of 
these perspectives. The fact that aggregate indicators of inequality and violence do not correlate 
in Venezuela could be because people are still motivated to use violence by their interaction 
networks, because the informal social control mechanisms in these networks are inadequate, or 
because the structure of their relationships, rather than the material distribution of resources, 
is conducive to confrontational conflict.  
 
Personal network research, because it focuses specifically on people’s interactions and 
relationships can help clarify some of these debates. Diverse personal networks have been 
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related to a variety of positive outcomes such as jobs (Granovetter, 1973), social mobility and 
integration (Lubbers et al., 2010; McCarty and Molina, 2010), household welfare (Grootaert et 
al., 2004), poverty reduction (Marques, 2012) and even better mental and physical health (Smith 
and Christakis, 2008; Wellman and Gulia, 1999), but have not frequently been used in research 
on violence. Studies on personal networks in Latin America have found the personal networks 
of the poor to be highly localised, with bonding but little linking ties, again, they were not linked 
to violence (Espinoza, 1999; Marques et al., 2009; Wellman, 1999).  
 
Various studies have looked at whole school networks to evaluate the spread of violence. They 
get people to pick their friends from a list of other students, and often find that adolescents who 
pick violent friends are also more likely to engage in violence themselves (Dijkstra et al., 2011; 
Faris and Ennett, 2010; Haynie, 2001; Haynie et al., 2006; Megens and Weerman, 2011; 
Weerman, 2011). These studies do not take into account friends or significant others that do not 
attend school (Carrington, 2011). Others have evaluated the structure and flow of information 
and violence within whole criminal networks (Morselli, 2009; Morselli et al., 2007) and gang 
networks (McGloin, 2005; Papachristos, 2009; Sarnecki, 2001; Tita and Radil, 2011). Because 
whole networks look at interactions within a well-defined boundary, they are unable to link 
these patterns to community interactions and macro-level structures. They cannot evaluate how 
these interactions may affect connections between inequality and violence.  
 
Only a few studies known at the time of writing have explored the personal networks of people 
involved in violence. None of these have looked at how people’s relationships might induce 
strain and relative deprivation. Fleisher (2005) looks at the personal networks of gang members 
and finds them to be much more diverse and gang group boundaries much more flexible than 
he would have expected based on ethnographic observation data. He argues for the integration 
of both types of data in empirical research. Reid (2013) evaluates personal friendship networks 
of prisoners within correctional facilities in the US. She distinguishes three types of network 
structures and finds that these structures influence institutional misconduct. Two studies 
compared these networks to networks of people that had not been involved in violence. De 
Cuyper et al. (2013) find that prisoners, prior to incarceration, had a network similar to or even 
better with respect to network structure (denser networks) and relationship quality (more 
frequent contact with the people in their networks) compared to the general Dutch population. 
However, prisoners' network members lacked socioeconomic resources. Roman et al. (2012) 
evaluate the personal networks of 147 youth living in a Latino neighbourhood in Maryland. They 
show that youth are highly connected to people from the neighbourhood but find no significant 
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structural differences between the networks of people that have been involved in delinquency, 
violence or gangs and those that have not.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the evidence for a relationship between inequality and violence 
stems predominantly from macro-level correlations, but the exact mechanisms responsible for 
these correlations remain debated. This thesis contributes to this literature with an appraisal of 
the lower-level mechanisms, particularly people’s interactions and relationships, that are said 
to influence correlations between inequality and violence. It is qualitative and exploratory rather 
than quantitative and hypothesis-testing. It explores how people’s relationships might influence 
any connections between inequality and violence through exploring the boundaries that define 
people’s daily experience of inequality, and evaluating how their interactions and relationships 
may contribute to violence. Further, many of the studies in this chapter have been conducted in 
countries of the global North, where reasonably good data are available, but the prevalence of 
deadly violence comparatively low. This study focuses on one of the countries where the vast 
majority of deadly violence is actually occurring, addressing an abundance of global North 
research.   
 
Although almost all the theories discussed in this chapter have something to say about people’s 
relationships, there is no coherent relational perspective on interpersonal violence, partly due 
to a lack of adequate data. In general, analyses focus on violent communities, actors and their 
attributes, rather than their relational structures. Thus, although many authors acknowledge the 
relevance of several types of relationships, actual relational approaches remain rare. A truly 
relational approach involves seeing violence itself as produced within interactions and 
relationships, rather than as a propensity of individuals. This type of approach is conceptually 
and methodologically challenging. Most measures of violence, even in the current paper, remain 
at individual level. In acknowledging the difficulty of collecting relational data on violence, the 
investigation starts from a more relational analysis of inequality, exploring how the structure of 
peoples’ relationships may contribute to the patterns of violence observed in Venezuela. The 
next chapter starts with an evaluation of what aggregate homicide rates and aggregate 
administrative boundaries tell us about violence and inequality in Venezuela. 
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CHAPTER 3 HOMICIDE, SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND THE LIMITS OF VENEZUELA’S POLITICAL-
ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES 
3.1 Introduction  
Going by its homicide rate, Venezuela currently has the bleak reputation of being the second 
most violent country in the world (UNODC, 2014). In 2012, according to a report from the 
Venezuelan Ministry of Justice report, a record 16,072 homicides were registered (Reverol, 
2013). This was a rise of 14% on 2011, when 14,092 murders were recorded. It represents a 
dramatic and more or less continuous rise since the 1980s (see Figure 3-5 on p.66). Accounting 
for population figures, the 2012 figure represents a rate of 54 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, 
up from 48 in 2011 and a temporary ‘low’ of 39 in 2010. Only Honduras had more homicides in 
2012, 92 per 100,000 (UNODC, 2014). For comparison, the US and UK had rates of 4.7 and 1.2 
homicides per 100,000, respectively. Estimates from a victimisation survey in 2009 showed a 
homicide rate of 75 per 100,0001. 
 
Average statistics can be useful indicators of social trends, however, categories and levels of 
aggregation should be selected sensibly and knowledgeably. The above figures tell the hasty 
observer a tale of random and epidemic violence, a violence that does not distinguish rich from 
poor, old from young, ‘guilty’ from ‘innocent’2. They feed into a generalised fear that ultimately 
reproduces Venezuela’s contrasts, as we will explore in Chapter 8. These national figures hide 
crucial differences within and between alternative levels and categories of aggregation. 
Venezuela’s deadly violence does make distinctions, but political-administrative boundaries are 
poor dividing lines to appreciate these. The second part of this chapter shows homicide 
disproportionately affects young males living in barrios, informal urban areas right across the 
country, and particularly those involved in the conflict networks of ‘el malandreo’, a Venezuelan 
gangster identity. Administrative boundaries do not reflect these networks very well; 
nevertheless they are the only readily available categorisation to make some sense of these 
gloomy data. As Chapter 2 argued, average homicide rates whether on the national, state or 
municipality level do not tell us anything about the perpetrators of this deadly violence (see 
                                                          
1 Stratified sample of 16,419 households were interviewed about their experiences of crime between July 
2008 and July 2009. This relates to just 1% of all reported crimes. Coefficient of variation is 21% (0.95) 
(INE, 2010). 
2 A distinction that is frequently made in Venezuela with the implication that innocent people caught in 
cross-fire are more ‘mournable’ (Butler, 2006) than those already involved in violence.  
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2.2.1). Instead, they stigmatise high-violence communities and ignore the differences within 
them.  
 
Venezuela is a country of extremes, and these aggregate numbers hide big disparities. There are 
dramatic differences between cities and rural areas but importantly also within cities, between 
higher-class areas and informally constructed barrios; differences that are not captured by 
administrative boundaries. I will refer to ‘centre’ and ‘barrio’ throughout this thesis, making a 
‘class’ distinction between relatively central and serviced areas that are traditionally upper-
/middle-class, and barrios that are traditionally lower-class and informally constructed. 
Traditionally, because income or wealth are arguably no longer the main dividing line between 
these classes, many people in the barrio earn good wages3. Nevertheless, I will explore below 
that the differences between barrio and centre reflect durable inequalities (Tilly, 1998) that are 
continuously reproduced through a lack of contact between them. They can be seen as classes 
in the sense that reflect multi-dimensional differences (e.g. in access to opportunities and state 
institutions) that are continuously reproduced in interaction.  
 
It will be argued in chapters to follow that these entrenched and multi-dimensional differences 
are indeed at the basis of Venezuela’s deadly violence. The many insecurities of the barrio have 
allowed for the institutionalisation of an informal governance system, el malandreo, which 
provides individuals with respect, identity and existential meaning in their uncertain 
surroundings. Nevertheless, the deadly violence malandros, young men that identify with el 
malandreo, use has little more to do with socioeconomic differences, rather with previous 
violence, fear and reciprocity as I will explore in detail in Chapter 7.  
 
The observations in this chapter justify this thesis’ focus on relational micro-dynamics over and 
above the aggregate indicators that are meant to reflect these dynamics.  
 
This chapter triangulates the often limited data4 from different sources in an effort to paint a 
more grounded, historical picture of social inequality and deadly violence. It draws on official 
                                                          
3 Further, this distinction is not always discernible with the naked eye; many barrios have consolidated 
and have a growing middle-class population. Nevertheless, the negative connotation attached to their 
name remains tangible. The centre of Catia, one of my fieldwork sites, for instance is lively and relatively 
well-serviced, nevertheless the upper-classes consider it barrio and do not enter it.    
4  Factual data in Venezuela are scattered and inconsistent, further complicating an already difficult 
endeavour, particularly with regards to interpersonal violence, I explore this in more detail in the 
methodology chapter on p. 110 and in the conclusion chapter.  
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data from the national statistics office (INE), central bank (BCV), police (CICPC) and health (MPPS) 
instances as well as lower-level data and a report on firearms kindly provided to me by the 
people at the Universidad Nacional Experimental de la Seguridad (UNES, 2012). It also makes 
use of a nationally representative victimisation survey conducted in 2009 (INE, 2010) and survey 
data from the longitudinal LatinoBarometro5 survey. Where available, I tried to consistently use 
data of similar years, and 2012 data in particular as this was also my main fieldwork period. 
Nevertheless, this was not always possible and inconsistencies remain.  
3.2 Urban wealth versus rural poverty and the puzzling relationship with homicide 
Venezuela is politically divided in 24 states6, 330 municipalities and more than 1,000 parishes. 
These are further divided in census tracts of about 200 individuals. In terms of its income 
distribution, Venezuela has traditionally been one of the more egalitarian countries on a highly 
unequal continent (ECLAC, 2011; Gasparini et al., 2009). Even though Venezuela’s per capita 
GDP7 is about a sixth of the UK and a seventh of the US, its 2010 Gini coefficient (0.39) compares 
favourably with both US (0.41) and UK (0.38) Gini coefficients8 (World Bank, 2014).  
 
The Human Development Index9 (HDI) testifies to some of these extremes. Figure 3-1 shows a 
map of the municipalities of Venezuela according to their 1999 Human Development Index.  
                                                          
5 Chilean market research agency that conducts opinion surveys across Latin America. Sample sizes are 
relatively low (1,000-2,000 respondents/country), resulting in high error variances on their point 
estimates. Further, their questionnaire varies between waves, in what follows I often had to rely on 
available rather than most relevant years.  
6 For a political-administrative map of these states, see Figure 4-1. 
7 2012 per capita GDP at constant 2005 US$; Venezuela $6,412, UK $39,796, US $45,038 (World Bank, 
2014). 
8 The Gini coefficient is a vertical measure of differences between everyone in the country; it is not very 
sensitive to the polarisation of this income distribution and hides the many extremes of Venezuela’s 
reality. 
9 The HDI measures Human Development as a function of Health (life expectancy), Education (literacy and 
school enrolment), and Income, (GDP per capita). 
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Figure 3-1 Dispersion of 1999 Human Development Index, by municipality (Source: Roche 2009) 
 
 
The highest indices of Human Development are to be found around Venezuela’s various urban 
centres in the Northern corridor and West towards the border with Colombia. Municipalities in 
Venezuela’s Southern and Eastern, more rural, states have the lowest development levels 
(Gruson, 2006; Ponce, 2010). Strikingly, the HDI of the Capital District is comparable to that of 
France, whereas that of Amazonas compares more readily with Kazakhstan10. Interestingly, less 
developed states also tend to have higher Gini coefficients, or more absolute income differences 
between their inhabitants11. Chapter 4 will justify the selection of two fieldwork sites, one in the 
Capital, another in a more rural site, to appreciate these stark differences.  
 
In contrast with empirical evidence from other countries introduced in Chapter 2, and just like 
the evolution of national indicators discussed in the introductory chapter, these state-level 
inequalities show a puzzling relationship with homicide rates 12 , which are lower in less 
                                                          
10 2007 HDI of 0.74 in Amazonas, 0.87 in the Capital District. These differences have been appeased in the 
last decade. In 1997, the HDI ranged from 0.53 in Delta Amacuro to 0.84 in the Capital District. 
Nevertheless, these vast disparities were not eradicated. 
11 From a visual evaluation of INE figures, it appears that rural states may be more unequal in terms of 
their Gini coefficient of incomes because a larger amount of poor are contrasted with a smaller amount 
of rich. Urban states tend to have less overall differences, but more rich opposed to relatively fewer poor. 
The resulting pattern of inequality is quite different.   
12 These rates vary substantially between states, years and data sources (see section 3.4 below). 
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developed, more unequal states in Venezuela. Figure 3-2 shows that the 2007 state-level HDI is 
significantly positively correlated13 (r=.68, p=.00) with average homicide rates14.  
Figure 3-2 State-level correlation HDI 2007 and Homicide Rates (2010-2011 average) (N=24) (Data 
source: CICPC INE) 
 
 
Predominantly urban states with higher levels of aggregate human development also have 
higher homicide rates. Further, the average state-level Gini coefficient correlates negatively (r= 
–.43, p=.04)  with average homicide rates as shown in Figure 3-3 below.  
Figure 3-3 State-level correlation Gini Coefficient and Homicide Rates (2010-2011 average) (N=24) 
(Data source: CICPC, INE) 
 
                                                          
13 Note that, strictly statistically speaking, two time series should not be correlated as they may both 
reflect ‘trends of time’, see e.g. (Johansen, 2007). 
14 These are averaged for 2010-2011. Taking an average allegedly improves data reliability by avoiding 
year-on-year variation that is due to error rather than actual trends (Neapolitan, 1997). This practice may 
actually hide what is specific about homicide rates, its variation, see section 3.4 for an exploration thereof.   
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Even at the state level, the relationship between inequality and violence does not show the 
expected positive correlation. Quite the opposite, states that have bigger income differences 
between all residents tend to have lower homicide rates.  
 
It is relatively easy to match data on inequality and violence at these political-administrative 
levels because they are more or less readily available. While these administrative boundaries do 
reflect some longstanding rural-urban cleavages in Venezuelan society (Briceño-León, 1992; 
Gruson, 2006) they hide many others15. These boundaries obscure the locally felt inequalities 
that are the subject of this thesis. They hide in particular a more meaningful boundary that runs 
right across these administrative divisions, that between informal barrios and serviced centres.  
 
According to some sources, more than 80% of homicides occur in the barrio16, but the barrio has 
no administrative boundaries within or between which to calculate inequality measures. 
Aggregate numbers hide cleavages between the barrio and the centre, but also importantly 
within the barrio. To fully grasp the lived reality of these differences in chapter 5, I first delve a 
little deeper into Venezuela’s demographic and political past and present. In what follows, I 
briefly explore the profound polarisation of Venezuelan society, rooted in colonial times. I then 
explore recent social change, which gave rise to claims of a ‘Venezuelan paradox’ explored in 
Chapter 1.  
3.3 The origins, meaning and relative inertia of inequality 
In Venezuela’s cities, the traditionally rich and poor live, quite literally, worlds apart. These two 
worlds, though adjacent, obtained their own logics.  
 
                                                          
15 Roche’s (2009) analysis of Housing Adequacy in Venezuela looks at census tract differences in Caracas 
and shows how the two extremes of the index he created, top and bottom housing adequacy, live next to 
each other in an area of Western Caracas. These types of differences are instantly observable in real life, 
but masked by aggregate state, municipality and even parish-level measures.  
16 Many authors state this figure. In one article Zubillaga (2013) traces this to a victimisation survey 
conducted in 2009, where 83% of reported homicides were reported by lower-classes, nevertheless this 
reflects a low base size, only 1% of reported incidents were homicides.   
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The traditionally well-to-do live in 
serviced centres. That is also where 
they work, go to school, shop and 
play. There are office buildings, 
schools, universities, hospitals, 
frequent police patrols, shopping 
centres and metro stations. These 
are not necessarily central state 
institutions; they are often privately 
or municipally funded. Many 
residents have expensive SUVs to 
move around the insecure public spaces in between work, home and leisure. These relatively 
central 17  areas are a mix of hypermodern 18  office buildings (see Picture 3-1), gated 
condominiums and relatively quiet, tree-lined boulevards. Plazas and parks bring select groups 
of people together for coffee, domino, or even yoga. Police are visibly present on its streets.  
 
The barrio traditionally houses the less well-off, mostly second and third generation internal and 
Latin American migrants that moved to the city in search of better lives. They constructed their 
houses in informal enclaves, on the outskirts of serviced centres. The city thus informally 
expanded into surrounding hills and wastelands. Many barrios are quite consolidated today, 
with neighbours that have known each other for generations and extended families building in 
each other’s direct vicinity. In 
Caracas, physical limits to this 
expansion have led to a particular 
architecture, upwards rather than 
outwards, new generations building 
their houses on top of the old (Rosas 
Meza, 2009). Housing conditions 
generally deteriorate the further 
into the surrounding hills one 
ventures (see Picture 3-2). Homes 
often expand as the family grows – 
                                                          
17 The richest people also live in the mountains around Caracas, where there is little social life at all.  
18 At least in Caracas. 
Picture 3-1 Office building in Central Caracas, 2012 
 
Picture 3-2 Zink shacks at the top of the barrio, Caracas 
2012 
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housing parents, children, cousins, nephews, lovers, in some cases acquaintances that might 
need somewhere to stay. Some barrio residents have motorbikes, but they do not often have 
cars like people in the centre. Those that work in the centre face a lengthy commute, youngsters 
skipping down windy staircases, the elderly boarding customised jeeps to join the flocks of 
commuters on heavily congested metro and informal buses. Shopping and leisure facilities have 
developed in these informal sectors too, though they are rowdy and chaotic in comparison to 
the secured shopping centres of the centre. Rubbish lines the colourful wish-wash of alleyways. 
Informal merchants sell their goods on the street – anything from greasy takeaways to 
telephone calls, pirated DVDs and mototaxi services.  
 
This distinction between serviced centres and informal barrios is present right across more 
traditional administrative divisions. Almost every serviced centre has an informally constructed 
area in its vicinity. Even lower-level municipal and parish boundaries are not good indicators of 
whether they are more barrio or more centre. Aggregate income differences within or between 
these boundaries thus often hide more variation than they highlight similarities. In this section I 
evaluate the historical evolution of these boundaries, paying particular attention to recent 
changes under Chávez. 
3.3.1 The short 20th century; rapid urbanisation, oil wealth and the rise of Chávez 
Latin America experienced a demographic explosion in the second half of the 20th century; its 
population tripled between 1950 and 2000 (Brea, 2003). This provoked massive internal 
migrations to the cities and rapid urbanisation of the continent. Venezuela was no exception. 
Until the 1990s it had one of the highest population growth rates in the world (Audain, 2014; 
World Bank, 2014). The 1920 census counted barely 2.5 million people; less than 100 years later, 
in 2011 there were 27 million (INE, 2013). The vast majority (94%) of these people live in urban19 
areas; Venezuela is the most urbanised country in Latin America (Bolívar, 2008). This explosive 
population growth was not matched by equivalent growth in state services and institutions, 
which were arguably weak to start with, as a result of centuries of colonial rule20  and the 
                                                          
19 Settlements of 25,000+ people. 
20 The foundations of Venezuela’s pattern of inequality were arguably laid in colonial times. Galeano (2004) 
describes how state institutions in Latin America were not based on centuries of internal contention like 
European institutions, they were imported by the colonisers. Mineral wealth and commodities were 
extracted and exported to the Spanish crown, the colonial state never had a relationship to those that 
maintained it. This created a ‘class’ of European descendants that relied on indigenous peoples and 
African slaves for physical labour. The discovery of oil arguably further entrenched these patterns, see 
footnote below.  
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discovery and exploitation of oil21 (Coronil, 1997). The traditionally rich, often descendants of 
European22  migrants, maintained control over the oil economy and settled in well-serviced 
centres. The traditionally poor, often internal migrants, worked their land and factories and 
predominantly23 assembled their own housing and services in surrounding informal areas known 
as barrios. Relationships with an elitist state in the barrio were arguably always clientelist, 
exercised through co-optation of the catholic church and neighbourhood associations (Ellner 
and Salas, 2005). Population growth predominantly occurred in the barrio, placing already 
limited public services under increasing pressure. In Caracas, Bolivar (2008) tracks the 
population living in informal barrios from 14% in 1941 over 42% in 1978, to 56% in 200624. Today, 
people are moving ever further out, expanding the barrio into various satellite cities and 
instigating a process of ‘metropolisation’ (Barrios, 2008; Pedrazzini, 1995). These developments 
generated a distinct pattern of inequality; contra-posing a wealthy, predominantly white, 
minority that controlled oil, politics and state, to a mixed-race majority that had little access to 
or influence over state institutions (Pedrazzini, 2008). Physical separation between barrio and 
centre, subsequent lack of contact and stereotype continuously reproduce these two worlds, 
generating a durable inequality that is not captured by the Gini coefficient.  
 
In February 1989 these two worlds came to a violent head; a rise in transport fees on the back 
of prolonged structural reform and adjustments sparked the ‘Caracazo’, popularly known as ‘the 
day the barrio descended’. The government violently put down the looting and protests, 
resulting in hundreds of deaths. Subsequent governments remained severely affected by 
economic turbulence, corruption scandals and largely unable to (re-)connect with the poor 
majority. It is in this climate of polarisation and uncertainty that Chávez –himself from the 
barrio– first took centre stage as a protagonist of a failed military coup in 1992. Six years later 
                                                          
21 Oil was discovered in the 1920s. Some authors argue that oil economies, because they are not reliant 
on income taxes to build state-citizen relationships, have less developed institutions, this is known as the 
resource curse (Di John, 2009). Di John (2009) shows how a mismanagement of oil wealth led to 
institutional underdevelopment in Venezuela. Further he shows how an economy too singularly 
dependent on oil exports generates financial distortions, as these economies heavily subject to inflation 
and economic booms and busts.  
22 In 1961, 68% of immigrants were born in Europe, compared to 11% in 2011 (INE, 2014). Migrants today 
are mostly Latin Americans (from Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, and Peru).  
23 Attempts at state construction were indeed made in oil boom periods. Perez Jimenez in the 1950s 
oversaw substantial construction programmes. His overthrow ushered in a period of democratic peace 
with two major parties signing a power share agreement known as the ‘punto fijo’ pact that came to an 
end with the election of Chávez.  
24 It is difficult to find exact national estimates, partly because definitions of ‘barrio’ vary and many 
informal settlements have consolidated into relatively serviced areas. Perez de Murzi (2008) contends 
‘more than’ 50% of urban residents live in a barrio. Bolivar (2008) using 1991 data, estimates people living 
in a barrio at 61% nationally. 
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he was elected president on a platform of emancipation, poverty reduction and redistribution. 
It is important to remember that a figure like Chávez could not have come to power in any 
country – he was both a product and expression of the crystallisation of relationships into a 
particular constellation that gave him, and the poor he always vowed to represent, a voice 
(Buxton, 2005). Echoing his election slogan of 2012, he was ‘pueblo’, the people.  
 
Politically, this inherited constellation was one of confrontation rather than dialogue. Chávez 
ratified a new constitution and soon started implementing progressive reform programmes, 
often using emergency decree powers25 over and above the arduous road of parliamentary 
negotiation. In 2002, a coup attempt and national oil strike instigated by an equally determined 
opposition sparked important reforms of the State oil company (PDVSA) and the creation of the 
‘Misiones’, social programmes that channelled food, education, housing and health care directly 
to the poor, that were funded directly through oil revenues rather than having to pass through 
the traditional state bureaucracy (Bujanda and Torres, 2008). Power to the people through 
participation, local organisation and governance was always a pet concern in what was dubbed 
the ‘Bolivarian revolution’ or ‘21st century socialism’ as Chávez veered further towards the 
ideological left (Ellner, 2010; Wilpert, 2011). This concern found full expression in the promotion 
from 2006 onwards of local community councils, Consejos Comunales, which can claim money 
for community projects directly from the central government, bypassing established local 
governance bodies and neighbourhood associations.  
 
By the time of my fieldwork, these changes were in full swing. In 2012, an important election 
year, favourable oil prices subsidised at least two dozen different Misiones, from free basic 
education and health care, to considerable housing projects and subsidised food outlets. The 
Chávez years were also a veritable oil bonanza, oil prices grew steadily but dramatically, from 
$12 per barrel in 1999 to $105 in 2012 (Indexmundi 2014). With changes to PDVSA mentioned 
above, this windfall was injected into social programmes, with marked effects on a wide number 
of aggregate development indicators (see Chapter 1, p.4). These changes, in combination with 
rising homicide rates initiated claims of a Venezuelan paradox as elaborated in Chapter 1.  
 
Nevertheless, these aggregate changes ignore the dimensions of inequality that are theorised 
to bear particularly negatively on violence. That Venezuelans are better off on average does not 
                                                          
25 ‘Leyes habilitantes’ which give the president the power to approve decrees without parliamentary 
approval in cases of national emergency.  
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mean they all are. Further, people’s opportunities and relationships may not have changed as 
dramatically as their expectations. In what follows the supposed Venezuelan paradox is 
demystified as a case of indicator inadequacy rather than evidence that inequality does not 
relate to violence. Changes in the Gini coefficient do not necessarily reflect changes in people’s 
opportunities or relationships. These observations further justify the collection of micro-level 
interactional data to assess the mechanisms by which inequality and violence might relate to 
each other.  
3.3.2 Chávez’ divided legacy: a stationary revolution?  
All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal 
than others  
(Orwell, 1946, p.133) 
 
This section evaluates the influence of Chávez’ policies on inter- and intra-class relationships, 
arguing that in terms of these relationships, little may have changed.  
3.3.2.1 ‘Fatherland, socialism or death’26, the reproduction of class boundaries 
That political power changed hands did little to alleviate historical class polarisation (Woloski, 
2005). The Bolivarian revolution did not build (m)any bridges between the barrio and the centre. 
People still live separate lives; they even speak and look different. Though Venezuela’s people 
stress its multiculturalism and often deny racial issues, skin colour still is an indication of wealth 
and class (Ciccariello-Maher, 2007; Salas, 2005). It is the result of centuries of polarisation and 
the absence of ties between a white colonial power that settled in serviced centres and a 
peasant workforce that mixed with foreign slaves and built informal houses around these 
serviced areas. Categorical differences between criollos and mestizos institutionalised through 
the alignment of political and economic power along these racial and geographic lines, 
generating two distinct groups of people. Geographical boundaries that cross-cut the city 
became real over the years, attained meaning.  
 
                                                          
26 ‘Patria, socialismo o muerte’, election slogan used by Chávez. 
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Tilly (1998) called this durable inequality; when economic  inequality flows along categorical 
lines, such as race or geography, it tends to reproduce itself through various relational 
mechanisms. When political power changed hands with the election of Chávez, this did not 
suddenly undo centuries of class relationships. Even if the bottom is now in power, it is still 
visibly different from the top, reflecting this durable inequality. Before the elections in October 
2012, both government and opposition groups organised mass marches on Caracas, images of 
which are shown in Picture 3-3 and Picture 3-4, respectively. ‘Chavistas’27 were disorganised, 
motorized, rowdy and physically bigger and darker skinned. Their march originated in lower 
middle-class areas in Western Caracas. The opposition marched predominantly through higher-
class areas in the East of the capital. In comparison, 
it was a well-organised event, with relatively white, 
healthy-looking people, jubilant and equally 
convinced of an oncoming victory28.  
 
A physical lack of interaction (as we will see in 
Chapter 5) and an emotional layer of entrenched, 
often racial, stereotypes of the other continue to 
reproduce this class divide, even if incomes 
recently converged. People in the barrio are seen 
as ‘marginales’, or ‘flojos’ – uneducated, and lazy. 
The channelling of resources directly to them has 
not helped these perceptions. People from the 
centre, on the other hand, are called ‘sifrinos’, 
‘majunches’ or ‘escualidos’ – elitist and scrawny 
snobs, quite literally. Taxis will not take you into 
the barrio. People judge you, on both sides of the boundary29.  
 
                                                          
27 As Chávez followers are called as his incumbent, Maduro, continues the policies of ‘Chavismo’.  
28 This conviction can also be seen as an effect of the lack of links between barrio and centre; everyone in 
their networks, their mirror on the world, votes for the opposition. These people find it hard to grasp 
people vote for Chávez freely, as they often do not have contact with anyone that does.  
29 Mentioning in the barrio that I lived in a central area was often a confirmation of what my white skin 
spelled out long before; my belonging to a different class, a rich and wealthy elite. In the centre, my 
motivations were questioned, I was often criticised for supporting Chávez merely because I was doing 
research in the barrio. I will explore these perceptions and how they affected my fieldwork in more detail 
in Chapter 4 (p.110). 
Picture 3-3 Chávez supporters holding a 
picture of Simon Bolivar on a pre-election 
march, October 2012
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Where previous governments failed to connect 
with the poor, Chávez alienated the traditional 
upper segments. People of the traditionally upper-
classes feel disenchanted by a binary discourse 
that excludes and stigmatises them, even from the 
right to a ‘fatherland’30.  
 
In all, the geographic boundaries between the 
barrio and the centre do retain their political and 
class meaning; the centre remains predominantly 
upper-class and unified in its opposition to 21st 
century socialism. Political change did not alleviate 
the barrio/centre divide. Nevertheless, the 
boundaries of the barrio themselves are not 
necessarily relevant indicators of wealth nor 
politics31 . The next section looks at how recent 
changes may have affected perceptions and relationships within the barrio. As Venezuela’s 
deadly violence predominantly occurs in the barrio, inequalities within the barrio may be more 
important in understanding this violence. 
3.3.2.2 The barrio; expectations, institutions and uncertainties in ‘21st century socialism’ 
The barrio today is a true Latin mix of race, tastes and convictions – some of its residents are 
professionals that make a very good living, and certainly not everyone supports Chávez. This 
section looks at how changes under Chávez may have affected barrio residents’ conditions in 
terms of their expectations and opportunities, as well as relationships and access to institutions.  
3.3.2.3 A revolution of expectations  
A discourse of equality and empowerment has indeed affected most barrio residents’ 
perceptions of their opportunities positively. In 2000, just 15% of Venezuelans interviewed in 
                                                          
30 See election slogan to introduce this section, as well as ‘los que quieren patria vengan conmigo’, those 
who want a fatherland, join me. 
31 Chávez obtained 55% of the total national vote in the 2012 presidential elections, a number that reflects 
important geographical and class differences. According to figures from the CNE, the National Electoral 
Council, in upper-class areas, such as El Cafetal, and certain areas of Chacao, his opponent Capriles won 
over 90% (in some neighbourhoods almost 100%) of votes. In the barrio, however, support for the 
opposition remains, particularly among the Catholic Church and organisations that were co-opted by 
previous governments. In the parish of ‘el 23’, a well-known chavista stronghold, Chávez received a much 
smaller majority of 66%. He tends to get bigger majorities in poorer, rural states. 
Picture 3-4 Opposition supporter holding a 
proud to be ‘Majunche’ sign on a pre-
election march, September 2012 
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the Latinobarometro survey classified themselves as 6 or more on a scale of 1 (poorest) to 10 
(richest), in 2011 47% did so. Moreover, satisfaction with life doubled from 41% in 1997 to 80% 
in 2011. My fieldwork data also suggest the poor felt more empowered under Chávez. Moses, a 
21 year old army recruit echoed a recurrent sentiment in the barrio insisting that; ‘before 
[Chávez] you only counted if you had money, without money you were not worth anything’. 
Interestingly, he was just 7 when Chávez came to power, so it is doubtful he clearly remembers 
what came before. Instead, it seems that his mother and older brothers continue to remind him 
of the turbulent politics of the 80s and 90s where consecutive ‘elitist’ governments reneged on 
their election promises and implemented profound structural reform programmes32. In contrast 
to these times, the changes of the Chávez era are felt and welcomed by almost everyone in the 
barrio. 
 
Even so, where Chávez generated a true ‘revolution of expectations’ (Salamanca, 2011), 
opportunities may not have followed suit. The levels of anomie and strain (see chapter 2) in the 
barrio, or the discrepancy between expectations and opportunities, have not necessarily 
reduced. Redistribution was achieved mainly through the Misiones, social programmes 
discussed above. They did indeed substantially improve average living conditions. Nevertheless, 
it is often questioned to what extent subsidised supermarkets, universal pensions, free housing 
and education are a continuation of paternalistic politics rather than empowerment and 
emancipation (Machado, 2009; Mariñez, 2010; Mundó, 2009). It is not clear to what extent 
people’s capabilities, and predominantly those of the poor, did indeed improve. The 
convergence of incomes, for instance, is reflected more in a gradual decrease in the (reported) 
33 incomes of the rich rather than substantial increase in the incomes of the poor. In 2012, the 
richest 20% of the population had lost 16% of its 1997 income share, but they still owned 45% 
of the total income share. The income share of the poorest fifth remained relatively stable, rising 
from 4 to just 5% (INE, 2013). Similarly, unemployment figures halved from 12% in 1999 to 6% 
in 2012 (BCV, 2014), and the percentage of people working in a more secure formal sector 
improved from 50% to 59%34. Nevertheless, we will see in Chapter 5 that many barrio residents 
continue to work in informal professions, and also have little access to more secure job 
                                                          
32 ‘Paquetazos’. This record is strongly embedded in the collective memory of the barrio. 
33 These trends may be partly influenced by unreliable data. In particular, there might be a growing 
reluctance to accurately report incomes, in light of government discourse and policy (cf. expropriations) 
that is often perceived as anti-rich (Briceño-León; Spanakos, 2010). 
34  These data are also questioned as beneficiaries of the Misiones are no longer included in 
unemployment statistics (Huerta, 2014).  
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opportunities through their contacts. Where opportunities were theoretically opened up to all, 
practice does not necessarily change that quickly.  
 
Further, the redistribution of incomes and opportunities, and access to government 
programmes is often seen to be conditional upon political support35 (Bolívar, 2008; Machado, 
2009; Riutort, 2009). Orwell’s ironical quote introducing this section frequently returned during 
my fieldwork as people sneered; ‘we’re all meant to be equals but some are definitely more 
equal than others’. People in the barrio certainly feel better off in comparison to their past selves. 
However, they may feel deprived in relation to their peers, especially if those peers are seen to 
have benefited through mere political affiliation. It is conceivable a discourse of radical change 
has generated more resentment among those that have not benefited versus those that have. 
Against the background of this discourse of equality and state provision, there are no more 
excuses for remaining poor, poverty becomes an individual liability. Many people, even in the 
barrio, commented that people whom remain poor today, amongst these changes, do so 
because they are ‘flojo’, lazy. Where an elitist state may have absolved some responsibility for 
poverty in the past, a consequence of a state that works for the poor is that the poor today are 
blamed individually. Political empowerment of the barrio may thus have instilled a sense of 
entitlement that may have been absent before, potentially increasing felt inequity, resentment 
and strain if people’s opportunities do not match these expectations. Chapter 5 will evaluate 
primary data on people’s opportunities and expectations. They suggest many people continue 
to feel deprived generally, though not necessarily in comparison to their interaction groups. 
Further, chapter 6 will show these perceptions are not necessarily related to violence.  
 
3.3.2.4 The continuation of uncertainty and informality  
What unites the barrio in its diversity is a historical absence of formal institutions 36 . The 
Venezuelan ‘state’37  always intervened indirectly (horizontally rather than vertically) in the 
                                                          
35 Several people told me they only got their jobs in state institutions, or were not hired, after they were 
asked for their political affiliation. To which extent this is a general tendency is difficult to ascertain. These 
people were predominantly opposition supporters.    
36 Smilde (2005) speaks of an ‘institutional vacuum’. 
37 I use quotation marks, as the ‘state’ has always been quite personally interpreted as ‘the president’ 
(Coronil, 1997). During my fieldwork period, the state was Chávez; his picture adorned building sites, 
hospitals and consejos comunales, as if he was personally responsible for people’s well-being. The 
newspaper featured a section where people asked him to resolve various problems. He would often 
respond to these very personal requests, sometimes based on an evaluation of merit, other times much 
more haphazardly, e.g. the 3rd million follower of his twitter account was given a new house. Mariñez 
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barrio, through civil society organisations, the Catholic Church and neighbourhood 
associations 38 . It exerted influence through the co-optation of these organisations. Barrio 
residents predominantly rely on informal bonds and bridges for the provision of security in the 
broad sense of the word – jobs, services, food, health, housing and crime control39. Formal 
institutions are little trusted in Venezuela. Figure 3-4 shows Latinobarometro data for 
confidence in some institutions in 2011, with the most trusted institutions at the top.  
Figure 3-4 Trust in institutions as measured by Latinobarometro, 201140 (N=1,200) 
 
 
                                                          
(2010) considers this personal relationship between the state and the people as a major impediment to 
development of trust in institutions. 
38 These organisations often provide state services, such as education, rubbish collection and public works 
in the barrio. 
39 One particular image that remains with me is quite illustrative of an on-going absence of state in health 
and crime control. Where Anderson (2000) describes how ambulances have difficulty negotiating the 
Philadelphian ghetto, in the Venezuelan barrio ambulances are not even seen. People rely on their own 
resources to get their wounded (and dead) to hospital. This way, one Tuesday about lunchtime, a 
motorbike pulled into the emergency department at one of the public hospitals in western Caracas. It 
carried two young men, early twenties, one grasping on to the other. As they got off the motorcycle, the 
shortest boy clasped his chest. I suddenly noticed the dark red stain, just above his heart, on his otherwise 
white t-shirt. The youngsters entered hospital staggering, only to come back out a minute or so later. 
There were no surgeons, or they were already busy that day. They got back on the bike, this time more 
weakly and desperately hanging on, the bloody stain growing bigger, as they disappeared hooting their 
way through traffic, in desperate pursuit of the next hospital. The police officer guarding the emergency 
department later told me that the boy had apparently attempted to rob a bus at gunpoint, but had been 
shot himself by an off-duty officer on that same bus. There had been no formal interventions – whether 
medical or legal.  No one even seemed to blink an eye. 
40 Note trust in Consejos Comunales is taken from a different survey by Centro Gumilla (Salamanca, 2011) 
and thus not necessarily comparable. Although trust in police and church is at comparable levels to these 
Latinobarometro data. 
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The Catholic Church traditionally receives most trust, with 61% saying they have confidence in 
it. The police and justice system get particularly low confidence, almost three quarters (73%) say 
they have little or no confidence in the police. Impunity and judicial delays are endemic. PROVEA 
(2013) reports that of 48,262 prisoners in 2012, just 31% had received a sentence, and 63% were 
being processed41 . Venezuela’s various state, municipal and investigative police forces are 
plagued by corruption and records of human rights abuses (Red de Apoyo, 2006). Where the 
centre is sometimes seen to be over-policed (Antillano, 2009), the state’s monopoly on violence 
is questioned in the barrio (Smilde and Pérez, 2014). 
 
In some areas, such as ‘el 23 de enero’ in Caracas, infamous ‘colectivos’, armed revolutionary 
groups, manage crime control. They are quietly sanctioned by the state and take care of any 
wrongdoing within their territory. In el 23, the police station redundantly functions as a 
community centre42. Other barrios have not quite got more or less accepted informal crime 
control agencies – security is often a cat and mouse between malandros and police. These 
malandros are local boys that have grown up within the barrio, they are the sons and nephews 
of age-old friends and neighbours. They are sometimes trusted more than a historically arbitrary 
police force, which nevertheless is more than 90% barrio (Diaz and Sayago, 2012). The police are 
frequently referred to as ‘uniformed malandros’. However, that formal social control is absent 
does not mean people are not subject to informal social control, in fact, informal social control 
may be more prevalent in the barrio than in the centre, as I will argue in Chapter 5. Further, 
Chapter 7 will evaluate the institutionalisation of el malandreo as an informal governance 
system that underwrites a particularly violent, deadly and contagious form of social control. 
Picture 3-5 ‘Mision Vivienda’ construction sites with Chávez brand 
 
                                                          
41 The Venezuelan Violence Observatory states that only 9 people are detained for every 100 homicides, 
but it is unclear where these data were obtained. Many authors claim 90% of homicides are never solved, 
but they link to each other without citing a clear original source.  
42 A leader of one of these colectivos explained this evolution to me in an interview, showing me the 
community centre and explaining how they take care of any wrongdoing in the community.   
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In the last 15 years, the state moved into the barrio more openly, building parallel systems of 
governance and health. The Misiones, often branded with a Chávez logo (see Picture 3.3), 
substantially improved general living conditions. Housing projects relocated those that lost their 
homes due to floods, and a ‘revolutionary’ police force wanders a number of trailblazer barrios 
in Caracas and beyond (Hanson, 2014a). Arguably, more formal jobs (in expanding state 
institutions) also opened up to the people of the barrio.  
 
Longitudinal Latinobarometro data suggest trust in institutions portrayed in Figure 3-4 improved 
recently. Nevertheless, it remains low overall and there is little evidence state institutions were 
strengthened (Smilde, 2015). PROVEA (2011) reports the number of demonstrations to have 
risen dramatically under Chávez, which it considers a symptom both of increased participation 
as well as a failure of institutions to resolve grievances. In fact, the Consejos Comunales 
undermined the power of existing municipal governments and neighbourhood associations, and 
entailed a de facto recentralisation of power in the president (Rangel Guerrero, 2008). Bringing 
health to the barrio arguably undermined resources of existing hospitals. The revolutionary 
police force is often seen, even by its own members, as weak and unable to deal with growing 
security concerns (Hanson, 2014b). A number of laws were revolutionary in content, but hardly 
implemented and had little effect on the justice system’s capacity, if not a decline in the rule of 
law (Smilde, 2015). Further, many initiatives lack continuity43.  
 
The effects of these changes on people’s actual relationships, as on their opportunities explored 
above, seem mixed. Social change itself always involves conflict (Black, 2011) and there is no 
doubt the establishment of Consejos Comunales and other social programmes disrupted local 
relationships and power dynamics in many places44. Yet, Latinobarometro data seem to indicate 
marginally increasing levels of ‘trust’, a frequently used measure of social cohesion and informal 
social control (see chapter 2). General interpersonal confidence increased from 12% in 1996 to 
25% in 2011. Aggregate measures of confidence in neighbours fluctuate around the 50% mark, 
                                                          
43 One of the opposition’s arguments is that there were 11 different ministers of justice under Chávez, but 
comparing the previous 12 year period there had also been 12. Again, this testifies of a continuation of 
old patterns rather than revolutionary change. 
44 Many Consejos Comunales are confronted with internal problems, they argue, split and reform. Two 
factions of one particular Consejo Comunal I visited had fallen out over workloads, so one of them just 
formed an entirely new Consejo Comunal, claiming a different street as their catchment area. These 
organisations are often distrusted as Figure 3-4 shows and I will explore in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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from 49% in 2003, over 68% in 2006, back to 54% in 2009. These data tell us equally little of 
people’s interactions and relationships.  
 
As mentioned above, access to social programmes is often seen to be politically motivated. 
There is at least a continuation, if not an increasing sense, of uncertainty. The lack of truly 
overarching rules in Venezuela has many people talk of a constant revolution or crisis, they have 
little idea what tomorrow will bring. This continuity of uncertainty and informality may have the 
most dramatic impact on violence, as we will explore in the chapters to follow. In all, Chavez’ 
legacy, at least on institutions and relationships, may be one of continuity rather than 
revolutionary change (Uzcátegui, 2010). 
3.3.3 Summary 
In summary, there is little doubt that 2012 had a more egalitarian income distribution than 1997 
and that the everyday reality of many Venezuelans was transformed for the better. It is much 
more questionable to what extent this was achieved through the creation of jobs, the 
transformation of relationships or the strengthening of state institutions rather than dependent 
on oil revenues that funded social programmes, and a continuation of clientelist politics. In many 
ways, Chávez’ policy was a continuation of top-down paternalistic politics rather than the 
implementation of bottom-up, participatory democracy (Smilde and Hellinger, 2011). Thus, the 
effects of inequality that are theoretically important in the aetiology of violence were not 
necessarily affected by reducing overall income inequality. Objective changes in the aggregate 
income distribution hide that people may still be motivated to become violent. Social change 
may have created new fault lines, within poor areas, between people that have benefited from 
social programmes and others that have not (Motta, 2011; Spanakos, 2010). Further, a declining 
Gini coefficient is no evidence there are better relationships or more informal social control on 
people’s behaviour. Social change may have disrupted the relationships that are meant to 
provide social control.  
 
Having evaluated some of the trends behind these aggregate numbers, there is little reason to 
suggest, as does an intuitive reading of the declining Gini coefficient, that violence should go 
down. Nevertheless, it is difficult to match these observations to a more or less dramatic rise in 
homicides. The next section shows this rise in homicide rates is not uniform. Many states, 
municipalities and parishes remain relatively immune to homicide, suggesting perhaps national 
policies and changes matter less than do local inequalities and relationships.  
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In all, these observations remain mostly speculations that justify looking at people’s 
relationships in more detail. Venezuela’s political-administrative boundaries tell us very little 
about differences between the barrio and the centre, or how people’s opportunities, 
expectations and relationships may have changed. The data to accurately evaluate people’s daily 
interactions and relationships, and how they may prevent people from or indeed motivate them 
to use violence, are lacking. The following chapter outlines the strategies that were used to 
collect these data, before analysing them in the empirical chapters that follow. First, I explore in 
more detail Venezuela’s deadly violence.  
3.4 Homicide in Venezuela, the characteristics of deadly violence. 
The introduction to this chapter made reference to a number of statistics that lend Venezuela 
the sad reputation of being the second most violent country in the world. This section explores 
these data in more detail. It shows that homicide rates have not increased steadily or 
dramatically, rather they ebb and flow. Further, they do not necessarily reflect ‘everyday 
violence’, violence that expresses itself in verbal and physical aggression and more often occurs 
between people that know each other. The homicide rate is driven by guns and 
disproportionately affects young, barrio men. It seems to spread through interactions between 
malandros, a colloquial term for delinquents of various trades and assignations that identify with 
el malandreo, a Venezuelan gangster identity.  
3.4.1 The gradual spread of deadly violence 
Figure 3-5 below shows the evolution of Venezuela’s homicide rate between 1987 and 2009.  
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Figure 3-5 Homicides registered by police and health organisations, 1987 – 200945 (Source: MPPS, 
CICPC, Chacon 2012) 
 
 
It was already established that the 16,072 homicides recorded in 2012 are the most on record 
in Venezuela, and represent a dramatic rise since the 1980s. Nevertheless, this figure shows the 
last few decades have not seen a continuous rise in the homicide rate. We can identify periods 
of stagnation and even decline; a cumulative ebb and flow that echoes ‘boom and bust’ or even 
‘rollercoaster’ patterns found in other countries (Fagan et al., 2007; Goertzel et al., 2012) 46.  
 
Further, the national homicide rate hides important variation across and within administrative 
boundaries. Table 3-1 shows the state-level firearm mortality rate as recorded by health 
                                                          
45 Latest available year for health data is 2011. Note the discrepancy between health and police sources. 
In health statistics, ‘deaths with undetermined intent’ are recorded separately from ‘deaths due to 
aggression’, i.e. ‘homicide’. The former show an incremental rise since 1991, also when discrepancies start 
occurring. This is particularly the case in the Capital District, Vargas and Miranda, all areas served by the 
Caracas morgue. It is highly plausible that the policy there is to classify deaths as ‘undetermined intent’ 
rather than ‘due to aggression’. In 2010 for instance, only 61 deaths were classified as ‘homicide’ in the 
Capital District, whereas 1,994 were classified as ‘undetermined intent’. It’s interesting to note that when 
all firearm deaths are added together, including those of undetermined intent, accidents and suicides, the 
police and health lines converge, as indicated by the dotted blue line in Error! Reference source not 
found.. Police homicide figures in turn, do not include ‘investigations’ nor ‘resistance to authority’. People 
killed in ‘legal’ (read: police) interventions are recorded separately, and thus do not make it into the 
category ‘homicide’. NGOs such as the Venezuelan Violence Observatory add these and a proportion of 
‘unresolved’ incidents to their tally, reporting much higher homicide rates, 73 per 100,000 in 2012 
compared to an official rate of 54. Homicide rates thus also reflect more arbitrary differences in definitions 
and recording practices. Importantly, peaks and throws are registered in both sources, reaffirming the 
validity of general trends (Gabaldon et al., 2012).  
46 Fagan and Wilkinson (2007) studied New York homicide rates, which continued to rise along a roller-
coaster pattern, each peak setting new base levels. However, New York never reached as high peaks as 
Venezuela’s homicide rate and finally receded in the 1990s.  
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instances in 1990, 2001 and 200947, ranked by 2010 police homicide rate. Compound average 
growth rates (CAGR)48 were calculated to measure average percentage growth.  
Table 3-1 State-level firearm mortality (MPPS) and homicide (CICPC) rates (per 100,000 population) 
State Firearm mortality rate (MPPS) Homicide 
rate 
(CICPC 
2010) 1990 2001 1990-
2001 
CAGR 
2009 2001-
2009 
CAGR 
Capital District (Caracas) 45 74 5% 96 3% 73 
Carabobo (Valencia) 12 54 15% 80 5% 61 
Miranda (Caracas) 18 49 10% 77 6% 59 
Aragua (Maracay) 6 47 20% 61 3% 49 
Nueva Esparta 3 28 22% 67 12% 47 
Vargas * 61 * 97 6% 46 
Cojedes 5 25 16% 42 6% 45 
Bolívar (Ciudad Guayana) 9 37 14% 55 5% 40 
Guárico 6 26 14% 34 4% 39 
Táchira (San Cristobal) 4 14 11% 38 14% 38 
Barinas 5 17 11% 56 16% 33 
Lara (Barquisimeto) 6 26 15% 39 5% 33 
Sucre 2 18 21% 55 15% 29 
Anzoátegui 6 21 15% 37 10% 28 
Yaracuy 5 22 13% 47 8% 28 
Monagas 4 18 14% 26 5% 26 
Portuguesa (Guanare) 6 35 18% 28 -3% 25 
Trujillo 9 21 8% 26 2% 25 
Delta Amacuro 1 9 14% 16 3% 21 
Zulia (Maracaibo) 8 34 21% 44 8% 21 
Apure 6 19 11% 31 10% 19 
Mérida 4 14 12% 30 6% 19 
Amazonas 2 5 12% 10 5% 15 
Falcón 4 14 8% 20 9% 15 
Venezuela 11 35 11% 53 5% 39 
 
Two important observations can be made. First, the relatively major surges in firearm violence 
occurred in the years between 1990 and 2001 rather than in the last decade. In 1990, many 
states, even some containing the urban centres, had relatively low levels of firearm related 
deaths. Their homicide rates all rose by substantial annual percentages between 1990 and 2001. 
                                                          
47 This includes all firearm-related deaths recorded in health statistics. Arguably, this is a better reflection 
of homicides than ‘homicide’ category as it appears recording policy changed and health instances started 
recording incidents as ‘unknown intent’. See footnote 45. Disaggregated police statistics are not available 
going back to 1990. Unfortunately these state-level health data are only available for these particular 
years. 
48 CAGR = Compound Annual Growth Rate = (((year 2/year 1)^(1/number of years))-1)*100 
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Though the absolute number of deaths is far higher in 2009 than it was in 2001, the relative rise 
in this decade is small in comparison. Only Táchira and Barinas saw larger average growth rates 
between 2001 and 2009 than between 1990 and 2001. Secondly, homicide rates are not stable 
within these state boundaries. States that have a high homicide rate one year do not necessarily 
do so the following. In fact, relative rankings fluctuate dramatically between years and data 
sources49. The evolution of homicide rates in the states where my fieldwork sites are located 
illustrates this ebb and flow (see Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4). The state of Sucre had the second 
lowest homicide rate in 1990 (2/100,000), it then rose by an average annual 21% moving up 
from 23rd to 17th most violent state in 2001. By 2009 it came 8th (55/100,000) in this morbid 
ranking. The Capital District on the other hand, only saw marginal rises but also dramatic 
fluctuations. Homicide rates were high to begin with, as if they reached a platform and other 
states are playing catch-up. Most recent (incomplete) statistics for 201250 show that homicides 
in the Capital District declined by 11%, from 1,957, in 2011 to 1,743 in 2012. Two states, Miranda 
and Carabobo, had higher levels of violence in 2012 than the Capital District (Reverol, 2013). 
What is certain is that all states did indeed see a substantial rise in their homicide rate since 
1990, but this was more gradual in the last decade than the national homicide rate might have 
us believe. In absolute numbers we get the dramatic rise shown in Figure 3-5, relatively this rise 
has been much steadier, and scattered across various states. These observations suggest 
national policy may have little impact on these homicide rates. 
 
A similar pattern can be observed comparing the 2001 to 2008 firearm related death rates51 in 
Venezuela’s municipalities52 more visually in Figure 3-6.  
                                                          
49 This is why many authors, a.o. Messner (1992) suggest averaging homicide rates, potentially ignoring 
exactly what makes homicide unique, its fluctuating character. 
50 Not shown because they were disclosed in a press release that did not have data for all states.  
51 Again, this includes all firearm related incidents recorded by health instances, including aggressions, 
suicides, accidents and incidents with unknown intent. Category created because of issues noted in 
footnote 45.   
52 For the Capital District and Vargas, lower level parishes are used, often they have as many inhabitants 
as municipalities.  
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Figure 3-6 Municipality-level firearm mortality rates, 2001 and 2008 (per 10,000 inhabitants) 
(Chacon et al., 2012)  
 
In both years, the highest levels of firearm mortality are concentrated around the urban centres 
of Caracas in the central north, Maracaibo towards the border with Colombia in the north-west, 
and Valencia, Barquisimeto and Maracay in their middle. Ciudad Guayana, an industrial town 
towards the south-east also colours dark red. These are also the 6 largest cities; all have more 
than a million inhabitants. The relatively poorer, more rural, areas of the south and east 
experience much less firearm-related deaths. We clearly see a pattern of diffusion and 
convergence between these two maps, with other regions gradually approximating the high 
homicide rates of the Capital District. Apart from the 6 main urban areas, the municipalities with 
highest homicide rates vary substantially between years of observation and data sources, they 
ebb and flow, show cyclical booms and busts (Goertzel et al., 2012). Some municipalities and 
parishes have remained relatively immune, whereas others have seen an exponential rise, 
accounting largely in and of themselves for national rising homicide rates. In all, it is the 
combined effect of the spread of deadly violence to the regions rather than ever incremental 
violence that seems to have produced Venezuela’s rising homicide rate. Simple and sudden 
institutional demise under Chavez (i.e. post 1999), as scholars like Briceño-León53 argue is a 
rather unlikely explanation of these trends. 
 
                                                          
53 E.g. he mentions in a newspaper article (Correo del Orinoco, 2014 anniversary edition) homicides 
suddenly rose after Chávez came to power, after 5 years of ‘stability’. As this analysis shows this was not 
generalised, nor sudden; they had been rising incrementally since the start of the 1990s and the data 
show subtle spread across urbanised regions rather than a sudden leap. These analyses feed into a 
generalised fear that further divides Venezuela.  
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If we disaggregate a little further, once more, we find distinct areas with high concentrations of 
deadly violence, where others hardly see any violence at all. Figure 3-7 shows homicides that 
occurred in sectors of the Capital District, in 2010, and in 2011.  
Figure 3-7 Homicides by firearm in sectors of Capital District, 2010 and 2011 (Source: Gabaldon and 
Benavides (2012), based on CICPC) 
 
 
In 2011, we see many more homicides, but they appear less concentrated. In 2012 (map 
unavailable), two thirds of homicides occurred in 8 of the Capital District’s 22 parishes. Some 
saw a substantive diminution. These patterns are more congruent with a dynamical interaction 
explanation rather than one that focuses on static essences of these areas or their inhabitants. 
With a little imagination, we can observe the ebb and flow from one sector to the next, as 
homicides incite revenge homicides in adjacent sectors. When it comes to understandings of 
their daily lives, local residents are often well ahead of the social scientists that study them. 
More often than not respondents would answer my textbook question ‘Has violence in your 
area increased, decreased or stayed the same?’ with a ‘it depends, sometimes it goes up then it 
goes down again’, or ’Sometimes it’s quiet, other times its disturbed, and you never know at 
which time … the youngsters here have a lot of problems in other areas that you don’t know of… 
so… you never know really’.  
   
Figure 3-8 aligns two geographically identical maps of Catia, the area in Western Caracas I 
selected for fieldwork. The left-hand map shows the concentration of property crime (robbery 
and theft), whereas the one on the right shows the concentration of homicide.  
2010 2011 
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It is instantly clear that, where theft and robbery are concentrated among the more consolidated 
shopping area of Catia’s Boulevard, homicide predominantly occurs in the informally 
constructed barrios that line the hills around this Boulevard. Investigation of homicide statistics 
at lower administrative levels in other countries often reveals the strong geographic 
concentration of violence in poor and disadvantaged inner-city areas (Block and Block, 1992; 
Land et al., 1990; McCall et al., 2010; Sampson and Groves, 1989). Again, it is tempting to match 
these homicide rates with structural features of these areas and/or aggregate individual 
characteristics of their residents. This ignores that only a small proportion of their residents, 
malandros, are possibly to a large extent responsible for property crimes, as well as homicides. 
This thesis argues that their motivations, at least for homicide, are not to be found in structural 
indicators, but in the pattern of relationships in which they are embedded. This type of violence 
spreads through interactions between malandros and the expectations for future interactions 
these generate. Chapter 5 shows these communities display less evidence of social 
disorganisation than of a vivid social life, where social control is exercised informally, sometimes 
by malandros themselves.  
 
Geographic disaggregation of homicide statistics tells us something about patterns of diffusion 
and concentration, but it reveals little about the micro-level, interpersonal dynamics of violence. 
That violence seems to be concentrated in these areas does not imply its residents are more 
violent, or that their characteristics would be related to violence. Most of the poor or multiply 
deprived are never violent (Collins, 2009; Wikstrom and Loeber, 2000). That deadly interactions 
seem to have spread across the country does not mean there are more violent offenders today 
than there were 10 years ago, few may simply commit more crimes, or more deadly crimes. 
Nevertheless, most studies explain homicide rates through characteristics of the areas where 
Figure 3-8 Concentration of property crime and homicide in Catia, 2011. (Source: Bastidas, UNES) 
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they occur, or even characteristics of their residents. Many studies thus incorrectly infer 
individual-level motivations from aggregate official statistics (Hojman, 2004). The next section 
argues these homicides do not stem from interactions between all residents, and are perhaps a 
bad reflection of everyday violence. They seem indicative of increasingly violent interactions 
between malandros.  
3.4.2 The characteristics of deadly violence  
3.4.2.1 Public opinion 
Lagos and Dammert (2012), in an analysis of Latinobarometro data, compare reports of 
victimisation54 against perceptions that ‘delinquency is the main problem facing the country’; 
Venezuela stands out in Latin America for having the highest discrepancy between fear and 
actual victimisation. Figure 3-9 shows that reported victimisation in Venezuela was at a 25 year 
low in 2010-11, while people that reported ‘delinquency is the main problem affecting the 
country today’ reached its peak in these same years.  
Figure 3-9 Perceptions of delinquency and victimisation rate in Venezuela, 1995-2011 (Lagos and 
Dammert, 2012) 
 
 
Although the sample sizes are too low to appreciate whether this decline is actually significant55, 
these data do suggest common crime has not necessarily risen, and homicide data may not be 
a good indicator thereof. Further, the discrepancy between victimisation rates and fear leads 
the reports’ authors to conclude that the nature rather than the quantity of crime may be more 
                                                          
54 Without distinction between types of crime e.g. with or without violence. 
55  The survey’s low base size (around 1,000 respondents annually) and consequent variance around 
parameters does not allow to conclude the victimisation rate has indeed gone down significantly. 
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important in shaping people’s perceptions. Indeed, people’s perceptions do seem to follow the 
evolution of the homicide rate (Figure 3-5) more closely than actual victimisation.  
 
Homicide data feed into an imaginary of ubiquitous violence that shapes people’s subjective life 
worlds. According to Wievorka (2009), violence has a ‘dark lure’, which is also what defines it 
best. Fascinating and repellent at once, its perceived uncontrollability plays on our innermost 
fears. Like disease, natural disasters and accidents, violence inhabits the realm of seemingly 
overpowering forces that challenge our most sacred possession, our physical integrity. Deadly 
violence in particular, is a relatively rare, but terrifying prospect. It calls up emotional images 
that shape our subjective life-worlds and interaction patterns. Objective realities of 
interpersonal violence in Venezuela weave into subjective realities that, in turn, reproduce 
violence, as Chapter 8 argues.  
 
Contrary to these perceptions, the lethal violence that anguishes Venezuelans does discriminate. 
Further, it shows some distinct characteristics in comparison to the types of violent interactions 
criminology has traditionally analysed in the more developed nations of the global North, where 
comprehensive data are more readily available. It does show important parallels with a 
particular type of violence, i.e. gun gang violence, a violence between young men that hardly 
know each other, perpetrated with guns and in public places.  
3.4.2.2 Homicide as the dubious tip of a violent iceberg 
As discussed in Chapter 2, homicide statistics are often considered the most valid proxy for 
violence. Homicide is seen to be hiding a cumulative base of unreported or undiscovered 
incidents of interpersonal violence, by mathematical extrapolation (Briceño-León et al., 2012). 
Studies in the Global North indicate more severe incidents of violence are also less frequent 
(Collins, 2009). Nevertheless, looking at limited other statistics for Venezuela, a distinct pattern 
emerges. Assault data, for instance, show a relatively low frequency in comparison to homicide. 
In fact, as the homicide rate rises, the relative number of assaults declines. Where in 1999, the 
police recorded 5.3 assaults per homicide, in 2010, there were only 1.8. This in sharp contrast 
to other countries – in England and Wales for instance, there are around 30 assaults per 
recorded murder. State-level homicide and assault rates show insignificant minor positive 
correlations, suggesting they might reflect different underlying variables. Assault data are much 
more prone to reporting and recording biases than homicide statistics. Nevertheless, allowing 
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for substantial underreporting bias 56 , the discrepancy between homicide and assault data 
suggest violence in Venezuela is uncannily deadly.  
 
Results from the victimisation survey shown in Table 3-2, confirm the deadliness of Venezuela’s 
violence, with less than 3 assaults for every homicide.  
Table 3-2 Crimes reported in 2009 victimisation survey (INE, 2010) 
 % of all 
reported 
crimes 
National 
rate per 
100,000 
Caracas 
rate per 
100,000 
Homicide 0.98 75 233 
Threats 5.74 482 412 
Assault (with result in injury) 3.24 272 429 
Sexual assault 0.39 33 43 
Robbery (theft with force or immediate threat of 
force) 
60.42 5,076 8,951 
Kidnapping 1.14 95 203 
Extortion 0.84 71 57 
Corruption 2.09 175 108 
Theft 20.64 1,734 2,020 
Fraud 4.61 387 370 
TOTAL 2,364,452 8,401 12,826 
 
It also stands out that robbery57 is much more frequent than common theft. Over three fifths 
(60.4%) of reported incidents were robberies, whereas only 20.6% were thefts. This difference 
is not quite as pronounced in police statistics58, where reported robberies fluctuate around 
similar numbers as reported thefts. It does challenge a pattern in countries of the global North, 
were theft is much more common than robbery. The vast majority of homicides as well as 
acquisitive crimes are committed with firearms, which could partly explain a relatively lower 
prevalence of assault and theft.  
 
 
                                                          
56 In the 2009 victimisation survey, 59% of victims of assault said they did indeed report it to the police, a 
relatively large number compared to common theft, which 22% of victims said they reported. There is no 
immediate reason to believe a significantly lower percentage of assaults would have been reported to the 
police between 1999 and 2010, this trend might reflect an actual decline in violent assaults, with more of 
these assaults turning deadly.  
57 Technically ‘involving the use or threat of force’, in Venezuela this means predominantly with firearms, 
92% of robberies were committed with guns.   
58 32% of robberies disclosed in the victimisation survey were said to have been reported to the police, a 
mere 22% of thefts. 
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3.4.2.3 Gun violence 
The availability, or more correctly, use59 of firearms is an important contributory factor to this 
deadly violence. Victimisation, health and police statistics all reveal a high prevalence of firearm-
related violence in Venezuela. These databases show that 80% to 90%60 of homicides were 
committed with firearms. Tragic figures in global comparison, where 42% of homicides involve 
firearms61. Figure 3-10 shows the rise in homicides recorded in health data is primarily driven by 
firearm-related deaths. The absolute number of homicides committed without firearms remains 
relatively stable, whereas those committed with firearms rises steeply in proportion, from 53% 
in 1980, over 71% in 1995 to 90% in 2008. 
Figure 3-10 Homicides recorded in Health Statistics by use of firearms, 1980-2011 (Source: MPPS, 
Chacon) 
 
 
These trends suggest that, in the Venezuelan case, higher homicide rates might not necessarily 
reflect an inflated base of violent incidents. Although many trends and assumptions remain 
speculative, it is clear that Venezuela has seen a substantial rise in deadly interactions, and that 
this is in large part due to the use of firearms. This does not necessarily reflect a rise in violent 
interactions per se, challenging a common assumption that homicide is indeed the visible mask 
                                                          
59 Use and availability of firearms do not correlate well. Many countries have high availability of firearms, 
yet little firearm related violence, see (Small Arms Survey, 2010). Guns have arguably been readily 
available throughout Venezuela’s history, it may be their use that has increased.  
60 Depending on the source, 2009 victimisation survey 80% of offenses committed in previous year, 2009 
MPPS data 89% and 90% in 2010 CICPC data. 
61 A global rate which is itself to a large extent driven by Latin America; the vast majority (74%) of 
homicides within the region are committed with firearms. Even for this region however, Venezuela has 
high incidence rates. In the UK and US, only 6% and 60%, respectively, of homicides are committed with 
firearms.  
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of a bigger beast, and a ‘reasonable proxy for violent crime in general’ (see e.g. (UNODC, 2011; 
WHO, 2002).  
3.4.2.4 Threatened masculinities 
In other countries, victims, as well as perpetrators, of lethal violence are more likely to be young 
men. In Venezuela too, 96% of firearm deaths in health statistics, and 93% of homicide victims 
recorded by the police are men, a ratio of about 1 to 15. This is slightly more than Latin American 
average62, and much higher than the US where around three quarters of victims (or one woman 
for every 3 men) are men (Miethe et al., 2004). Figure 3-11 below shows the differential firearm 
mortality rates for men and women, where that for women has doubled over a decade, it 
remains marginal compared to that for men. The rise of lethal violence in Venezuela is driven 
almost entirely by male victimisation.  
Figure 3-11 Firearm mortality rates from health sources, men vs. women (MPPS) 
 
 
These observations differ further by age. In 2010, 71% of male victims of firearm violence were 
between 15 and 34 years old. The majority (57%) between 15 and 29, and nearly a quarter (24%) 
were between the ages of 20 and 24. Over the years, the rise in lethal violence has also 
disproportionately struck these age groups. The mortality rate for men between 20 and 24 in 
2008 was 307 per 100,00063, up from an already enormous 204 per 100,000 in 2001. In 2010, 
homicide was the third most frequent cause of death for men generally, behind heart disease 
                                                          
62 Vrancxk (2011) terms this viricide (to contrast with femicide) – homicide of males because they are male. 
An average of 1 female is murdered for every ten men in Latin America. 
63 For women there is also a slightly higher risk of victimisation in these age groups, although the highest 
rate of 9.8 per 100,000, for 25-29 year olds in 2008, is not nearly as pronounced as the relative male 
victimisation rate. Women maintain relatively similar levels of risk across the life span.   
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and cancer64, and before traffic accidents. For 15-44 year olds, they are the first cause of death 
by far. These trends reflect a demographic tragedy in the making, in 10 years’ time more than 
126,000 mostly young men died violent (avoidable) deaths. 
 
It seems generally accepted that barrio residents are disproportionally likely victims of homicide, 
though there are no exact estimates of this differential risk. Some authors suggest that more 
than 80% of homicides occur in the barrio, but this may be based on the victimisation survey in 
which relatively few homicides were reported and where a distinction is made between social 
class of victims, rather than where they live. In the victimisation survey, 83% of victims of 
homicide were of two lowest social strata (Zubillaga, 2013). From the patterns in Figure 3-8 it is 
clear that homicide is indeed disproportionately concentrated in the barrios that surround 
Catia’s more commercial district. If general young male risk peaks at 300, it is daunting to think 
about victimisation rates among young male barrio residents65. 
 
Very little is known of the characteristics of offenders or the relationship to victims in Venezuela, 
as the vast majority of homicides go unsolved. In the US, around 90% of known perpetrators are 
men, usually under 30. Most homicides are committed by people known to the victim, family, 
friends or acquaintances. In 2010, strangers only accounted for 21% of homicides where the 
offender was ‘known’. In Venezuela, the victimisation survey is the only one that gives us a 
window on perpetrators – 4% of victims (that knew details of the perpetrators) had been killed 
by women. It also reveals that, of households that reported someone in their household had 
been murdered and that knew whom killed them66, 60% were strangers, i.e. not anyone related 
to them. The deadly violence in Venezuela thus seems to be a violence between relative 
strangers. Young males that know of each other but do not interact on a regular basis. What 
thus contrasts Venezuela with countries where a large body of research on violence is available 
is that the majority of the violence we find out about does not occur between people that know 
each other. However, it does show the characteristics of a particular type of violence that has 
                                                          
64 Note that if causes of death were registered similarly in Capital district, Vargas and Miranda (see 
footnote 1, they seem to register many homicides under the ‘unknown intent’ category), it might in fact 
be the first cause of death nationally.  
65 There are estimates for deaths in prison. In 2012, 591 prisoners died, nearly 4% of all homicides 
occurred within protected walls (Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones). On an (approximate) population 
of 48,262, this is a rate of 1,225 per 100,000, or more than 20 times the average homicide rate on the 
streets. 
66 Only 8% declared not knowing whom killed their household member. Note that reported homicides are 
just 1% of all reported crimes. It isn’t exactly clear from how the report is structured how many households 
actually reported a homicide.  
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also received a fair bit of attention in the US, violence between gangs. Many authors describe 
how this violence is a violence committed with guns and in public spaces, between relative 
strangers, yet also relative equals (Braga et al., 2006; Decker and Pyrooz, 2010; Klein and Maxson, 
1989; Miller, 1977). Indeed, this violence hardly crosses boundaries. I describe the dynamics of 
this violence in more detail in Chapter 7.  
 
Some other police statistics seemingly corroborate that this violence is a violence between 
malandros. Table 3-3 shows that over two thirds (67%) of homicides and seven in ten (71%) 
firearm homicides in Venezuela are classified by the police67 as a ‘settling of scores’ (‘Ajuste de 
cuenta’).  
Table 3-3 Police recorded homicide 2011, by motive and use of firearms (Benavides, based on 
CICPC) 
  All With 
firearms 
Without 
firearms 
  100% 
(n=14,007) 
100%  
(n=12,706) 
100%  
(n=1,301) 
Score settling 67% 70,6% 34,4% 
Robbery 13% 13,4% 13,2% 
Argument 4% 2,9% 19,5% 
Passionate 2% 1,1% 8,1% 
Contract Killing 0% 0,4% 0% 
Under investigation 13% 11,4% 24,4% 
Other/ No information 0,2% 0,2% 0,4% 
 
This terminology implicitly infers a dispute between gangs is at the basis of the violence, the 
victim is said to have had ‘problems’, unsettled scores within el malandreo. This is again 
substantially higher than other countries. The UK does not have a gang category as its homicide 
rate is already low, though reports assume up to 50% of shootings in London are gang-related. 
In the US around 7% of homicides are classified as gang-related.  
 
From a reading of police files on 137 homicides in Catia in the first semester of 2012, brief 
descriptions indicate that, in homicides categorised as score-settling, people were often shot 
‘without exchanging words’, with a high number of bullets, often in the head, by offenders 
whom often make a quick escape on a motorcycle. Of these 137 homicides, just 5 victims (under 
4%) were female and 120 (nearly 88%) involved firearms.  
                                                          
67 Proper time series unavailable. Note that this classification may also be a registration effect, as a gang-
related killing relieves the police from some responsibility. 
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It is hard to estimate homicide rates within gangs, in absence of estimates of gang membership, 
but US research (Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000) suggests an incredible 1 in 4 chance of dying in a 
four year period. This was about 80 times the rate observed among young (14-17) black males 
in the US.  
 
In all, it is difficult to establish exactly what percentage of these homicides is perpetrated by 
malandros, its exact proportions remain unknown. Nevertheless, the characteristics reviewed 
here, particularly the high male victimisation rate, the use of guns, the unknown relationships 
between victim and offender, and the categorisation as score-settling suggest much of this 
violence is indeed related to el malandreo, rather than a product of ongoing conflicts within 
relationships.  
 
In conclusion, homicide statistics in Venezuela may not reflect everyday violence. Unfortunately, 
there is little way of knowing whether everyday violence generally has gone up or down in 
Venezuela. Perception data would suggest it has gone up, but are notoriously unreliable in this 
regard. Grouping all (deadly) violent interactions together as if expressing a common underlying 
motivation or violent urge may be a crucial mistake, that prevents from getting to the bottom 
of the problem (Cao et al., 2008). 
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Introduction; exploratory case study research  
This thesis is based on data collected during 12 months of fieldwork in Venezuela, over the 
course of three different visits between May 2009 and December 2012. This chapter describes 
the methodological choices that were made. It describes the choice for two different locations 
where data were collected and the strategies that were used to find, approach, observe and 
interview respondents.  
 
From previous chapters, it is clear that recent trends in Venezuela appear to contradict a 
theoretical positive relationship between inequality and violence. The usual indicators of these 
concepts display a negative relationship that contradicts research findings in other contexts. This 
makes Venezuela an apt candidate for a deviant case study (Gerring, 2007, p.105) to explore 
what, if any, might be the connections between inequality and violence. Chapter two showed 
that most studies that have explicitly evaluated the relationship between inequality and violence 
have taken a quantitative approach. They rely on aggregate indicators which offer limited 
insight. The current study is aimed at a better understanding of the underlying concepts and 
exploring any micro-level connections between inequality and violence that may be missed 
using aggregate indicators. It focuses in particular on people’s relationships and how these can 
help clarify these connections. Further, it focusses predominantly on barrio residents’ 
relationships, as the barrio is where much of this violence occurs (see Chapter 3).  
 
Understanding and exploring are better served by qualitative data collection methods, although 
I use network methods that offer a quantifiable perspective on people’s relationships. An 
intensive approach to data collection limited me to the selection of just a few sites where these 
data could shed most light on the research questions, sacrificing scope for understanding. I had 
to make a number of choices; selecting areas in which to observe and approach people, what 
and when to observe or collect, selecting respondents for the semi-structured instrument and 
making most use of my time with them by asking them the right questions. This often involved 
trade-offs which I will address in each of the following sections.  
4.2 Selection of fieldwork sites 
Gerring (2007), in a thorough review of case study approaches, identifies the common rationale 
behind all selection strategies as looking for variation and representativeness. I used a ‘most 
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different’68 (Ibid. p.139) approach to the selection of broad research sites. I selected two cities 
that offered variation on inequality but were relatively similar in terms of homicide rates, within 
practical constraints. Travel time between the two sites was around 8 hours by bus, which is 
manageable. Further, I had some access to homicide data, and contacts, in each of these sites. 
Catia, the research site in Caracas in particular, is a research focus for UNES, an Experimental 
National University of Security. This University was established in 2009, dedicated to educating 
a revolutionary police force, and understanding security issues more broadly. It has a large base 
of lower-level data which I could draw on.  
 
Figure 4-1 shows a political map of Venezuela, and the location of the fieldwork sites; Catia and 
Cumaná69.  
Figure 4-1 Political map of Venezuela with location of fieldwork sites 
 
 
As elaborated in chapter 3, Venezuela’s administrative divisions hide a country of contrasts. 
Considerable rural and urban poverty is eclipsed by the riches of rural haciendas and 
                                                          
68 This involves selecting cases that vary on the independent variables (inequality) but are similar on the 
dependent variable (violence). If (any) similar processes can be found to operate between inequality and 
violence in differing contexts, more confidence can be had that these processes indeed influence any 
relationship.  
69 I am using common names for these cities to avoid confusion. When talking about Catia, I actually refer 
to what is administratively known as the parish of Sucre, in the municipality of Libertador, in the Capital 
District. Cumaná is (confusingly) the capital of both the municipality of Sucre and the state of Sucre. It 
actually only comprises 3.5 of Sucre municipality’s 7 parishes, but the vast majority of its population. Some 
of the data below are actually for the municipality of Sucre rather than Cumaná as such, as parish level 
data are often unavailable beyond the capital.  
Cumaná, Sucre State 
Catia, Caracas (Capital District) 
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extravagances of its cities. Internal contrasts are arguably especially palpable within the big 
urban centres, such as the capital Caracas, where colourful barrios garnish the hills around an 
opulent central business district.  
 
The fieldwork site I selected here, Catia, is a parish on the North-western edge of Caracas. It is 
an area of predominantly informal housing that spreads high up into ‘el Avila’, the mountain 
that separates the valley of Caracas from the Caribbean Sea. The lower parts of Catia are 
relatively consolidated, with a shopping Boulevard spanning several metro stations, busy 
markets, cinemas and plenty of entertainment. Houses become ever more precarious the 
further up the hills one ventures, paved streets turning into seemingly endless flights of stairs 
and, even further up, unpaved and sandy alleyways. El cerro, literally, the mountain, is a 
pejorative term for the shacks that have sprouted upwards and northwards, into the mountain.  
Picture 4-1 Catia, Caracas 2012 
  
 
My other fieldwork site, Cumaná, is the capital of Sucre state, a much poorer, rural state on 
Venezuela’s Eastern Caribbean Coast. I selected Cumaná to get a better idea of Venezuela’s 
urban-rural cleavages explored in Chapter 3. It is a historic fishing town that also houses a Toyota 
factory. The informal areas of Cumaná spread out wide, rather than high, into its surrounding 
wastelands. Unlike Catia (which centre is less well-regarded than other, richer parts of Caracas), 
the centre of Cumaná also houses the very rich, owners of tuna factories and private yachts. 
Where Caracas’ richer residents are continuously confronted with the barrio in their views of 
the city, they can avoid entering it. Cumaná is more compact this way, the shacks are perhaps 
not as visible, but arguably less avoidable as people contemplate the city’s streets. Poverty is 
still more obvious in Cumaná; it was rather upsetting to find alleys where sewage waters ran 
free, something I never encountered in Caracas. 
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Picture 4-2 Cumaná, 2012  
 
 
Figure 4-270 shows these cities’ income distributions in the left-hand panel, and their respective 
state-level income distributions in the right-hand panel. 
Figure 4-2 Household income distribution in Cumaná (Sucre) and Catia (Capital District) (INE 2001)  
 
  
In 2001, Cumaná had double the amount of people earning less than 1,500 bolivars71 than Catia 
(24% compared to 12%), but a similar amount earning over 10,000 (8% and 10% respectively).  
Nevertheless, the right-hand panel shows their substantially varying wider contexts. State-level 
income distributions are almost polar opposites. Sucre’s distribution is skewed towards the 
bottom, whereas that in the Capital District is skewed towards the top. There are many more 
                                                          
70 This figure is based on 2001 data, as lower-level data from the 2011 census were unavailable. 
71 It is difficult to translate this figure into other currencies. Venezuela has pegged its currency to the dollar, 
which has generated a lucrative black market in dollars. Since 2001, this currency was devalued by 1,000 
bolivars, creating the bolivar fuerte, the strong bolivar, which is shown here. In 2012, 1,500 bolivars was 
worth around $350 officially, but just over $200 on the black market at the start of the year and just $100 
by the end. 
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lower-income households in the state of Sucre72. Where Cumaná is surrounded by less affluent 
communities, Catia is surrounded by more affluent communities in the Capital District and 
Caracas more broadly.  
 
Table 4-1 shows some sociodemographic indicators for both fieldwork sites.  
Table 4-1 Sociodemographic comparison of fieldwork locations (INE, CICPC) 
  Average 
income 
(Bolivars, 
INE 2011)  
Income 
Gini 
Coefficient 
(INE 2011) 
Basic 
Necessities 
Poverty 
(INE 2011) 
Population 
(Census 
INE 2011) 
Population 
Density 
(inhabitant
s / km2, 
INE 2011) 
Homicide 
rates/ 
100,000 
(CICPC, 
2011) 
Capital District 4,439 0.36 12% 1,943,901 4,489 91 
Catia n/a  n/a  14% 345,944 4,003 82 
Sucre State 2,728 0.37 30% 896,291 76 43 
Cumaná n/a  n/a  26% 358,919 230 70 
 
This table shows that relatively similar state-level Gini coefficients 73 , income differences 
between all inhabitants, of 0.36 and 0.37 mask substantial variation within these states. In 2011, 
state-level average household incomes, were almost double that of Sucre (2,700 bolivars) in the 
Capital District (4,400 bolivars). Further, 30% of people in Sucre state and 26% of Cumanese had 
at least one of their basic necessities74 unfulfilled, compared to 12% and 14% in the Capital 
District and Catia, respectively. It also shows these two areas have similar number of inhabitants, 
around 350,000, but population density is much higher in Catia than in Cumaná, with 4,003 and 
230 inhabitants per km2 respectively. Further, on the state level these sites had quite different 
levels of deadly violence in 2011, 91 police recorded homicides per 100,000 in the Capital 
District, compared to 43 per 100,000 in Sucre. Nevertheless, the selected research areas have 
more similar rates, 82 and 70 homicides per 100,000 in Catia and Cumaná, respectively.  
 
Figure 4-3 traces these homicide rates over time on the state level75.  
                                                          
72 This is reflected in other development indicators. Sucre is at the lower end of Human Development 
within Venezuela, with a 2011 HDI of .78, where the Capital District has the highest levels of human 
development .91 (INE 2012). See also Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3.  
73 See Chapter 2 p.31. 
74 Basic necessities poverty is based on 5 dimensions; education, overcrowding, housing adequacy, basic 
services and economic dependency. Households are considered poor when at least one of these 
dimensions is unsatisfactory.  
75 Lower-level time series are not available. 
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Figure 4-3 Evolution of police recorded homicide rates, selected states (Data source: CICPC) 
 
 
Where the Capital District traditionally has the highest homicide rates in Venezuela, Sucre has 
more average levels. In line with national homicide rates, its homicide rate has risen more or 
less steadily but substantially (614%) over the last decades, from 7 per 100,000 in 1994 to 43 in 
2011. Homicide rates in the Capital District reached 91 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011, which 
is actually a return to 1995 levels. Of the few researchers that have looked at violence in 
Venezuela, most have limited their observations to Caracas (Rodgers and Baird, 2014). I thought 
it very important to be able to say something about a different city, where most of the recent 
increases in violence have occurred (see also Chapter 3). Levels of homicidal violence in Caracas 
ebb and flow strongly, nevertheless, they have remained relatively stable, whereas in Cumaná 
they have risen more continuously over the last decades.  
 
In all, these research areas were seen to offer lots of variation on inequality, with relatively 
similar levels of deadly violence. Finding evidence for similar processes in these widely differing 
areas can underscore the validity of my findings. 
4.3 Data collection  
I collected a wide variety of primary data over the course of 12 months fieldwork during three 
visits to Venezuela between May 2009 and December 2012. I first started collecting data in 
Caracas between May and July 2009, whilst doing an internship with ‘Red de Apoyo por la 
Justicia y la Paz’ (Red de Apoyo), an organisation that engages local communities in raising 
awareness of police torture, impunity and justice more broadly. I accompanied their staff on 
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various community engagement visits to the barrio and made my first contacts there. I started 
my PhD part-time in September that year, later obtaining 1+3 ESRC funding which required me 
to do an MSc degree in cross-national and comparative research methods in 2010/2011. I 
returned to the field during spring break that academic year, in April 2011, conducting some 
stakeholder interviews, making further contacts and collecting secondary data to justify my 
selection of research communities. Between March and December 2012, I fully immersed myself 
in the field. In all, I spent around 10 weeks in Cumaná on 4 different visits during 2012. The 
remainder of my time was spent in Caracas. 
 
During this time, I collected primary data through participant observation, unstructured 
individual and group interviews and semi-structured personal network interviews. Many 
interviews were conducted informally, for some, and particularly the group and semi-structured 
interviews, I used interview guides that can be found in Appendix 2 . All respondents were given 
a study information sheet that stressed confidentiality and anonymity and had my and the 
University’s contact details, also in Appendix 2. Respondents that participated in more formal 
interviews signed an authorisation form. I stressed confidentiality throughout these interviews 
and particularly before any questions on violence. I always obtained consent to use a tape 
recorder, which was not refused on many occasions. This resulted in 122 audio files of 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews with 98 unique respondents (residents as well as 
stakeholders, some were repeat interviews) and 27 recordings of group interviews with a further 
130 unique respondents. These records ranged from just 10 minutes to 3 hours in length, of 
which around 40 were transcribed by a research assistant in Venezuela, others I transcribed 
myself. Table 4-2 lists unique respondents according to type of interview and location. 
Table 4-2 Unique respondents according to type of interview and fieldwork site 
 Total Catia Cumaná 
Semi-structured interview 45 38 7 
Unstructured interview 53 41 12 
Group interview (n=27) 130 85 45 
Total 228 164 64 
 
My informal interviews and observations also resulted in 239 typed pages76 of fieldnotes and 
some written notebooks. These fieldnotes and transcriptions were analysed through repeated 
reading, picking up quotes, and applying some codes through comments and annotations. The 
                                                          
76 This also included sections of newspaper articles and/or opinion pieces I wanted to refer to later on. 
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semi-structured interview data were coded in Excel and analysed with SPSS, as well as E-net and 
Gephi for the network data.  
Throughout this thesis, all given names and references to places (apart from the place names of 
Catia and Cumaná themselves, and the name of the prison gang in Cumaná) were anonymised 
to ensure that what people said cannot be linked back to them personally.  
4.3.1 Field entry and gatekeepers 
During my time in Venezuela, I lived predominantly in central and serviced areas in Caracas as 
well as Cumaná, venturing to the barrio on an almost daily basis. In Caracas I shared a flat with 
two others, in Cumaná I stayed in a central hostel. My research was intended to explore 
relationships in the barrio as this is where the majority of the violence occurs. Nevertheless, I 
had chosen to live in central areas because I myself had been apprehensive about my personal 
safety in the barrio, particularly at night. In the end living in these areas gave me a privileged 
view of the whole, the relationships and stereotypes that maintain the barrio, and made me 
question my own stereotypical preconceptions of its ubiquitous violence. I ended up staying 
over in the barrio for a few weeks too, with two religious organisations and in a public hospital 
in Caracas and a friend in Cumaná.  
 
I first made contact with community organisations in Catia’s barrios through abovementioned 
Red de Apoyo, whose staff introduced me to a number of clerics and Consejos Comunales, 
community councils initiated by Chávez (see Chapter 3). I later also started accompanying UNES 
staff, attending community engagement sessions, accompanying them on surveys77 and making 
further contacts with community leaders in various sectors of Catia. In Cumaná, both the local 
government and statistics office (INE) introduced me to Consejos Comunales in their 
communities. I made contact with another just wandering the streets and walking into their 
office which was, as many are, clearly marked with posters of Chávez and other revolutionary 
heroes. These contacts were particularly interesting and gave me privileged insight in the politics 
of community relations. Nevertheless, it became clear that neither the church nor the Consejos 
Comunales truly engage everyone in the community. The Consejos Comunales in particular 
often work by representation more than participation, only a select few community members 
are part of the core working group. Decisions are meant to be made by majority in community 
                                                          
77 As mentioned above, one of the reasons I selected Catia was because this was also the area where the 
experimental university (UNES) had started rolling out its programmes aimed at violence reduction, this 
included a vast array of programmes, including victimisation surveys.  
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meetings, but it is not always clear how many community members attend these meetings (see 
also Machado (2008, 2009)). Chapter 5 will show they are often distrusted in the community. 
Both these organisations were extremely helpful in helping me find willing respondents and 
organising group interviews, but they would present me mostly to people that were actively 
engaged in community activities and this hardly included the local malandros, people that are 
engaged in various delinquent activities and arguably responsible for most of Venezuela’s deadly 
violence (see Chapter 3). In some cases, they only introduced me to the people they wanted me 
to hear.  
Picture 4-3 One of my gatekeepers in her barrio in Catia, 2012 
 
 
I also started meeting and interviewing people on the street ‘randomly’ 78 . It is often said 
Venezuelans are ‘callejero’, literally ‘of the street’, implying they live their lives in and around 
the streets. This is true for some, though others –particularly the better-off – live their lives more 
or less behind closed doors. Nevertheless, it was easy to start a conversation with anyone, 
whether on public transport, on the street or in shops, and these various entry strategies meant 
I also spoke to people that did not go out very often. Some people that attended church services 
for instance, often lived more secluded from more general barrio life. More problematic was 
that I was not coming into contact with people involved in violence. Particularly at the start I 
would not have considered walking up to the boys hanging around the street corners, keeping 
an eye out for greater trouble. It had never been my intention to speak to malandros directly, I 
had originally intended to select relatively violent sectors on the basis of this qualitative research 
phase where I could then conduct more interviews. Nevertheless, people often thought that 
other neighbourhoods were more violent (through processes I will explore in detail in Chapters 
7 and 8) and this strategy did not work. I decided to start interviewing people between the 
                                                          
78 Of course this is never truly random, chances of meeting people on the street also implied they are 
more likely unemployed, relatively easily approachable etc.   
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arguably safer79 confined walls of prisons and hospitals, an approach used by a.o. Wilkinson 
(2003) in her research with violent youth in New York.  
Picture 4-4 Hospital environments in Caracas and Cumaná, 2012 
 
 
Unfortunately, after a number of enquiries I was not allowed to visit prisons in Caracas80, but I 
did interview a number of victims of gun violence in Catia’s three public81 hospitals, obtaining 
often hard-negotiated clearance from hospital directors. In Cumaná I was allowed in a police 
prison compound where I conducted a group and various individual interviews. Prison, as I will 
explore in Chapter 7, is separated in wards where ‘prans’, prison leaders, make and observe the 
rules. Initially, prison staff introduced me to people that did not live on these wards, rather 
within the public areas of prison82, but after further enquiries, and approval from a pran himself, 
I also gained access to one of the wards that houses a group of people that identify with one of 
Cumaná’s well-known gangs. I also interviewed a couple of victims of gun violence in Cumaná’s 
main public hospital.  
                                                          
79 Arguably, as Venezuela’s prisons and hospitals are also notoriously violent. In 2012 alone, 591 prisoners 
died, nearly 4% of all homicides occurred within protected walls (Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones). 
Further, there are many stories of incidents of violence in hospitals. In one of Catia’s hospitals, a gang had 
come to kill someone they failed to kill in a first attempt on the street. Public hospitals today rely on heavy 
military protection.  
80 Venezuela’s prisons are notoriously lethal (see footnote above) and a particularly sensitive area to the 
government.  
81 A few private hospitals I also visited (one in Catia, others in a more affluent area) promised to call me if 
and when any gunshot victims came in, but never did. Apparently victims of gun violence in these private 
hospitals are relatively rare, perhaps also indicative of the class background of gunshot victims, whom are 
unlikely to have private insurance. Public hospitals had an almost continuous instream of gunshot victims. 
Every single week there were several new people to be interviewed, in each of these three hospitals just 
serving Catia. One Friday night I stayed over on the emergency ward, two corpses came in and at least 5 
more victims were attended to. As the night went on, many others had to be turned away as all doctors 
were busy operating.  
82 This may be difficult to grasp, as it was for me. The walls of prison seem almost permeable, some more 
trusted prisoners live among staff. This prison also had a separate little enclave where 3 women were 
held.   
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Picture 4-5 Police prison compound in Cumaná, 2012  
 
 
It was through a friend of a friend, who had moved to a middle-class area from one of Catia’s 
barrios, that I made contact with an ex-malandro he had come to respect and known all his life, 
having growing up together in the barrio. This ex-malandro introduced me to the new malandro 
generations in his barrio, which gave me access to perhaps the most pertaining insights of this 
thesis. After explaining my research interests in an interview/conversation that lasted almost 
three hours in a central café, he was convinced of the importance of my research, and 
introduced me to two different groups in his barrio, stressing that he trusted these people and 
that nothing would happen as long as I followed his guidance, and let him know when I was 
coming. I typically sent him a text message before I visited. The boys of these groups, after 
having been briefed by this ex-malandro, were happy to have me around and also very 
protective. They knew that if something happened to me, they could be in trouble with him. As 
time passed, and more trust was established, they started inviting me to parties (which I always 
declined) and also took me to two major drug transaction sites, where large quantities of drugs 
are transacted and rifles more or less openly carried. These ventures too, were approved by the 
ex-malandro.  
 
Around the same time a contact I made in hospital introduced me to her neighbour’s son whom 
had started taking on a life of vice, as she described it. He himself identified as a malandro. 
Importantly, residents usually have a mental image of malandros as evil and ruthless killers, their 
neighbours’ sons often do not fit this picture. Stereotypes abound and I certainly will not pretend 
to have been immune to their effects. I will evaluate the complexities of this image of malandros 
in Chapter 7, as a myth that reproduces the barrio’s ecology of danger and ultimately, its deadly 
violence. After having spent some time with these malandros in Catia, I myself came to see them 
as normal boys more than violent predators and gained confidence approaching them in 
different areas, including Cumaná. In Cumaná, I asked one of my contacts from a Consejo 
Comunal to introduce me to the local malandros in her barrio, and she happily obliged, often 
sitting with us as we chatted. I gained further trust with this group through my contact with a 
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local cleric whom had set up a pacification project among the different feuding groups of the 
barrio, giving them jobs in exchange for ending the killings. If something had happened to me, 
they would certainly have faced consequences. 
 
In all, I always took care that these people, and my flatmate in Caracas or hostel staff in Cumaná, 
had my mobile number, and knew where I was and how long I estimated to be there. In the next 
section I describe the strategies I used to collect qualitative data in these areas.  
4.3.2 Qualitative research strategies  
I collected the qualitative data for this study through participant observation, as well as 
unstructured group and individual interviews. In this section I explore these methodologies in 
more detail.  
4.3.2.1 Participant observation  
Participant observation is a much used (and equally abused) term. It is about immersion, 
‘hanging out’, ‘talking the talk’ and ‘walking the walk’ (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2010) with the locals. 
In the barrio I accompanied representatives of Consejos Comunales, clerics and police officers 
on community walks and surveys, attended church, community meetings and protest marches, 
spent time with housewives, informal merchants, police officers, mototaxistas and malandros. I 
also took salsa classes, joined a running club and attended baseball games. I mostly sat or stood 
informally chatting and joking with old and new faces, and then did the same when I returned 
for the night, participating in the activities, lives and loves of my flatmates, and other hostel 
dwellers in Cumaná.  
Picture 4-6 Informal merchants in Cumaná and Caracas, 2012 
 
 
As an outsider in so many ways (white, non-native Spanish, female), I was a privileged observer 
of Venezuela’s divided worlds in two very different parts of the country. My thick accent and 
white face allowed me question people’s daily practices, they happily explained their most basic 
actions. I will discuss the intricacies of my position in more detail in section 4.4. 
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In all, observation mainly involved wandering the barrio, stopping to observe and chat and 
taking people up on proposals to show me their lives and experiences. I always carried my 
notepad and tape recorder, though I had to be cautious with my camera, phone and laptop. I 
stood out anyway, visibly carrying a laptop would have drawn further (unwanted) attention. 
People on the streets do not carry or wear expensive things generally as robberies are so 
common. Cameras are a rare sight, and I always felt wary taking pictures in the barrio. The 
national office for statistics (INE) strongly advises against carrying expensive material in the field, 
their interviewers have frequently been robbed of them, and they now always go out in groups 
of three or more. I took notes on my laptop almost every night, reflecting on the events and 
conversations of the day gone past. This resulted in many pages of typed notes and various 
thoughts and ideas jotted down in several notebooks.  
Picture 4-7 Barrio sights, Caracas and Cumaná 2012 
 
 
I should devote some attention to my observations of malandros. As explained above, I gained 
access to a number of sites of encounter and exchange between malandros, two in Caracas one 
in Cumaná. These were mainly street spots where boys convened in variable numbers to chat, 
laugh, play computer games, and/or sell and consume drugs. We mostly stood around chatting, 
laughing and joking, sometimes sharing some beers. Other people went about their daily 
business as we stood around, so I never felt in particular danger. Further, I mostly went to these 
places early to late afternoon and left before night fell. Although I stayed later on three occasions, 
on at least one of these occasions I may have compromised my safety as I will explore in the 
ethics section below. These spots are indeed hotspots for homicide, but it is difficult to 
appreciate when these might occur. The very nature of these boys’ predicament, as I will explore 
in Chapter 7, is that they always have to be ‘activo’, on guard for trouble. I, too, was always on 
guard, looking around and ensuring I had somewhere to run should something happen. Being a 
woman helped me feel relatively safer, even if shootings occur, few women get killed in 
Venezuela (see Chapter 3). Further, these boys were protective of me, knowing that if something 
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happened to me they could get in trouble with the ex-malandro that introduced me to them, or 
the cleric that had given them jobs in the case of Cumaná. None of these groups had very active 
conflicts, although on one street in Catia two boys had gotten killed a few months earlier. Most 
sources say homicides are most likely to occur on the weekend, and I mostly stayed away on the 
weekend, nor did I accept their invitations to parties, when many homicides also tend to occur. 
Further, other people always knew where I was.  
 
In prison, I never felt unsafe. The pran that had allowed me to access the ward was very keen 
for me to get a good impression of his rule, and guaranteed my safety. In all, all these boys were 
incredibly respectful towards me, ensuring for instance they kept their guns out of sight as I told 
them they made me very uncomfortable. Overall, these observations were incredibly important 
in contextualising the other types of data I collected.  
4.3.2.2 Unstructured group and individual interviews 
I conducted unstructured stakeholder (e.g. police officers, local NGOs, government 
representatives etc.), individual and group interviews. In some more formal cases, and 
particularly for the organised group interviews I used an interview guide, which can be found in 
Appendix 2.  
Picture 4-8 Pictures from some group interviews 
   
 
Many group interviews were organised for me by local organisations, mainly local churches and 
Consejos Comunales and also took place on their respective premises. I asked these 
organisations to organise groups that were relatively homogenous in terms of age and gender 
to facilitate open discussion and mitigate potential conflict. Participants to these group 
interviews were predominantly older women. Nevertheless, I also interviewed a good deal of 
young people, in a dance and two church groups, where more men were present. I also 
conducted group interviews in two classrooms with boys aged 7 to 14. In the UK there is strict 
guidance for interviewing children which is not present in Venezuela (Birkbeck et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, I obtained consent from the teachers and principals and never focussed on 
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violence in these interviews. I got these children to draw and talk about their quality of life. 
Violence did come up, one boy mentioned for instance that he was moving away because of the 
gun violence on his street, but I did not probe him and moved on to other boys’ thoughts 
ensuring not to upset anyone. Nevertheless, for some of these boys, violence is often very much 
a part of their lives, talking about it may be cathartic more than upsetting. I ensured that the 
teacher was present at all times.  
 
The interview guide focused on perceptions and experiences of some broad areas (as well as 
perceptions of recent changes in these respective domains); quality of life, violence, community 
cohesion and institutions. These questions varied depending on the interviewee – e.g. when I 
interviewed police officers I focused more on violence, with government officials more on 
institutions and quality of life. In most group interviews I used participatory techniques, such as 
drawing, listing and ranking that are often used in focus group research, e.g. by Moser and 
McIlwaine (1999) and World Bank researchers (Dudwick et al., 2006; Narayan et al., 2000).  
Components of well-being and quality of life 
I started off many interviews asking people what the characteristics of their community were, 
and what sorts of people lived there. I sometimes got people to draw the boundaries of their 
community and identify the types of organisations that were present in the community. I then 
focused on well-being and recent changes in the community. I often got people to define and 
list the components of a good quality of life. I did not often have to probe, if I did, I mentioned 
things like education, housing, income and employment. I asked people to rank these items in 
order of importance and evaluate any recent changes in these components. Picture 4-9 shows 
one of these listings I made with community members in Catia.  
Picture 4-9 Community well-being ranking 
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Security was often already brought up as a major component of quality of life in these listings. 
Nevertheless, many people thought their general situations had improved, and particularly with 
the implementation of the Misiones, the social programmes implemented by Chávez (see 
Chapter 3). The Misiones that focused on education were generally seen as positive, although 
the health branch of these programmes, Barrio Adentro, which brought Cuban doctors to the 
barrios, as well as the Consejos Comunales, often received more criticism. 
I sometimes also asked people to draw a ladder of conditions of life and imagine who might be 
at the top, who might be at the bottom, and where they might find themselves, or what 
proportion of the community might be found on each ladder. One of these ladders is shown in 
Picture 4-10.  
Picture 4-10 Quality of life ladder 
 
In general, people did feel many in the community were lacking basic resources, but they did 
not often see themselves as one of them, at least in Catia. In Cumaná, people often did feel 
worse-off.  
 
If this had not been explored in detail through people’s evaluation of their quality of life, I also 
asked people what the main problems in the community were, and what prevented them from 
having a good quality of life. Violence or security was often a main concern, although in some 
groups, particularly the younger ones, this was a more peripheral issue. In one group interview 
in Cumaná, I could not move past a discussion of the community’s problems. It had been 
organised by a representative of the local government and many more people turned up than I 
could manage. As the community representative remained present, these people saw this as 
their chance to communicate their problems, and the discussion turned into a petition for 
government support.  
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Types and degrees of violence  
Moser and McIlwaine (2004) suggest qualitative research on violence should not identify this as 
a research concern from the start, not to distract respondents from other issues and make the 
interview situation too negative. I followed their suggestion, not introducing the research as a 
project on violence, but rather on exploring well-being in these communities. People often 
mentioned violence or security as a component of quality of life, and I asked them to define this 
in more detail. I asked them which types of violence were present in the neighbourhood, what 
its effects were and how they may have changed recently. Picture 4-11 shows one of these 
listings.  
Picture 4-11 Typology and ranking of violence 
 
Overwhelmingly, the most prevalent forms of violence were related to malandros; drug 
problems, homicides and shoot-outs.  
 
In my group interviews with police officers, prisoners and malandros, I did ask about violence in 
detail. These were very insightful in terms of the dynamics that will be explored in Chapter 7, as 
well as the particular predicament of police officers, whom can generally count on little trust or 
support in the barrio.  
 
Unlike experiences of Moser and McIlwaine in Colombia, people did not seem to have many 
problems talking about violence in these group situations. In Colombia in particular, it appears 
there is a code of silence around violence by paramilitaries (Moser and McIlwaine, 1999). 
Malandros do not operate in secret, people, and even the police, are often aware whom and 
where they are. Relationships with the community arguably sustain their existence, as Chapter 
5 will explore. In the individual interviews, people often volunteered very personal stories, 
although I never probed or enquired for more sensitive details. Nevertheless, talking about 
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these experiences often seemed cathartic more than problematic.  Some people cried, I often 
gave them a hug and an expression of my sympathy and regret for their situations, and asked if 
they knew people they could turn to. I had made contact with various organisations and 
sometimes referred people to the Red the Apoyo or an organisation that looks after victims of 
domestic violence.  
Community cohesion, institutions and support networks 
Many groups already mentioned peace or cohesion under quality of life, and often felt this was 
compromised through violence. They did not really feel anyone was excluded from community 
life, although they often complained of a lack of respect for others in the community. This was 
an area that was quite difficult to get a sight on given the groups I was introduced to. As many 
of these groups were organised by the church and Consejos Comunales, they were people that 
were often relatively involved in the community. Nevertheless, even malandros often felt their 
communities were cohesive, although they complained about interfering neighbours. Interviews 
with people that no longer attended or engaged in community meetings and activities often 
revealed they rely on a close group of trusted others.  
 
I also asked people which types of organisations and institutions they relied on for the 
satisfaction of their needs. I often related this to the items of quality of life explored above, 
asking people which types of formal and informal organisations they relied on for the items they 
identified as part of a good quality of life. Picture 4-12 shows one of these listings.  
Picture 4-12 Listing of components of a good quality of life and organisations that provide them 
 
Family and friends featured highly on these lists. Although the government, was also frequently 
identified, providing important health and education services through the Misiones. Not many 
people seemed to rely on the private market for the satisfaction of their needs. 
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These qualitative observations and largely unstructured interviews provided me with lots of 
contextual detail, but little confidence that what I was observing was not a reflection of my own 
prejudices and the types of people I was introduced to, particularly with regards to people’s 
relationships. Following Fleisher  (2005, 2006), I combined this strategy with a more quantifiable 
one, through semi-structured personal network interviews. The particularities of this relatively 
new (certainly in criminology) network approach will be elaborated in the next section. The 
empirical chapters will demonstrate that these types of data complement each other quite well, 
qualitative data allow for interpreting and contextualising more quantitative network data. Both 
types of data will be used to support the arguments developed in this thesis.  
4.3.3 Semi-structured personal network interviews 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted towards the end of my fieldwork, between 
August and December 2012. I based the instrument on various examples from the literature 
which are referred to in respective sections below. The instrument itself can be found in 
Appendix 2. It explores a wide range of items, from demographics, opportunities and 
perceptions of quality of life, to experiences of violence, as well as people’s interactions and 
relationships through closed and open-ended questions, providing both quantifiable as well as 
qualitative data. I used personal network tools to explore people’s interactions and relationships. 
Personal network data allow for evaluating the characteristics of people’s personal communities 
(Wellman, 1999), the people they interact with and rely on, people that are quite feasibly spread 
across different neighbourhoods, contexts and more traditional communities. I will explore the 
particulars of this method in more detail in section 4.3.3.2 below.  
 
It should be stressed that this instrument is not an authoritative nor closed tool, it contains a 
mixture of items that have been used in different studies and was used as a means to explore 
some possible connections between inequality and violence rather than test hypotheses. I did 
not ask everyone all questions83, which is particularly relevant to my questions on violence. I 
originally meant to compare the networks of people involved in violence to people uninvolved. 
Nevertheless, I found it hard to implement such a categorisation and ended up using the self-
report questions to construct an indicator that offers a more balanced view of people’s 
involvement in violence. This is a limited strategy because not everyone was asked and 
answered all questions, nevertheless, this was not due to their involvement in violence, rather 
                                                          
83 Note that all people included in this sample completed the network component by listing the people 
they interacted with, as well as their characteristics and the relationships between them.  
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my own negligence in ensuring everyone answered all items. The questionnaire also contained 
many items I will not be exploring in this thesis due to space concerns.   
  
In all, the questionnaire took around 1 hour and 20 minutes to complete on average. The 
shortest interview was around 40 minutes, the longest over 2.5 hours. Some were completed 
on two, and even three, separate occasions. As with the other interviews, all respondents were 
given a study information sheet that stressed confidentiality and anonymity, which was 
repeated on various occasions and in particular before questions on violence. I always obtained 
consent to use a tape recorder, which was refused by two respondents. 
 
These interviews were coded in Excel, resulting in a data set that contains data related to 45 
egos and 975 alters. I used E-net, a free software programme that can analyse several ego-
networks at once, to compute measures of network composition and structure. Gephi was used 
for drawing personal network graphs for relevant case studies. I used SPSS for descriptive and 
correlation analyses.  
4.3.3.1 Sampling strategies and respondent profiles 
I aimed to get a broad sample of respondents in Catia and Cumaná, but also to interview people 
that had been involved in violence. I started approaching people on the streets of the barrio84, 
a method employed by Marques (2009) in Brazil, and asking them whether they would like to 
take part in the research project. Finding respondents this way was relatively straightforward, 
people were generally forthcoming and keen to participate. However, as mentioned above, I 
soon realised I might not be able to say much about violence itself. I decided to boost my sample 
with people that had been involved in violence. This concern drew me to hospitals, an approach 
used by e.g. Wilkinson (2003) in her research with violent youth in New York, and prisons. As 
fieldwork went on and I gained more confidence through my observations of malandros, I also 
conducted semi-structured interviews with people that had been involved in violence on the 
streets. In the end, I completed semi-structured interviews with 22 people because of their 
involvement in violence. I tried to complement these 22 people with a broad selection of 
respondents from the barrio, setting rough quotas to get a representation of different ages, 
professions and genders. Nevertheless, the sample remains biased towards males. It is also likely 
                                                          
84 Note that it had been my original intention to select a few relatively violent, lower-level, sectors to 
conduct these interviews in, but through processes mentioned above, I had not been very successful 
finding these sectors in a qualitative research phase, and decided on conducting interviews in hospitals to 
find individuals involved in violence. Nevertheless, these people could not be linked to a particular sector 
as they came from all over these parishes, and I decided to keep with the wider areas of Catia and Cumana.  
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biased towards poorer respondents, due to interviewing in public hospitals and on the streets, 
thus potentially including more people that were not working (although I also specifically looked 
to interview people that had formal jobs for comparison) or could not count on private insurance 
to be admitted to private hospitals.  
 
Table 4-3 below breaks down respondents according to the location where they were 
interviewed.  
Table 4-3 Respondents according to interview location (N=45) 
Interview context Total Cumaná Catia 
Barrio 42 7 35 
Centre 3 0 3 
 Total 45 7 38 
 
Seven respondents were interviewed in Cumaná, the remainder in Caracas, limiting any 
comparative analyses between these areas. Nevertheless, the inclusion of Cumaná brought me 
many insights I would have missed out on otherwise, if anything the similar processes of violence 
between malandros that will be explored in detail in Chapter 7. I would also not have been able 
to speak to prisoners if I had focused on Caracas. Although the research focused on the barrio, I 
also interviewed three people living in higher-class centres of Caracas as a comparative standard. 
They turn out providing much richer insights into the dynamics of the barrio, as we will see in 
Chapter 5. In all, this sample is very much indicative and diverse rather than representative, it 
aims to explore the relationships people entertain in two Venezuelan cities, with a particular 
focus on barrio residents, and those involved in violence. I briefly summarise some other 
characteristics of this sample that will not be explored in further detail in the empirical chapters.  
 
Of 45 people that completed the semi-structured questionnaire, 14 were female and 31 male. 
As mentioned above, this is skewed due to my strategy of sampling on violence.  Only 1 of 13 
people interviewed in hospital and 1 of 4 prisoners were female. The average age of respondents 
at the time of interview was 30, and the median age was 26. This is in line with the relatively 
young population of Venezuela, with a median age of 27, according to the 2011 census (INE, 
2014). The youngest respondent was a 15 year old female victim of a stray bullet, the oldest a 
55 year old ex-police officer that now owned a small informal business. The majority of 
respondents (28 or 62%) had a partner, and they had, on average, 1.2 children. Just under half 
(21 or 47%) had no children yet, but three teenagers were expecting a child when I interviewed 
them. One 38 year old security guard had most children, 5 in total. Most (72%) respondents 
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described themselves as non-white, black (22%) or ‘moreno’ (50%), mixed race, or ‘café con 
leche’, coffee with crème, as Venezuelans refer to people of mixed race. 
 
On average, people had lived in their current homes for 13 years (ranging from a month to 47 
years), or two fifths (42%) of their lives. A lot of respondents have grown up and continue to live 
in extended family homes. Nevertheless, a closer look at these data shows many respondents in 
this sample only do so temporarily. Table 4-4 shows respondents’ residence according to 
permanency.  
Table 4-4 Residence of respondents, according to permanency (N=45) 
  
Total 
Permanent home  26 
No fixed abode, several homes 6 
Temporary/looking for elsewhere 6 
Prison 4 
Street 3 
Total 45 
 
Over two fifths of respondents (19) did not have a permanent residence as such. Six respondents 
regularly stayed away from home as it was closer to work or away from problems. Another six 
temporarily lived with family or friends whilst they got on their feet after having lived elsewhere. 
Three currently lived on the streets, returning home intermittently. Four respondents were 
currently in prison.  
 
Further, it soon transpired that, although I interviewed all but three respondents in the barrios 
where I did my fieldwork, they did not all live there. Apart from three people that lived in higher-
class areas of Caracas, six other respondents had recently, within the last 6 months, moved up85 
from the barrio to a purposefully constructed building in a more middle-class area (2) or, more 
frequently, a satellite city (4). These people essentially grew up in the barrio, and still spent a 
good amount of their time there, often staying with their families, which was also where I met 
and interviewed them. As the majority of their contacts still lived in the barrio, I still see them 
as barrio dwellers for the purposes of this thesis. It is fair to say that only three respondents 
                                                          
85 Nobody had moved down from a central area to a barrio, although one respondent had grown up 
abroad, on the Canary Islands. He was born to a Venezuelan mother and a Spanish father and, after their 
divorce, moved to a Cumanese barrio, where he started hanging out with the local malandros.   
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belonged to the traditional middle-upper classes living in the centre; one of these was born and 
raised in a middle-class area, two had always lived in the most upper-class hills of Caracas.  
 
Table 4-5 shows respondents’ education according to their age category.  
Table 4-5 Highest obtained education level (N=45)  
 
Total None Primary 
Some 
secondary 
Bacca-
laureate 
Higher 
education 
Age 15-21 11 - 0 7 4 0 
22-28 14 1 1 5 6 1 
29-35 10 - 2 2 3 3 
36+ 10 1 2 3 3 1 
Total 45 2 5 17 16 5 
 
Just under half (21) of respondents had completed secondary school, five of whom had gotten 
a higher education degree. Some had not finished their educational trajectories yet; of eleven 
respondents aged 15-21, five were still studying. The lower educational achievements of older 
age groups stand out; two people had not finished primary school, and five others had not gone 
on to secondary education. Other characteristics of this sample are addressed in the empirical 
chapters. Appendix 1 also contains some additional descriptive tables.  
 
4.3.3.2 Categorical and self-report measures of violence 
Where it was my original intention to compare the networks of people that had been involved 
in violence to the networks of those that had not, my strategy of approaching people in hospital 
may not have been completely adequate to encounter people that had actually been involved 
in the types of deadly gun and gang violence that is the interest of this thesis.  Table 4-6 below 
lists the number of respondents according to their involvement in violence, making a further 
distinction according to the type of involvement, which I explain below.  
Table 4-6 Number of respondents according to involvement in violence (N=45) 
  
Not involved 23 
Involved 
Victim 9 
Prisoner 4 
Mala conducta 4 
Ex-Malandro 2 
Malandro 3 
TOTAL (N) 45 
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Many respondents I originally interviewed because of their involvement in violence, and 
particularly many of those interviewed in hospital, are eventually better described as victims, 
through a triangulation of their answers 86  on self-reported violence items that were also 
included in the questionnaire. Chapter 6 will explore these categories and their respective scores 
on a measure of self-reported violence in detail. It is likely that hospital may not have been a 
great strategy to find malandros in particular in the Venezuelan context. Because of the lethality 
of the violence malandros use (see Chapter 3), it could be that many malandros that get shot 
today never end up in a hospital bed; sadly, death is often inflicted instantly and they go straight 
to the morgue 87 . Only one person in hospital admitted to being a malandro, although he 
ascertained he would no longer hang out with malandros as soon as he could leave hospital. 
Another person said he had been involved in el malandreo in his younger years, but no longer 
engaged in it. On the other hand, with the malandros on the street, it was more difficult to 
conduct a semi-structured interview. They quickly lost interest. I only managed to conduct a 
complete network interview with two of the malandros I observed on the streets. The final 
sample, at least for the semi-structured interviews, thus includes just three self-identified 
malandros, but offers plenty of variation in terms of violence, as I will explore in much more 
detail in Chapter 6.  
 
The category of ‘mala conductas’, badly behaved people, also deserves some attention. Mala 
conductas are not necessarily bound by the dark code of el malandreo (see Chapter 7), or the 
geographical limits of a sector, but might flirt with the malandro identity. Family members often 
describe boys involved in el malandreo as mala conductas. Seeing them in their role as son, 
nephew or brother makes it much harder to classify them under the nominator of malandros 
people read about in the newspapers. Nevertheless, four respondents in the sample were 
indeed better described as mala conductas, they had drug habits and robbed to sustain them, 
which they all freely admitted, but they did not feel tied to a sector in a barrio as malandros tend 
to. Further, many of the malandros I spoke to look down on the drug users they sell to. Two 
                                                          
86 It is possible these answers, and my subsequent categorisation, were affected by hospital surroundings. 
Although I always asked to conduct the interview in private, some had family members in the vicinity, 
which may have affected some of their answers. On the other hand, the hospital environment made these 
interviews somewhat easier, as people had time and were often happy to be distracted from their injuries. 
As in other interviews, I continued to stress the importance of honesty and confidentiality and have no 
reason to believe these respondents were more or less honest about their involvement in violence than 
others. Further, in these cases I often completed the interview in two sittings, which allowed me to check 
any inconsistencies. 
87 A reading of police records of homicides in Catia in the first semester of 2012 shows this grim detail, 
homicides often involve multiple bullets through the head. This was also corroborated by the police 
officers and morgue assistants I interviewed.  
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people had engaged in el malandreo in the past, but no longer identified with it, I describe them 
as ex-malandros. Four further respondents were prisoners in the police compound of Cumaná.  
 
As already mentioned, I included some self-report questions on physical violence, as well as 
open-ended follow-up questions to explore specific instances of violence, but also some 
statements on anger and impulsivity and beliefs in the legitimacy of violence that will be 
explored in detail in Chapter 6. The ethical issues surrounding these questions are addressed in 
section 4.4.2 below. In the next section I look at the personal network component of the semi-
structured instrument.  
4.3.3.3 Personal network data 
I used personal network tools to explore people’s interactions and relationships. Just like 
traditional methods, a personal network approach includes questions about the respondents, 
also called ‘egos’. It distinguishes itself from these more traditional methods through enquiring 
about (1) the people, or ‘alters’, each ego has a certain relationship with (through name 
generators), (2) characteristics of these alters (through name interpreters), and (3) relationships 
between these alters (through alter-alter ties). 
 
Name generators and network size 
Discussions about appropriate ways of eliciting alters are on-going. Personal network interviews 
can be long and burdensome; they need to strike a delicate balance between research value and 
respondent fatigue. It is impossible to get a full list of respondents’ relationships, researchers 
thus have to sample relevant alters from their memory through name generators. This generates 
many problems and biases, that are discussed in detail elsewhere (Aral and Van Alstyne, 2011; 
Flap et al., 2006; McCarty and Molina, 2010; Van der Gaag et al., 2008). Some personal network 
approaches ask respondents for a determined number (e.g. 25, 40) of alters. This has the 
advantage of generating equally sized networks, with important implications for comparability 
of indicators, but offers less control over generating people from a diversity of contexts. For 
instance, one respondent had twenty-seven brothers and sisters, just naming these would have 
filled a reasonable list of alters, but would have offered little perspective on the variety of people 
he interacted with. I tried to limit recall bias by asking respondents for important alters across 
several life domains, the household, family, neighbourhood, education, work, and spare time. 
This is sometimes referred to as a contextual name generator (McCarty and Molina, 2010). It is 
similar to the name generator used by Marques (2012) in his study of personal networks in poor 
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communities in Brazil88. The questionnaire was structured around these five spheres. After 
asking some general questions about respondents’ views and characteristics on each item, I also 
asked them to name me some people (up to five) that were important to them in that respective 
sphere89. I specifically asked for people older than 15, and with whom they had had some form 
of contact in the last 2 years.  
 
Towards the end of the interview, I asked respondents to look back over the list of elicited alters 
and asked whether they could think of anyone else that was important to them, but had not yet 
been listed. I probed for specific categories of alters that seemed to be missing, such as people 
living in serviced centres. I initially wanted to include more problematic relationships, as I was 
particularly interested in violence and wanted to be able to potentially evaluate this type of 
relationships. I asked respondents whether they had had arguments, fights or conflicts with 
anyone in the past year. This proved difficult; even if people did not seem to have problems 
reporting instances of violence they had been involved in, it seemed more difficult to give these 
instances, quite literally, a name.  
 
These 45 respondents listed a total of 975 people they had had contact with in the last 2 years, 
with an average of 22. A 50 year old buhonera (street vendor) found it difficult recalling just 11 
people, whilst Juan, a prisoner in Cumaná, eagerly summed up 4690. Given these varying network 
sizes, we have to be careful comparing network indicators, as most depend heavily on size. Partly 
due to recall effects mentioned above, people tend to mention stronger (e.g. more trusted, 
more frequently seen) contacts first, then move on to weaker ties. The networks of people that 
mentioned fewer significant others are thus likely made up of stronger contacts that are also 
more likely to know each other, making the networks denser overall. Trends and findings 
reported in this thesis are thus always indicative, but offer many insights to be explored in 
further research.  
 
 
 
                                                          
88 With an important difference in that Marques also contacted the people in each person’s network to 
obtain much larger networks overall, that include second degree contacts.  
89 This is arguably also less burdensome than a simple name generator, through varying ego and alter 
questions.  
90 Note that in chapter 6 I evaluate his network in more detail, including all 48 contacts he mentioned. 
Nevertheless, this included two people that had died, people I did not include for the analysis of network 
composition measures but are important for the points made in chapter 6. 
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Alter characteristics and network composition  
To be able to explore the characteristics of the network that is generated through these name 
generators, a network approach also involves asking questions about these alters and their 
relationship with the respondent, through name interpreters. I asked respondents about each 
of their alter’s sex, age, profession and residence. I also enquired about alters’ perceived quality 
of life on the same scale of 0 to 10 I used to evaluate their own quality of life. To evaluate the 
strength of their relationships, I asked how close these people lived, how long they had known 
them, how frequently they saw them and how much they trusted them. The alter and 
relationship attributes that are generated this way allow for evaluating the diversity and 
strength of people’s networks and relationships. For the characteristics for which I have 
matching ego characteristics, I can also explore homophily, whether respondents’ alters are 
similar to them, e.g. how many of a person’s contacts have the same job, or are of the same sex. 
Homophily measures go beyond summarizing the alter characteristics, measuring the extent to 
which the alter characteristics match the respondent, this is also referred to as ego 
correspondence. I calculated network composition and homophily measures using E-net, these 
measures are summarised in tables in Appendix 1, whilst they are described in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Alter-alter ties and network structure 
Another important aspect of personal networks is the set of relationships between alters, the 
‘connectedness’, ‘density’ or ‘cohesion’ of the network. These are the actual relational data of a 
personal network analysis, that allow for evaluating the pattern of relationships in which an ego 
is embedded. Nevertheless, these are also the most burdensome to collect. A list of 25 alters 
produces 30091, albeit short, questions of whether each of these contacts have a relationship. I 
asked whether alters knew each other, i.e. whether they were likely to talk to each other if, for 
instance, running into one another in the supermarket. Network density has an effect on the 
spread of information and the constraint of people within these networks. Information spreads 
much quicker in tight, densely connected networks. I calculated network structural measures 
using E-net, they are summarised in Appendix 1, and described in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
In all the instrument aimed to capture a network that relatively accurately described people’s 
social context in relatively few ties. This strategy had as an important side effect that networks 
are not of equal size, complicating comparability because most network measures depend on 
                                                          
91 Where n is the number of alters, the amount of possible ties is defined by (n*n-1)/2. 
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its size. Before analysing these data in greater detail in the empirical chapters, I first turn to some 
important ethical issues.  
4.4 Research ethics and reflexivity 
The nature of the research project presents a wide array of ethical issues I aim to address in this 
section.  
4.4.1 Ethical issues  
The first of a number of ethical issues relates to the representativeness of my data. With field 
methods like the ones I used for this project, one can never be sure to have spoken to a 
representative number of people (Decker, 1996). Nevertheless, through various entry strategies 
for the qualitative interviews and setting broad quotas for the semi-structured interviews, I tried 
to guarantee I spoke to a variety of different people that represent the diversity of Venezuela’s 
barrios in two very different parts of the country. Further, the limited scope of the exercise is 
off-set by the wide range of meaningful data I collected in these quite different contexts, and 
particularly the data I was able to collect from malandros. I conducted group interviews until I 
reached a subjective level of saturation, when I felt people were repeating issues explored in 
other interviews. The use of both qualitative as well as more quantitative network data allows 
for triangulating my research findings, my qualitative observations and experiences mostly 
reflect and support the network analyses I explore in the following chapters. Mixed methods 
can illuminate different aspects of research concepts that are not necessarily reflected in a single 
method. Qualitative interviews allow for gaining broad, unprompted insights that are difficult to 
gather through more structured interviews. Nevertheless, the semi-structured interviews allow 
me to explore in more detail some of the assumptions made by theoretical perspectives outlined 
in Chapter 2. In all, any research project is ultimately influenced by the researcher’s choices, 
addressing each of these choices allows for evaluating how they affected the research exercise 
and I hope to have done so in the previous sections.   
 
There are many issues around personal safety in research on violence generally (Lee and Stanko, 
2003). In Venezuela’s context in particular, personal safety involves some common-sense 
measures such as not carrying expensive jewellery or displaying any other valuables such as 
camera, phone or laptop. I bought a very cheap and inconspicuous mobile phone and audio 
recorder that were kept in an equally discreet backpack whilst roaming the barrio. I often also 
carried the phone number of my flatmate in my trousers, in case my backpack was stolen. I was 
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vigilant at all times, and frequently went over how I would respond to any exposure to violence. 
I always had an idea of the area I was in, and remained fully aware of exit strategies. If I had 
been approached for any valuables I would never have felt the urge to resist, exposing myself to 
more danger of violence. Fortunately, I never had to apply any of these strategies. 
 
When I completed the form to obtain ethical approval for my fieldwork I never intended to stay 
in the barrio, let alone engage with malandros. As fieldwork proceeded however, it became 
obvious to me that this would be necessary to answer my research questions. Further, as I 
gained more confidence in the barrio, I realised malandros are part of the barrio’s daily life. All 
places where they convene have people going about their daily lives, children running up and 
down alleyways. I grew increasingly aware that, to understand the dynamics of violence, it was 
necessary to understand these community dynamics, and the way malandros are entwined in 
them. On the few occasions I did stay in the barrio, I stayed with people I trusted. In Catia, I 
stayed with clerics and in a hospital, in Cumaná, I stayed with a trusted friend. In all, it needs to 
be remembered that violence is still relatively rare, and disproportionately affects people that 
expose themselves to it through their lifestyles, which brings me to the much more complicated 
issue of engaging with malandros.   
 
Among malandros, I was certainly in more danger than any other place, but there were still 
measures I took to look after my own safety, such as not staying beyond dusk and not accepting 
invitations to parties. I always ensured my gatekeepers knew where I was. Having been 
introduced by these gatekeepers, these people were also very protective of me. The ex-
malandro and cleric I discussed previously were particularly helpful in this regard, these boys 
would not have wanted to offend them. Further, being a woman, and perhaps also being a 
foreigner, certainly helped me on these instances. Sadly, as many boys confided, young men 
always garner suspicion, just entering another barrio can make them a suspect and have them 
shot. Arguably this is much less the case for women and I certainly never experienced this type 
of enquiries in any of the barrios I entered, partly because I was often accompanied and always 
introduced by trusted locals. And as I started attending more, I gained these boys’ trust too. 
They knew I was uncomfortable around guns, and did their best to hide them from me. I never 
pressed for their co-operation, e.g. with the semi-structured interviews. I believe I gained 
substantial trust through making the research exercise a conversation, rather than an interview 
as such. These boys were incredibly interested in life in Europe (although they often had 
difficulty locating it away from the US) and we exchanged stories more than I extracted them. 
We talked about the rarity of murders in Europe and things like legal marihuana, which incited 
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them to tell their own stories. In all, this type of research is a delicate balance between obtaining 
trust and staying away from any more potential danger than being around malandros already 
puts you in. Turning down invitations to parties, for instance, meant that I was not exposed to 
the violence that often occurs at these parties, but also meant I always remained an outsider.   
 
There were only three times I actually felt in danger, and only one of those times was in the 
company of malandros. One instance was when I turned a corner in the barrio and suddenly saw 
two police officers with their guns drawn, ready to shoot. My heart started racing and I 
instinctively looked for cover, until I realised everyone else was carrying on as normal, ignoring 
the officers. This in itself taught me a lot about the normalisation of violence in these spaces, 
issues I address in a little more detail in Chapter 8. The other time was outside hospital as two 
bodies had been brought in, and family members of one of the dead were looking for revenge. 
In a scuffle outside someone suddenly pulled a gun, I panicked and sprinted inside, in what felt 
like milliseconds, much to the amusement of security guards whom laughed at my ‘gringa’, 
American, panic, and even whiter face than I already had for days to come. Another time was 
with the malandros in Cumaná. I usually avoided going late at night, but on this occasion, just a 
week or so before the end of my fieldwork, I had stayed till around 9.30pm. People were getting 
drunk and boisterous, showing me their guns. It was not until my gatekeeper called to check 
where I was, I realised I was putting myself in unnecessary danger. Where at the start of 
fieldwork, I was perhaps overly cautious, towards the end, and as occasion upon occasion turned 
out fine, I may have been exceedingly inattentive and it was probably good be able to return 
home to put things in perspective.  
 
There are also a number of ethical issues and biases around asking people about their 
involvement in violence. These issues are related to respondents’ honesty, memory and 
inclination to give socially desirable answers (ICVS, 2011; Lee and Stanko, 2003). A number of 
precautions can avoid some of the biases inherent to violence research, but these biases are 
always present. Some precautions include conducting these interviews away from others, 
repeatedly stressing confidentiality and impartiality, and the use of fully anonymised 
interviewing techniques through audio-assisted PDAs (Thornberry and Krohn, 2000). The use of 
PDAs was more or less out of the question for me, as carrying this equipment in the barrio would 
have put me in additional danger92. Nevertheless, I always asked to conduct the interview in 
                                                          
92 This issue also prevented me from using visualisation programmes for gathering network data, which 
meant more work recording and transcribing the data into various data matrices required for network 
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private. Some people did not oppose to others remaining present, which may have affected their 
answers, although some did offer detailed descriptions of their involvement in violence even in 
the presence of others. Further, before any questions on violence, I always stressed the 
importance of being honest and repeatedly emphasised the confidentiality of people’s 
responses, and I feel that most respondents were indeed responding honestly. On the few 
occasions I found inconsistencies, I returned to clear these up. This was facilitated by the 
research environments, people in hospitals and prison often stayed there for a long time.  
 
In all, perhaps partly because I repeatedly stressed the reasons for these questions and so many 
respondents had been personally affected, people did not have many problems with my 
questions on violence, apart from the ones asking for details of people they may have had 
conflicts or violent interactions with, which respondents generally found more intrusive and did 
not like to answer. All people, including malandros, were concerned for the security situation, 
and understood the importance of my research. My accent and appearance helped establish 
that I was not linked to anyone local, whether police or political. In all, people had little reason 
to hide things from me. Nevertheless, people may have been motivated to make a different 
impression on me and conceal their full involvement in violence, an issue all research on violence 
encounters.  
 
I tried to limit inducing stress or anxiety in respondents by not including questions on violence 
that may be particularly sensitive, such as sexual violence. Nevertheless, two women shared this 
information with me spontaneously. These instances, and the group discussions, where violence 
was discussed relatively openly, indicate that talking about experiences of violence may often 
be cathartic rather than stressful. As mentioned I tried to offer some consolation through a hug 
and expressions of sympathy and referred them to other instances where I could.  
 
Using the tape recorder did not seem to make people feel uncomfortable, only a few people 
refused to let me use it, which I of course obliged. I had the impression the tape recorder often 
made people feel important rather than uncomfortable, some malandros thought it quirky, 
although they did not like me taking pictures. ‘Hey, it’s like National Geographic’, one said. ‘Que 
arrecho’, how cool, indicating they thought it was something of a spectacle.  
 
                                                          
analysis. It also meant I was unable to double check some discrepancies that were only apparent after 
data entry, e.g. non-existing relationships between family members.    
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There is of course also the issue of hearing about violence, and whether the researcher should 
take action and report these instances to the police. Unfortunately, in Venezuela’s climate of 
police corruption, reporting would not necessarily have much effect. There was not much I could 
do with these stories, which was perhaps also why people shared them so voluntarily. I never 
condoned the acts people talked about, and tried not to judge, I always repeated that I just 
wanted to understand them. Importantly, people that had killed did not condone homicide 
themselves, as will become clear in Chapter 7. Malandros in particular have strong morals about 
violence against women, children and what they see as innocent people. They kill for, in their 
eyes, valid reasons. Nevertheless, these stories often had a strong impact on my own emotional 
well-being, I had many nightmares during fieldwork and found it difficult to engage once I 
returned, an issue I will return to in the next section.  
 
All participants were given an information sheet with my and the university’s contact details 
(also in Appendix 2), which certainly helped establish trust in some contexts. They were always 
promised anonymity and all data in this thesis were indeed fully anonymised, and cannot be 
linked back to any individual. I also gave people with whom I conducted an individual interview 
the option to look over it and retract any information. The few people that asked for transcripts 
of their interviews were sent these for approval, which was always granted. I also hope to return 
to the field to share my data with participants.  
 
In the next section I reflect on some other issues, particularly regarding my own position and 
how that affected the data that were collected.  
4.4.2 Reflexivity  
Llevo franela negra, cara gringa  
I’m wearing a black shirt and an American face 
 
As a female, white middle-class foreigner I had an undeniable influence on the data I collected. 
Confidence was often hard-negotiated, but I feel that my appearance opened more doors than 
it shut. Though often denied, my skin colour remained symbol of my other-ness. In the barrio, I 
stood out immediately. The introductory quote is a text message I once sent to someone I was 
about to meet for the first time to recognise me. It was sent and received humorously, but 
reflects the intricacies of my position in Venezuela, and particularly its barrios. My face spelled 
‘gringa’ (meaning ‘US citizen’ or ‘foreigner’ more broadly), long before my accent. Attitudes 
towards Americans in particular, and foreigners in general are sometimes hostile. Government 
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officials in particular were often reluctant to co-operate. This thesis is written testimony of the 
considerable effects of political and class polarisation and the historical lack of transparent 
institutions on people’s lives; it should be no surprise my own data collection experiences were 
affected by institutional arbitrariness and polarisation which have dramatic effects on the 
availability and dissemination of reliable data. Obtaining data on violence was no small feat, and 
impossible on my first visits to Venezuela. Officially, these data have not been published since 
2004. Further, where these data are available, their reliability is often questionable. I was 
witness to a number of unusual situations, e.g. police recruits themselves conducting 
victimisation and perception surveys (including perceptions of the police). Within the police, 
there is no unified data collection system and even official data vary between agencies93. It was 
only the opening up of a dedicated research team at UNES that allowed me access to these data 
in Catia. In Cumaná I harassed the local investigative police force repeatedly for lower-level data. 
I was invited to a core team meeting and told face-to-face they were very interested in my 
research and ready to co-operate, only to be left with nothing several follow-up emails, request 
letters, phone calls and hours waiting at reception later. These situations lead to frustration and 
uncountable lost hours and days, yet worked in my advantage too; when people took a liking to 
me they often shared the data they had regardless of institutional prescriptions. I did get some 
access to some data for Cumaná, through a police officer in a different office. Similarly, access 
to prison in Caracas was denied on grounds of a national directive not to let foreigners into 
prison after high-profile riots and disturbances in previous years. In Cumaná, access was granted, 
then denied again, then granted when I submitted my request to a new director. Insistence 
sometimes works, sometimes it does not. This arbitrariness and uncertainty maintains a system 
of personal favours and institutional shortcuts. Requesting data often felt like asking for personal 
favours. I often had to be creative, and above all, patient, just like Venezuelans. If anything, 
these experiences helped me understand and put into perspective their daily lives.  
 
Although formal institutions were often weary of my intentions, I strongly feel other people 
went out of their way to explain and introduce me to things Venezuelans would take for granted. 
I was not afraid to ask for clarification if I did not understand a word or reference. We often 
joked about Venezuelan habits comparing and contrasting them to e.g. the punctuality of 
Europeans. People enjoyed asking me about how they differed from us and were happy to offer 
me their local insights, almost in exchange. The climate of polarisation has also generated a 
                                                          
93 See also chapter 3 for differential practices for recording data. 
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distrust of government-sponsored research. As I could not be clearly linked with either band94 
expectations were perhaps more manageable. Whether they felt sorry for me, being alone in a 
dangerous foreign country, wanted to impress me or even sleep with me, most people I met 
were also really interested in my research topic, and had a strong opinion on the violence that 
seems to be slowly suffocating their society. For people in the centres, the stories of my 
experiences in the barrio opened a world they themselves have often never entered. 
 
Venezuela also remains a strongly gender-polarised world; women do female things, men 
masculine things. Men have to be strong and women should look pretty and after the household. 
There is an absolute respect for the mother figure, but disdain for ordinary women, sometimes 
termed ‘bochinches’ that drink, smoke and neglect their households. Men do not often play a 
role in the household, but do need to provide and protect. It is sometimes expected people have 
several amorous relationships, to the extent people did not really look up when I started asking 
whether they had a lover as well as a partner. Personally, hardly disguised sexual advances from 
random people on the street as well as interviewees (regardless of power positions), were often 
difficult to deal with, but I learned to ignore them or talk of a very protective boyfriend. Not 
taking people up on their advances sometimes garnered respect, other times made them try 
harder. In all, men were often much keener to speak to me and probably tried to impress me 
more. Women were often quite suspicious and withholding to start with (depending on whom 
had introduced me), but soon dropped their guards, laughing, joking and sharing, Venezuelan 
style. 
 
As an endnote, fieldwork was also very emotional. Up to today I find myself emotional when 
thinking about the stories of pure desolation and intense fear; stories that often do not attain 
their full dimensions on paper, disjointed from the people that put them into words. These were 
stories of extreme violence, multiple deaths, and, perhaps most of all, having no one to turn to. 
I myself coped with support of my flatmate, whom sadly passed away since, and other friends I 
made out there, who took me out for ‘cervezaterapia’, necessary chats over a cold beer. 
Nevertheless, the true horror really dawned on me back in the relative security of home, as I sat 
transcribing the details of these stories in the cold and comparatively desolate spaces of the 
Global North. Anyone’s daily concerns, my own PhD even, seemed futile in the face of 
                                                          
94 I soon learned to answer the unavoidable question of political affiliation – whether ‘I was chavista or 
opposition?’ – with an evasive though relatively satisfactory for both sides ‘I can’t really comment as I 
don’t know Venezuela that well, we hear a lot of good and bad things about Chavez abroad, I’m here for 
you to tell me what it is really like’ 
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Venezuela’s daily realities. I was lucky enough to have a scholarship that allowed me some 
financial leverage to return to the UK to continue writing up. Many in the PhD community at 
Sussex went through similar things on fieldwork, which helped put things in perspective. In all, 
the emotional consequences of this type of fieldwork should not be underestimated. A good 
support network is incredibly important in curtailing some of these effects.  
 
Nevertheless, fieldwork was also fun and exciting, and more than anything, eye-opening. 
Observing how people cope and continue to laugh and joke among sheer adversity, having 
drawn a birth ticket to any particular Venezuelan barrio, changed my perspective on life 
dramatically.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter described the different methods I used to collect a wide variety of data on violence, 
inequality and people’s relationships. It outlined my choice for collecting data in two different 
cities that vary substantially in terms of inequality, and the use of mixed methods that offer 
distinct perspectives on violence and people’s relationships. I also devoted some attention to 
ethical concerns and possible limitations of these strategies as well as my own position. In the 
next chapters I analyse these data in further detail, applying the theoretical perspectives that 
were outlined in Chapter 2. I start in Chapter 5 with evaluating how barrio residents’ 
relationships reflect their real and perceived opportunities as well as informal social control 
mechanisms, two aspects of people’s relationships that are often considered important in 
theorising about inequality and violence. In Chapter 6, I look at how these relationships might 
influence the effects of inequality on individual-level involvement in violence, and in Chapter 7 
I evaluate in much more detail the data I collected from malandros, to explore the dynamics of 
the violence they use.   
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CHAPTER 5 NETWORKS, OPPORTUNITIES AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE BARRIO  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at how barrio dwellers’ actual relationships, rather than their abstract 
communities, provide them with opportunities, expectations and informal social control. 
Chapter 2 showed that traditional perspectives on violence assume a lack of opportunities, a 
discrepancy between these opportunities and expectations, or a lack of informal social control 
in lower-class communities makes these communities more susceptible to violence. Anomie 
perspectives (Merton, 1938; Agnew, 1992) suggest that inequality can leave people feeling they 
cannot achieve the goals projected in society. This gap between opportunities and expectations, 
rather than a lack of opportunities as such, then generates motivations to engage in violence. 
Social disorganisation perspectives (Sampson and Groves, 1989) suggest neighbourhood-level 
relationships can mitigate the effects of inequality by providing informal social control over the 
behaviour of its residents. While such approaches offer interesting insights they also face certain 
limitations. Empirical tests of these perspectives often rely on aggregate administrative 
boundaries that do not necessarily reflect the interest of their theoretical assumptions. As was 
discussed in Chapter 3 the aggregate income distribution in Venezuela does not tell us much 
about people’s opportunities, expectations or informal social control mechanisms. It also 
showed administrative boundaries do not reflect the more salient boundary between the centre 
and the barrio1, where most of Venezuela’s deadly violence is concentrated. These limitations 
can be overcome through the use of more micro-level approaches that focus more closely on 
people’s actual, everyday interactions and relationships. 
 
More relational perspectives look at how inequality makes violent identities attractive and 
meaningful, without necessarily making assumptions about individuals (Young et al., 2008). They 
do not try and explain differential levels of violence, nor why people use more violence than 
others, but look at the construction and meaning of violent identities. Masculinity theories, for 
instance, suggest violent masculinities offer masculine power that provides distancing from 
feared, weak or female identities (Messerschmidt, 2005; Vigil, 1988). Like other perspectives, 
these perspectives acknowledge the importance of unequal opportunity structures, but look at 
how they generate meaning rather than motivations. Although they thus make similar 
assumptions about the effect of unequal opportunity structures, more relational perspectives 
                                                          
1 I use centre to refer to traditionally higher-class areas, whereas barrio refers to informally constructed 
and traditionally lower-class areas. I explain this in more detail below. 
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make fundamentally different assumptions about the potentially mitigating effect of strong 
relationships. Where social disorganisation perspectives assume strong neighbourhood ties can 
mitigate the effects of inequality through instilling informal social control, perspectives that look 
at people’s actual interactions and relationships suggest that strong ties can generate violence, 
particularly where there is ambiguity about people’s positions and where conflict avoidance is 
difficult. These perspectives see violence itself as a form of social organisation and informal 
social control (Baumgartner, 1988; Black, 1983; Gould, 2003).  
 
In line with such approaches and rather than trying to collect representative data within abstract 
boundaries, this chapter aims to provide insight into the dynamics of the barrio, and particularly 
those aspects of barrio residents’ lives that are often seen to be conducive to higher levels of 
violence. It uses personal network and qualitative rather than representative data. At one level 
this limits my ability to say anything about differences in homicide rates, but it does offer a 
detailed understanding of conditions in the barrio. I cannot test macro-level theories, but I can 
explore some of their assumptions, by looking at people’s personal networks as concrete 
reflections of their opportunities, expectations and informal social controls.  
 
Overall, this chapter shows that barrio dwellers have little access to formal opportunities in their 
networks and also feel disadvantaged, although they do not necessarily feel worse off than their 
interaction networks. These findings could be interpreted as tentative evidence that some barrio 
residents may indeed be motivated to use violence, or that violent identities provide meaning 
under these conditions. Nevertheless, there is little evidence barrio dwellers are less subject to 
informal social control. They have strong, dense relationships, which offer plenty of informal 
social control. The chapter therefore questions the relevance of looking for indicators of 
community disorganisation. In looking for community-level processes that can provide informal 
social control over residents, social disorganisation perspectives ignore that violent identities 
can also provide informal social control, particularly where formal social control is absent or 
perceived inadequate.  
 
In what follows, I first pay some more attention to the particulars of the personal network 
approach used here, justifying this methodology by showing people’s interaction networks are 
not necessarily confined to their neighbourhoods. An important and salient boundary, however, 
is that between the barrio and the centre. Subsequent sections explore, first, how these 
personal networks reflect barrio residents’ access to opportunities and their expectations and, 
second, their informal social control mechanisms. 
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5.1.1 Personal network data 
Durable patterns within the social world are durable 
because they are constantly reproduced and preserved 
within interactions.  
(Crossley, 2010, p.32) 
Network research sees interactions and relationships as the building blocks of macro-level 
structures. People’s relationships and interactions, rather than their attributes, generate 
observable, durable patterns in the social world (Crossley, 2010). Personal network data allow 
for the evaluation of how macro-level inequalities are reflected in people’s relationships. 
Although they are individual-level data they reflect the boundaries of society as a whole. Such 
data thus offer an unparalleled connection between the micro- and macro-level, by showing 
across and between which boundaries people’s daily interactions occur. 
 
Network theory makes a distinction between relationships within horizontal boundaries (bonds), 
those crossing horizontal boundaries (bridges) and those crossing vertical boundaries, or explicit 
power gradients in society (links) (Lin, 1999; Smith, 2009). These boundaries differ from one 
context to the next. In Venezuela, for instance, a salient vertical boundary is that between the 
barrio and the centre. It is well-known that people tend to interact more comfortably and readily 
with similar people, within and between horizontal boundaries, a social phenomenon also 
referred to as homophily (Lin, 2002; McPherson et al., 2001). Bonds and bridges are thus often 
stronger relationships, as people interact more comfortably with similar people. Relationships 
that cross salient boundaries (links) are often weaker, but important for access to new ideas and 
opportunities. Strong ties offer social support, but little access to new ideas and opportunities. 
The composition of people’s personal networks is thus important for people’s exposure to new 
ideas and opportunities. The structure of personal networks, the relationships between people 
in the network, is important for the spread of information and ideas in these networks. 
Information spreads more rapidly in dense networks where there are many connections 
between the people (or alters) that make up the network.   
 
Chapter 2 made reference to previous studies that have used personal networks, here I briefly 
expand on those studies that are important in this chapter. Barry Wellman is often seen as one 
of the pioneers of personal network research. In a now classic study of social support networks 
in Toronto (1979), he takes issue with perspectives that argue community is lost in modern 
societies. He shows instead, that people’s communities are no longer confined to the 
neighbourhood but that personal networks, rather than abstract neighbourhoods, represent 
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people’s real ‘personal communities’ (1979, 1999). Other researchers have evaluated these 
personal communities in a variety of contexts, in the US (Lee and Campbell, 1999; Roman et al., 
2012), France (Ferrand et al., 1999) and Holland (Van Eijk, 2010), to name but a few. Studies that 
have evaluated these personal communities in the Latin American context do often observe 
strong neighbourhood ties. Espinoza (1999) explored personal networks of 300 respondents in 
two poor neighbourhoods in Santiago, Chile, showing that people are reliant on strong, but 
predominantly local ties that limit their integration into wider society. Marques (2012) used 
personal networks to explore the networks of the 361 poor and 30 middle-class individuals in 
São Paulo and Salvador, Brazil. He finds these networks to be diverse in terms of size and spheres 
of sociability, but observes a strong localism, many of his respondents’ contacts live in the same 
neighbourhood, at least for the poor. He does not observe a strong localism among middle-class 
respondents.  
 
Personal network data offer a unique perspective on all of the theoretical perspectives 
mentioned above, by seeing their relationships rather than states or neighbourhoods as the 
basis for people’s opportunities, expectations and informal social controls. They help us explore 
the core assumptions of these theories in rich detail. First, they help us engage with anomie and 
strain theories that assume a discrepancy between people’s opportunities and their 
expectations pushes people into violence. Research has shown time and again that people’s 
networks are important for access to job opportunities (Granovetter, 1973; Lin, 2002; Lin and 
Erickson, 2008). Network data thus help us evaluate the opportunities embedded in people’s 
relationships, rather than their neighbourhoods. Secondly, a particular strand of strain theories 
(relative deprivation theory) assumes strain results from negative comparison with a reference 
group, but have difficulty conceptualising this reference group. Using personal network data, it 
is possible to evaluate relative deprivation in comparison to people’s interaction networks, 
conceiving of these networks (rather than abstract neighbourhoods) as their reference group 
and the basis for their expectations. Third, personal network data help us engage with 
perspectives that assume people’s relationships mitigate connections between inequality and 
violence. In the criminological literature, strong, cohesive ties2 are often assumed to provide 
informal social control. In contrast, more relational perspectives suggest strong, dense ties can 
generate violence, particularly where there is frequent contact and ambiguity about people’s 
                                                          
2 More recent perspectives, e.g. collective efficacy suggest there also needs to be a willingness to activate 
these ties. Nevertheless, they still see social cohesion as a prerequisite for informal social control as I will 
explore below.  
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positions. Network data can help us disentangle these perspectives by looking at informal social 
control mechanisms embedded in their relationships.  
 
The Venezuelan case makes personal network research relevant on another level. Chapter 3 
showed that the state has traditionally had little presence in the barrio. The security situation, 
but also formal job and housing scarcity often make people (if only temporarily) reliant on 
significant others for the provision of jobs and services such as childcare and even housing. In 
the centre, the state is much more present and remaining uncertainties are more frequently 
dealt with by private markets. People often have money to pay for private education, health and 
security. People in the barrio are in many ways much more subject to uncertainty, relying on 
informal connections for housing, work, and even physical security.  
 
Chapter 4 described the methodology and sample selection used to collect the data in rich detail. 
It is, however, important to reiterate a few limitations of the data. On top of qualitative 
interviews and observations, I conducted semi-structured network interviews with 45 
respondents. As my research focussed on relational dynamics in the barrio, the vast majority 
(42) of respondents were barrio dwellers. Further, because I interviewed people on the streets 
and in public hospitals, this sample is potentially biased towards the poorer sections of these 
communities. It was also important to have some form of comparative example with higher-
class respondents living in the centre. Although only three higher-class individuals living in the 
centre completed a network survey, these respondents’ networks end up providing a striking 
contrast to the networks of barrio dwellers and give us a much deeper insight into the dynamics 
of the barrio. As in Chapter 3, I use ‘centre’ and ‘barrio’ to refer to a subjective class difference 
between relatively central, serviced and higher-class areas and relatively poorer, informally 
constructed and lower-class barrios. This is not to say all people in the centre are rich, or all 
people in the barrio are poor, on the contrary, income differences may be increasingly felt within 
the barrio rather than between the barrio and the centre. Nevertheless, these differences reflect 
durable inequalities that, as we will see in this chapter, are continuously reproduced by a lack of 
interaction between them.  
 
This is an exploratory research exercise, where the boundaries of respondents’ networks were 
as important as their content, so I did not set a limit on the significant others respondents could 
mention. I used a contextual name generator similar to Marques (2012), which explores people’s 
contacts in a variety of contexts, but makes it harder to set a limit on the amount of contacts 
people can mention (see Chapter 4 p. 104). The networks explored here thus vary in size from 
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11 to 46, with a mean of 22. These differences in network size are particularly relevant for 
comparisons between higher-class respondents and barrio dwellers. The three higher-class 
respondents mentioned more significant others, on average3. Some differences may thus be 
partly due to differences in network size. Future research should carefully consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of letting people name an unlimited number of significant others. 
In all, the trends and findings reported here are indicative rather than representative. I used 
one-way ANOVA analyses to test whether any differences in means between classes were 
significant, but these tests should be interpreted with suitable care given these sample sizes. 
Nevertheless, the findings in this chapter are corroborated by qualitative research data and 
reflect some important issues that can be taken on board in future research.  
5.1.2 Worlds apart; neighbourhood boundaries and class limits 
This section validates looking at respondents’ interaction networks over and beyond abstract 
neighbourhood boundaries, showing these interaction networks often cross neighbourhood 
boundaries. Nevertheless, they do not often cross class boundaries, as we will see below.   
 
Figure 5-1 first shows the composition of respondents’ interaction networks by proximity4 of 
their contacts, making a distinction between the networks of barrio dwellers and higher-class 
respondents.  
                                                          
3  The three higher-class respondents mentioned an average of 29 contacts, higher than the overall 
average of 22. Marques (2012) also found networks of middle-class respondents to be larger overall than 
those of lower-class respondents. Whereas we might interpret this as indicative that these higher-class 
respondents have larger networks, and consequently perhaps more diverse resources as Marques 
suggests, in this study this is based on just three respondents and it may be they just mentioned more 
people. 
4 I included Caracas’ satellite cities (e.g. Guarenas/Guatire, los Valles del Tuy, la Guaira) under ‘other city’ 
as they can be quite far removed and people do often see these as different cities. This differs from Figure 
5-2 that is not meant as a reflection of proximity, but class. I used the category ‘other city’ there only for 
contacts where respondents said e.g. Valencia, or Maturin without specifying a neighbourhood. Caracas’ 
satellite cities are listed there as a separate ‘class’ category as they are not informally constructed like the 
barrio, nevertheless they house many former barrio residents.   
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Figure 5-1 Composition of personal networks by proximity of alters and class of respondents (N=45)  
 
*Difference between classes significant at p=.05 
 
From the figure it is clear that barrio residents’ contacts do not necessarily live locally. On 
average, well over half (57%) of their networks are composed of people that live in different 
neighbourhoods (33%), different cities (23%) or even different countries (1%). Nevertheless, 
these findings do not quite replicate the dispersed personal communities that are often found 
in the global North. In his classic study of personal communities of East Yorkers, Wellman (1979) 
found only 13% of these people’s contacts lived in the same neighbourhood. Other researchers 
have replicated these findings. For instance Van 
Eijk (2010) found that just 17% of ties in three 
Rotterdam neighbourhoods were local. In this 
sample, on average, over two fifths (43%) of the 
significant others barrio residents mentioned do 
live in the same neighbourhood, of which almost 
one fifth (18%) live in the same house. These 
findings are more in line with Marques’ (2012) and 
Espinoza’s (1999) findings among the poor in São 
Paulo and Salvador, Brazil, and Santiago, Chile. 
Marques found 32% of poor respondents’ contacts 
lived in the same area, whereas for middle-class 
respondents this was just 5%. Espinoza found 63% 
18%
25%
33%
23%
1%
0%
1%
12%
39%
41%
6%
1%
Same house*
Same neighbourhood
Same city
Other city
Other country*
Unknown
Barrio (n=42)
Centre (n=3)
Picture 5-1 consecutive layering of barrio 
homes, Caracas 2012 
122 
 
 
 
of people’s contacts lived close by, within 3 blocks of themselves5.   
 
Barrio residents in particular live much closer together than their counterparts in the centre. The 
self-constructed spaces of the barrio are almost literally expandable, and houses have grown as 
one generation built on top of the 
next (see Picture 5-1). The spaces 
of the centre are much more 
distant (see Picture 5-2); only 1% 
of contacts of higher-class 
respondents live in the same 
house, and only 12% in the same 
neighbourhood. These class 
differences are reflective of 
diverging interaction patterns 
that will be discussed in more 
detail in section 5.3 below.  
 
Overall, these findings suggest that traditional neighbourhoods may indeed be a less than 
perfect reflection of people’s communities. Although this is truer of higher-class residents for 
whom 87% of contacts mentioned live in different neighbourhoods to their own. Still, over half 
(57%) of barrio residents’ relationships are with people outside of their own barrio. This 
emphasises the inherent limitations of macro-level approaches that, too often, are based on the 
relatively arbitrary spatial divisions of administrative or governmental districts. 
 
Beyond the spatial extent of social relations an even more striking finding emerges from an 
exploration of respondents’ personal networks and class divisions. Respondents’ contacts may 
not necessarily be local in a geographical sense; they are local, however, in the sense that they 
rarely cross historically entrenched class boundaries. Figure 5-2 also lists people’s contacts 
according to where they live, this time making a distinction between areas based on whether 
they are traditionally seen to be higher- or lower-class6.  
                                                          
5 These differences are probably influenced by diverging network sizes. The average size of the networks 
Marques collected was larger, 50 on average, whereas the average size of networks in Espinoza’s study 
was just 9.  
6  I make a distinction between traditional upper-class areas like Chacao and El Cafetal in Caracas, 
Parcelamiento Miranda and various gated communities in Cumaná, and more middle-class ones of la 
Candelaria, el Silencio and los Chaguaramos in Caracas and el Centro in Cumaná. Both types of areas 
Picture 5-2 Space in the centre, Caracas 2012 
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Figure 5-2 Composition of personal networks by residence of alters and class of respondents (N=45) 
 
** Class difference significant at p=.01 
* Class difference significant at p=.05 
 
This figure shows homophily by type of area is remarkable, on average 63% of people’s contacts 
live in a similar class area to themselves. Over two thirds (68%) of the contacts of barrio residents 
live in a barrio too. This does not imply that the remaining third tend to live in higher-class areas, 
in fact less than 1% do. Most of these other contacts live in satellite cities, or middle-class areas. 
I asked barrio dwellers whether they knew anyone in higher-class areas; in the few cases they 
said they did, this was a distant relationship, e.g. they stayed in touch with a family where their 
mother had been a personal servant. The composition of higher-class respondents’ networks is 
almost the exact mirror image of the networks of barrio dwellers. Only 4% of higher-class 
respondents’ contacts live in a traditional barrio, and many of these are people they have a 
patron-servant relationship with. One higher-class respondent did not know anyone living in a 
barrio, another mentioned two; one was his live-in maid, the other the gardener in his gated 
condominium. An important proportion (6%) of upper class respondents’ contacts live abroad, 
possibly reflecting an important evolution7. 
 
                                                          
distinguish themselves from informally constructed barrios and more recently developed satellite cities, 
which are centrally planned, but often house former barrio residents.  
7 It is often reported in national media that many upper class respondents’ contacts are leaving the 
country because of the political situation. 
1%
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In all, we find some overlap in middle-class areas and satellite cities, but very little between 
higher-class areas and barrio. These reflect the durable inequalities described in Chapter 3. This 
class segregation remains intrinsically linked to patterns of sociability, but also opportunities and 
capabilities. It reflects a multi-dimensional inequality that is difficult to capture with vertical 
single-dimensional measures like the Gini coefficient. People in serviced centres traditionally 
had access to economic and political spoils, and remain seen to be doing better as we will 
explore below. Importantly, as Figure 5-2 indicates, there are hardly any interactions through 
which these spoils might be shared. In the absence of the means of the rich, the social life that 
evolved in the barrio was arguably more reliant on informal networks, generating an informal 
economy and informal social controls.  
 
These findings question the validity of perspectives that conceive geographic neighbourhood 
boundaries as the basis for inferences about the behaviour of their residents. Further, 
neighbourhoods may not only be bad reflections of people’s interaction networks, people’s 
residences are not always fixed. It was often hard to pin people down to a particular barrio. 
Many live semi-nomadic lives, moving between homes, in often completely different barrios of 
the city, dictated by work, family or love. People living in Caracas’ satellite cities in particular are 
often so far removed from employment opportunities that they are almost obliged to 
temporarily live closer to work to make it in on time. Moses’s (21) situation is telling here – he 
lived in a little shack he shared with his mum and 9 of his 10 siblings. Only one brother had left 
the house, moving to his partner’s house about 2.5 hours away by public transport, though he 
also frequently returned to the family home in the course of fights with his partner. During the 
week, Moses himself often went to stay with his brother as it simplified his commute to work. 
 
The next sections look at how these networks reflect respondents’ opportunities, expectations 
and informal social controls, starting with an evaluation of their opportunities.  
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5.2 Opportunities, informality and strain  
Picture 5-3 A typical street scene; mototaxis and a hotdog stand awaiting business, Caracas 2011 
 
 
This section engages with theoretical perspectives that assume violence is more prevalent in 
lower-class communities because people have less opportunities to achieve their desired goals. 
Anomie and strain8 perspectives suggest a discrepancy between opportunities and expectations 
generates motivations for violence. Subcultural perspectives assume unequal opportunity 
structures make violent identities inherently attractive. More relational masculinity theories 
suggest violent masculinities provide distancing from feared, weak or female identities. This 
section shows that the boundaries between the barrio and the centre indeed still reflect 
important differences in objective as well as subjective opportunities. Barrio residents’ have 
little access to formal opportunities in their networks and also feel disadvantaged, on average.   
5.2.1 Objective opportunities 
This section explores some objective indicators of respondents’ opportunities, first evaluating 
their own characteristics before moving on to the opportunities embedded in their personal 
networks. It shows that people in the barrio do have opportunities to earn good money, though 
these are often in insecure professions. There are also important gender role differences among 
respondents’ contacts, with women more frequently being unemployed and taking care of the 
household.  
5.2.1.1 The informal economy, income and making ends meet 
Table 5-1 below shows respondents’ broad9 employment situation, adding a class distinction. 
                                                          
8 Strain theories are the micro-level variant of anomie theories, in what follows I refer only to strain as my 
measures are based on micro-level data.  
9 See table 1 in Appendix 1 for a more detailed description.  
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Table 5-1 Respondents’ employment according to class (N=45) 
 Total Barrio Centre 
N 45 42 3 
Waged  12 (27%) 11 (26%) 1 (33%) 
 Private sector 
 Public sector 
4 (8%) 
8 (18%) 
3 (7%) 
8 (19%) 
1 (33%) 
- 
Unwaged  33 (73%) 31 (74%) 2 (67%) 
 Unskilled labour 
 Informal employment 
 Non-remunerated 
5 (11%) 
13 (29%) 
15 (33%) 
5 (12%) 
11 (26%) 
15 (36%) 
- 
2 (67%) 
- 
 
It shows that only twelve respondents (27%) are in waged employment, eight of which are in 
the public sector (police, army and government administration). The vast majority (33 or 73%) 
have no regular wage coming in; they do unskilled labour (5), have informal professions (13), or 
have no income whatsoever (15). Latter category includes five students and four prisoners, only 
six respondents are currently out of a job, three of whom are women. 
 
Like other boundaries, these professional boundaries are blurry; many people ‘matan tigros’, 
literally ‘kill tigers’ a typical Venezuelan saying meaning they pick up bits and pieces of work to 
keep afloat. Martin (31) sells at the emergency entrance of one of Catia’s public hospitals. He 
lives just around the corner and has a relatively well-paid formal job as a butcher too, but in his 
spare time he brings out his picnic table, spreads out a colourful variety of candies, biscuits and 
cigarettes (sold by the unit), a coffee thermos and a mobile phone for each network and starts 
selling. Malandros, people that identify with el malandreo and engage in various delinquent 
activities, considered their occupation an informal profession too, training for which is received 
on the streets of the barrio. Like other informal professions, it is not a full-time nor permanent 
one; some merely top up their earnings in mainstream employment with drug sales or robberies. 
 
Informal employment is not necessarily indicative of class differences; two of three higher-class 
respondents are also informally employed, testimony to the attractions thereof. Arguably 
however, neither of them experience the same levels of insecurity as ‘buhoneros’, street 
vendors, whom are often looked down upon, although they can make good money. One is a taxi 
driver, the other a musician who reported the highest earnings of this sample. 
 
There is indeed a fine balance between the insecurities and freedoms offered by informal work. 
People in informal professions are in no way tied to the state; they have no social security or 
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benefits10, but also pay no taxes (Perazzi et al., 2010). People are not necessarily forced to take 
these jobs because formal jobs are unavailable, public sector jobs in the police force or army are 
popular professions, particularly among barrio residents. People often prefer informal jobs as 
they provide quicker results and the freedom to do whatever they want, whenever they need 
to. While they might lack long-term job security, there is a feeling that they gain freedom.  
 
Street vendors (buhoneros) in particular have a real taste for opportunities. Bea (52) for instance, 
gave up her secure job as a secretary to sell ‘avena’, a typical porridge-like hot drink outside 
hospital. After all ‘the street is free’, she vowed. Venezuela is often referred to as the land of 
opportunities, where people do as they please. It certainly seems easy to start a new business, 
all you need is a small initial investment, a product and a spot to sell from. And even this may 
be an overstatement as popular vending areas are the many informal vans, jeeps and minibuses 
that take people around the cities – people hop on and off selling toothbrushes, stickers, 
chocolate, lottery tickets – cheap, but necessary things that invariably sell.  
 
Moreover, even waged jobs offer little security - at least two of the 45 respondents had lost their 
waged, supposedly more secure, jobs within the last month. Adriana (27) had been a police 
officer in Cumaná, who told me she had been fired for requesting her maternity benefits. 
Jonathan (18) had been working in a shop in a higher-class shopping centre. Both had had 
contracts, but were nevertheless easily dismissed, indicative of the precariousness of the 
professional situation of people in the barrio. Contradictorily, informal sector workers might 
have most control over their immediate fate; they can sell anything anywhere and sometimes 
earn more than formally employed people, depending on what they sell and how often they 
work.  
 
Table 5-2 below shows respondents’ reported personal incomes (from their main profession), 
and whether or not their household income suffices for the household’s needs. 
 
 
  
                                                          
10  Although they can indeed profit from some of the recently established Misiones, government 
programmes established by Chávez.   
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Table 5-2 Income and making ends meet, according to class of respondents (N=45) 
 Total Barrio Centre 
N 28 25 3 
Average personal income** 6,496 5,616 13,833 
N 40 38 2 
Does your household income 
suffice for your needs?  
   
Yes, we can save 21 (53%) 20 (53%) 1 (50%) 
Yes, just 8 (20%) 7 (18%) 1 (50%) 
No, we have difficulties 9 (23%) 9 (24%) - 
No, we have major difficulties 2 (5%) 2 (5%) - 
** Class difference significant at p=.01 
 
People in unwaged professions often found it difficult to put an exact number on their monthly 
earnings, they may not have a clear idea without a monthly pay check coming in. As fifteen 
respondents were unremunerated, only twenty-eight (62%) reported an income. These 
reported incomes range from 1,800 to 25,000 Bolivars, with an average of 6,500 and a median 
of 4,800. This average wage is more than three times the minimum wage11 of 2,048 Bolivars at 
the time of fieldwork. Nevertheless, the average incomes of barrio dwellers are significantly 
lower than those of the three higher-class respondents. Indeed, even if two higher-class 
respondents are informally employed, they reported a much higher average income of 13,800 
bolivars. The sample size does not allow us to draw firm conclusions, but this is potentially 
indicative of a difference in capabilities.  
 
Perazzi et al (2010) state that ‘the average income in the [informal] sector is lower than the one 
in the formal economy’. However, in this sample, and excluding higher-class respondents, 
informal sector workers reported higher average monthly wages (6,200) than those in waged 
employment (4,800). Especially (moto)taxi drivers and buhoneros can earn a good living. Bea 
started out selling prepared lunches, but soon turned to less work-intensive and more profitable 
avena. She sells 5 mornings a week from 7am, until all is gone, usually by 11am. After paying for 
ingredients, she takes home the full profit and makes around 12,000 bolivars a month, enough 
to support a three-person household (her husband is a contractor and between jobs).  
                                                          
11 High inflation urges frequent revisions of this minimum wage in Venezuela. Further, it is difficult to give 
an exchange rate for bolivars due to the currency being pegged at around 4 bolivars to a dollar (more 
recently revised to 6), generating a vibrant black market in dollars. At the start of my fieldwork, this 
minimum wage was worth around £220 in black market rates, whereas by the end it was worth just £100. 
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Malandros report good incomes too. One said he earned 8,000 bolivars a week selling drugs, 
another malandro estimated to be earning 4,000 per day. Nevertheless, they do not work every 
day, and some days and weeks are better than others. Those involved in robbery, in particular, 
might work when they need to, or would like to buy a new pair of shoes, just like buhoneros it 
is another freelance job. It is likely malandros earn more than police and army officers, whom 
start out at the minimum wage. Nevertheless they can also top up their incomes informally, as 
we will see below.  
 
Overall, the average reported income is substantially higher than the minimum wage. Further, 
Table 5-2 shows almost three quarters (29 or 73%) of respondents, when asked, said their 
household incomes suffice for their needs. Nevertheless, a sizeable proportion (11 respondents 
or 28%) say they have trouble making ends meet, all of them barrio dwellers. Two of these, 
Adriana (27) and Vanessa (21), have major difficulties. Both are not currently working but reliant 
on other members of their household, with important effects on their perceptions of their 
quality of life, as I will explore below. Nevertheless, these figures are an indication that the 
people that reported an income are not necessarily destitute. Most respondents (35 or 78%) live 
in privately owned property, they do not need to worry about mortgages. Further, most people 
have large extended families where people contribute as and when is needed. People’s 
networks are important for material security, but also for initial access to opportunities.  
5.2.1.2 ‘Palancas’ and gender roles 
As in other countries, people often look for inspiration and opportunities in their immediate 
network. This is reflected in the colloquial term ‘palanca’ (literally ‘lever’), which refers to 
someone who can help you on the employment ladder, either directly or through their own 
connections. In Venezuela people do indeed have palancas but they do not always offer 
opportunities in stable employment. Table 5-3 shows some indicators of the opportunities 
embedded in respondents’ networks.  
Table 5-3 Opportunities embedded in respondents’ networks, according to class (N=45) 
 Total Barrio Centre 
N 45 42 3 
Average proportion of contacts in waged 
employment 
33% 32% 50% 
Homophily of job sectors (% of people in same 
job sector) 
32% 32% 25% 
Homophily of waged/unwaged employment (% 
of people in same employment situation) 
69% 70% 51% 
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*None of these differences are significant at p=.05 
 
On average, 32% of respondents’ contacts work in the same broad sector as they do, rising to 
69% if we make a dichotomous distinction between waged and unwaged professions. This 
means that, for unwaged people, on average, 69% of their contacts are similarly unwaged. Even 
though two of three higher-class people are informally employed, they appear to have slightly 
more contacts working in waged professions, although again the small sample size prevents us 
from drawing firm conclusions.   
 
Figure 5-3 below breaks this down a little further. It shows people’s contacts according to their 
professional sector. It shows that the fundamental job insecurities (and freedoms) explored 
above are also prevalent in respondents’ networks. 
Figure 5-3 Professional sector of alters (n=975), by class of respondents (N=45)  
 
** Class difference significant at p=.01 
 
Over a third (37%) of barrio residents’ contacts have unwaged professions (19% in unskilled 
labour and 18% in informal professions). Almost another third (30%) do not have an income at 
all (15% non-remunerated, 15% students). Although we cannot draw firm conclusions, higher-
class respondents’ networks provide an interesting contrast. Nearly half (49%) of the contacts 
of the people living in higher-class areas receive private sector wages (29% skilled, 20% unskilled), 
compared to just 15% of the contacts of barrio dwellers. Barrio dwellers generally have little 
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access to private sector jobs through their contacts. Further, there are also some important 
gender differences. 
 
Table 5-4 below looks at the opportunities embedded in people’s networks from a gender 
perspective, making a distinction between male and female contacts and showing some 
important and recurrent gender roles; police and army officers, construction and trades workers, 
(moto)taxi drivers, malandros and housewives.  
 
Table 5-4 Job sector of alters, by gender of alters (N=975) 
    
   Male Female 
   N 508 467 
 
WAGED 
 
 
 
 
Public sector skilled 1% 2% 
Private sector skilled 10% 5% 
Public sector unskilled 12% 14% 
 Police officer 5% 2% 
 Army official 2% 1% 
Private sector unskilled 11% 10% 
 
UNWAGED 
  
  
  
  
Unskilled labour 25% 10% 
 Construction/ 
trades 
15% 0% 
Informal/self-employed 25% 12% 
 (Moto)taxista 5% 0% 
 Malandro 5% 0% 
Non-remunerated 5% 25% 
 Housewife 0% 19% 
  Student 11% 19% 
  Don't know 2% 2% 
 
This table shows the high non-remunerated percentage among people’s contacts is actually 
concentrated among females, 25% of whom are not working. Only one in twenty (5%) of 
respondents’ male contacts are not currently working. This table also provides an interesting 
perspective on gender roles. Over one in ten (12%) of respondents’ male contacts carry a gun 
professionally (5% police officers, 2% army officials and 5% malandros), whereas almost one fifth 
(19%) of their female contacts are housewives. These patterns reflect my observations in the 
barrio which often feels feminine, especially during the day, when men are often at work. 
Women take care of the household and often also social life in the neighbourhood. These 
observations are also supported by looking at overall gender patterns. Just over half (52%) of all 
respondents’ significant alters are male, which is slightly surprising. Given 31 of 45 (69%) 
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respondents were male, and assuming from the homophily principle that men tend to feel more 
comfortable with other men, one might have expected a higher proportion of males. That many 
women were mentioned may be an indication that people get their network fixes, social support 
in particular, from women. All12 respondents named their mothers, whereas just 25 listed their 
biological fathers. Young men growing up in the barrio often live in female worlds where other 
men are distant, absent characters (Gruson and Zubillaga, 2004). These patterns reflect Vigil’s 
(1988) account of the construction of masculine identities in opposition to feared (female) 
identities. Some important ways in which barrio residents’ male contacts make a living is through 
joining el malandreo, a Venezuelan gangster identity, the army, or the police force, all 
institutions in which violence is condoned and exercised on a regular basis.  
 
In this section we have seen that barrio dwellers can indeed make good money although this is 
often in insecure professions. A closer look at the opportunities embedded in their networks 
shows they also have little access to more secure professions in their networks, and that many 
of their female contacts are not working. Nevertheless, these patterns do not imply there is a 
discrepancy with their expectations. Many theoretical perspectives assume it is a discrepancy 
with expectations, rather than a lack of opportunities as such that generates motivations for 
violence.  In the next section I evaluate barrio residents’ expectations and any discrepancy with 
their opportunities.  
5.2.2 Subjective perceptions – expectations, strain and relative deprivation 
Theoretical perspectives on violence often suggest that not people’s objective opportunities, 
but a discrepancy between these opportunities and their expectations generate strain and 
motivations for violence. Chapter 2 showed that this gap between opportunities and 
expectations is difficult to evaluate. In this section I explore a number of possible measures, 
most of which show that there is indeed still evidence for strain among barrio residents, 
although there is substantial variation across the measures.   
5.2.2.1 Expectations and strain 
The semi-structured instrument that was used to collect data on people’s personal networks 
also included an open-ended question on respondents’ expectations, enquiring what their 
expectations for the future were. In Chapter 4, I showed how almost two fifths of respondents 
(19 or 42%) do not have a permanent residence; it should be no surprise that a stable home and 
                                                          
12 Even if 6 of these mothers had died and were thus excluded from analyses. 
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family life often topped the list of expectations. For example when I asked Mateo (29) what he 
meant by ‘having all I want’, he responded: 
A house, a car. Living quietly. Having a small business, a fast food business or 
something like that 
Semi-structured interview, Mateo, Catia  
People often spoke of just wanting to live a good life. Or ‘salir adelante’, get ahead, referring to 
continuing on the right track, moving on to succeed in life. Given that many have relatively good 
incomes, they often feel they can achieve these objectives with time, particularly the men. In 
contrast to this general feeling among male respondents many of the women in the sample are 
dependent on others and have few prospects. Adriana (27), for example, has a three-month old 
baby, just lost her job and is staying with her aunt and four other family members in a dilapidated 
shack in Cumaná. When I interviewed her, tears of frustration welled up in her eyes as we spread 
plastic over the worn couch to protect it from incoming rain that poured through the holes in 
the roof. Similarly, Lara (22) has never had a job, her parents had been malandros and provided 
for her every need. She now relies on her partner to provide for her and the children. She 
mentioned she would like to go back to school and get a job one day.   
 
Further, many respondents, especially those recently victimised, said they wanted to move away 
from the barrio, somewhere more secure and quiet, where they could live in peace and without 
fear. Many people had been affected by violence, and this physical insecurity may have a 
substantial impact on people’s perceptions, over and above material insecurity. William (31) 
described how he had been hit in the buttocks as he ran away from the bullets that hit his friend 
in the head in an apparent retaliatory attack. They had been enjoying some after work beers 
outside their housing block on a Friday evening. He puts it this way;  
It’s a case of where you can’t go, you can’t leave your house, you can’t leave your sector. 
I don’t want this for myself, not for my family… [I want to move to] another sector with 
another type of people where I can live in peace  
Semi-structured interview, William, Catia  
This may indeed be a difficult expectation to substantiate, given the lack of links between the 
barrio and the centre in people’s personal networks, and an overall housing shortage. Some 
barrio dwellers had recently moved to satellite cities, but these remain barrio in spirit. Diana (24) 
has temporarily moved in with her aunt in Ciudad Caribe, a newly constructed city on the 
outskirts of Caracas. She says people that were moved there ‘preserve their barrio mentality, 
they don’t know how to live peacefully with their neighbours’. Many people do indeed want to 
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distance themselves from the barrio, be different from what they grew up in, as I will explore in 
a little more detail in Chapter 7.  
 
To be able to situate respondents’ expectations more quantifiably, and evaluate any discrepancy 
with their opportunities, I showed them a ladder with 0 to 10 steps and asked them to imagine 
this ladder represented the worst possible conditions of life at the bottom, and the best possible 
conditions at the top. I first asked them what types of people they imagined at either end of this 
ladder, with widely varying responses. People that had few material or emotional concerns, 
people that were at peace with themselves, were often seen at the top. Many respondents 
interpreted this question in terms of occupations, imagining people like entrepreneurs and 
business owners, police officers, politicians, the president and his circles at the top. We have 
already seen how barrio residents have little access to the private sector businesses many put 
on top of their hierarchies. Further, people often see police officers and politicians as abusive of 
power, they are often called ‘uniformed malandros’ as they are seen to have the power to do 
the things malandros do but without the personal consequences and repercussions. 
 
Enrique (24) had also been shot, as thieves got away with his motorbike. He is a popular barber 
in his neighbourhood, catering to all, including the local malandros. When I asked him for the 
best possible condition of life, he said: 
The CICPC. [Investigative police force]  
Why the police? Because they make a lot of money, with everything they do, they take 
a lot of money from people.  
But they don’t make that much money? No, but they for instance, the police officers 
where I live have expensive cars, they fine people a lot… when they capture murderers, 
they arrest them and to let them go they ask for 50,000 Bolivars. (…) they let them go 
as if they didn’t do anything.  
And malandros were on ladder 0 right? Well not necessarily 0, because they sell drugs 
and that goes well for them, they have plenty of money, they’re not on 0 in terms of 
poverty, but as for living conditions, they live purely incarcerated in the barrio, in a little 
alleyway (…) everyone is looking for them, other malandros, the police, everyone, they 
can’t leave. 
Semi-structured interview, Enrique, Catia  
His comments touch upon a fundamental distrust of the police, which we will see further on is 
an important factor in the prevalence of informal control mechanisms in the barrio.  
 
Like Enrique, many respondents believe malandros are to be found at the bottom, along with 
people that live in ‘ranchos’, poorly constructed housing, beggars and, sometimes, buhoneros. 
Indeed, these informal professions do still tend to be looked down upon, even if previous section 
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showed they can make good money. Buhoneros themselves would often describe their 
profession in less laden words, as ‘comerciantes’, merchants. Further, malandros can often 
command respect in the barrio too, we will explore the power of violent identities in more detail 
in Chapter 7. 
 
I then asked respondents to situate themselves on this ladder of 0 to 10, a measure of strain13 
used by Baron (2004). It can be seen to reflect whether or not people feel they can or have 
achieved their expectations, in terms of this general standard of quality of life. Figure 5-4 shows 
the dispersion of this measure, making a class distinction.  
Figure 5-4 Perceived quality of life by class of respondents (N=45) 
 
On average, respondents’ own perceived quality of life of is 5.6, with a significant 14  class 
difference that is potentially, keeping in mind there are only three higher-class respondents, 
indicative of higher levels of strain in the barrio. Barrio respondents position themselves at 5.4 
on the ladder, compared to 9 for higher-class respondents. Further, the barrio average hides 
substantial variation with 19 (or 45% of) respondents placing themselves at 5 or below on the 
ladder. Three barrio dwellers put themselves at 0 on the ladder. One, Carlos (35), is in prison for 
a murder he says he never committed. Another, Arturo (24), is a hospitalised drug addict whose 
groin had become infected after injecting it for lack of other veins. A third, Vanessa (21), is a 
single, unemployed pregnant girl living in an overcrowded shack on the outermost inhabited 
                                                          
13 In fact he uses this as an indicator of relative deprivation but as it compares people to a general standard, 
it is better described as an indicator of strain.  
14 ANOVA (F=6.59, p=.01) 
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edge of Catia. In contrast, abovementioned William gives himself a 10, even if he wants to move 
away from the barrio, he feels blessed to have escaped death in the shooting that killed his 
friend. On average, respondents are 4.4 steps removed from the best possible conditions of life. 
Overall, there thus seems to be plenty of strain, as reflected in this general standard of quality 
of life. In the next section I evaluate people’s perceived opportunities in comparison to more 
concrete standards. 
5.2.2.2 Relative deprivation 
Relative deprivation theory is a particular strand of strain theories. It suggests these general 
standards are not as important as people’s actual reference groups when it comes to generating 
their expectations and any subsequent discrepancy with their opportunities. They assume strain 
results from negative comparison with a reference group.  
 
To examine these ideas I asked people to place each of their contacts on the same ladder of 0 
to 10 that they had used for themselves. This encouraged them to evaluate whether they feel 
their significant others have better life conditions than themselves, and can thus indicate 
whether they might experience strain resulting from negative comparison to these interaction 
groups. On average, people place their contacts on a slightly higher scale than themselves, 6 vs. 
5.6. There are some interesting differences in quality of life ratings these alters received 
according to living area and profession. People rated alters that worked in waged sectors 6.8 on 
average, versus 5.5 for those without formal contracts. Alters living in higher-class urbanisations 
were rated 8.4 on average, compared to 5.6 for barrio dwellers. Unwaged professions and the 
barrio do still seem to reflect a poorer quality of life in the eyes of these respondents. In Figure 
5-5 I look at the correlation between respondents’ own perceived quality of life and the average 
quality of life they gave their alters.  
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Figure 5-5 Correlation between respondents’ perceived quality of life and average quality of life 
of their alters (N=44) 
 
 
The correlation is quite strong (r=.53, p=.00). This suggests respondents do compare themselves 
to the people in their networks when evaluating their own quality of life, or judge these people 
based on their own life conditions. Nevertheless, the fitted regression line does not go through 
the origin, indicating that people perceive others to be doing slightly better than themselves, on 
average. It is important to note that two outliers, abovementioned Carlos and Arturo, influence 
this correlation significantly, without them the correlation is much stronger (r=.72, p=.00) and 
the fitted regression line does indeed move down. Both respondents were extremely unhappy 
at the time of their interviews. They both give themselves a 0 on quality of life, but rated their 
contacts much higher, averaging 7.7 and 7.3, respectively. Adriana, who put herself at 3 on the 
ladder, still feels she is doing slightly better than her contacts whom she placed at an average of 
1.7. On average, respondents position a third (32%) of their contacts on the same position on 
the ladder as themselves.  
 
I calculated a relative deprivation measure that compares respondents to their actual 
interaction group by subtracting their alters’ average quality of life from their own. This 
approach is similar to poverty measurement approaches where the gap between an individual’s 
income and the poverty line is measured, but rather than using an abstract poverty line15, I use 
people’s actual interaction groups as a comparative standard. Negative scores indicate people 
feel they have a lower quality of life than most of their alters, whereas a positive score puts 
                                                          
15 It may have been interesting to use these contacts’ incomes as a comparative standard, but it is difficult 
to ask people to estimate their contacts’ incomes.  
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them on top of the majority of their interaction network. This measure has an average value of 
-0.5. People feel on average slightly deprived in comparison to their interaction network, but 
this ranges from -7.7 to 3.3 and thus hides significant variation. 
 
Figure 5-6 shows the dispersion of this measure, making a distinction between barrio dwellers 
and higher-class respondents.   
Figure 5-6 Dispersion of relative deprivation in comparison to interaction network by class (N=44) 
 
 
The large dispersion is disproportionately influenced by several outliers. In fact half (50%) of 
barrio dwellers put themselves just 0.7 steps above or below the average of their network, 
suggesting they do not necessarily feel their quality of life is very different to that of their 
significant others. Interestingly, three relatively violent people, Manuel, Arturo and Carlos, 
influence this dispersion disproportionately, but in opposite ways. Manuel feels he has a better 
quality of life than the average of his interaction network, whereas Arturo and Carlos feel they 
have a much worse quality of life than their networks. We will look at these people in more 
detail in the next chapter. Although the higher-class respondents evaluate their own quality of 
life around one ladder above that of their contacts, this is based on just two respondents as 
Natalia did not rate her contacts. 
5.2.3 Opportunities – Summary  
This section has shown that looking at people’s actual relationships as the basis of their 
opportunities and expectations offers a distinct perspective on these issues that would have 
been difficult to appreciate using abstract boundaries. The people in their interaction networks 
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are more concrete sources of their opportunities and expectations, as people don’t necessarily 
interact with everyone within abstract boundaries. This section also shows the limitations of 
inequality measures based on incomes, as many of the people in this sample do not have a 
regular income.  In all, this section showed that some respondents earn good money, but this is 
often in informal professions that are still looked down upon. The majority of the people in their 
networks also work in unwaged professions, and many of the women in their networks are 
housewives. The indicators of strain and relative deprivation suggest, overall, people are quite 
a way off from achieving the best imaginable conditions of life. On average, people also feel 
slightly worse off than their interaction groups, but there is substantial variation and many 
people do not feel their quality of life is very different from that of the people in their networks. 
These findings could be cautiously interpreted as evidence that some people in the barrio may 
indeed be motivated to use violence, assumptions I will explore in Chapter 6. I will explore 
whether the substantial variation in strain and relative deprivation measures may be related to 
respondents’ involvement in violence. These findings also support the potential meaning of 
violent identities, Chapter 7 evaluates in a more detail how these conditions might make violent 
identities attractive and meaningful.  
 
In the rest of this chapter I will look at how people’s relationships might mitigate the effects of 
inequality, through providing informal social control mechanisms that can keep people from 
violence, or rather generate violence where there is ambiguity about people’s positions.   
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5.3 Informal social control and neighbourhood cohesion 
 
 
This section engages with theoretical perspectives that assume people’s relationships can 
mitigate the effects of inequality by providing informal social control. Social disorganisation 
perspectives assume that strong, cohesive neighbourhood ties can keep people from getting 
involved in violence (Krohn, 1986). Relational perspectives, in contrast, predict that strong ties 
among ambiguity about authority may lead to more violence as confrontational social control 
(Black, 1983). In this section I look at how people’s actual relationships provide informal social 
control. It shows that barrio residents’ personal networks are made up of strong ties that do 
provide social control over their behaviour. I extend these findings to the community level using 
qualitative data, showing that barrio residents are also subject to informal social control on the 
neighbourhood level. Irrelevant of social cohesion, the absence of formal authorities in the 
barrio opens it up to much more ambiguous forms of informal social control. El malandreo, a 
Venezuelan gangster identity, can be seen to offer informal social control in the vacuum left by 
the state (see section 3.3.2.4). 
5.3.1 Interaction patterns and informal social control 
As we saw in section 5.1.2, a substantial proportion of barrio residents’ contacts live in the same 
neighbourhood. Here I will go deeper to consider the levels of contact that occur between 
individuals as well as the fact that many of the respondents’ contacts tend to know one another. 
This, I will argue, has important effects on social control; these contacts can easily keep a close 
eye on respondents. Further, the dense relationships restrict barrio dwellers’ potential to avoid 
any conflicts.  
 
Picture 5-4 Children playing in the barrio, Caracas 2012 
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5.3.1.1 Strength of relationships 
Table 5-5 below shows some indicators of the strength of respondents’ relationships, making a 
distinction between the relationships of barrio dwellers and those of the higher-class 
respondents.   
Table 5-5 Indicators of the average strength of respondents’ relationships, by class (N=45)    
 Total Barrio Centre 
N 45 42 3 
Average trust (1-5) 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Average years known 18 18 16 
Average years known 
(standardised for respondent’s 
age) 
0.60 0.61 0.52 
Average proximity    
Same house* 17% 18% 1% 
Same neighbourhood 24% 25% 12% 
Same city 34% 33% 39% 
Other city 24% 23% 41% 
Other country* 1% 1% 6% 
Average frequency of contact     
Every day* 44% 46% 18% 
Every week 23% 23% 35% 
Every month* 18% 17% 33% 
Less frequently 12% 12% 14% 
* Class difference significant at p=.05 
 
On average, respondents trust their contacts substantially. People gave their contacts a score of 
3.8 on a scale of 1 (no trust at all) to 5 (trust completely). Almost half (46%) received a maximum 
score of 5. They have also known their contacts for a long time, 18 years or three fifths (60%) of 
their lives, on average. We have already seen that many of these people live close to each other. 
Overall, 42% of respondents’ contacts live in the same neighbourhood, of which 17% in the same 
house. Respondents also have frequent contact with the people they mentioned, they speak to 
44% of the contacts they mentioned on a daily basis. These are indeed strong ties that offer 
social support and also social control; frequent, proximate contact helps people watch over on 
another as we will see in more detail further on and in Chapter 6.  
 
Fran, a young woman in one of the group interviews recounted an instance where she and her 
brother had almost been robbed; 
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We were walking in the alley back home and I saw a guy hiding a bit further up, my 
brother told me to keep walking, not to be scared, but surely, the guy caught us, hiding 
his face in his t-shirt and feigning a gun in his hand. But my brother recognised his voice, 
it was someone he knew! And he told him, dude, are you going to rob us like this? So 
the guy lowered his t-shirt, apologised and left us alone.  
Group interview, female resident, Cumaná 
The fact people in the barrio know each other can prevent them from being victimised.  
 
Further, these indicators suggest barrio dwellers’ relationships might be stronger than those of 
higher-class respondents, at least in terms of frequency and proximity of contact. People in the 
barrio live much closer together. Just under half (46%) of the people barrio dwellers mentioned 
are people they have contact with on a daily basis, compared to under a fifth (18%) of the 
contacts of people in the centre. Figure 5-1 (p.121) already showed the composition of 
respondents’ interaction networks by proximity and class, with remarkable differences. Only 13% 
of higher-class residents’ contacts live in the same neighbourhood and just 1% in the same house. 
Two higher-class respondents live alone16, the other lives with just 2 others. Barrio dwellers in 
this sample live, on average, with 5 others. Almost one fifth (18%) of the people they mentioned 
live in the same home.  
5.3.1.2 Spheres of sociability 
Many of these proximate contacts are also family members. Figure 5-7 illustrates the 
composition of people’s networks by relationship type. 
                                                          
16 One lives with a live-in servant, who goes home on Sundays. Nevertheless, this respondent did not see 
this servant as a home companion, telling me he lived alone.  
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Figure 5-7 Relationship composition of personal networks by class (N=45) 
 
** Class difference significant at p=.01 
* Class difference significant at p=.05 
 
More than half (53%)17 of barrio dwellers’ networks are composed of family members; of which 
6% partners or children 18 , and 47% general family members, including (grand)parents, 
(half-)siblings, aunties, uncles, cousins, nieces and nephews. Just under a fifth (18%) are friends, 
remaining eighths are colleagues (12%) and neighbours (13%). That many family members also 
live in the same house and thus neighbourhood accounts for the differences in the proportion 
of neighbours between Table 5-5 and Figure 5-7. Where only 12% are listed as neighbours here, 
Table 5-5 showed that on average, 43% of barrio dwellers’ networks live in the same 
neighbourhood, but this thus includes a substantial amount of their family members. In network 
terms this is called ‘multiplexity’; one relationship encompasses multiple overlapping roles 19.  
 
Again, there is a clear, but indicative, distinction between the networks of higher-class people, 
whom count a higher proportion of friends and also more colleagues among their core network.  
                                                          
17 This is a larger proportion than Espinoza (1999) and Marques (2012) whom found 38% and 41% family 
members in the networks of the poor in Chile and Brazil, respectively. Marques collected larger networks 
overall and Espinoza used a slightly different methodology that was specifically aimed at gathering weaker 
ties.   
18 Only children 15 or older. The questionnaire specifically asked for contacts that were 15 or older.  
19 I coded people’s alters as first relationship – e.g. if people were colleagues and became friends in the 
process, I coded them as colleagues. This might partly be responsible for networks being so family 
orientated, as this will always be the first relationship, even though they might also be neighbours and 
friends.  
47%
6%
18%
12%
13%
5%
25%
1%
44%
22%
5%
4%
General family*
Partner, child
Friend**
Colleague
Neighbour
Other
Barrio (n=42)
Centre (n=3)
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5.3.1.3 Network density 
The ties between the people in respondents’ networks also reflect barrio residents’ strong 
communities. Whether or not the people in a personal network know each other has important 
consequences for the spread of information in these networks. Table 5-6 shows the density of 
these networks, a measure that is derived from the connections between the significant others 
respondents mentioned. 
Table 5-6 Network size and density, by class (N=45) 
  Total Barrio Centre 
 N 45 42 3 
Network size 22 21 29 
Density 0.60 0.60 0.51 
*None of these differences are significant at p=.05 
 
Network density is inherently dependent on network size. Because there are less possible 
connections in smaller networks, they will naturally be denser20. Nevertheless, the average 
density of respondents’ networks is 0.60, meaning 60% of all possible ties between the 
significant others they mentioned are present. This means that information can flow quite 
rapidly, if someone does or knows something, information can be easily passed on through the 
network. This also means people are constrained, when they do something it is very likely others 
will know. Information on someone’s reputation spreads rapidly through these small worlds, 
also the neighbourhood in the case of barrio residents. For example when Meribel’s (36) mobile 
phone was stolen last New Year’s eve, it was soon recovered from the culprit through some 
enquiries in the neighbourhood. It was actually only stolen because someone else had been 
carrying it, had the thief known it was Meribel’s he would never even have attempted to steal 
it. The same counts for Pablo (17), who’s network I explore in a little more detail in the next 
chapter. Pablo had apparently robbed someone on Catia’s Boulevard, which quickly came to his 
mother’s ears high up in the barrio, and had her threatening to disown him. Moses (21) also 
recounted an encounter he had had with malandros in adjoining sector that had questioned his 
presence and put a rifle to his head, until one of the boys recognised him, and they decided it 
best to leave him alone. 
                                                          
20 As could be expected, the amount of contacts people mentioned and the density of their networks is 
inversely correlated, though this is only just significant (r= -.30, p=.04). We cannot really say anything 
about already tentative class differences here, as barrio dwellers mentioned fewer alters on average, their 
networks can be expected to be denser regardless of whether this reflects real-life patterns. 
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Some of the patterns described in this section may be interrelated or related to differences in 
network size. For example that barrio dwellers tend to have known their contacts for a long time 
may be partly attributable to having many family members in their networks. Nevertheless, 
these patterns also reflect qualitative observations of almost diametrically opposed interaction 
patterns. Social life is much more vibrant on the streets of the barrio than in the centre, where 
people live their lives in the sanctity of fortified homes and secured shopping centres. 
Venezuelans are ‘callejero’ it is often said, they live their lives on the street. This resonates much 
more with life in the barrio than elsewhere (even if in the barrio certainly not everyone 
participates). In the evenings and on weekends, groups of men stand chatting around their 
motorbikes, drinking beer, listening to music. People congregate on the local street corner or 
basketball court, salsa rhythms echo from countless speaker systems and laughter bounces up 
and down the alleyways.  
 
People live much closer together both physically and socially, with important consequences for 
social control, as above examples suggest. Frequent and proximate relationships also make it 
difficult for barrio dwellers to avoid conflict. Higher class respondents are physically removed 
from their closest contacts. They enjoy the more separated physical space that Baumgartner 
(1988) deemed characteristic of American suburbia. Instances of disrespect can be more easily 
shrugged off and avoided in the separate physical space of the private home. 
 
There is certainly little evidence these respondents have few control mechanisms in their 
personal networks. Nevertheless, it may well be that more violent people are less constrained 
by their networks, which I will evaluate in chapter 6. Social disorganisation theories also make 
assumptions about community-level relationships, not personal relationships. They suggest the 
absence of trust or cohesion among neighbours and subsequent absence of informal social 
control on residents, opens communities up to violence. In the next section, I evaluate these 
assumptions, using qualitative data.  
5.3.2 Neighbourhood cohesion, informal social control and el malandreo  
Vivir en barrio hay que saber vivir! 
To live in a barrio one has to know how to live! 
Jorge (55) 
The previous section showed how barrio residents do have neighbourhood ties, but this does 
not mean these neighbourhoods are cohesive or are willing to activate these ties to implement 
informal social control. Where early social disorganisation perspectives often assumed informal 
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social control from the mere presence of relationships, more recent collective efficacy 
perspectives suggest the mere presence of ties between neighbours is not; these ties need to 
be strong; there needs to be community cohesion, trust between neighbours, and a willingness 
to activate these ties (see Chapter 2). This section explains that community cohesion is not 
necessarily present in the barrio. However, there is plenty of informal social control over its 
residents. This section argues that a focus on community cohesion distorts an understanding of 
informal social control processes in the barrio. Social disorganisation perspectives ignore that 
violence can be seen as informal social control, particularly where avoidance is difficult and 
formal social control absent (Black, 1983). This section shows the absence of formal authorities 
is much more devastating than any absence of community cohesion or willingness to activate 
ties. In the absence of state provision, el malandreo has claimed some legitimacy over crime 
control in the barrio.  
5.3.2.1 Neighbourhood cohesion and informal social control 
Table 5-7 below shows the strength of people’s relationships in terms of trust and frequency of 
contact, by relationship category.  
Table 5-7 Strength of ties, according to type of relationship (N=975) 
 Trust (1-5) Frequency 
(1= Every day 
– 4= Hardly 
ever) 
 N 430 434 
Family 4.0 2.0 
 N 48 48 
Partner, children 4.7 1.1 
N 117 118 
Neighbour 3.1 1.8 
 N 134 134 
Work/ school colleague 3.6 1.8 
 N 197 197 
Friend / association 3.7 2.0 
 N 42 44 
Other 2.6 2.9 
 N 968 975 
Total 3.7 1.9 
 
It shows that, unsurprisingly, people’s family ties are strongest in terms of trust whereas 
neighbour contacts are slightly stronger in terms of frequency of contact. Average trust in 
neighbours (3.1) is lower than for other categories. Further, this average figure hides a strong 
division; nearly a quarter (23%) of the neighbours people mentioned received a score of 1, 
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indicating people did not trust them at all. Nevertheless, almost a third (33%) of neighbours 
received a score of 5. People see their neighbours frequently, but do not necessarily trust them 
as much as their family members. Interestingly, the neighbours that were less trusted were often 
those more prone to keep an eye on others; they were deemed ‘chismoso’, gossiping, interfering. 
Neighbours do indeed apply informal social control on other neighbours’ behaviour, whether 
these neighbourhoods are cohesive or not.  
 
Further, many communities show evidence of a willingness to activate these ties, to get involved 
in the community. The Consejos Comunales, community councils (see Chapter 3), have arguably 
revived community participation, at least in some communities (Machado, 2009). Gilberto (68) 
is a retired agricultural engineer and member of a Consejo Comunal in Catia. His 18 year old son 
was mistakenly killed in a gang shootout on the street corner four years ago. Nevertheless, his 
response when I asked him what had changed in the community in the last few years was telling: 
Things have changed a bit, actually let’s say they have changed a lot, there is a raised 
awareness of what constitutes public participation in community problems, where 
before we used to be a little apathetic; we didn’t collaborate much in this sense. Today 
people… at least in 2010, in the floods of 2010, there were terrible rains, people here 
started helping people in ‘La Cueva’, helping those above in ‘Macayapa’, taking them 
to refuges, they put them here in the local school… 
Unstructured interview, male resident, Catia  
Of course, this does not mean that everyone participates. Many people do indeed try and avoid 
the streets, often because of fears of violence. Jorge (55), a retired police officer is well aware 
of the dangers of the barrio. His son-in-law had been shot and killed, and his mother was hit by 
a stray bullet the year before. He locks himself in a tight network of close family, neighbours and 
friends that all know each other. He relies on these neighbours for safety, calling them to check 
whether any gunshots are going off before making his way home to the barrio. When I asked 
him whether he had any difficult relationships, or fights with anyone in the barrio he said: 
No, if you have a fight, next time you’re not looking they kill you from behind, you can’t 
pick a fight with anyone in the barrio, because if you have a little problem with anyone, 
when you look the other way, they stab you in the back. To live in a barrio, one has to 
know how to live! Someone that doesn’t know how to live in a barrio is dead, do you 
understand, one that doesn’t know how to live in a barrio is dead … If you’re rude, 
lacking respect in any way, you’re dead. 
Semi-structured interview, Jorge, Catia  
In this view, among frequent contact and lack of avoidance in the dense spaces of the barrio, 
violence itself becomes a form of informal social control. The relational structures of the barrio, 
rather than an ability to work together for the common good, open the barrio up to violence (or 
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the threat of violence) as informal social control. Jorge says it well – there is certainly no lack of 
informal social control over residents in the barrio, people that are disrespectful of others will 
be reprimanded, if necessary with violence.  
 
The contrast with the centre is telling here, and indicative of how a focus on community cohesion 
stigmatises poor communities by telling them they need to work together to solve their 
problems. In the centre hardly anyone takes responsibility for community problems. The people 
living there also do not need to take responsibility or activate ties beyond paying their municipal 
taxes. Rubbish is collected, common spaces are maintained. Police patrols are frequent, and 
even then, there is money to pay for private security. Private security that usually consists of 
paying poorer, barrio, residents minimum wages to watch the properties of the rich.  
 
Eduardo (44) is one of these private security guards in the centre, his case illustrates the 
ambiguities of informal social control. When his 14-year-old son was shot and paralysed, he was 
not allowed to take time off from his job as a night-watchman. He shuttled between hospital 
and work. His son had been implicated in a deadly shooting, and they could no longer return to 
their barrio; the whole family (mother, father and daughter) and two police officers instructed 
with watching the boy stayed on the same hospital floor for weeks. It was exactly the 
implementation of informal social control, the knowledge that the extended family of the man 
his son had allegedly killed would be seeking revenge, which put him in this situation.  
 
In putting the onus for informal social control on the community itself social disorganisation 
perspectives take away from a much more urgent problem.  
 
5.3.2.2 The absence of formal authorities 
What is intrinsically striking about the barrio is the absence of authoritative third parties for 
conflict resolution. We have already seen barrio residents cannot easily avoid conflicts in the 
dense relationship structures of the barrio. The vibrant social life might often cause conflict, but 
nobody has more authority than anyone else to deal with it. Everyone is equal and entitled to 
have their rights respected. Nobody has a more legitimate say over anybody else. In absence of 
state (see also 3.3.2.4), community problems are reduced to exactly that, community problems. 
The community is responsible for addressing them, but it is often unclear whom represents the 
community more legitimately than another.  
 
149 
 
 
 
Even the recently established Consejos Comunales cannot necessarily claim to represent the 
community. They receive funds directly from central government in a continuation of clientelist 
politics (see Chapter 3). The community itself does not necessarily need to be involved in a 
transaction that is ultimately between the government and these representatives of the 
community. Representatives are elected and projects voted at community meetings, but 
certainly not all residents attend these meetings21. As everyone is equal, those that have taken 
it upon themselves to take responsibility for the community, are often distrusted, mocked or 
accused of doing it for self-gain. Gilberto was still engaged in the Consejo Comunal, but he was 
tired of accusations and rumours that spread like fire in the small worlds of the barrio.  
People are like… What one person says is repeated by others and those others say it’s 
true, that kind of gets to me (…) you know that ‘the Consejos Comunales steal money, 
that they are making a profit from the apartments, that we’re helping our friends, that 
some have put their children in residences meant for flood victims…‘  
Unstructured interview, male resident, Catia  
Individuals do come together, whether in the Consejo Comunal, Church, or on the streets, there 
is ultimately no consensus over whom has more authority over anybody else. Putting the burden 
on individuals and groups rather than truly authoritative institutions has many unwanted, and 
potentially violent, side-effects. Victor (38) took me by surprise when he said levels of violence 
in his sector were ‘maintained’: 
You mean it has stayed the same?  
No no, we maintain it (…) people that come here with eh (…) that start robbing and 
stuff, we stop them.  
Ah ok, how do you do this? You have a neighbourhood watch?  
No. We do it ourselves, people that come and are involved in this type of thing, we 
catch them ourselves. ‘If you do this, you’re going to do it outside, here you can’t get 
into this. If you start robbing here, you’ll (…) you’ll get what’s coming’ 
Semi-structured interview, Victor, Catia  
Even police officers implement informal social control over and above the law and order they 
are meant to represent, as evidenced by Hector (26). Hector is an interesting case study because 
his twin brother is a malandro in the barrio, whereas he joined the police force (I will touch upon 
this apparent contradiction in Chapter 7). He vividly recounted an altercation he had had a few 
months before, where he had engaged in a fierce exchange of bullets with a local boy who 
endangered his sector and family by hanging around their street, attracting his ‘culebras’, 
vendettas or ‘problems’. Did you report this incident, arrest him or something, I asked? He 
looked at me, kind of taken aback, exposed;  
                                                          
21 Only 4 people that completed the semi-structured interviws (8%) participated in meetings of their local 
Consejo Comunal. 
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Why would I? This was a personal thing. 
Going on to explain the particular conundrum of police in Venezuela’s barrios, where everyone 
knows everybody else, and malandros have effectively taken over some of the state’s contested 
monopoly on violence and crime control;  
I didn’t report it because he no longer posed a threat, I knew the leader of his gang and 
resolved the issue. In this barrio I know everyone, well not everyone, but... there’s 
contact, you know, ‘what’s up, brother?’… (…) In the barrio there is no social security. 
In the barrio, delinquents, the underworld rule. Nobody reports them and they reap 
the benefits. The policeman that enters there has his hands tied, you know… There is 
no support, you’re not in your own barrio, you don’t have the necessary security (…)   
Semi-structured interview, Hector, Catia  
5.3.2.3 El malandreo as informal social control 
Malandros play an ambiguous role in community safety. They endanger the community by 
attracting problems, but are often tolerated because they also paradoxically protect the 
community from unknown malandros in other sectors. Where frequent contact provides 
informal social control over residents, including malandros, residents have no control over 
people coming from different neighbourhoods. Malandros may be the lesser evil than having a 
community whose gates are open to roaming malandros from outside. They do a better job than 
the police in protecting these neighbourhoods from outside interference, even if they endanger 
the community simultaneously. One elderly lady illustrates this tenuous relationship perfectly: 
Where I live for instance there is a lot of insecurity… Insecurity is ubiquitous, but where 
I live we have the weakness of a drug parlour that causes us a lot of trouble, 
nevertheless within this weakness lies its strength too, because these same people do 
not allow that others come and cause trouble for the people that live there. 
Group interview, female resident, Catia  
Carlos, abovementioned prisoner in Cumaná, looks back on his glory days with melancholy and 
illustrates this symbiotic relationship with the barrio, where both the barrio and malandros 
profit from the dense ties that link them together22.  
I helped the people (…) when people asked me to throw a party I did; a big party, every 
December, a party in the whole barrio, I liked it (…)  
You shared with everyone?  
Of course, drinks, food, if someone didn’t have enough, didn’t have enough food, I gave 
it to them. Because it compensates me, because they’re aware that, you know… when 
I need a favour of one of them, they won’t tell. You have to reach out, and when the 
                                                          
22 These findings are more in line with the negotiated coexistence model, where strong community ties 
are seen to support violent offenders (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, I do not use this term because in 
explaining this coexistence solely by dense, interdependent ties in the neighbourhood, this perspective 
also ignores the absence of formal social control.  
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police come looking for you, they also reach out ‘here they come’ and you have time 
to get to safety. That’s how it is. You have to be on a good footing with the people, like 
a good governor something like that. 
Semi-structured interview, Carlos, Cumaná  
Barrio residents will not turn in local malandros, not necessarily because they are on a ‘good 
footing’ with them, but because the alternative may be worse. Informal social control is feared 
more than formal social control. Gabriel (24), who had been shot in the back as he was 
celebrating Chávez’ election victory on the streets of a neighbouring barrio, when I asked him 
why he did not report it to the police, responds: 
Because the justice system in Venezuela doesn’t function, say I report it, the police 
catches him, they take his gun and 10,000 Bolivars and they tell him so and so was the 
one who reported you. And then they let him go, so in the end [reporting] is worse… 
Semi-structured interview, Gabriel, Catia  
Reiterating the absence of formal control mechanisms as an important factor in the tenuous 
balance between informal social control systems in the barrio. In the barrio nobody imposes 
hierarchy or has more authority than another – malandros are still malandros, police are 
‘uniformed malandros’ and the community councils are ‘thieves’. There is no consensus over 
whom has more rights than another to implement their rules. Malandros are not trusted, but 
they are local and will not hurt the community. Chapter 7 will show their code explicitly 
condemns robbing or killing in the neighbourhood. As Victor suggests in his quote above, this is 
also closely watched over by the community.  
5.3.3 Informal social control – Summary  
In all, there is little evidence people’s personal networks or neighbourhoods lack informal social 
control. In the absence of formal social control, life in the barrio can feel more regimented than 
the centre. There is an inherent tension between the freedoms, on the one hand, and many 
physical and material insecurities, on the other, generated by the lack of formal institutions23. 
Informal social control mechanisms take over and people that break informal rules of 
engagement are indeed reprimanded, with words, social isolation, or even violence. Because 
these rules are informal and inherently flexible it is difficult to anticipate the consequences of 
one’s actions. Generally, if one avoids confrontation and ‘does not interfere with another’s 
business’, it is commonly accepted that one should be able to avoid violence. Nevertheless, the 
dense spaces of the barrio make avoidance difficult to start with. Where Baumgartner (1988) 
                                                          
23 That formal institutions are lacking also does not mean other institutions are undermined; the family, 
the church, and el malandreo are strong, informal institutions invoking rules and social order.   
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describes social control in the American suburb as moral minimalism, the barrio could be 
described as a place of moral ubiquity, social control is frequent and ubiquitous, yet informal 
and ambiguous.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at conditions of life in the barrio, focussing particularly on those aspects of 
barrio residents’ lives that are often seen to be conducive to higher levels of violence; their real 
and perceived opportunities and their informal social control mechanisms. It made use of 
personal networks as concrete indicators of people’s opportunities, expectations and informal 
social controls to better appreciate some assumptions of macro-level theories. Traditional 
macro-level research uses abstract boundaries that do not necessarily reflect people’s real or 
perceived opportunities, nor their informal social control mechanisms.  
 
This chapter has shown that these perspectives are particularly limited in understanding the role 
of people’s relationships in the production of informal social control. Social disorganisation 
perspectives make assumptions about the effects of community-level relationships on cohesion 
and informal social control, without questioning these relationships in detail. I do not suggest 
community cohesion is not important in the production of neighbourhood homicide rates, 
although it might be difficult to distinguish cause from effect, as violence might also limit 
community cohesion and participation. The main point is that a focus on cohesion ignores 
informal social control processes in the barrio. Whether or not these spaces are cohesive does 
not mean there are no informal social control mechanisms, rules or institutions that govern 
behaviour in the barrio, and thus that violent people are free to exploit these opportunities. A 
more nuanced appraisal of these relationships offers important insights and suggest future 
research should focus on these relationships, rather than their effects. Further, by focussing on 
how relationships within abstract boundaries might provide informal social control, these 
perspectives ignore the more detrimental absence of formal social control. More relational 
research approaches stress the construction of violent identities and the role of violence as 
social control, where formal social control is absent. This chapter supports these relational 
perspectives, showing that the barrio has plenty of informal social control, regardless of its 
internal cohesion. 
 
This chapter also showed that in many ways barrio residents’ conditions are defined by 
informality and uncertainty. Many respondents have no permanent residence. They have little 
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access to formal job opportunities in their networks, particularly in the private sector. There is 
also evidence of strain, a gap between people’s opportunities and their expectations, whether 
given by a general standard, or by their interaction groups, although there is substantial 
variation in these measures. Further, a historical lack of formal social control opens the barrio 
up to much more ambiguous forms of informal social control. It is relatively easy to see the 
attractions of violent identities under these conditions. El malandreo fills the vacuums24 left by 
the state, simultaneously providing material wealth, masculine status and (paradoxically) social 
control and physical security. Where we can see the continued attractions of violent identities, 
we cannot link these observations to differential homicide rates as the data I collected are 
indicative rather than representative for any particular barrio. In the next chapter I will look at 
the effects of inequality at the micro-level, evaluating whether more violent individuals are 
perhaps more affected by strain or have less informal social controls embedded in their 
networks.  
 
In conclusion, a focus on networks also showed how inequalities continue to reproduce 
themselves. It showed that barrio dwellers in this sample have strong, homophilous ties that are 
good for social support and social control but not for access to different ideas and opportunities. 
Private jobs appear to remain predominantly in the hands of people living in the centre, even if 
political powers were recently reshuffled. Social change is slow, and material inequalities 
continuously reproduce themselves through a continued lack of vertical ties between the barrio 
and the centre.  
 
                                                          
24 See section 3.3.2.4 
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CHAPTER 6 VIOLENT PEOPLE? AN EXPLORATION OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN INEQUALITY 
AND VIOLENCE AT THE MICRO-LEVEL 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores some connections between inequality and violence at the micro-level, by 
looking at how the interactions and relationships embedded in people’s personal networks 
might relate to their involvement in violence. Chapter 2 showed that many theories make 
assumptions about how people’s relationships mediate or mitigate connections between 
inequality and violence, but empirical work that explicitly explores these relationships is 
relatively rare, particularly in Venezuela. Where chapter 5 focussed on how people’s 
relationships shape life in the barrio more generally, this chapter focuses more closely on 
individuals, their relationships and their use of violence. It specifically explores the core 
assumptions of three theoretical frameworks; relative deprivation, social control and self-help 
theories through evaluating whether and how people’s interactions and relationships may 
generate motivations for violence, can keep them from violence through exerting social control 
or how the pattern of relationships itself may generate the conditions for violence.  
 
Chapter 2 showed that most academic work on violence continues to subscribe to rational-actor 
perspectives on violent offenders whom lack the means or controls to live a non-violent life. 
These theories make assumptions about how inequality affects people, and how their 
relationships may mitigate and mediate the effects of inequality. Chapter 2 presented a detailed 
overview of these assumptions, I repeat them here very briefly. Strain perspectives assume 
people may be motivated to use violence when there is a gap between their expectations and 
their opportunities to achieve these. Relative deprivation perspectives suggest strain follows 
from negative comparison to a reference group, and thus that people’s relationships may 
mediate the effect of inequality on violence by generating strain. Social control perspectives 
expect a mitigating effect from strong, dense relationships that can keep people from violence. 
Self-help perspectives expect the opposite, that strong, dense ties may lead to more violence as 
informal social control. Chapter 3 evaluated aggregate statistics on inequality and violence and 
concluded that these tell us very little about these theoretical assumptions. A decline in 
aggregate income inequality does not necessarily imply people are less motivated or more 
constrained to use violence. Chapter 4 outlined the methodological tools and strategies used to 
collect more appropriate data. Chapter 5, the first empirical chapter, then looked at inequality 
through the lens of people’s personal networks. It showed that people living in the barrio still 
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tend to have little access to formal opportunities in their networks and many experience 
considerable strain, but found little evidence the barrio lacks informal social control. 
 
This chapter relates these findings to violence by exploring whether people that have used more 
violence than others differ from these others in terms of their relationships, using the network 
data collected for forty-five people in Venezuela and relating them to some measures that 
reflect their use of violence. It finds few differences between people that had used more 
violence than others and concludes that these people’s interactions and relationships do not 
necessarily generate motivations for violence, nor do they reflect a lack of adequate social 
controls, as much as they generate violence. People may feel relatively deprived, they are 
watched over and actively discouraged from violence, but the weight of previous and/or future 
violence can exert the more pressing influence on their behaviour. In lack of avoidance or third 
party settlement in the dense spaces of the barrio, violence itself can thus be seen as a way to 
exert control over others’ behaviours. Nevertheless, these findings may be influenced by the 
particular type of violence explored here, which is biased towards gun and malandro behaviours. 
This type of violence may indeed follow a distinct dynamic, as I will explore in more detail in 
Chapter 7.  
 
In all, and throughout this chapter I argue that the mechanisms by which inequality is said to 
affect people’s relationships and lead to violence in traditional frameworks do not materialise 
so clearly at the micro-level, at least with these measures and among this sample. This chapter 
suggests that rather than looking for individual differences, evaluating the relationships in which 
violence occurs is a more adequate line of enquiry that does not stigmatise all of the poor, but 
problematizes the interactions and relationships that sustain poverty and inequality. In what 
follows I first examine some of the recurring problems when measuring violence and some 
characteristics of the measures used here. The next section looks at some demographic 
differences. The following sections explore the mitigating and mediating effects of people’s 
relationships; strain/relative deprivation, control and self-help, respectively. Findings are 
summarised in a conclusion.   
6.2 The many shades of violence 
This chapter draws predominantly on data collected from the forty-five people that completed 
the semi-structured questionnaire. Chapter 4 described the sample and data collection in detail, 
here I summarise some key characteristics. As I was particularly interested in people that had 
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been involved in violence, I looked for respondents on the streets of the barrio, but also in public 
hospitals and prison. Because of this sampling strategy, the sample is biased towards young, 
barrio men that have indeed engaged in violence and thus well-suited to explore some 
assumptions about violence. The average age of respondents in this sample is 30, ranging from 
15 to 55. The majority (31 of 45) of respondents are male, and just over half (24 of 45), have not 
finished secondary education. The bulk of these people work in insecure sectors, 33 have no 
regular wages coming, of which 13 are informally employed. Almost all (42 of 45) respondents 
are barrio dwellers, three live in higher-class areas.  
 
The questionnaire contained standardised as well as open-ended questions on inequality, 
personal networks and violence. The standardised data provide some comparative measures 
that allow me to typify and compare these forty-five respondents, whereas the open-ended data 
allow me to explore these standards in much richer detail. Whereas other chapters also draw 
explicitly on qualitative data gathered through observations and unstructured interviews, these 
data remain mostly implicit in this chapter. Nevertheless, they still strongly guided my 
interpretations, it was through the triangulation of the semi-structured interviews with data 
from the unstructured interviews and observations that my thoughts garnered a structure I feel 
adequately reflects the realities of the barrio I encountered. This chapter thus mostly presents 
data from the semi-structured interviews, that are nevertheless corroborated by the other types 
of data that were collected during fieldwork. Most of the data used in this chapter have been 
described extensively in Chapter 5, I restrict myself here to a description of the data on violence, 
that have not previously been discussed.  
 
Chapters 2 and 4 outlined some of the main difficulties in gathering data on violence. The key 
initial problem is that it is almost impossible to systematically observe acts of violence. As such 
research traditionally depends on secondary police data, or post-fact accounts and reports of 
violence by the people involved in it. Even in Venezuela, classified as the second most violent 
country in the world based on its homicide rate (UNODC, 2014), violence is still a relatively rare 
occurrence in everyday life and very difficult to observe directly. As detailed in Chapter 4, one 
of my main research strategies was thus to look for respondents in hospitals and prisons, where 
there was a higher likelihood of engaging with people that had been directly involved in violence. 
While this research strategy was effective in gaining access to people involved in violence it also 
led to a relatively diverse sample, just under half (22 of 45) of which were interviewed because 
they were involved in violence. It was my original intention to compare the networks of this 
sample to a control sample of people that I approached on the streets of the barrio. However, 
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these respondents could not easily be categorised into neatly defined groups. Even severe acts 
of violence seldom fall clearly on either side of malandro/’sano1’ or even victim/perpetrator2 
divides. The boundaries are grey. Jorge, for instance, an ex-police officer described in Chapter 5, 
had set up a food stall after his police regiment, the Caracas Metropolitan Police, was disbanded 
by Chávez3. Because I interviewed him on the streets, he was part of the not involved control 
sample, but in discussions with him he noted that he had killed at least 5 people while on active 
duty for the police. Here it was difficult not to draw a parallel between the acts of violence he 
had perpetrated with those of gang members whom also perceive themselves to be doing their 
duty, within their own lived hierarchy and set of rules, as Chapter 7 will explore in more detail. 
Apart from this categorical classification, I asked respondents a number of different questions 
that allow for comparing and contrasting their involvement in, and attitudes towards, violence. 
I included some open-ended and self-report questions on physical violence, but also some 
statements on anger and impulsivity and beliefs in the legitimacy of violence. The open-ended 
questions enquired in detail about any violent interactions these people had been involved in 
and allow me to add some important insights to this chapter. The other questions allow me to 
calculate more standardised measures by which I can compare these individuals, I discuss them 
sequentially below.  
 
I asked respondents for self-reported frequencies 4  of involvement in six different acts of 
violence. I used wording and items from the Reactive-Proactive Aggression Questionnaire (RPQ) 
(Raine et al., 2006) to evaluate the frequency (1, never, to 4, often) 5  of respondents’ 
                                                          
1  Literally ‘healthy’, word used colloquially to refer to people who do not get involved in malandro 
practices.  
2 The correlation between a composite measure of victimisation and the composite measure of violence 
is quite strong (r=.65 p=.00) but I do not have space to address it here.  
3 The regiment was disbanded because of several corruption scandals and a reputation for violence. 
4 Asking for frequency of involvement without stipulating a timeline gives me more variation to work with. 
For instance, in a self-report study of Venezuelan students, only 7% of adolescents reported having 
participated in fights in the last 12 months, which was the highest 12-month frequency of all included 
behaviours (Birkbeck et al., 2010). Given I already have a small sample, asking for recent involvement 
would have severely limited my potential to say anything about violence. Asking for frequency implicitly 
controls for recall bias, as people who had not recently been involved can indicate lower frequencies. 
Antonio (45), for instance, an ex-malandro who had overtly renounced his past life, had engaged in all of 
these behaviours, but he responded ‘rarely’ or ‘sometimes’ to most as it had been a long time since he 
had. This is still reflected in a relatively high CVI score of 2.8. Pablo (17) is a current malandro whom 
responded ‘often’ to most items, reflected in the highest CVI score of the sample at 3.6. Nevertheless, this 
approach makes it more difficult to relate these instances of violence to people’s more concurrent 
perceptions and relationships.   
5 I adjusted this scale from a 3 point to a 5 point scale. As nobody used the category 5, all the time, apart 
from for the carrying of weapons, I merged 4 and 5 into ‘often’. 
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involvement in these acts of aggression6.  Figure 6-1 shows respondents’ responses to how 
frequently they had ‘had a physical fight’, ‘carried a knife or firearm out on the streets’, ‘broken 
things because they were angry’, ‘used force to obtain money or things from others’, 
‘deliberately shot at someone’, or ‘participated in gang fights or shoot-outs’. 
Figure 6-1 Self-reported frequency of involvement in violence (N=45) 
 
 
Only eight people had never engaged in any of these acts of violence, most (5) of them women. 
It might not be surprising the majority (31 or 78% of people asked) have had a physical fight 
(kicked, hit, or pushed someone) at some point in their lives, for quite a few these fights 
remained limited to physical playground quarrels. We may thus find this level of violence in 
other settings. Nevertheless, other frequencies are high too; eighteen people had carried a knife 
or firearm, fifteen people had broken things because they were angry, twelve people had robbed, 
and nine had participated in gang fights or shoot-outs. Chillingly, ten people, over one in four, 
admitted to having deliberately shot at someone. Most of these behaviours are also typical of 
                                                          
6 I also adjusted the wording of the original RPQ items for the Venezuelan context. Exact Spanish wording 
can be found in the questionnaire in Appendix 2.  
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malandros and ‘mala conductas’, badly behaved people, a less defamatory description used for 
people that are not necessarily as embroiled in illegal activities as malandros. As my sample 
includes four prisoners, three malandros, four mala conductas and three ex-malandros, these 
frequencies are not necessarily high.  
 
I calculated a Composite Violence Indicator (CVI)  by summing respondents’ frequency scores on 
these items and dividing it by the number of answers to account for missing values7. These items 
do not necessarily tap the same types of aggression, although they are all highly correlated8. 
Further, theoretical perspectives do not often make distinctions between different types of 
violence, or even crime in general. The same individual risk factors are often presumed to lead 
to behaviours as diverse as homicidal violence, property crime and even involvement in gangs. 
The items included here are all measures of aggression, but the people that have highest scores 
on it are malandros and ex-malandros (see below). Because many items (e.g. gang fights, 
robbery) are associated with malandro lifestyles, this measure is undoubtedly distorted towards 
gun 9  violence by malandros. This is also the type of violence that is of most concern to 
Venezuelans and is indeed very much the interest of this thesis. However, this type of violence 
may follow a different dynamic than the types of aggression and violence other studies explore. 
The patterns explored below seem to contradict many previous studies and do indeed lead me 
to evaluate the particular dynamics of gun violence used by malandros in Chapter 7.  
 
                                                          
7 The missing answers are quite high on all these items. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe people 
declined to answer because they had been involved in these acts, thus biasing the measure. As the 
questionnaire focussed on personal networks and I originally set out to compare networks of people 
involved in violence versus people that had not been involved, I was negligent in ensuring everyone 
answered all items. For instance, when people said they had not carried a gun, I often assumed they had 
not shot at someone and declined to follow up with this question. Because many interviews were 
conducted on the streets and in hospitals, some responses were also unclear as I was transcribing these 
interviews. It was at the analysis stage that the greyness of the boundaries of violence became increasingly 
obvious, nevertheless the insight that these self-report measures would allow me to make better 
distinctions came too late.  
8 Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is .865, indicating high reliability. Only ‘I have broken things because I was 
angry’ does not correlate significantly to carrying weapons or having shot at someone. This measure 
ranges from 1 (where people had never participated in any) to 3.6, with an average score of 1.8 and a 
standard deviation of 0.8. It is skewed towards the left, with a median of 1.5 and 14 people scoring 1.2 or 
below. 
9 The ubiquity of gun use in this sample is corroborated by the fact that, even though this is a 
notoriously underreported question, twelve people admitted to owning a gun. Some others did 
not own a gun at the time, but could easily borrow or rent one from acquaintances. Disturbingly, 
more people confided they had a gun than owned a car or motorbike (11 respondents). Four of 
the people that completed the instrument admitted to having killed (an)other(s), all with guns. 
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Figure 6-2 shows the dispersion of the CVI according to the original categorical distinction 
between people that had been interviewed on the streets, and thus not because they had been 
involved in violence (n=23), and those that were interviewed because of their involvement in 
violence (n=22), making further distinctions in this latter category according to type of 
involvement.  
Figure 6-2 Dispersion of Composite Violence Indicator (CVI) within and between violent identity 
categories (N=45) 
 
This original categorisation does indeed reflect important differences, on average. Those 
involved in violence have a significantly higher average CVI of 2.2 compared to 1.410 for those 
uninvolved. Nevertheless, the additional distinction I make in latter category shows it still hides 
many differences. Many of the people I interviewed in hospital (n=9) had been purely victims, 
at the wrong place at the wrong time. Carla (15) for instance had just been sitting on her porch 
with her sisters when a stray bullet, fired in celebration of Chávez’ election victory, hit her in the 
neck. The category ‘mala conductas’ (n=4) is a commonly used term to refer to people that are 
on a deviant path, but are not necessarily tied up in el malandreo. In this sample, it refers to 
people that do not identify as malandros but were problematic drug users and often involved in 
robberies and petty theft to maintain their habits. All four people in this category, Javier (20), 
Arturo (24), Gabriel (24), and Ale (25) have a relatively high CVI, 2.8 on average. Three of four 
prisoners also have high CVI scores. Juan (45) had murdered a boy in his barrio and frequently 
engaged in fights, Carlos (35) had been a malandro and was accused of murder, and Simon (31) 
                                                          
10 ANOVA (F=16.7, p=.00) 
INVOLVED NOT 
INVOLVED 
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had attempted to kill someone. The fourth prisoner was Nadia (18), a pregnant girl who had 
been arrested as she had been travelling in a car where a large quantity of cocaine was 
discovered. She mentioned she had once been involved in a fight, but her CVI (1.2) reflects she 
had not been involved in many other incidents. It was also difficult to place ex-malandros, 
categorically speaking they would belong on the not involved side as they no longer explicitly 
engaged in violence. Nevertheless, both had been recently affected by violence (Antonio’s 
nephew and Mateo’s cousin had been killed recently) and both indicated they might seek 
revenge. Because of their past involvement in violence, they also have high CVI scores. Self-
identified malandros, Pablo (17), Jaime (18) and Manuel (26) have the highest average CVI of 3 
in this sample. In all, the CVI is a better reflection of people’s involvement in violence than a 
categorical distinction. This is also the case for abovementioned Jorge, an outlier with a CVI of 
2.6 on the not involved side. Using the CVI as an indication thereof we can account much better 
for his past involvement in violence.  
 
I also asked respondents to indicate how well a number of items from the Buss-Perry (1992) 
Aggression (BPA) questionnaire and the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS-2)11  (Straus et al., 1996) 
described them (1, not at all, to 5, very much). They tap hostility, anger and impulsivity more 
than physical violence. Figure 6-3 shows respondents’ agreement to these statements.  
Figure 6-3 Conflict Tactics (CTS - ACTIVA) and Buss-Perry Aggression (BPA) scales  
 
                                                          
11 I used the Latin American adaptions of these questionnaires from the cross-national ACTIVA study 
(Fournier et al., 1999).  
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In stark contrast to the prevalence of physical violence in this sample, most respondents (30 or 
81% of respondents asked) felt they could control themselves, and just 6 (18% of those asked) 
said they had trouble controlling their temper. Nevertheless, a substantial number say that they 
may hit another person, given enough provocation (17, or 45% of those asked) or that they 
sometimes fly off the handle for no good reason (11 or 31% of those asked). I also computed a 
composite measure of these items by summing respondents’ scores on these items and dividing 
it by the number of answers to account for missing values 12 . Surprisingly, this composite 
measure does not correlate well with the CVI13, indicating that people that score higher on the 
types of gun and gang violence measured by the CVI do not necessarily feel ‘angry’, ‘impulsive’, 
or are unable to resolve conflicts in appropriate manners, and suggesting these measures reflect 
different types of violence, an issue which I return to in section 6.4.2 below. 
   
I also included some scales that measure attitudes towards the legitimacy of the law and 
violence that were used in a cross-national study of violence and conflict resolution mechanisms 
in Latin America and Spain (Fournier et al., 1999). Figure 6-4 shows respondents’ agreement to 
these items.  
Figure 6-4 Attitudes towards the legitimacy of violence 
 
                                                          
12 After rescaling items d, e , f and g so 1 reflected less and 5 more control. Cronbach’s alpha for reliability 
was .760, indicating relatively high consistency between these items.  
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A substantial number of respondents hold quite cynical attitudes towards the law and feel 
violence is justified on many occasions. Over a third of respondents asked (35%) felt people have 
the right to kill to defend their families, and just under a fifth (18%) feel people have the right to 
take justice in their own hands, if authorities fail. Around a quarter also feel having and carrying 
guns makes them more secure (24% and 23% respectively). Just as I did with the other scales, I 
computed a composite measure of these statements14 that shows the strongest correlation with 
the CVI (r=.68, p=.00). This suggests the people that had used more physical violence than others 
do indeed feel violence is justified. I will explore this correlation in more detail in 6.4.3. below.  
 
In what follows, I often focus on the types of violence measured by the CVI, using this indicator 
as well as descriptive accounts of specific instances of violence, as this is the type of violence of 
interest in this thesis. Nevertheless, where relevant I add additional contrast with these other 
measures of self-control and beliefs towards the legitimacy of violence. In all, while the sample 
is small and biased and the measures imperfect, these data are useful for exploring some 
connections between inequality and violence at the micro-level. Some people have indeed been 
involved in much more violence than others, we can now explore whether and how they might 
differ from these others.  
6.3 The demographics of violence 
In this section, I briefly explore some age, gender, and class differences, before turning to how 
the relationships in people’s networks might be related to their use of violence in the next 
sections.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, respondents’ age does not correlate well with the indicators of violence 
discussed above. Other studies and official statistics often find young people are more 
frequently involved in violence than older people (Orpinas, 1999; Smith, 2007). Official statistics 
in Venezuela also reflect important age differences in violent victimisation (see Chapter 3), but 
official estimates of violent offenders are not available. The lack of correlations in this sample is 
doubtlessly influenced by the fact I specifically looked for people involved violence. The few 
older people in the sample, particularly the men, were often approached because they had been 
involved in violence. Victor (38) and Juan (45) had both been recently involved in violence. 
                                                          
14 Cronbach’s Alpha = .838. 
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Further, the use of a lifetime frequency rather than a recent prevalence measure of physical 
violence influences some older respondents’ scores, as is the case for Antonio (45) and Jorge 
(55), whose relatively high CVI scores reflect behaviours that had occurred a while back. Younger 
men like Pablo (17), Javier (20) and Manuel (26) do have higher scores, but this is balanced out 
by the fact many other young men, and women in particular, have low CVI scores. It is fair to say 
that most recent incidents of severe violence are indeed concentrated among young males.  
 
Table 6-1 shows the composite indicators of physical violence, self-control and beliefs in the 
legitimacy of violence according to gender.  
Table 6-1 Average scores on indicators of violence, according to gender15 
 Male Female 
N 31 14 
CVI** 2.1 1.3 
Self-control 3.9 3.8 
Belief in legitimacy of violence 2.4 1.9 
 
We observe little gender difference in the composite measure of self-control, a small but 
insignificant difference in beliefs in the legitimacy of violence, but a significant difference in the 
type of violence measured by the CVI. This difference, with average composite violence scores 
of 2.1 for men and 1.3 for women is one of the most pertinent findings in this sample. It reflects 
recurrent, but comparatively little investigated, findings in violent offending between men and 
women in many different contexts (Heidensohn and Gelsthorpe, 2007). These differences are 
indeed accounted for in traditional frameworks, strain theories suggest women are less driven 
by material goals, and respond differently to strain. Control perspectives suggest women 
experience more constraint from their environments. We will evaluate these assumptions in 
more detail below. It should be noted here, however, that these gender differences may be due 
to the particular behaviours included in the CVI. Apart from abovementioned Carla (15), I never 
encountered any women victimised by bullets in a hospital bed. Nadia (18) was in prison, but 
she was kept separately from the wards controlled by malandros and did not appear to have 
engaged in much deviant behaviours. Like Carla, she may just have been at the wrong place at 
the wrong time, travelling in a car that was transporting cocaine. Although malandros often 
talked of female counterparts, I never came across any. Almost all women were approached on 
                                                          
15 All gender differences were tested for significance using ANOVA, only the difference in the CVI was 
significant (F=14.4, p=.00).  
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the streets. Some of these women have indeed engaged in violence, but none of them were 
engaged in the type of lifestyle centred on guns and violence associated with malandros. As the 
CVI is biased towards this type of violence, this may partly account for these differences. 
Interestingly, Table 6-1 also shows that there is little difference16 between men and women in 
terms of the more angry, impulsive behaviours that are measured by the composite measure of 
self-control, further suggesting these measures may indeed reflect different types of violence.  
 
Table 6-2 shows indicators of violence according to class. 
Table 6-2 Average scores on indicators of violence, according to class17 
 Barrio Centre 
N 42 3 
CVI 1.9 1.5 
Self-control 3.9 3.6 
Belief in legitimacy of violence 2.3 2.0 
 
Barrio residents have slightly higher scores on all of these indicators, but none of these 
differences are significant. The three higher-class respondents have lower CVI scores of 1.5 on 
average, compared to 1.9 for barrio dwellers. This small and insignificant difference may be 
surprising given the vast majority of homicides occurs in the barrio (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, 
it reflects that certainly not all barrio residents, even in this sample, have been involved in the 
violence measured by the CVI. Further, given the very small subsample of higher-class 
respondents, it is influenced disproportionately by Naklon (32), a higher-class taxi driver with a 
relatively high score of 2.2. Two other higher-class respondents, David (35) and Natalia (21) had 
low CVI scores of 1 and 1.2 respectively. Naklon grew up in the upper-class hills around Caracas 
and moves in these circles, his network includes some of Venezuela’s most famous musicians. 
Nevertheless, he had been imprisoned for spouse abuse and told me of an adolescence of 
frequent fights, drugs and robberies; he even proudly referred to himself as a ‘malandro rico’, a 
rich malandro, even if he had never engaged in deadly violence. Violence certainly is not limited 
to the bottom classes, although all instances of deadly violence are indeed reported by barrio 
dwellers.  
 
                                                          
16 In fact, although this is of course entirely indicative given the sample size, the slightly higher score for 
men indicates the men in this sample feel they can control themselves slightly better than the women in 
this sample.   
17 All class differences were tested for significance using ANOVA, none were significant.  
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In sum, as previous research in different countries has repeatedly established, the more 
physically violent people in this sample tend to be younger, lower-class males, on average. These 
differences are often attributed to the effects of inequality. Strain and relative deprivation 
perspectives suggest these people do not have the opportunities to achieve their expectations 
and are thus motivated to use violence. Control perspectives suggest a lack of social control 
frees them to use violence. Self-help perspectives assume the structure of their relationships 
leads to more violence. In the next sections I evaluate these perspectives by looking at how 
respondents’ relationships and networks reflect the assumptions of these theories.  
6.4 Exploring the effects of people’s interactions and relationships 
6.4.1 Strain and relative deprivation as motivations for violence 
This section explores the core assumptions of strain and relative deprivation theories; that 
discrepancies between respondents’ capabilities and their expectations, an inability to achieve 
their goals, might motivate them to use violence. These perspectives predict a negative 
relationship between people’s subjective capabilities and their use of violence. People who feel 
they cannot attain their expectations would be most motivated to use violence. Chapter 5 
already showed that many respondents in this sample experience strain. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to relate people’s subjective perceptions of their capabilities to their use of violence. I 
compared and contrasted various indicators of these subjective capabilities to the indicators of 
violence and attitudes discussed above and did not discover any substantial patterns. Some of 
the people that rated their opportunities and quality of life quite highly also had relatively high 
violence scores, and the other way around, some of the people that experienced strain were not 
particularly violent. This is particularly the case for women, whom often feel deprived and 
dependent, but do not engage in the types of violence measured by the CVI very often, although 
some do feel less in control over their impulses18. Further, it is difficult to evaluate to what extent 
respondents’ perceptions of their quality of life are a result of violence, rather than the other 
way around, that they would motivate them to commit violence. Upon closer inspection of some 
marginal relationships between some indicators of strain and the CVI, they are given almost 
entirely by people whose violent choices turned sour, suggesting a mismatch between people’s 
capabilities and expectations may often follow violence rather than the other way around. 
                                                          
18 Strain may perhaps better explain the types of angry violence the measure of self-control taps into, 
although, again, relationships are weak and the various indicators do not point in the same direction. The 
argument here is that strain does not explain the type of deadly gun violence explored here very well.  
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A look at respondents’ deprivation relative to their interaction group illustrates these issues in 
more detail. Relative deprivation theories suggest strain results from negative comparisons, not 
to a general standard, but to a reference group. The network data collected for this study allow 
for comparing people to their actual interaction groups, rather than a general standard of quality 
of life (see p.136 in Chapter 5). Doing badly may not be so difficult if everyone around you is 
doing equally badly. However, if people’s immediate others do better than themselves, have 
benefited from recent social programmes implemented by Chávez (see Chapter 3) for instance, 
whereas they have not, these people may experience more strain and more motivations to 
engage in violence.  
 
Figure 6-5 shows the correlation of the CVI with relative deprivation in comparison to the 
interaction group in more detail, making a gender distinction.  
Figure 6-5 Correlation between CVI and relative deprivation compared to interaction group 
(N=44)  
 
 
Looking at this graph, we observe a moderate negative correlation (r=-.32, p=.04); some of the 
more violent people do indeed feel worse off than their significant others. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to interpret this correlation in terms of the assumptions of relative deprivation theory, 
that relative deprivation motivates people to use violence. This correlation is influenced 
disproportionately by Arturo (24), a crack cocaine addict who engages in robberies to support 
his habit, and Carlos (35) who is currently in prison. Both classified themselves as 0 on quality of 
life but rate their interaction groups much higher. They have high violence scores because of 
their involvement in various acts of violence, but both allegedly regret their choices and wanted 
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to take a different route. That they give themselves a 0 and their contacts a much higher score 
on average, is more easily interpreted as an effect rather than a cause of their violent ways. This 
was not necessarily their state of mind as they were committing violent offences. Carlos 
described in detail how money from drugs and robberies allowed him to throw lavish parties for 
the neighbourhood, suggesting he felt quite satisfied at the time (see quote on p.150 in Chapter 
5). Manuel (26) is a good counterexample, he has a CVI score comparable to Carlos, but they are 
on opposite ends of this measure of relative deprivation. Manuel has no regrets, he even puts 
himself on the eighth rung of his scale of quality of life, 2.5 rungs above his contacts, on average, 
and continues to engage in the violent life of el malandreo. Strain or relative deprivation are not 
sufficient nor necessary conditions for continued involvement in the type of violence we explore 
here, although they may go some way in explaining the meanings and attractions of el 
malandreo, as I will explore in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 
The case of Juan (45) and a particular instance in which he used deadly violence, illustrates these 
issues in further detail. I spoke to and interviewed Juan on a number of occasions in prison in 
Cumaná, where he had been incarcerated for murdering a 14-year-old boy in his barrio. He had 
never finished high-school and was a man of many trades, most recently he had taken on artisan 
woodwork, an occupation he continued within prison walls. He had lived in the same house all 
of his life, two of his six brothers and sisters as well as his mother, his partner and their children 
continued to live there. He proudly recounted how they had built it up from a ‘pile of zinc’ to 
somewhere they all lived relatively comfortably, in a dense barrio on the brink of Cumaná’s 
bustling marine port. He described himself as a key figure in his barrio, known and well-liked by 
most, organising football competitions and theatre plays. The barrio is his life, where he works, 
socialises, and where everyone knows him, as well as Nelson, the boy he had killed. Where other 
respondents often had to be prompted to list more of their contacts, I asked Juan to stop 
summing up contacts when he reached 48, most of them living in his barrio.  
 
The resulting network is shown in Figure 6-6 below. It shows the contacts19 Juan mentioned 
represented by nodes, connected by a line when these contacts also know each other. The 
colour of the nodes reflects the job sector of these contacts, their size reflects their perceived 
                                                          
19 Whereas, for the calculation of network measures I excluded people whom had died or whom 
respondents no longer had contact with, I included them for the specific case studies in this 
chapter, because they allow for some interesting observations. Juan was one of the only 
respondents that agreed to include the person they had had a violent conflict with in their 
network, allowing me to evaluate their relative positions.  
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quality of life on a 0-10 scale, and the size of the name labels reflects the trust Juan has in them. 
Nelson is circled in blue.  
Figure 6-6 Juan's network 
 
1 Graph assembled using Gephi’s Force Atlas2 algorithm, using connections between nodes to position them according to 
centrality  
  2 Colour of nodes reflects job sector, size of nodes reflects perceived quality of life, and size of name labels reflects trust. 
  3 Nelson, the boy Juan killed, is circled in blue.  
 
This figure shows a densely connected network of relative equals. Relative equals, in terms of 
perceived quality of life as well as precarious employment, just five people in Juan’s extensive 
network have regular wages coming in. Most (26) of his contacts are unskilled labourers on the 
fishing boats and in the tuna factories the Cumanese economy, and Juan’s barrio in particular, 
rely on. Interestingly, the people that appear to do better, both in terms of jobs and perceived 
quality of life are on the outer edges, and thus not as central, in his personal network. Juan does 
not feel comfortable around people that do better, nevertheless, this does not necessarily urge 
him to be violent towards them (or anyone else), rather avoid them. He did speak of the upper 
classes in a resentful tone, the ‘bourgeoisie’, that entertains itself in shopping centres and areas 
of Cumaná he never frequents. The vast majority of people in his network live in a barrio, like 
him, and he trusts them because they are similar to him. The only person not receiving a 5 on a 
scale of 1 ‘no trust’ to 5 ‘trust completely’, was Nelson, whom he did not trust at all for reasons 
that will become clear below.  
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Juan does experience strain, particularly now he is in prison, he classifies himself on ladder 3 of 
his 0 to 10 quality of life scale. However, he classifies himself just a little lower than the average 
of his network (3.5), he does not experience relative deprivation in terms of his most immediate 
contacts, including Nelson, whom he felt had a lower quality of life than him20. People in his 
barrio and immediate circle are mostly in the same boat, making ends meet. Some (for instance 
Jorge, whom works for the council, Jesus the owner of a small, informal businesses and his aunt, 
Maria, whom married a cattle farmer) do better than others, but it is difficult to relate his 
subjective capabilities to his use of violence.  
 
Juan also has a relatively high CVI score, he had engaged in a number of fights, robberies and 
had killed 14-year old Nelson. Nevertheless, he was largely good-humoured, respectful and well-
trusted by prison staff for instance, evidenced by the fact he was allowed to sleep in a secluded 
area in the entrance to the prison, away from violent gang sections and was even allowed to 
carry a knife for his artisan work. He recounted the day he had shot and killed Nelson in 
painstaking detail. He had ‘had to’ do it though, it was ‘him or me’, as he puts it himself:    
I’m here because I defended myself. I killed the boy in self-defence. He was going to kill 
me. He had a gun… It’s hard because he was going to kill me, my friend. (…) he was a 
malandro, selling drugs and stuff, as I was always passing by with the lads... He was 
envious of me because I did good things for the barrio, he got a gun out on me on 
several occasions. (…) I had to do it, I had to kill him so that he wouldn’t kill me. (…) The 
boy was going around the barrio threatening people and stuff, very badly behaved… 
Well, you know, 14 years old, what are you doing going around with a gun? (…) I never 
had any problems with anyone else in the barrio, everyone always goes ‘hey, Juan, 
come here, do me a favour.’ (…) everything happened from Saturday on Sunday, I killed 
him on Monday. We had an indifference, a discussion on Saturday, as we were setting 
up theatre. On Monday, he came out from an alleyway and shot at me, but the bullets 
didn’t hit me. After that, when he came back, I’d got a gun too and I shot him in the 
neck, one single shot.  
Semi-structured interview, Juan, Cumaná  
Whereas Juan (retrospectively) interprets the source of the conflict in terms of envy, it was not 
this feeling of resentment that motivated the killing, but the knowledge there was nowhere to 
                                                          
20 As mentioned in Chapter 4, it was difficult to get people to talk about and name violent 
relationships. Juan was one of the only respondents that agreed to include the person they had 
had a violent conflict with in their network, allowing me to evaluate their relative positions. 
Interestingly, and also counter to relative deprivation theories, violent interactions often 
involved relative equals or inferiors rather than superiors. Where people did mention these, 
they classified the people they had had fights or trouble with as equals, or more usually lower 
than themselves (as in the case of Juan and Nelson). These rankings can also be seen as a 
justification that moralises violence, these people were bad people whom deserved to be 
treated the way they were. 
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turn. Even if he was strained, and felt disrespected by Nelson, the more immediate pressure in 
the lead-up to the actual violence was the knowledge he would be killed if he did not act first. 
The murder was not a consequence of strain, nor relative deprivation, but the irreversible 
resolution of a conflict in which its protagonists could see few different options.   
 
A strong sense of inevitability emerges from most people’s accounts of deadly violence, there 
was no other way to resolve the conflict than resorting to extreme violence, or leaving the barrio.  
Because everyone knows everyone, there is little escape. The dense, strong ties in the barrio 
make confrontation more likely than avoidance. Juan knew Nelson would be coming after him, 
other people had already warned him. Nelson’s views remain illicit, but he may have thought 
the same. Further, people like Juan feel they are on their own, they talk resentfully of politicians 
and police officers, whom are perceived as inherently corrupt, and do not expect much from 
these instances. People’s relationships do generate expectations, but it is not that people are 
not able to live up to these (whether material or symbolic) expectations that motivates (deadly) 
violence, but the nature of these expectations; that the police is not to be counted on, other 
people will resort to extreme violence, and one thus has to do the same. Juan has this to say 
about violence in the barrio: 
I had a few fights in the past, but never with anyone in the barrio, with people from 
other barrios, not my barrio. They used to come and challenge us, and we would come 
out and… (…) Today you can’t fight anyone like that, with bats, fists, no. Today those 
minors have lots of guts, we have to live with that, always on alert… Almost every 
weekend they kill someone in the barrio, every weekend they kill people, last night they 
killed someone. Enough. I’m going to Falcon when I leave here, I have family there, they 
await me there. 
Semi-structured interview, Juan, Cumaná  
 
Where he had a number of fist fights with people from other barrios in the past, he no longer 
feels these fights can be fought, because of the expectation that guns will be used. He makes 
reference to what has been described by Fagan et al. (2007) as an ‘ecology of danger’, a context 
in which instances of gun violence generate normative expectations that reproduce the use of 
guns and deadly violence, and will be explored in further detail in Chapter 7. Juan’s aunt Maria, 
who married a cattle rancher in Falcon, a state more than 800 kilometres away, is his only place 
to turn after prison, leaving behind his barrio and, in essence, his life.  
 
In all, it is difficult to see strain or deprivation relative to the interaction network as a motivation 
for people to use (deadly) violence. Strain can be interpreted as a consequence of violence if it 
turns badly, nevertheless, cannot necessarily be seen as a motivation to sustain a life of violence. 
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These observations suggest perhaps most of all that a life of violence does not pay any personal 
favours. It may momentarily provide money and respect relative to others, as we will analyse in 
more detail in Chapter 7, the consequences of a life of violence on a personal level should not 
be underestimated. This is not to say strain does not have many adverse effects, many 
respondents were unhappy and felt hard done by. However, motivations stemming from 
negative social comparison seem unlikely to be the major determinant of the type of violence 
analysed here. These observations thus do not immediately support the assumptions of strain 
theories; they are more in line with self-help theories I will explore below. In the next section I 
look at whether social control perspectives may better account for some differences in people’s 
use of violence.  
6.4.2 Social control; The mitigating effects of relationships as social control 
This section explores the core assumptions of social control theories; that strong, dense 
relationships exert control over behaviour, and can prevent people from engaging in violence. 
Control perspectives assume everyone has the capacity for violence, but strong ties to 
conventional society can mitigate this capacity. Chapter 5 already showed there is no lack of 
informal social control in the barrio, this section looks at whether perhaps more violent people 
experience less social control, particularly from their relationships. Again, it is difficult to relate 
some measures of social control stemming from people’s relationships with the type of violence 
analysed here. I compared and contrasted various indicators of the strength and quality of 
people’s relationships (trust, frequency of contact, …)21 with the measures of violence and, again, 
did not observe patterns supportive of control theories. On the contrary, more violent people 
appear to have stronger and denser relationships in some respects. This supports the few studies 
that have used personal networks to evaluate the effects people’s relationships, and found that 
more violent or deviant people’s networks do not differ substantially from those of non-violent 
people, or not in the expected direction, some find denser networks that are highly integrated 
into the neighbourhood (de Cuyper et al., 2013; Roman et al., 2012). Interestingly, little suggests 
that women are more or less constrained by their networks and that this could thus explain they 
do not often engage in the behaviours measured by the CVI. I did not find substantial differences 
                                                          
21  Note that indicators of people’s relationships may be influenced by the amount of people they 
mentioned, the size of their networks. It is likely that people who mentioned less contacts mentioned 
stronger ties overall (see Chapter 4 and 5). Further, as more violent people mentioned slightly less 
contacts, on average, this may influence these correlations. However, I also calculated partial correlations 
for all these measures, controlling for network size, and did not find any substantial differences.  
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in the type or quality of relationships between women and men, nor between more or less 
violent women.  
 
A closer look at some correlations illustrates these observations in more detail. We have already 
seen that the barrio is densely connected and there is plenty of informal social control, however, 
people that have less contacts living in their barrio could be less subject to these forms of 
informal social control. Further, people that are tied up into dense networks, where their 
contacts know everyone else, can expect these others will hear about any deviant behaviour 
and they may thus be restrained from behaving violently. Figure 6-7 shows the correlation 
between the CVI and the average proportion of respondents’ contacts that live in the same 
sector (r=.19, p=.21) as well as network density (r=.18, p=.24). 
Figure 6-7 Correlations between proportion living in the same sector, network density and CVI 
(N=45)  
   
These correlations are not significant, and in the opposite to expected direction, at least for men. 
Some of the men that have more frequently engaged in the types of violence of interest in this 
thesis appear to have a slightly larger proportion of contacts living in their own sector, and 
denser networks. This suggests that, at least some, more violent men are not less, but more 
constrained by their networks. Pablo’s (17) network for instance includes many people he has 
known all his life and that also know each other, predominantly barrio residents he more or less 
grew up with. I will explore his network and how it does indeed provide control over his 
behaviour, but also generates conflicts that are difficult to escape, in further detail below. Moses 
(21) who has a relatively sparse network and a small percentage of contacts living in the same 
barrio, has not engaged in much of the violence explored here. His network is analysed in the 
next section, showing that rather than freeing Moses to use violence, this relatively sparse 
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network allows him to escape violence. These observations thus suggest strong, dense 
relationships are not very efficient in stopping people from behaving violently.  
 
More recent control theories assume people’s early relationships instil them with the ability for 
self-control. Figure 6-8 shows the correlation between the composite measure of self-control 
discussed above and the CVI (r=-.22, p=.19).  
Figure 6-8 Correlation between CVI and composite measure of self-control (N=42) 
 
 
Again, this relationship is not significant, and some of the more violent people also felt they 
could control themselves, whereas many people that had not used a lot of violence felt the 
opposite. Interestingly, many women score lower on these items, indicating they often feel less 
in control. These observations may indicate that people who engage in the type of violence 
explored here do not necessarily feel they are less in control. Malandros in particular often need 
to give an impression of control, angry indiscriminate violence is not appreciated as we will see 
in Chapter 7. Manuel, although he admitted to having killed at least three people and hitting his 
now ex-girlfriend was adamant he knew how to control himself. If he did ‘fly off the handle’ it 
would be for a very good reason, like when one of his friends was killed. These people do not 
necessarily lack informal social control mechanisms, whether external or internal, they often see 
themselves as implementing social control where other means of achieving justice are 
unavailable. 
 
The case of Pablo (17), a self-identified malandro with the highest CVI score in this sample, 
illustrates how some of his contacts do indeed restrain him from violence, yet the pressures of 
violent friends and feuds he has engaged in are the more pressing ties that reinforce his use of 
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violence. A closer look at his network illustrates in more detail the assumptions of social control 
theories. Figure 6-9 below shows a picture of the contacts Pablo mentioned, and the 
relationships between them. A line between contacts shows they know each other. The size of 
the nodes representing Pablo’s contacts reflects how frequently Pablo sees these people, with 
larger nodes indicating more frequent contact. The size of their names indicates trust Pablo has 
in them, with larger fonts indicating more trust. The colours represent these contacts’ 
professional situation.  
Figure 6-9 Pablo (17)’s network  
 
  1 Graph assembled using Gephi’s Force Atlas2 algorithm, using connections between nodes to position them according to 
centrality  
  2 Colour of nodes reflect job sector, size of nodes reflect frequency of contact, and size of name labels reflect trust 
  3 Pablo’s gang is circled in blue, % malandro in table refers to those that had no other professions, i.e. Carlos, Oscar and Eduardo 
 
Pablo lives with his girlfriend, Anna, three of his seven half-sisters (Bea, Caterina and Daisy), and 
their respective children in the house he grew up in, in a relatively violent sector high up in Catia. 
His father Eric, a mechanic, lives a few miles away, he trusts him substantially, but does not see 
him that often. His mother, Laila, is one of the most central people in his network, she knows 
most of the people Pablo mentioned too. With a recent day job as an apprentice at a car 
mechanics, Pablo earns just 2,050 bolivars a month, hardly enough to satisfy his tastes. Luis, his 
boss, is the only unconnected (weak) tie in his network, he does not know anyone else22. After 
work, Pablo hangs out with other malandros on the street corner, Carlos, Oscar, Pedro, Romeo, 
Jose and Eduardo, whom are circled in blue. Three in ten (30%) of the relationships Pablo 
                                                          
22 Atypically for this sample, he found this job through an advertisement in the newspaper, not through 
his network. 
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mentioned are deviant ties. Nevertheless, like Pablo, most of these people have more formal 
jobs, only Oscar and Carlos are full-time malandros. Eduardo is currently in prison for homicide. 
They rob to top up their meagre earnings and are involved in a number of ‘culebras’23 with other 
sectors. Pablo does not quite trust Pedro, Romeo or Jose, although he sees them all on a daily 
basis. Hector is his cousin, he is not a malandro but does hang out with them, and knows them 
all.  
 
A number of things stand out. First the group of malandros is not a separate clique, it is 
completely embedded in his network, and the barrio. Further, Pablo has many ties to law-
abiding people, which are also stronger contacts in terms of trust. Nevertheless, most of these 
ties are unemployed women. This speaks to theories that look at the construction of masculine 
identities in opposition to feared, female identities. Through his contacts with violent men, 
Pablo can provide means and distance himself from the dependent lives of his sisters, whom all 
have babies and rely on men to provide for them. I will evaluate these theories in more detail in 
chapter 7.  
 
Importantly, none of his sisters are involved in violence and all very worried for their youngest 
sibling, frequently urging him to stay away from the street corner. Pablo’s network is also quite 
dense, 75% of all possible ties between people are present. Control theories suggest he would 
be constrained from violence through these ties. Indeed, the very day I interviewed him, his 
mum had been reprimanded by neighbours about his behaviour, which had her threatening to 
disown him, never to speak to him again. One of these neighbours, Marta (54, described how 
she too had complained to his mother and gone to reprimand Pablo himself after he and a few 
others had beaten up her heroin-addicted son, Toby, allegedly for trying to rob them of drugs. 
She made reference to the strong ties between their families, reminding Pablo of how he had 
grown up with them. Her words are reminiscent of the moral order of the barrio that was 
described in Chapter 5, a fragile order that can be and is often maintained with violence, but 
should never be used against barrio residents themselves.  
It was them who did it, and I went, I’m a mother in the end, my son lives on the streets 
and perhaps he’s not an excellent human being, but he’s my son, and I went and gave 
them their dues. (…) they go around harassing people, people in the barrio, and it’s not 
right, because if I saw you grow up, I saw you become a man, now you’re going to come 
and attack me, you’re going to offer me bullets and threats, that’s what I told them, 
‘you know who my son is; and who is Marta (sic.)? Marta partakes in the barrio and 
                                                          
23 Literally meaning snakes, a colloquialism for often deadly vendettas that will be explored in detail in 
Chapter 7. 
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does good for everyone.’ (…) I went up to see them in despair, I didn’t offend them but 
I went and told them many things and asked them how it was possible that they 
permitted this, that it wasn’t fair, four people against one, and they have no right to 
beat up my son (…) I asked ‘why don’t you go and confront the police, start a fight with 
a police officer, with a malandro from the gang down below, they have guns, my son 
doesn’t have a gun’ (…) then one of them shuffled his hands kind of weirdly, as if he 
had a gun there so I said ‘you know that if you shoot me or my close ones, if you kill me, 
you pay for it, write it down, because that doesn’t square, I’m not a dog without a soul, 
I’ll tell you that if you hit me, hurt me or do anything, write it down that it doesn’t stay 
that way, because you don’t know who’s behind me.’ I don’t have malandros, not in my 
house nor my family, but in my family there are police officers, my daughter’s husband. 
She told me, ‘look, I’ll send a couple of masked guys and I’ll order them to…’ but I told 
her, ‘no, I don’t want that, I want this to be resolved and I don’t want them to beat up 
Toby again, because they know Marta will be there to keep an eye out.’  
Unstructured interview, female resident, Catia 
Pablo had told me of this beating too, but he felt justified because Toby had robbed them. In 
absence of other means (they could certainly not turn to an already distrusted police over drugs), 
violence was a way to resolve this conflict too. Nevertheless, Pablo and his associates could not 
use deadly violence. If they had killed Toby, they would certainly have faced reprisals. In ‘merely’ 
beating up a lone, frail heroin addict, they had little fear of reprisal. Nonetheless, this type of 
violence is off bounds against other gangs that, like them, demonstrate their ferocity through 
posturing with guns and boasting of killings, as we will see in Chapter 7. 
 
The basic assumption of control theories, that strong ties instil people with informal social 
control mechanisms is indeed supported, but these do not necessarily restrain Pablo from using 
violence. Pablo’s relationships, though doing their hardest in trying to discourage him, cannot 
constrain him. He felt guilty about disappointing his mum and sisters, but had no intention to 
leave the street corner. His ties to the gang are the more pressing ones, falling out with one of 
the other boys could cost him his life. Further, the gang offers him a warped sense of security, 
protection from the culebras he has amassed with other sectors through the many shoot-outs 
he has engaged in. Pablo feels trapped and fearful, he does not see how he can escape these 
conflicts. This also seems to be the reason he feels deprived in comparison to his network (rating 
his quality of life as 3, almost three rungs lower than the average of his network24), he feels 
anxious and trapped. Nevertheless, the violence he uses is not given by this relative position, 
nor the amount of control he is subject to from his network, but by the dynamics of the barrio, 
and the dynamics of conflict with other malandros. He cannot simply hide or run away in a barrio 
                                                          
24 He rates the other malandros in his network equally, as 3, their lives are fearful and in many ways 
constrained to the barrio.  
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where everyone knows him, and, particularly in violence with other gangs, he cannot count on 
different forms of resolution but the exchange of gunfire, hoping that his enemies will perish 
first.  
 
In all, more violent people do not necessarily have weaker bonds than non-violent people. Dense 
network structures are observed right across the sample, and even the most violent people have 
plenty of relationships that offer informal social controls in their networks. Further, social 
control theories cannot explain gender differences in the CVI, women are not necessarily stricter 
tied into their networks, or more constrained from violence. In all, whether or not people are 
more or less constrained by their networks, have stronger or weaker ties, more or less trust in 
these ties, and even whether or not they feel they can control themselves, none of these seem 
to influence their involvement in the type of violence explored here, questioning the basic tenets 
of social control theories. Instead, these observations are more in line with self-help theories, 
which I explore in the next section.  
6.4.3 Self-help; violence as social control in dense interaction networks 
Self-help perspectives suggest that, rather than keeping people from violence, strong, dense 
relationships can generate violence. Violence is seen, not as a maladaptive attribute, but as a 
conflict resolution mechanism, where other mechanisms (such as avoidance and third party 
settlement) are unavailable. They shift the focus from individual attributes and positions to the 
structure of relationships in which violence emerges. Chapter 5 showed that indeed, the barrio 
has no accepted hierarchy, everyone is equal and nobody has a more legitimate claim over 
anybody else. Previous examples showed that people’s networks too, tend to be made up of 
relative equals that get together frequently and are capable of exerting informal social control. 
In previous sections we saw how neither strain nor social control perspectives adequately 
explain some of the patterns observed here. The examples of Pablo and Juan show they may be 
strained and even relatively deprived but it is difficult to relate their use of violence to these 
feelings of deprivation. Further, they are certainly not lacking effective controls. The network 
does exert control over people, relationships keep them in line. However, this does not 
necessarily prevent violence, on the contrary, in certain situations people need to take control 
using violence. These people turned violent on one, or even a number of occasions, not 
necessarily because of their individual attributes, but because the context of the barrio, and in 
the case of Pablo, also the feuds of el malandreo, demand they do so. The dense interaction 
networks make avoidance difficult and violence inevitable at times, there is often no other way 
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out. What unites the diverse people in this sample, violent and non-violent alike, is a densely 
connected network of relative equals, and little recourse to avoidance or formal conflict 
resolution mechanisms. In this section I explore these assumptions in a little more detail, looking 
specifically at attitudes towards the legitimacy of violence, and the case of Moses.  
 
Figure 6-10 shows the correlation between the composite measure of respondents’ beliefs in 
the legitimacy of violence described above and the CVI (r=.68, p=.00). 
Figure 6-10 Correlation between beliefs in legitimacy of violence and CVI (N=35) 
 
 
This is one of the strongest relationships between a number of different measures and the type 
of violence explored here. People who have used more violence than others strongly believe 
their violence is justified, and even necessary, given the failings of the justice system. Even 
Hector (26), whom, as a policeman, ostentatiously preached the legitimacy and supremacy of 
the law as indicated in the scatterplot, owned up to violence beyond the law, as the quote in 
chapter 5 showed (see p. 150). These people have little belief in the legitimacy or efficacy of the 
justice system. Many respondents, when asked whether it was justified to kill or take the law in 
their own hands answered with a tentative ‘well it shouldn’t be that way, but given our 
circumstances, actually, yes’.  
 
In Chapter 5, I briefly discussed Moses’ (21) precarious situation, sharing a four-bedroom shack 
with his mother, nine of his ten siblings from seven different fathers, and some of their own 
partners and children (a battalion as he referred to it himself). His household has real trouble 
making ends meet, but he still puts himself on ladder 5 of a 0-10 scale of quality of life, slightly 
higher than the average of his network (4.7). At his young age, he had worked as a security guard 
180 
 
 
 
at a private bus station, a labourer, concierge, and had earned some extra cash as a break-dancer. 
Most recently he had joined the army, inspired by his most recent stepfather. Moses’ network 
is shown in Figure 6-11, with nodes showing the contacts he mentioned, connected by lines 
when they also know each other. The colours of the nodes reflect their job sector, their size their 
quality of life on a 0-10 scale, and the size of the node labels the trust Moses has in them.  
Figure 6-11 Moses’ (21) network 
 
1 Graph assembled using Gephi’s Force Atlas2 algorithm, using connections between nodes to position them according to 
centrality  
  2 Colour of nodes reflects job sector, size of nodes reflects perceived quality of life, and size of name labels reflects trust. 
 
We can observe a much sparser network than most other respondents (37% of all possible ties 
are present, compared to 60% on average across the sample, 87% in Juan’s case and 75% in 
Pablo’s case). Moses’ network has four distinct groups, or cliques, although there are no 
disconnected nodes, everyone knows at least someone else. The group towards the left 
represents his army colleagues, on the right is a group of break-dancers he often practices with 
on a central Caracas’ square, at the bottom a few friends from high school, and at the core his 
extended family and the few people he knows in the barrio. Only twelve people (17% of his 
network) live(d) in his barrio, eight of whom in the same house. Moses does not like to hang 
around the streets, because they are so violent. He recounted a number of robberies and near-
death encounters where bullets had just razed his body. Two of his friends, Bobby and Johan, 
had died. Johan too had been a malandro, as had his dad, whom he had never known. He 
described Johan in endearing terms, someone he could trust with his secrets, but went ‘crazy’ 
on weekends. Nevertheless, Moses has little respect for malandros in general, they are always 
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in hiding, cannot leave the barrio. He has much more respect for his older brothers, Alejandro, 
and Hairo and the boys of the breakdance group.  
 
Moses had not engaged in the types of gun and gang violence of interest here, but he did believe 
it was legitimate to respond with violence at times. His account of violence in his barrio is quite 
insightful, particularly regarding an instance where he had had to get involved too:  
Before they were constantly exchanging fire [in my sector], that has stopped. The last 
shoot-out I witnessed close to my home is about a year ago, from then onwards, 
nothing… How did it change? Well, like I said, many of those who hung out there have 
died now, at the moment they’re purely youngsters, purely new malandros. New 
malandros that start learning. It’s like cycles, chains and it will never end. I’m 100% 
certain that, well in my opinion, whilst I am in this world, and whilst I live, I know that, 
in this time, for me, it will never end. (…) Like I said, you get used to it. You don’t see it 
as another world anymore. Here, people live for the day. It’s a question of habit. Aren’t 
you scared? No, when the problem doesn’t involve me, when it’s someone else, no. 
Have people already had a problem with you? Yes, one single time. Close to my home 
a guy messed with one of my little sisters and I seized, when I heard that he had messed 
with her… when I saw him, I hit him hard, and it emerged that he was the brother of a 
malandro from around there, a murderer. I moved to a different barrio for like three 
months. After three months I came back here. How do you mean, he messed with your 
sister? Well, as she was going to school he started messing with her, telling her things, 
all sadistic, morbid, filth… and I didn’t like it. I had to do it.  
Semi-structured interview, Moses, Catia 
Like so many others, Moses refers to the inevitability of responding the way he did, he ‘had to 
do it’. The interconnectedness of the barrio means he could not just let it go. Importantly, 
through his challenge, he set up his own cycle of potentially deadly violence, which he was able 
to escape by moving to another barrio for a while. An option that was not immediately available 
to people like Juan, whose life is much more centred around the barrio. Pablo had similarly been 
sent away to a different city, in an effort to avoid the escalation of a conflict, nevertheless, upon 
his return, he just started hanging out with the boys on the corner again. Violence becomes 
necessary in the dense and informal spaces of the barrio, where reputation is important, but 
sadly deadly. That these people acted violently on different occasions had little to do with their 
individual attributes, but more with the relational structure of the barrio, where conflict cannot 
be readily avoided, and failure to respond to status challenges affects one’s reputation, at least 
if one is male. This particular instance of violence also draws our attention to an important 
gender pattern, whereas it was Moses’ sister that had been insulted, it was Moses, and not his 
sister, whom ‘had to’ put it right. These types of behaviours are not expected of women; in the 
barrio, men are expected to provide, financial means as well as physical protection, for the 
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household. Even if women experience strain, and enjoy flirting with malandros, as we will see in 
Chapter 7, violence is not expected of them.  
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter explored some connections between inequality and violence at the micro-level, 
looking specifically at how people’s interactions and relationships reflect the assumptions of 
strain/relative deprivation, social control and self-help theories. Looking at these relationships, 
the connections between inequality and the type of deadly gun violence that is the interest of 
this thesis are not as straightforward as traditional theories often assume. This type of violence 
does not seem to follow from strain associated with inequality or from ineffective controls, but 
from the pattern of relationships in which inequality is embedded. This chapter found that 
people who experience strain and relative deprivation are not necessarily more motivated to 
use violence, on the contrary strain and relative deprivation may often follow violence. Strain 
may exacerbate the meaning and power of violent identities as I will explore in the next chapter. 
This chapter also showed more violent people do not necessarily lack social controls. On the 
contrary, they often perceive themselves as applying social control, through violence. In all, 
strong, dense relationships do not appear able to halt this type of violence, rather they appear 
to generate it. Rumour and expectations in dense networks make confrontation more likely than 
avoidance.  
 
In all, where we found indications of substantial differences in strain, strength of ties and 
patterns of sociability between the barrio and the centre in Chapter 5, these are not present 
between people all or not involved in the type of violence explored here. Whether or not the 
people in this sample have access to different ideas and opportunities or are more or less 
constrained than others is not related to how frequently they have been involved in this type of 
violence. This questions theories that look at individual differences and suggests the overall 
structure of relationships in which these people are embedded is more important in 
understanding this type of violence. High levels of violence in the barrio may have more to do 
with general conditions in the barrio rather than the attributes of violent people. Self-help 
perspectives suggest violence is more prevalent in poorer sections of society, not because of 
perceived or relative poverty, nor a lack of informal control mechanisms, but because of 
people’s interaction patterns. They predict more confrontational (violent) conflict where ties are 
more frequent, avoidance difficult and authoritative third parties absent.  
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Overall, this chapter suggests we need to understand the dynamics of violent interactions more 
than static personality characteristics. This chapter made an important contribution by looking 
at people’s interaction networks as the source of their expectations and relationships. Personal 
networks are a step in the right direction, by using more concrete boundaries to evaluate the 
effects of inequality, but they still make an abstraction of the many ties people have. Further, 
qualitative data were essential in interpreting how these relationships provide informal social 
control, and exploring violent interactions in more detail. Even though the sample was small, 
and the measures of violence imperfect, these findings question whether it makes sense to 
continue looking for individual differences that in effect stigmatise 94% of this sample – almost 
all respondents living in the barrio have a shortage of something, this does not mean they will 
turn violent. In chapter 7 we briefly address the meaning of violent identities before evaluating 
violence between malandros, not as an individual attribute, but as informal social control, as 
self-help in a context of ambiguity and uncertainty. It shows how actual interactions generate 
expectations of violence that continuously feed the need for violence, and reinforce the power 
of violent identities. 
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CHAPTER 7 EL MALANDREO; EXISTENTIAL MEANING, RULES AND VIOLENCE 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the meaning and expressions of ‘el malandreo’, a Venezuelan gangster 
identity, with particular attention for the deadly violence it applies.  Much of the deadly violence 
in Venezuela is attributable to malandros (see Chapter 3) but little research has evaluated this 
type of violence or its presumed protagonists in this context (Olimpo et al., 2010; Rodgers and 
Baird, 2014). Based on primary qualitative data this chapter shows that the violence malandros 
use is not entirely related to historical inequalities. While these inequalities can be seen to 
facilitate the development of el malandreo as an institution, that is, as a social structure that 
proscribes and encourages certain behaviours, overall it is the internal logic of cyclically violent 
vendettas that appears to sustain these behaviours most strongly. My argument is that violence 
between malandros is not so much motivated by disempowering social structures but by fear 
and previous violence that spread rapidly through the horizontal reciprocity networks of el 
malandreo. The ‘culebra’, meaning snake, a fitting metaphor and Venezuelan colloquialism for 
retaliatory violence that is used to refer both to the violent conflict or vendetta itself, as well as 
the person or group with whom the conflict (Zubillaga, 2011), has important endogenous 
feedback effects, sowing the conditions for future violence and simultaneously sustaining el 
malandreo as a governance structure.  
 
Previous chapters explored how inequality is reflected in barrio residents’ relationships, and 
how these conditions affect individual propensities for violence. Chapter 6 concluded that it is 
difficult to attribute individual differences in violence to the presumed effects of inequality, i.e. 
relative deprivation or a lack of controls. It was suggested more relational interpretations may 
better explain the connections between inequality and violence. This chapter engages with the 
relational perspectives on violent identities and violence that were introduced in Chapter 2, with 
a case study of el malandreo. It makes use of institutional and network theories to frame the 
data. Institutional theory ‘examines the processes and mechanisms by which structures, 
schemas, rules, and routines become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior’ 
(Scott, 2005). Network theory looks for patterns or regularities in relationships between 
interacting units (Papachristos 2010). These theories are paradigms that have been applied in a 
variety of disciplines and adopted by diverse theoretical perspectives. They contain conceptual 
tools for organising empirical data without the necessity to specify clear hypotheses. They allow 
me to let the data speak.   
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The chapter builds on primary data to develop an understanding of el malandreo as an 
institution that sanctions violence. Malandros, Venezuelan slang for delinquents of various 
trades and assignations tend to associate in relatively disorganised groups more or less 
embedded in the barrio. This chapter argues that what weaves these varying shapes and forms 
together is a conflictive network of fear and lethal reprisal. El malandreo found substantial 
following in Venezuela’s barrios, providing individuals with existential meaning and respect, and 
the barrio with informal social control (see also chapter 5). This chapter explores in further detail 
the construction of violent masculinities in interaction with the community, as well as other 
malandros.  
 
As explored in Chapter 2, many perspectives singularly focus on the material distribution of 
resources in explaining the meaning of these identities. These perspectives are important in 
fleshing out the exclusionary practices and contradictions that are so evident across the globe 
today, not least in Venezuela. Nevertheless, they often inadvertently provide excuses for 
deprived and disrespected offenders that have no other options but to engage in a life of 
violence, tacitly assuming that in providing young men with formal opportunities, the gangs will 
simply go away. The Venezuelan case is interesting not just because it has a long history of gangs 
(Bolívar et al., 2012), but because they seemingly increased violent activity over the last 10 or 
15 years where inclusive policies have been introduced that should have made these gangs less 
attractive. Although these policies have not necessarily provided the target group of 
disenfranchised young men with more opportunities (Gonzalez Plessmann, 2010), it is 
questionable in how far simply doing so would deinstitutionalise the complex governance 
structures of el malandreo. More relational interpretations look beyond the material 
distribution of resources, at the construction of identities in the context of actual social 
relationships. Nevertheless, these perspectives are incomplete without an understanding of the 
relationships through which violence itself flows. This chapter argues that the historical 
emergence of gangs can be related to exogenous social relations, such as unequal opportunity 
structures and a lack of formal social control, gang violence follows a dynamic that is 
endogenous to these gang networks. What sustains and further legitimises the institution of el 
malandreo today, over and above poor living conditions, is its deadly, reciprocal violence. The 
malandro claims to protect the barrio from random violence, through what he considers to be 
legitimate violence, generating cycles of retaliatory violence. This chapter engages with 
relational perspectives by showing how the dynamics of la culebra generate an ecology of 
danger, where fear and violence spread quickly. Malandros adopt ever-deadlier violence 
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because it is (a) condoned (even expected) behaviour within el malandreo and (b) embedded in 
a chain of fear and retaliation, affecting evermore neighbours1 in the dense reciprocity networks 
of el malandreo. 
7.2 The data, malandros as dynamic networks of interacting individuals 
This chapter draws predominantly on recorded interviews with 45 unique respondents that had 
at one point or another engaged in el malandreo, in Caracas and Cumaná. Most of those (29) 
were interviewed in group situations, ten completed a semi-structured network interview2, 
another six were people I conducted unstructured interviews with and had also engaged in el 
malandreo. This chapter also relies on unrecorded interviews, fieldnotes and observational 
material gathered in a period of around three months towards the end of my fieldwork, where 
I gained access to a number of sites of encounter and exchange between malandros, allowing 
me to compare and contrast the structure of four different gang groups below. Chapter 4 
described how I first attempted to find these people in hospitals and a Cumanese prison, made 
contact with two gang groups through an ex-malandro in Catia and, as I gained more confidence, 
approached them on the streets of Cumaná, accompanied by a representative of a local Consejo 
Comunal. The many ethical issues surrounding this approach are also addressed in detail in 
Chapter 4.  
 
In this section, I look at the structure of relationships within four of these sites, as well as 
connections to the community and illicit drug markets, conceiving of these groups as I defined 
them in Chapter 2, as local organisational expressions (or ‘franchises’ Hagedorn (2008)) of the 
broader identity of el malandreo, that are shaped in interaction with other gangs and the wider 
community. The groups often take on the name of their street or sector, reinforcing their 
relationship with the community, and simultaneously setting them apart from groups in 
different sectors. Nevertheless, rather than clearly defined groups, they are dynamic networks 
of interacting individuals (Morselli, 2009). The particular identities single gang groups in 
Venezuela might claim divert attention away from a broader malandro identity that actually 
unites each of these competing groups in their defiance of debilitating conditions, but 
simultaneously sets them against each other through the exchange of violence. In this chapter I 
show how different meanings are generated from different interactions; interactions with the 
                                                          
1 Network theory uses the term neighbours to refer to nodes, or actors, whom are connected.  
2 Of whom just 3 currently self-identified as malandros, but 2 prisoners, 3 mala conductas and both ex-
malandros had at one point engaged in el malandreo. 
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community lift malandros above their surroundings, as elite protectors of the barrio. 
Interactions with other malandros generate shared meanings about the violent other and 
legitimise violence against this other. I argue that the most pressing interactions that define each 
gang group are their culebras, referring both to the vendetta-type conflict itself as well as to the 
people or groups with whom the conflict exists.  
7.2.1 Internal structure 
Organisationally speaking, the malandros I observed in Caracas were quite different from those 
in Cumaná, but only the prison gang had an explicit top-down hierarchy. In Cumaná, two distinct 
gangs ‘Carro Azul’ and ‘Carro Paisa/El Tren’3 are said to rule the city, evoking the classic picture 
of hierarchically organised gangs. It is not clear whether this reflects an actual top-down 
structure. Felson (2006) draws attention to mimicry at the core of gang myths and stereotypes. 
He notes that gangs often take on the name of better-known gangs, to foster a ferocious image. 
In the end this is a self-protection strategy that prevents other gangs from ‘messing’ with them. 
It appears that in Cumaná too, individual gangs are not bound necessarily by authority or 
monetary structures, but more by a symbolic allegiance that underlines their ferocity. They are 
‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991) that are not based on everyday face-to-face 
interactions, but give the gang more clout. Both Carro Azul and Paisa have their origin in prison, 
where a strict separation is observed. When people enter prison they are put in the pavilion that 
corresponds with their affiliation. People that are not affiliated with either band are usually left 
to endure their time in peace, though they will certainly pick up relationships, tales and tricks 
that they take away for their lives outside. As people from different barrios ‘graduate’ from 
prison – they take these links and even identities with them, back to the barrio. Different sectors 
within the city of Cumaná appear to have signed up to one or other band this way.  
                                                          
3 Apart from these names of overarching gang groups in Cumaná, all other names are anonymised so that 
they cannot be linked to actual groups or individuals within them.    
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Picture 7-1 Prison ward Carro Paisa (Cumaná, 2012) 
 
 
I visited a prison ward ruled by Carro Paisa (see Picture 7-1). It housed around 30 prisoners in 
just a couple of dorms, surrounded by a courtyard with an inflatable pool. The leader (‘pran’) on 
the ward itself was the one authorising my entrance, not the official prison guards. Unlike the 
gangs I met on the streets, there was a clear authority structure. He proudly told me he was the 
only one allowed to eat with a knife and fork. To demonstrate his power, he threw a ‘pan de 
jamon’, a savoury stuffed bread that is a typical Venezuelan Christmas delicacy I had brought in, 
onto the ground, upon which prisoners fell to the floor and scrambled for pieces like a pack of 
wolves.  
 
The gang I met on the streets of Cumaná convened late afternoon in a group of around six to 
ten men in a local square, or Angelo’s (37) house nearby. They had officially taken a less violent 
path; as part of a pacification project they had been offered jobs in return for putting down their 
arms. As I sat with them one Friday night, it was clear that they were still involved in selling drugs, 
and as the night went by, they proudly showed me their guns. Wives and children assembled 
with us as transactions occurred. The conflicts they put to rest were those within the barrio, 
generating a fragile peace. The culebras outside the barrio remained, as did the necessity for 
keeping their guns. They had not sided with either faction of Carro Azul, or Paisa, yet kept their 
own name ‘Los Lobos’.  
 
The gangs I observed in Caracas did not have such distinct names, they identified with the street 
or sector in which they sold drugs and that were associated with their reputation and culebras.  
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Picture 7-2 Surrounds of Calle Real (Caracas, 2012) 
 
 
The gang of Calle Real had just 2 permanent members, Mauro (18) and Azul (26). Azul moved 
around on a Zimmer frame after having been shot a few years back. He cut up drugs inside whilst 
Mauro kept an eye on the street. Mauro’s dad lived on the street, but he only stayed there on 
from Thursday to Sunday and went away during the week, ‘to avoid trouble’. At various points, 
mostly late afternoon and on weekends, up to ten others would join, congregating on Azul’s 
mother’s porch. This included people that did not engage in criminal activity, as well as people 
that said they committed robberies and kidnappings, often ‘freelancing’ next to more formal, 
but irregular, jobs. Ramos (34) now lived quite a few miles away, and associated with a different 
group there, but still had family on Calle Real and frequented regularly4.  
 
The gang of Calle Bolivar assembled in an alleyway (see Picture 7-3) a few sectors up from Calle 
Real. It was comprised of three drug sellers. Manuel (26) was their leader by seniority, though 
he vehemently denied any official leadership. Two associates had been killed on the street just 
a few months earlier, for ‘personal problems’. Manuel did not want to talk about what happened 
and had relocated to an apartment block in a satellite city, in an effort to avoid these problems, 
returning frequently to oversee drug sales. He took pride in explaining to me that his rule was a 
proper democracy, the three members had equal rights to sales and incomes. Everyone sold 
what they could and took their own profits home. He saw himself as mere facilitator in a spot 
that had always been a drug spot, just outside his family home. He retired from robberies when 
the old occupants vacated the spot.  
                                                          
4 This was the only group which I was able to stay in touch with after my main fieldwork period. Although 
they did not appear to have many issues at the time, Ramos has since been killed by a culebra and both 
Azul and Mauro were in prison around a year after fieldwork. 
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As on Calle Real and with Los Lobos, there appears to be some sort of specialisation in terms of 
criminal activities, but this is based more on personal preference than a clear division of labour 
within the gang.  
Picture 7-3 Calle Bolivar (Caracas, 2012) 
 
 
Although many of the boys I observed had killed and lived from illegal activity, group boundaries 
are blurry. Many boys show up irregularly, making an ‘extra buck’ after their daytime jobs.  They 
identified with the sector they congregated in, but did not use markers, tattoos etc. to safeguard 
this identity. Many did not even live there anymore, at least not all the time, as was the case 
with Mauro, Manuel and Ramos. These sectors do carry a reputation, they are entangled in 
reciprocal conflict (culebras) with other sectors in the same barrio. Nevertheless, many people, 
like Ramos, who associated with two groups, identified more with the general figure of el 
malandro.  
 
My observations suggest that these groups are not necessarily internally cohesive, as Pablo’s 
(17) case demonstrated in Chapter 6. He did not trust many of the other people in his gang group, 
which convened in a different sector of Catia. I wandered around there, but interviewed him in 
his house and did not talk to any of the other members. In all, these groups were not 
hierarchically organised, exclusive, or clearly delineated units. Each of the observed networks 
involved a complex tangle of relationships, centred around a street corner, square or house, 
from where drugs were sold and people congregated in variable numbers. People of all ages and 
constellations would join and share an evening beer. This always included people that did not 
get involved in illegal activities, even police officers, as was the case on calle Real, where Hector 
(26), Azul’s twin brother joined in too. 
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7.2.2 Relationships to others – community and other gang groups 
Malandros thus have plenty of relationships outside of the group that they most obviously 
associate with. They are not just malandros, but brothers, lovers, sons, baseball fanatics, 
neighbours and fathers.  
 
All boys had longstanding contacts, often family members, within the sector they associated in, 
allowing them to find out quickly if any trouble is stirring. Nevertheless, Antonio (45), an ex-
malandro, took time and effort in berating these ‘boys of today’, looking back melancholically 
over his own glory days in the 90s. When he was in business he would listen to survivors, and 
his gang would invest in the community. His group had built the basketball court on the street 
and now it was just all left to waste. I did observe these boys in their community shepherd role 
– carrying shopping bags for the elderly, reprimanding children, but their relationship with the 
community seemed indeed fragile. Many people quickly walked passed, uttering a disapproving 
‘hola’, hello. Chapter 5 explored the tenuous symbiosis between malandros and their 
communities. Residents commonly turn a blind eye to what their neighbours’ sons get up to. 
Many tolerate rather than engage with them, salute them but do not talk to them. It is better to 
keep them at arms’ length than cause problems or expose the neighbourhood to other 
malandros.  
 
The gangs are structured into higher order patterns of illicit networks by violence (the culebras) 
and markets for drugs and stolen goods. These structures evolve but remain relatively stable as 
individuals come and go, and even the crimes they commit are adapted to what is most 
profitable and least risky at a particular point in time. Manuel for instance had learned from the 
guy before where to obtain drugs, and which sectors best to avoid.  
 
All groups had minor drug businesses, supplying the local area. Manuel and Ramos took me to 
visit the sites where they buy their drugs, large quantities are transacted and rifles more openly 
carried. One was an apartment in one of the big housing blocks in the west, another a semi-
abandoned site in between two sectors of a barrio. Even in these places, people hung around 
that were labelled ‘sano’, decent, they had nothing to do with any illicit activities and were 
welcomed, like me, as long as they did not cause problems.  
 
All boys have malandro friends across barrio boundaries. Manuel made friends with a malandro 
from across the hill that had stolen his motorbike. As he negotiated getting the bike back, he 
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realised this connection was advantageous to him and they had remained friends for years. 
Ramos also maintained contacts in his new sector. Relationships are formed through associates, 
encounters, and importantly, prison. These connections allow for the flow and diffusion of ideas, 
expectations and behaviours.  
 
Malandros are indeed structurally equivalent, they occupy similar positions without a clear 
hierarchy, facilitating the spread of behaviour (Fagan et al., 2007). These groups can be seen as 
Zaluar (2001) conceived them in Brazil, as ‘horizontal reciprocity networks’ of structurally 
equivalent youth between whom drugs, but also violence and stories about this violence, are 
exchanged. These groups are not bound by an overarching criminal organisation that groups all 
the gangs of a barrio. Apart from prison, profits are not collected centrally or for group purposes, 
but rather are used for personal gain. They are collections of individuals enacting the unwritten 
rules of el malandreo and ‘la calle’, the street.  
The groups with whom violence (usually in the form of culebras) is exchanged are the more 
pressing relationships for these malandros. They had few obligations tying them up into the illicit 
drug structure, but the culebras restrict their mobility and entangle them in cycles of reciprocal 
violence, as we will explore in more detail below. All of these boys said that getting them off the 
streets would imply resolving their culebras. Many felt trapped, dependent on the barrio, or 
more accurately (given not everyone in the barrio supports them and their relationships span 
across barrios), their networks, for safety. When I took public transport with Ramos, he was 
continuously looking over his shoulder, reassuringly touching the gun under his belt. Manuel 
roamed free through the main roads of his barrio on his motorbike, but would not dream of 
going into adjoining alleyways.  
 
Focussing on el malandreo as an institution allows for incorporating each of these different 
shapes and forms as local expressions of more general scripts. It absolves us from looking for 
explanatory potential in single group structures, but urges us to look for it in the way they are 
intertwined. The following sections will look, first, at the construction of masculine identities in 
the barrio and, second, the construction of shared meanings and rules in interaction between 
malandros. Where inequalities go some way in explaining the meaning of el malandreo to boys 
in the barrio, we need to look at violent interactions to understand violence between them. It 
will be argued that this violence has further legitimised it as a fully-fledged street institution.  
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7.3 Cops and robbers; the making of men in the barrio 
Picture 7-4 Mural painting in Cumaná (source: Facebook) 
 
In the end, going to school here is about dying in silence 
 El Carro Azul  
 
This section engages with theories that look at the construction of masculine identities. I have 
already touched upon these perspectives in Chapter 5 (p.129), showing that people in the barrio 
have little access to formal opportunities in their networks, which also displayed some marked 
gender roles. Although women often rule the household, security provision (financial as well as 
physical) is still a male task. A man has to ‘have balls’, pay the bills, and protect the family. Men 
thus carry heavy responsibility in the informal and insecure surroundings of the barrio.  
 
Vigil (1988) explores in detail the identity processes that influence joining a gang during 
adolescence. He calls it a time that ‘involves maximizing the distance between feared (what a 
person would not like to be) and real (what a person believes he is) identities and minimizing 
the gap between ideal (what a person would like to be) and real selves’ (p.425). Vigil argues that 
the masculine, tough gang provides distancing from the feminine, weak self.  
 
These issues are reflected in my observations. Many young people want to be ‘special’, ‘to be 
someone’. That someone was often opposed to what they grew up in, different from the 
blandness and desolation of the barrio and many of its residents (their feared identities). They 
want to get ahead, like Hector (26), Azul’s twin brother, himself a policeman. They had already 
lost their older brother to violence a decade ago. Overlooking the dirty, rubbish-lined Calle Real, 
where they spent the latter part of their young adult lives, I asked him why he had not started 
selling drugs like his brother: 
I used the people in the street as a mirror – I decided I didn’t want to be that way. I 
experimented with drugs too when I was younger, but I knew that if I continued that 
way I would end up dead, or in prison. I wanted to advance, have a better life, be an 
important person, have a family. 
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Semi-structured interview, Hector (policeman), Catia  
Many men almost desperately wanted me to acknowledge how special they were, how different 
they were from their environments, convincing themselves thereof and opposing their real 
identities to the feared identity of not being anyone, ‘just one of the million’. A 42-year-old 
malandro in Cumaná, who described himself as a ‘fighter not a pistolero’, eagerly started telling 
me his life story. He was under the stubborn impression I had come to write a book about his 
life. Wiping cocaine off his nose, he told me:  
Delinquency isn’t what people make it. There are many people here who just stay in 
their houses, they don’t rob, don’t do nothing, right? But who’s going to write a book 
about their lives huh? 
Unstructured interview, malandro, Cumaná  
Barrio men, often emasculated through circumstance and an abundance of female role models 
(feared identity), thus resort to hyper-masculine tough identities: policeman, army officer or 
malandro. Identities that clearly reflect their masculinity. Additional kudos comes with carrying 
a gun. Young men (and women) are attracted to those professions and identities that instil them 
with power over life, and ultimately, respect.  
 
On a more practical level illegal activities provide them with ‘easy’ money and a relatively good 
life – they can dress well, buy motorbikes, attend baseball games, party in trendy discothèques, 
consume weed (many do not touch the hard drugs they sell, or have a more leisurely habit) and, 
they get the attractive girls. A former malandro was told upon entering prison the first time;  
First time hey? Listen up, do you like the ladies? The only good thing, [about el 
malandreo] the only good thing, is that you’ll have women fighting over you. 
Unstructured interview, ex-malandro, Catia 
Manuel’s girlfriend asked why she chooses to be with him says it this way;  
At least for me, what can I say… respect? That they respect him. Everyone just has an 
incredible respect for Manuel. (…) I like feeling important, to put it crudely. (…) Being 
with any regular guy, I’d just feel normal. 
Unstructured interview, female resident, Catia  
Chapter 6 showed that looking for individual motivations is difficult when it comes to violence, 
they may never adequately explain why people join gangs either. Many malandros do not fit the 
stereotype of poor and deprived offenders. Many of them have been to school, unlike many 
poor. They had other opportunities too. Carlos repeats what I heard from several boys when I 
asked him whether it was a lack of jobs that had gotten him involved: 
A lack of jobs, no. I knew how to work, I knew. But laziness… It was just easy.  
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Semi-structured interview, Carlos (prisoner), Cumaná 
Young boys join gangs partly because they are there and they wind up experimenting with its 
offerings, as new social and sexual identities are contemplated in adolescence. In the absence 
of more formal institutions and masculine role models, street institutions do the socialisation. 
Antonio (45) puts it quite well: 
My mum was always telling me, ‘don’t go down this street, just don’t. Play here, but 
not there’. So I became really curious. It’s curiosity. As a boy of 13, 12... I wanted to 
know, so I went and saw them. Smoking. One time I heard a gunshot. One of the big 
boys took out a gun. Boom. He shot it in the air. I stood there, looking at the pistol. The 
guy had fame, he had money, you know… He’s dead today… I was curious about the 
street, but never about doing anything like that… Never. But as you’re in the street, in 
a particular spot, you think the street belongs to you. And you need to make sure the 
street is respected. Otherwise you shouldn’t be there. Those higher up come and tell 
you – ‘what are you doing here? This is a bad life. The police come here and shoot you, 
because they’ll think you’re a malandro. It’s better you leave’… If you insist and stay 
there, well… They’ve told you. Now you need to assume your responsibility… After a 
while you start doing everything on the street – breakfast, lunch, dinner. You get the 
money somewhere … Until you start doing things that don’t, eh… Robberies… You get 
some nice shoes, you dress well… 
Semi-structured interview, Antonio (ex-malandro), Catia  
Young men growing up in the barrio today are indiscriminately confronted with an easy 
approach to money, status and relative security. Death lurks behind the corner either way.  
Studies that look at individual motivations for young people joining gangs are then as relevant 
as looking at how and why people take up smoking, or football. Just as only a few become 
addicted smokers, or international football players, only a small number of young boys in the 
barrio end up identifying with el malandreo. Mario (38) recalls how malandros were just there, 
like many boys that never got involved, he hung out with them on the street corner: 
Yes I hung out with them but I never had a gun or anything. I got back from work and 
started drinking with them, it’s like, how to explain… it’s a street corner where, there’s 
a bakery, the school is there, there’s a street, you see…  
Semi-structured interview, Mario, Catia  
Ultimately, starting out with a gang is, as Antonio says: 
It’s a fashion. Just like lighting a cigarette, or having a beer (…) It’s in the atmosphere.  
Semi-structured interview, Antonio (ex-malandro), Catia 
 
What is much more puzzling is how these young boys get caught in its nets, and why and how 
they start killing others, with detrimental effects on their own lives. Chapter 6 argued that a life 
of violence may generate more deprivation than it solves. Malandros can often feel trapped, 
wanting to escape their culebras, but once they have engaged in them it becomes difficult to do 
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so. Many of them are prisoners of fear, in networks where death and killing are indeed the norm 
rather than the exception. Death to them is routine.  
[Respondent draws a hypothetical line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ on my notebook] 
Those that are here [on the ‘good’ side] all are alive. All of them, Raul, Jose, Carlos, Ali. 
My generation, all of them have wives, kids. When I moved from here [good side] to 
there [bad side], to another ‘ambiente’ (...) I’m the lone survivor. The others, no. All of 
them are dead! (…) They perished in a war. Dead. It’s a war. Of those that survived, of 
all the ones I knew, enemies as well as allies, only about 10 remain. 
Unstructured interview, ex-malandro, Catia  
Similarly, Los Lobos in Cumaná, took me through the photographs of their past, kept alive in a 
drawer with a 9mm gun. They pointed out the dead amongst the smiling faces, virile young men, 
often posing with children, working out, or boasting in groups of 10 to 15 peers. Most of them, 
too, had died ‘in combat’.  
 
It is relatively easy to understand that el malandreo offers them respect and existential meaning, 
this does not necessarily explain why they use so much violence. In the next section we will 
explore the rules and meanings of el malandreo, suggesting violence itself is a major factor in 
the continued attractions of el malandreo. Once young boys engage in a culebra, as I will explore 
below, it becomes difficult to find formal jobs and they find protection in the gang network. El 
malandreo maybe more than anything gives people control over their life, they believe that, as 
long as they follow the rules described below, they should be fine. Other men have less control 
– if they do not explicitly choose to be part of the game, they may get drawn in by chance, shot 
by stray bullets or mistaken identities. Masculinities are constructed in an ecology of danger.     
 
These findings resonate with many of the issues identified by researchers in a myriad of other 
countries (see Chapter 2). El malandreo competes with other informal and more conventional 
identities in Venezuela’s barrios for young people’s souls; providing belonging, respect and 
livelihood. Where achieving masculine status and respect may be reasons for joining a gang, 
they do not necessarily explain the violence these people use. To understand why malandros 
are so particularly violent, we need to look at the beliefs and values el malandreo portrays, and 
how these influence behaviour.  
7.4 Myths and realities of el malandreo 
The previous section showed that el malandreo offers individuals livelihood and respect. 
Chapter 5 already explored how, through the threat of violence, it also provides informal social 
control in the barrio, particularly against malandros from other barrios. To fully understand its 
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violence we need to look at the rules it proscribes for people that identify with it, and how these 
are filled in in interaction. This section shows that repeated interactions have generated shared 
meanings, ‘myths’ about callous, heavily armed malandros that kill for fun rather than reason, 
as well as a set of rules that condemns this type of gratuitous violence. These myths are assigned 
to other gangs, making violence against them both legitimate and immediately necessary. The 
culebra is driven by the contagion of fear and gun behaviours more than any infraction of the 
rules. Each killing generates new feuds, stringing ever more people together in a deadly cast. 
This violence itself continuously reinforces an imaginary of random violence and the moral 
superiority of the malandro, whom claims to protect the barrio from it. In all, el malandreo is a 
complex governance structure. An end to its violence will necessarily need to involve dealing 
with these structures, perhaps even co-opting them in a movement for change.  
7.4.1 Imaginaries of the streets; the code and characters of el malandreo 
Menor Petare es una prisión 
Donde el malandreo es... Una Religión 
  
Boy Petare is a prison 
Where el malandreo is…  A religion 
 
Guerrilla Seca. 
Picture 7-5 Los Santos Malandros (Caracas, 2012) 
  
 
Malandros today are an inherent part of the contradictions of life in the barrio, as revered as 
they are despised. They are culturally embedded to the extent that they have their own 
perceived language, music, saints, YouTube series, dress style5 and alleged facial features – ‘cara 
                                                          
5 I certainly did not acquire a sixth sense for picking out malandros, but many others seemed to be able 
to do so. Malandros have the money to dress better than others, have the newest sneakers etc.   
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de malandro’6 (malandro face). The ‘santos malandros’, malandro saints (see Picture 7-5), are 
probably the most prevailing expression of this rich cultural heritage. They are invariably 
pictured with guns and other vices such as marihuana or alcohol. They were the original 
malandros, protectors of the barrio in true ‘Robin Hood’ style (Ferrándiz, 2004). Legend goes 
that they stole from the rich to give to the poor. Although the malandros I spoke to did not have 
any of these images and no longer claim to share their proceeds with the barrio, they continue 
to echo its ideals – protectors of the barrio and the working-class. Today, the barrio needs to be 
protected from within, from crazy kids (‘Chiguires’, see below) that threaten it with their 
indiscriminate violence. 
 
7.4.1.1 An imaginary of random violence 
Ustedes dicen que nosotros incitamos a la violencia  
Y los violentos no somos nosotros, violenta es la calle 
 
You say that we incite violence 
We’re not the violent ones, the street is the violent one 
 
El Prieto.  
 
Current-day malandreo revolves around an imaginary of random violence, an imaginary that is 
reproduced by new media like Youtube, Facebook and the lyrics of Gangsta Rap, and finds a 
quick following in the dense reciprocity networks of el malandreo. I call it an imaginary because 
it is questionable that these media and lyrics recount the everyday reality of the barrio. They 
depict the barrio as a place where death and violence are the day’s daily bread. This is a partial 
reality that I personally never saw or experienced first-hand. It is indeed more real for malandros 
whom are entangled in chains of reciprocal violence, but still not daily, nor entirely random. As 
in other contexts, malandros play on this imaginary to put on a front of toughness, to generate 
fear and fend off danger from other gangs (Felson, 2006; Howell, 2007). Part of gang life is 
posturing, projecting a tough identity to prevent being killed. Facebook is a where gangs display 
their guns (see Picture 7-6) as well as confronting pictures of those killed (not shown here). This 
is a major boasting and deterrence strategy that shapes expectations and feeds the imaginary 
of random violence.  
                                                          
6 I am not suggesting malandros have different facial features. One of the boys I interviewed in hospital 
had been accidentally stabbed in his cheek whilst playing games with his friend. He cried because he was 
extremely worried his ‘cara de malandro’ would effectively scar him for life. 
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Picture 7-6 Guns displayed on Facebook 
 
 
Influenced by this imaginary, malandros always thought others were more ferocious than them. 
In Cumaná malandros believe their counterparts in the capital are much more violent than them.  
What is the difference between the violence here [in Cumaná] and in Caracas?  There 
they don’t respect you, they’re pure criminals out there. They kill you for a pair of shoes. 
Here, they still respect you. (…) There they kill police officers, they don’t do that here. 
It’s much larger, bigger out there, Cumaná is still small. [inaudible] The thing is that 
here, the government [i.e. police] also respects delinquents. In Caracas the government 
come and kill you. Pa pa pa. 
Group interview, Los Lobos, Cumaná  
In Caracas, other sectors (e.g. El Valle, Petare) are where the real violence is. Other gangs are ‘el 
mas malo’, worse than them. A malandro at a drug transaction site repeats what they told me 
over and over: 
Children of 13 are killing people. You say ‘Oi, whats wrong with you?’ they kill you. For 
a bad look, they kill you. So many things. Delinquency is very advanced.  
Unstructured interview, malandro, Catia  
Whereas these stories paint a picture of more or less random violence, the rules of el malandreo 
explicitly condemn this type of violence. The malandro protects the barrio from indiscriminate 
violence through his ‘justified’ violence. There is an important contradiction here that is resolved 
through projecting these types of behaviours onto others, immediately justifying violence 
against them. The pictures on Facebook reflect these justifications, those killed were ‘sapos’ 
(snitches, see below). The arms are needed to deal with violent street realities.  
 
Violence is part and parcel of el malandreo, though it is bound by rules. A true malandro does 
not kill innocent people. Violence is reserved for people that deserve it one way or another. 
People that have ‘comido la luz’, literally ‘eaten their light’. This refers to traffic lights, they have 
skipped a red light, and can be called to justice. People that deserve respect, such as good 
students, caring mothers, hardworking fathers, the elderly, should be left alone. Manuel makes 
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a distinction between the death of his brother and that of his friend Pablito. Pablito was a good 
boy, and those that killed him ‘deserved’ to die too. 
It hurt me too, but that of Pablito hurt me more, because that of my brother was you 
know, I knew it would happen one day or another because he always looked for 
problems, and when you know this mentally… at least when that day comes it hurts, 
but I knew he was going to die sooner or later. Pablito on the other hand… Pablito was 
a boy who didn’t drink, didn’t smoke. He went to university, worked for university... 
didn’t swear, a very good boy, easy… what’s more he always advised me, not to get 
involved in problems 
Going back to your brother, did you avenge his death? 
No. That of Pablito, yes I did.  
Semi-structured interview, Manuel (malandro), Catia  
Random and indiscriminate violence is not appreciated. It endangers the gang group by raking 
up problems, and the profession as a whole by eroding sympathy within the barrio. Vigil (2006) 
sees crazy people (‘locos’) in the gang as essential for demonstrating toughness. In Venezuela 
these locos are a curse more than a blessing. They do set the standard, but it is a dishonourable 
standard projected onto others. Stories abound of the evil other, people killing for a ‘look’, ‘a 
pair of shoes’, or even for ‘fun’. These stories do have some basis in particular real events, but 
through urban legend and Gangsta Rap, these events accrue mythical proportions that shape 
malandros’ cognitions, and ultimately their behaviour. The hierarchy of el malandreo projects 
these behaviours on crazy kids that are not worthy of the name malandro.  
7.4.1.2 The hierarchy of el malandreo 
Central to the imaginary of el malandreo is a code of behaviour that is inherently linked to a 
status hierarchy as shown in Figure 7-1.  
Figure 7-1. The internal hierarchy of el Malandreo  
 
 
El Capo 
El Pran
El Hampa (seria) / 
El malandro (serio) / 
Ladron
Chiguire/ Batanero/ Cocoseco
Sapo / Bruja
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It is a loose hierarchy, not based on actual organisational structures, but the accumulation of 
respect. ‘El Capo’ is the ‘invisible delinquent’ (Bolívar et al., 2012), the person that controls the 
drug trade and has connections with law enforcement. In Cumaná he had two visible faces, Cheo 
Proyectil7 and Manuel Lanza; leaders of Carro Azul and Carro Paisa/El Tren, opposing groups that 
are said to rule the streets8. In Caracas, it was more difficult to put a face on the top of the 
hierarchy, the city isn’t ruled by just a few well-known gangs. Nevertheless, malandros told 
stories of other barrios where these people ruled indeed. It is difficult to say whether these 
stories were part of the imaginary whereby other gangs are seen as el mas malo. It is certain 
that the malandros I spoke to were not tied to a capo, but they spoke respectfully of these 
figures. 
 
The ‘pran’ is an equivalent figure, but he rules from prison. He controls a pavilion (a section of 
the prison), and collects a ‘causa’, a weekly protection payment of around 50 bolivars from all 
prisoners on his ward, that allows him to buy guns, drugs, and also prison guards. Prans are also 
frequently linked to illegal activities on the outside, such as kidnapping. These people have made 
it within el malandreo, they are said to set the rules. A Facebook message from a self-proclaimed 
pran that was eagerly reproduced by a malandro reflects a number of important rules: 
Street buddies… This is the serious underworld speaking from prison. This is for those 
minors who are out there robbing motorbikes. I speak clearly and in name of the people. 
Leave your ‘chiguireo’ because if you end up in prison for motorcycle robbery, you’re 
looking at a minimum of 50 shots in the face… remember that us serious people we get 
around by motorbike too, just like family fathers who’re out there making a living on 
their motorbikes… Let it be clear yeah… If you’re looking for money do it were it is to 
be found, not robbing the same people that see us grow up in the barrio and are 
basically the same as us, looking for money to survive… Spread the word until it reaches 
the pigeons that go around robbing motorbikes… Yours truly, the pran of Yare I. 
Facebook post, shared through account of one of my contacts on Calle Real  
Prison is where malandros find their fate if they have made too much trouble on the streets. The 
prospect of ending up in prison establishes social control over malandros, ironically not through 
the application of formal social control (imprisonment) as such, but through the much more 
frightening rules of el malandreo. A member of Los Lobos says: 
They’ll pay for everything. They [in prison] know everything. What happens here is that 
they behave badly on the streets, but they don’t know one day they’ll be imprisoned 
and that’ll be it… 
Group interview, Los Lobos, Cumaná  
                                                          
7 I have subsequently learned that he was killed soon after I finished my fieldwork. 
8 Although it is doubtful there is an actual top-down hierarchy, as explained in 7.2 
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Picture 7-7 Mural painting of a malandro (Source: Facebook) 
  
* ‘P.H.S. (Pura Hampa Seria) – I don’t believe in anyone – Gossips, frogs and witches need not apply’ 
 
The vast middle of this hierarchy is made up of delinquents of various assignations, commonly 
distinguished by their type of activity. El hampa, the underworld, refers to illegal activity more 
than a particular connection to the barrio, which is the malandro’s habitat. El hampa engages 
more in ‘outdoor’ activities; he robs (the rich, of course). Some referred to these people as 
‘ladrones’, robbers, although this word sometimes has a negative connotation too. The boys on 
Calle Real put it this way when I asked them what it meant to be a malandro: 
Mauro: Not letting yourself be fucked with. Selling drugs. Killing, fucking around. 
Hanging around the street.   
Ramos: Ladrones rob to get money, they’re quieter. Malandros belong to the barrio, 
they drink, joke around.  
Group interview, Calle Real, Catia  
In all, there is no clear status difference between el hampa, malandros and ladrones, although 
there is more organisation and connections instilled in the word hampa. They associate in 
structurally equivalent, but opposing groups of youth that all identify with el malandreo. 
Seemingly oblivious to the shared identity that ties them together, they are entangled in a 
reciprocal conflict network sustained by myths and culebras.  
 
‘Serio’, serious, is a commonly used adjective, used to illustrate that someone means business. 
It distinguishes the in-group within this layer of equivalent groups, and sets it apart from 
‘chiguires’ that mess things up for the serious malandro. ‘Chiguires’ (the Venezuelan word for 
the capybara - the world’s largest rodent), or ‘cocosecos’, empty headed people (literally ‘dry 
coconuts’), are looked down upon. They are inexperienced crazy kids that are often seen to take 
too many drugs and kill for the sake of it. ‘Bataneros’ (no translation) are equally despicable, 
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they rob their own people. They are ‘sin verguenza’, have no morals. They are a danger for the 
gang, and the community. The terms ‘sapo’, frog, ‘paja’, snitch, and ‘bruja’, witch, are reserved 
for the lowest of the low; people that betray their friends, e.g. by talking to the police.  
 
The distinction between the middle and bottom layers is important, but ambiguous. Malandros 
project bottom behaviours onto others that themselves identify as malandros too. None of the 
people I spoke to admitted to having killed for a pair of shoes, or enjoying violence, they project 
this behaviour onto chiguires. They kill for ‘valid’ reasons, as the code proscribes. Each malandro 
thinks the same, justifying their own violence. We will see in the next section that the dynamics 
of the culebra facilitate these processes, in the exchange of violence these myths acquire real 
dimensions. They generate an ecology of danger where death is routine and safety is found in 
the in-group.  
 
In all, God remains the ultimate judge in the barrio. Most malandros believe in God, and that 
they are doing right by him. This may be a way of coping with the extreme existential insecurity 
they face on a daily basis. They do not, in their own minds, disobey his rule of ‘Thou shalt not 
kill’. Rather, they extend it with a footnote, an exception, for their enemies, the evil other. True 
malandros only kill ‘bad’ people. Their ‘good’ violence is always reactionary – self-defence, it 
was him or me, or a proportionate response to an infraction of unwritten rules. This rather 
perversely makes them God’s representatives on earth, protectors of the barrio. In absence of 
formal social control, the malandro is like an elite force. The rules of el malandreo are above, 
and more urgent, than the law. They are enforced by el malandreo itself, on the streets and in 
prison.  
El hampa, more than the government [i.e. police]… El hampa is not braindead when it 
comes to killing people, when they kill someone here it’s because he did something, 
went around blaming, killing people and stuff (…) It doesn’t fuck about (…) 
Group interview, Calle Bolivar, Catia  
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7.4.2 The dynamics of ‘la culebra’; the contagion of fear and retaliatory gun violence  
Gang members do not kill because they are poor, black, or 
young or live in a socially disadvantaged neighborhood. 
They kill because they live in a structured set of social 
relations in which violence works its way through a series 
of connected individuals. 
(Papachristos, 2009, p.75) 
 
Culebras have a wide range of obvious causes, most frequently a public challenge to masculine 
identity, a display of disrespect. ‘A monster’, as someone described it, ‘with a thousand heads – 
drugs, women, music, money, alcohol, movies…’. This instance of disrespect can be either a 
personal or a group insult. It is difficult to say when malandros act individually or in the name of 
their sector. As Bolivar (2012) showed in el Guarataro, many culebras have acquired a territorial 
dimension, they are tied to sectors in which different gang groups convene. Nevertheless, that 
this conflict, whether between sectors or individual malandros, takes a lethal form in Venezuela 
has more to do with the endogenous dynamics of violence itself, than disempowering social 
structures or evermore gratuitous offenders. It is the embedding in chains of lethal violence, 
more than disrespect or infractions of the code that make it so deadly. 
 
It is difficult to appreciate where a particular culebra starts or ends. Gang groups and individual 
malandros are often entangled in culebras that go back months or even years; one killing 
generated a culebra, which was resolved by another killing, which generated more culebras etc. 
They never end, as a malandro on Calle Real says: 
When they disrespect you it’s final, you have to… till the end. Time is both your friend 
and your worst enemy. The culebra sticks around. The people you kill have family. It 
takes a generation and still… these things don’t pass, they may pass [temporarily] but 
more like clouds above your head, the culebra stays around. 
Unstructured interview, malandro, Catia  
He touches on the multiplier effect of a culebra, acting upon a culebra generates a string of new 
culebras, ‘dolientes’ (mourners) as they are called.  This refers to people that are affected by a 
certain death, and instant candidates to avenge this death. Shooting someone exposes a whole 
line of potential enemies. Los lobos looked back on the period before they had to put down their 
arms:  
Respondent 1: And so it’s not that this guy didn’t want to pay, he wanted to kill a guy 
that was from another gang, but it was already on. They caught him, killed him and 
there it took off like a rocket. Cumaná exploded haha…  
How long ago?  
This is like 4 years ago, how long ago did he die? Respondent 2: Like 4, 5 years ago?  
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So that’s the cause of so many homicides?  
R1: Yep, from there on we started pa pa pa pa killing people, killing everywhere. R2: A 
massive war, many people with a whole lot of people more. R1: …After that they killed 
the brother of another mate, yet another boy, and more ‘dolientes’... And that was that, 
2, 3 deaths a day. 4 even.   
Group interview, prison, Cumaná  
This does indeed seem to correspond with a spike in homicide rates in Cumaná in 2007-2008, 
around 4-5 years before fieldwork (see Figure 4-3 on p.85). A homicide in one sector thus often 
triggers a series of revenge acts in adjoining sectors. This area becomes ‘candela’, scorching. In 
what follows I explore how violence multiplies through the contagion of fear and gun behaviours, 
generating an ‘ecology of danger’ (Fagan et al., 2007) in which violence becomes a basic survival 
mechanism. 
7.4.2.1 The contagion of fear and activation of network boundaries 
These dolientes are of prime concern to malandros, they are an ever-present threat. A malandro 
has to be ‘activo’, ‘pendiente’, proactive and ready, always on guard. Mateo (29) has just been 
injured in a shooting that killed his cousin. He was not the instigator on this occasion, but he 
knows the people that killed his cousin will be expecting him to retaliate. He puts it this way:  
I’m not going to feel at ease, feel comfortable until I see them all dead. Why? Because 
Caracas isn’t big (…) Caracas is small (…) everyone knows everyone. I’ll live with the fear 
that I’ll be selling my gear and run into one or other of them, because I know what can 
happen (…) It has happened before, I ran into these types, and they saluted me out of 
fear, they don’t usually, in the center they salute because if I’m carrying anything at 
that time, they know (…) I shouldn’t say the words… 
Semi-structured interview, Mateo (ex-malandro), Catia  
 
Amongst this fear, malandros find safety in their network. A few streets or sectors where 
everyone is known, and life (like death) is controllable, become the only place to hide.   
 
This is also where group processes start to work. First of all, by activating the network. The battle 
cry when culebras are aroused is ‘activense’, literally ‘activate’. Los Lobos quickly find out when 
their culebras are in the area: 
R1: [the culebras] are out there, on the streets … R2: Out there. It’s cat and mouse you 
know. R1: Robin (sic.) and Jerry. R2: You can be quiet, but one comes out, look. The 
telephone, he’s here. Buddy, it’s going to take off. You take your gun… boom, boom, 
boom. R1: You may be just standing around and suddenly they call. Your friend says 
look there’s a culebra of yours there. You take a gun and go there… R2: Cause there’s 
plenty of people… R1: By telephone, that’s it. Communication.  
Group interview, Los Lobos, Cumaná  
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Secondly, within the relative safety of this network, stories about the violent other spread 
quickly. The immoral behaviours described above are projected onto the out-group, generating 
expectations of this dangerous other (and ultimately legitimising the use of violence against 
them). Other gangs do not play by the rules. A conversation with Manuel and some others at 
the drug transaction site shows how this type of story-telling, whereby the own group of friends 
is more valiant than others, further restricts them to places that are known:  
You think I’m stupid for going to these sectors right. 
R1: Yes. Manuel: Stupid no, crazy! R1: No, stupid. Stupid, because there are serious 
people like us who don’t get women involved… Manuel: Others are really bad! … R1: 
There are boys, because of drugs they don’t know what they’re doing… Suddenly they’ll 
shoot you in the leg or something. R3: You’re basically playing with your life. 
But you guys play with your lives much more than I do? 
Manuel: The thing is that we know, we know where we are. I’m not going to enter a 
zone I don’t know.  
Group interview, drug exchange, Catia  
The situation on Cumaná’s prison ward, where gang boundaries are strictly enforced, reflects 
these processes even more clearly. Locked up in their separate pavilions, they showed me 
pictures of prisoners (supposedly) in the other ward playing football with a chiguire’s head. They 
told tales of pigs eating the remains of sapos. The lack of contact except through the exchange 
of violence reproduces these myths of the evil other that not only justify, but make reciprocal 
violence immediately necessary. The presence of guns in these cycles of retaliatory violence 
adds a lethal twist that quickly affects expectations and interactions.  
7.4.2.2 Reciprocity and the contagion of gun behaviours   
The malandro is bound by rules but these are continuously rewritten in violent interaction. The 
overarching norm in the culebra is reciprocity. Gabriel (24) says: 
There is respect. I’ll treat you how you treat me. If you don’t respect my family, I won’t 
respect yours. If you don’t respect me, I don’t respect you. If you draw a gun on me, l’ll 
draw two on you, that’s the code of today. 
Semi-structured interview, Gabriel, Catia  
As one person adopts (or is alleged to adopt) a mutation of the code, they redefine the rules for 
the next interaction. A malandro in Cumaná puts it this way: 
You can’t kill someone’s family because you know… You’ll pay with a family member as 
well. (…) inaudible (…) When something like that takes off its very sad… they kill your 
mom, your dad. It’s crazy. 
Unstructured interview, malandro, Cumaná 
Guns change the rules of the game, by introducing a much higher level of threat. Partly under 
influence of the imaginary described above, gangs engage in an arms race. Guns always existed 
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but were often considered cowardly in the past (Bolívar et al., 2012). How and when they 
became more commonly used to resolve culebras, or whether this was a rapidly spreading myth, 
is unclear, but the impact this belief has on future interactions is certain. A generalised 
expectation that guns will be used by the other side condones their pre-emptive use:  
Today you can’t fight anyone like that, with your fists, bats. No. today, these youngsters 
have lots of guts, we have to live with that, always on alert… … Almost every weekend 
they kill someone in the barrio… Last night they killed someone 
Semi-structured interview, Juan (prisoner), Cumaná  
It becomes important for survival to shoot the other first, which may offer instant gratification, 
as a prisoner suggest below. Nevertheless, it reinitiates the process by generating more culebras.   
First you feel happy, one less person who’s going to kill me on the streets. And if he has 
money we take the debt. Pa pa. I killed this dog. Let’s celebrate, smoke a little weed… 
Say you have 5 culebras, you kill one, tomorrow you have 20 culebras… They come 
looking for you… Before you know it, a whole barrio is looking to kill you.  
Group interview, prison, Cumaná  
 
This type of violence ultimately is ‘self-help’ (Black, 1993), social control in the absence of formal 
social control. It becomes a question of him or me, if he does not kill, the other will kill him.  
I was there with him. [Hand on head like a pistol] that’s where they start begging ‘don’t 
kill me please, I have a child, I know where the motorbike is, I’ll get it to you’ [shakes 
his head]  
It’s too late?  
It’s too late… You can’t allow this. If you do, you’re dead. It’s you, or him. It’s too late… 
Too late. 
Unstructured interview, malandro, Catia  
The culebra thus sets up an ecology of danger where malandros need to be continuously activo, 
within a small world of trusted others, and kill before they are killed themselves. This type of 
violence is defined more by previous violence, fear and self-defence than it is by disrespect or 
intrusions of the code. Although it is justified post-fact by this code, they are evil, we are serious 
malandros. Nevertheless, much more than a demand for respect, it is a desire to stay alive.  
When do you use violence? R1: Against the enemy. R2: The enemy. 
But you’re killing people who are equal to you, why? R2: Because they’re culebras. R1: 
Because they’re problems. 
But they’re equals? Enemies. 
They live doing the same? Because if you don’t kill them, they kill you, it’s as simple as 
that. R2: You kill to survive. 
Group interview, prison, Cumaná  
Once one has engaged in a culebra, it is hard to get out. It becomes difficult to get a formal job, 
regular hours expose malandros to their culebras. Further, to be safe on the street, in absence 
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of formal social control, but knowledge of other gangs’ arms, malandros need to buy guns and 
bullets. Formal, regular jobs do not pay enough and put them in more danger. Drugs, robberies 
and kidnappings then necessarily provide the money for arms and offer the additional advantage 
that they can be planned and executed from the relative safety of the barrio. Malandros that 
have engaged in a culebra soon get caught in a vicious cycle of different illegal activities 
sustaining each other from which only few escapes exist; moving away, death, or evangelicalism9.  
 
The experience of Los Lobos in Cumaná shows relieving the culebras does indeed take the 
immediate pressure off, but it does not dissolve the complex governance structure of el 
malandreo. It was the truce between gangs in the barrio that managed to stop the killing 
between the gangs of a particular barrio. The gang members today had legal, but still irregular 
work on construction sites. They preferred this way of making honest money, but guns and drugs 
remain defining aspects of their lives. The meaning of the gang, and particularly their culebras 
with other barrios, remained unaltered. The mere calling of a truce does not solve years of 
posturing and scaremongering between different sectors. The guns are kept, just in case. Further, 
the law of the street has become superior to that of the government. In absence of formal social 
control, malandros still take up the responsibility to deal with defectors.  
But something’s missing right – why does the killing go on? Well because, eh… they 
continue to kill but they kill people for instance that eh ‘se comen la luz’ – jump a red 
light. They pacified right. I know what becomes me now, I’m a rehabilitated person… 
we know that at night the arms come out… this will never change. Before there were 
like 7 murders daily here, today no… a small death every once in a while, you know…  
Group interview, Los Lobos, Cumaná  
This section has shown that the horizontal reciprocity networks of el malandreo are sustained 
by myths and retaliatory violence. The violence generated by the dynamics of the culebra feeds 
back into an imaginary of random violence, continuously reinforcing the moral superiority of 
serious malandros that protect the barrio from this random violence. In this way, violence 
continuously legitimises the governance structures of el malandreo.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Smilde (2005)describes how identifying with the evangelical faith can protect malandros from their 
culebras, religious people should not be harmed.   
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7.5 Conclusion 
The moment the gangs start to consider that their words, 
their ideas, their projects can be respected as much as 
their arms or physical strength, we’ll be making significant 
progress.  
(Peddrazzini and Sanchez 1996, p.31) 
 
In conclusion, the informality of the barrio, the lack of links to the formal economy and state, 
has led to the emergence of an informal hierarchy of delinquency where wealth is obtained 
through illegal activities and status contested through violence. El malandreo is a noun that 
commonly reflects these activities – selling drugs and protecting the barrio, sometimes robbing, 
kidnapping, and often killing. It simultaneously fulfilled needs within the barrio, threatened by 
malandros from other barrios and unprotected by an arbitrary police force, as it did individual 
needs for respect and livelihood. It developed into a proper institution, with an internal 
hierarchy and proscribed rules. The sad –in this case– fact about institutions is that, having 
grown out of certain interactions, they resist change to these interactions, they are resilient 
(Scott, 2008). This way, el malandreo ends up recreating the difficult conditions that generated 
it. The dynamics of el malandreo reproduce a climate of fear that paradoxically sustains the need 
for it. Thus, even though many side effects do more harm than good to individuals as well as the 
community, the institution continues to fulfil needs. These young men are caught up in a deadly 
dynamic that offers very little protection in the grand scheme of things. Quite the opposite, it 
locks them in a seemingly never-ending spiral of violence.  
 
Belonging to a gang seems to be related to a particular type of lethal violence, though it does 
not explain it (Howell and Decker, 1999). Most of the time gangs do not engage in violence. Not 
all gang members engage in violence either. Young people the world over hang around on street 
corners, talk about the opposite sex and consume alcohol and drugs. In this respect, the young 
protagonists of Venezuela’s deadly violence do not differ substantially from other youngsters, 
most of the time. What sets them apart from others is that they carry guns, and, for a minority 
of their time, they rob, and kill. They maintain healthy or at least relatively normal relationships 
with family and boys that do not get involved. It is not even the violence per se, young men all 
over the world get into fights in an apparent effort to prove their burgeoning masculinity. 
Fighting is not necessarily deviant behaviour viewed through the lens of young men, whether 
urban, rural, rich, poor, black or white. Again it is the deadliness of the violence that takes centre 
stage here. 
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The violence takes this form because it is embedded in a chain of action and reaction where 
gang members have to respond proactively. Rather than seeing violence as embedded in 
abstract social structures or violent people, this chapter argues we should embed it in the 
interactions and relationships that reproduce it. Although this deadly violence does define the 
gang (see also Chapter 2 p.19), it does not define its members, who use violence only when their 
gang identity provokes it. Violence is not a characteristic of people, but of interactions. Deadly 
gun violence in Venezuela spreads through contagion, adaptation of certain behaviours in close-
knit interaction groups, rather than e.g. being provoked by deprivation, anger, or uninhibited by 
a lack of self-control. This violence is not linearly related to aggregate social indicators nor the 
sum of isolated events, it follows a rollercoaster pattern (Fagan et al., 2007).  
In the past five years, has violence in this barrio gone up, down or stayed the same? 
R1: Here violence goes up and down again… It augments, diminishes, augments, 
diminishes, augments, diminishes… Like the seasons… R2: There can be a lot of murders 
and suddenly it goes all quiet. Another time it heats up again (…) When the people that 
hang around here go about looking for problems elsewhere.’  
Group interview, local residents, Catia  
That similar processes seem to apply to gang violence in a context as different as Venezuela is 
perhaps the most important finding of this chapter, with several implications for theory, policy 
and practice. It renders the traditional juxtaposition of motivational and control theories of 
violence more or less irrelevant, neither motivations nor controls are as important in 
regenerating gang violence as is the prior presence of violence itself. The dynamics of gang gun 
violence are endogenous, not exogenous. 
 
Of course, the continued absence of formal social control mechanisms is an important factor in 
the spread of this violence. However, this is a continued absence. Only the endogenous feedback 
mechanisms of violence itself explain the patterns found in Chapter 3, with homicide rates 
gradually spreading across the country and ebbing and flowing.  
 
Seeing el malandreo as an institution with a varied following of complex and capable individuals 
organised into networks offers hope for transformation, and potential for turning these 
governance structures towards constructive goals, rather than destructive ones (Hagedorn, 
2008). The first step towards this goal will need to be an appraisal and resolution of 
institutionalised violence between different factions. Part of the answer may lie in finally 
accepting gang members as intelligent and capable actors, and co-opting their networks in a 
movement for change. None of the people I interviewed enjoyed the violence. Some were able 
211 
 
 
 
to justify it better than others, but many were fearful and felt trapped. Depressingly, none saw 
an immediate end to the violence.  
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter reflects on the findings of this thesis. It makes a case for a relational understanding 
of violence, which sees it in the context of interactions and relationships, and also incorporates 
this violence itself as an independent variable that continuously reproduces the boundaries of 
inequality and the conditions in which this violence can take hold. This chapter also explores this 
thesis’ implications for future research and policy, and acknowledges its limitations. 
8.2 Summary of findings 
This thesis explored the connections between inequality and violence in Venezuela. Chapter 1 
showed that traditional indicators suggest these concepts are not related in Venezuela, 
justifying a focus on exploring some lower-level mechanisms that might be responsible for 
correlations that are often found in different contexts. Chapter 2 looked at the literature that 
has evaluated these connections and showed that many theories do not assume direct 
connections between inequality and violence. They often assume people’s relationships 
mediate and mitigate these connections, validating a focus on these relationships. Chapter 3 
gave a brief historical overview of Venezuela’s divided worlds, homicide rates and recent 
changes therein, arguing that aggregate indicators tell us very little of the mechanisms that are 
often seen to connect inequality and violence. Chapter 4 described the methods that were used 
for exploring people’s interactions and relationships, explaining in detail the strategies that were 
used to approach violent offenders and the semi-structured instrument that captured the 
relationships embedded in people’s personal networks.  
 
The findings were presented and discussed in Chapters 5 to 7. Chapter 5 explored how barrio 
residents’ personal networks reflect their opportunities, expectations and informal social 
control mechanisms, conditions that are often seen to be conducive to differential levels of 
violence. Anomie or strain, a discrepancy between people’s opportunities and expectations, is 
often said to generate motivations for violence, whereas informal social control mechanisms are 
often seen to be able to mitigate these motivations. It showed that barrio residents have little 
access to waged and formal opportunities in their networks, and also experience strain, although 
not necessarily in comparison to their interaction groups. It found little evidence that barrio 
residents’ relationships or neighbourhoods lack informal social control mechanisms. Chapter 6 
explored the connections between inequality and violence at the micro-level, relating some 
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measures and instances of violence to motivations and controls embedded in people’s personal 
networks. It suggested that looking at the overall structure of relationships in which these 
individuals are embedded might be more productive in understanding the deadly gun violence 
that is the interest of this thesis. Chapter 7 applied a relational framework to the meanings and 
violence of el malandreo. It showed how violence between malandros, people that identify with 
el malandreo, generates an imaginary of random violence that continuously reproduces the 
need for further violence and the meanings of el malandreo itself.  
 
Overall, this thesis argues the type of deadly violence that affects Venezuela is not explained 
very well by traditional perspectives that assume inequality motivates people to use violence, 
or that their relationships can mitigate these motivations. There is evidence that people in the 
barrio may be motivated by a discrepancy between their opportunities and expectations, but it 
is difficult to relate this to micro-level measures of violence. The findings show particularly little 
support for social disorganisation and control perspectives that suggest strong relationships can 
mitigate an effect of inequality through providing informal social control. Instead, looking at 
people’s actual relationships, rather than their effects on community cohesion and informal 
social control, suggests strong relationships may generate violence, particularly where formal 
social control is absent. The absence of formal social control is much more detrimental than any 
absence of community cohesion and has allowed for the institutionalisation of el malandreo as 
a form of informal social control in the barrio. More relational interpretations that look at how 
identities, and violence itself, attain meaning offer better tools for understanding the deadly 
violence that affects Venezuela. Only an understanding of the actual relationships through which 
violence flows offers a fully plausible account of how this violence gained such proportions. 
Unequal access to formal opportunities and formal social control are the distal causes of 
Venezuela’s violence, whereas its proximate cause is to be found in this violence itself.  
 
In the next section, I discuss these findings in more detail, making the case for a relational 
understanding of violence that sees it as an expression of people’s interactions and relationships, 
as well as an important independent variable that generates the conditions for future violence.  
8.3 Discussion 
In this section I discuss in more detail the main findings of this thesis, steering towards a 
relational understanding of violence that also incorporates this violence as an important 
independent variable.   
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8.3.1 Towards a relational understanding of violence 
This thesis argues that, in order to understand the deadly violence that affects Venezuela, we 
need to look at the interactions and relationships that produce it, rather than seeing it as an 
attribute of people or their communities. Suggestions of a Venezuelan paradox –that income 
inequality is not related to homicidal violence in the Venezuelan context– are given by a 
continued focus on violent people as rational-actors. In this view, the absence of correlations 
between income inequality and homicide rates is interpreted as suggesting that people have not 
benefited from recent changes in inequality and remain motivated to use violence, or that the 
institutions that can keep people from violence were undermined. This thesis shows that in 
looking at people’s interactions and relationships, a distinct perspective on the connections 
between inequality and violence emerges. Looking at these interactions and relationships shows 
how el malandreo attains meaning in the dense and informal spaces of the barrio, and how 
violence itself spreads through interactions in its horizontal reciprocity networks, where this 
type of violence is an unparalleled form of social control. Historical inequalities are important in 
understanding this violence, but they need to be seen in the context of social interactions, and 
particularly the continued, rather than sudden, absence of formal social control agencies. The 
study thus contains a critique of traditional criminological thinking, which too often remains 
stuck in a juxtaposition of external motivations versus internal controls in the aetiology of 
violence. It needs to move beyond seeing violence as an attribute of the actors involved, by 
seeing it in the context of their interactions and relationships.  
 
Social disorganisation and control perspectives in particular embed violence in communities and 
people that lack informal social controls, without critically reflecting on the relationships that 
sustain these communities or the interactions in which people use violence. Social 
disorganisation perspectives suggest that community cohesion can mitigate the effects of 
inequality, arguing that where communities get together to implement informal social control, 
violence can be contained. This appears to be exactly what has happened in Venezuela, 
communities, or certain members of these communities, have started taking responsibility for 
informal social control, through violence, with devastating consequences. These perspectives 
ignore the historical absence of formal social control, which makes violence itself a form of 
informal social control. They have provided invaluable insights on differential levels of violence 
in communities, but should consider more carefully the effects of people’s actual relationships 
on informal social control, rather than looking for evidence of informal social control in 
community cohesion. A focus on people’s actual relationships, aided by the frameworks of 
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governance and self-help, shows how violent interactions and identities also provide social 
control and even institutional guidance where formal social control is absent or questioned.  
 
Anomie and strain perspectives, which look at how a discrepancy between structural 
opportunities and cultural aspirations generates motivations for violence, similarly often ignore 
the importance of formal social control institutions. Institutional anomie perspectives have 
made progress in this regard, through bringing in a focus on conventional institutions. 
Nevertheless, they are similar to social disorganisation perspectives in suggesting that 
conventional institutions such as family and religion can keep people from acting on violent 
motivations. They continue to focus on violent people over and above their interactions and 
support a normative view of the moral superiority of conventional institutions. The absence of 
formal social control institutions needs to be conceptualised much more carefully. The frames 
of legal cynicism perspectives offer better tools here, through actually conceptualising the 
illegitimacy of formal social control institutions in the aetiology of violence. This thesis argues 
that, at least in Venezuela, the absence of formal social control has more dramatic effects on 
violence than any absence of family or religious values and conventional institutions.   
 
Anomie and strain perspectives are valuable in conceptualising the importance of unequal 
opportunity structures. Nevertheless, they focus too often on how a lack of opportunities 
generates individual motivations, without conceptualising the relationships that sustain 
inequality. An account of inequality is necessary, it has dramatic effects on the daily realities of 
the poor, but this does not necessarily make them violent. Especially in the unequal structure of 
Venezuela, many people feel strained, nevertheless rarely resort to violence. Further, people do 
not necessarily feel strained in comparison to their significant others. This thesis questioned 
these perspectives’ reliance on abstract boundaries to infer motivations, as people do not 
necessarily compare themselves to everyone else within abstract boundaries. Nevertheless, it 
showed that even a focus on the concrete boundaries of people’s interaction networks and 
lower-level differences between people might not be as important in understanding violence as 
the uncertainties and informalities that tie them together. The violence in Venezuela is a 
violence between relative equals that is itself better explained by the dynamics of interactions 
than it is by material differences in opportunities. Inequalities in and of themselves no longer 
explain this violence, although they go some way in explaining the meaning of violent identities. 
A lack of formal opportunities and formal social control makes violent identities inherently 
attractive, but they do not make people kill each other. We need to make a distinction between 
these violent identities and violence itself. Where a focus on unequal opportunity structures 
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indeed explains some of the attractions of violent identities, the actual occurrence of violence 
is much better explained by how these inequalities are expressed in actual relational structures 
of the barrio as a whole, and the networks of el malandreo in particular. The dense and informal 
networks of the barrio make conflict at once more likely and less avoidable, and have allowed 
for the institutionalisation of el malandreo, an identity that offers existential meaning as well as 
informal social control. Violence between malandros spreads through violent interactions that 
generate expectations and justify deadly violence as a pre-emptive response to future violence.  
 
These observations question the relevance of looking for individual motivations in aspects of the 
social structure in order to explain violence. Assuming people are motivated to use violence 
because of structural inequalities depletes these people of their agency and almost excuses 
them for their violence, a role they are happy to take on and that is even diffused through the 
code of el malandreo, which sees malandros as protectors of the barrio. It makes more sense to 
explore the interactions in which violence does occur, rather than the people that apply it. A 
focus on how inequality is expressed in people’s interactions and relationships rather than a 
distribution of resources absolves us from inferring motivations, by looking at how violence and 
violent identities attain meaning in interaction. Rather than an attribute of deprived offenders, 
violence becomes a script that is recalled in particular interactions. Contagion theories help us 
understand how violent interactions generate expectations for future interactions and facilitate 
the spread of violence. A focus on these relationships also shows how these identities generate 
different forms of inclusion and social organisation over and above how they are defined by 
exclusion from mainstream society.  
 
Violence, it is argued here, is best understood as a characteristic of interactions and relationships, 
not a characteristic of people or their communities. To understand it – we need to look at the 
interactional spaces and encounters that produce violence. Nevertheless, where traditional 
perspectives can count on more or less readily available data, relational data are harder to come 
by. In section 8.4, I look at how these relationships might be taken on board in future research. 
First, I evaluate another important issue that emerges from my research.   
8.3.2 The reverse effects of violence and the reproduction of inequalities 
Most theoretical thinking sees violence as an effect of inequality, whether through generating 
motivations or through a lack of informal social controls. Nevertheless, in Chapter 6 we saw that 
violence can have an important reverse effect on people’s subjective perceptions of their quality 
of life. In Chapter 7 we saw how violence itself generates expectations and justifies future 
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violence among malandros. These findings suggest violence needs to be rethought not just as a 
dependent but also an independent causal mechanism. Further, violence has an important 
reverse effect on people’s interactions and subsequent patterns of inequality. The imaginary of 
random violence1 that was discussed in Chapter 7 not only shapes malandros’ expectations, but 
equally shapes and restricts other people’s expectations and interactions patterns, in the barrio 
as well as the centre. People in the centre use this imaginary to order their thoughts about (and 
avoid) the barrio in general, whereas people from the barrio tend to categorise other barrios as 
more dangerous than their own. Here, I evaluate how violence can thus be seen to continuously 
reproduce the historical inequalities that sustain it. 
 
The spaces of the centre are attractive targets for malandros. The violence they use here is often 
acquisitive, related to robberies and, as security systems grow evermore accustomed to 
preventing these robberies, express-kidnappings2. These types of violence are random and 
incontrollable. Anyone could be the next victim, and many residents here have indeed been 
robbed at gunpoint, if not kidnapped. Personal experiences, frequent talk of crime and incessant 
media reports generate a climate of ever-present fear that makes people reliant on networks of 
trusted others. If one has to meet these trusted others in public, spaces of choice are enclosed 
restaurants and shopping centres, for their added security. Like the Saõ Paulo described so 
vividly by Caldeira (2001), Venezuela’s cities have become ‘cities of walls’. The barrio is a no-go 
zone for people living in the centre. They have no reason to visit; there are no services, no friends 
or family. Mostly, they fear it. They know that the homicides that appear3 in their newspapers 
on a daily basis predominantly occur here, and they often imagine the barrio as some sort of 
pandemonium. People in the centre often believe people from the barrio are different, 
uneducated, violent, speak a different language, they have nothing in common. More times than 
comfortable, I heard people comment more aggressively that ‘they should just burn the barrios 
down’. 
 
Violence and fear thereof restrict barrio residents’ interaction patterns too. Nevertheless, the 
violence that affects the barrio is arguably qualitatively different than that which disturbs the 
                                                          
1 I call it an imaginary because, although it certainly reflects real events, it is shaped more by subjective 
interpretations of these events.  
2 A form of kidnapping whereby victims are forced, usually with guns, to drive their assailants to a bank 
to withdraw money, or held captive whilst money is extorted from families. A number of people recounted 
these instances to me, whereby they had also been beaten and robbed of their cars, with dramatic effects 
on their emotional well-being.  
3 Particularly in Cumaná the media use very graphic images of people killed on their front pages. 
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centre. Deadly violence is much more prevalent here, but more controllable in a certain way; as 
people in the barrio tend to know each other, they often know who lives and dies, those killed 
are predominantly identified as people with problems. They are often seen to have aroused a 
‘culebra’, the colloquial term for vendetta (see Chapter 7), through an action of their own, and 
thus held more or less responsible for their untimely death. This is an important psychological 
coping mechanism amongst this deadly violence – people convince themselves that if they can 
avoid problems, they will be fine. Violence is thus easily normalised and even denied. People 
often see adjoining barrios as much more dangerous, and in these adjoining barrios many people 
think it is relatively safe in comparison to others. Even malandros, as discussed in Chapter 7, 
often project this violence onto other barrios, where the situation is ‘candela’, literally meaning 
‘on fire’, dangerous or kicking-off. Deaths that occur in other barrios cannot easily be 
rationalised as the rules and antagonists in other barrios are often unknown, newspaper reports 
and rumours shape an interpretation of these deaths as random and ubiquitous. People’s own 
sectors often seem relatively safe. Even if gun fights and homicides regularly occur on their 
streets these are indeed often confined to the conflict networks of el malandreo. As long as 
malandros are victimised, the violence is sort of acceptable, they play the game and deserve the 
consequences. People that do not cause trouble or do not interfere with others should be safe. 
Further, and maybe more importantly, people in these sectors know the local malandros and 
that the local malandros know them. Malandros too, stick by the rules of a life where they have 
become the guardians of the neighbourhood; if they mess with neighbours they risk losing the 
quietly sanctioned refuge of the barrio. This gives people some sort of control over the fragility 
of life in these sectors, although it is brittle and restricted to their own barrio.  
 
As it is difficult to anticipate what lays beyond the boundaries of the barrio, people equally 
restrain their interactions to whom and what is known. Barrio residents do not tend to visit other 
informal areas, unless they know someone that can pick them up and guide them to the safety 
of their house. The unknown (and incontrollable) sectors in between their own barrio and the 
centre foster anxiety. The barrio does not hold people captive nor is it stationary. People move 
– temporarily and permanent, following love or opportunity. But they tend to do so within circles 
of close and trustworthy family and select friends and neighbours. Like in the centre, bonding 
between people similar in status and perspectives, is the traditional and prevailing relational 
mechanism. This way, the differences between the barrio and the centre are continuously 
reproduced through (a lack of) interaction between them. People on either side of the class 
boundary tend to interact with select groups of trusted people, further limiting an exchange of 
resources, ideas and opportunities.  
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Violence thus has important reverse effects, on the institution of el malandreo as we saw in 
Chapter 7, as well as on people that have used violence as Chapter 6 explained, but also society 
and its inequalities as a whole. Figure 8-1 shows the continuous reproduction of informality and 
insecurity, conditions where el malandreo and its violence find maximum expression.  
Figure 8-1 The reproduction of violence and inequalities 
 
 
A continued lack of formal opportunities and formal social control generates uncertainties and 
insecurities that make people reliant on informal networks or private markets for the provision 
of various needs. If violence in the barrio is manageable by sticking to what is known, the higher-
classes are arguably better able to protect themselves through private means and a more visibly 
present police. In the centre, police patrols are frequent, private security systems top-quality. 
Barrios do not often have a continued police presence, and little in way of privately securing 
their homes. It is precisely this lack of formal social control, coupled with the lack of formal 
opportunities and vivid and often conflictive social life in the barrio that gave rise to informal 
rules and social control mechanisms like el malandreo. As el malandreo started to fill some of 
the vacuums left by the state, particularly its monopoly on violence, the additional insecurity 
their violence generates further makes people reliant on these informal networks, continuously 
reproducing inequalities as well as violence. The fear associated with deadly violence limits 
social interaction between people considered other and reinforces boundaries, endlessly 
reproducing inequalities in access to opportunities and physical security. Violence too is thus an 
integral component that maintains Venezuela’s inequalities and reproduces the boundaries that 
divide Venezuela’s populace in the ‘immense minority and the plentiful few’ (Pedrazzini, 2009). 
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This continuation of insecurity and informality sheds light on an important brief for the state, 
lifting some of these uncertainties would certainly relieve some of the meanings of el malandreo. 
Nevertheless, the networks of el malandreo, and the gun violence they use independently affect 
these insecurities through generating fear and making people ever more reliant on informal 
networks. These observations bring us to some important implications for policy and research.    
8.4 Implications 
In this section I review this thesis’ implications for policy and research.  
8.4.1 Policy 
This thesis showed that deadly violence in Venezuela is a violence enacted with guns and in 
public places, between people that hardly know each other (see Chapters 3 and 7). It reflects 
more closely the type of gang gun violence that has been studied extensively in the US than it 
does other types of homicides between people that know each other, with important 
implications for policy. The fact that this violence reflects patterns of gun gang violence in the 
US suggests that perhaps policies that have addressed the contagion of this type of violence in 
this context might also be effective in Venezuela. Cure violence (Slutkin, 2013) for instance, is a 
programme that looks at violence from a health perspective and involves local community 
members as violence interrupters. These interrupters are often ex-gang members whom can 
count on established relationships of trust in the communities where they work, engaging with 
local gang groups to stop them from taking revenge and interrupting cycles of deadly violence. 
They have recently started exporting their framework to Latin America. Similar approaches have 
been applied in Venezuela, where local mothers came together to stop their sons killing each 
other in a Caracas neighbourhood (Llorens et al., 2015), and also in Cumaná, where a pacification 
project put an end to killing among malandros within a barrio (see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, the 
experience of Cumaná, where malandros, even if they have been given jobs and no longer 
engage in violence with other groups in the barrio, still see themselves as a legitimate instance 
to deal with people that have trespassed ambiguous community norms, suggests this cannot be 
the only strategy.  
 
The institutionalisation of el malandreo as an informal social control mechanism in the barrio 
raises particularly difficult questions for policy makers. It should be considered whether these 
networks might be included in the security debate, as they are sometimes trusted more than an 
arbitrary police force and can be seen as capable actors that are equally adversely affected by 
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deadly violence. All of the malandros I spoke to were negative about the violence they use, and 
would like to see an end to the killings. This requires a resolution of longstanding culebras, 
vendettas, in the first instance, but also opportunities whereby they can construct a truly 
meaningful life project, and most important of all a credible formal social control agency. Recent 
policy in Venezuela has seen the return to a ‘mano dura’, hard-handed law and order, approach 
with questionable effects on the human rights not just of malandros, but barrio residents 
generally (Pérez Hernáiz and Smilde, 2015). It is doubtful these policies will generate a long 
overdue climate of formal security, if not have the reverse effect of strengthening the networks 
of el malandreo. This hard-handed approach might lead malandros to find a common enemy in 
the state and organise amongst them, as some newspaper articles have suggested has happened 
in some of Caracas’ southern barrios (Risquez, 2015). Continued informal institutionalisation 
might limit violence between different malandro groups, but also strengthen their grip, as 
today’s disorganised factions might consolidate power, an evolution that has also been observed 
in some of Brazil’s favelas (Willis, 2009). 
 
Sustained political polarisation, which has the government blaming the opposition for this 
violence and vice versa is extremely counterproductive. It dramatically impedes an 
understanding of violence in this context, reflected in a continued unavailability of homicide 
data. This continued absence of reliable data and the air of mystery that is created by keeping 
them from public scrutiny feeds into speculative reporting and further nourishes the generalised 
fear described above. The government should drastically reconsider its policy on this front and 
understand that knowledge might support its efforts rather than impede them. Acknowledging 
that violence itself is related more to interactional dynamics between malandros than national 
policy might move the government forward here, although this should not absolve it from its 
responsibility to deal with the distal causes of this violence, the continued absence of formal 
institutions as well as truly empowering opportunities for its young men. Additionally, by 
focussing on the interactions and relationships that sustain inequalities, this thesis showed these 
inequalities are not deliberate nor intentional. They can be understood by relational 
mechanisms such as homophily, which implies people interact more comfortably with people 
similar to themselves. In this view, aggregate inequalities are a function of the interactions and 
relationships that define people’s access to resources rather than a deliberate strategy of the 
rich. A government discourse that stigmatises the rich (see Chapter 3) and stresses difference 
rather than similarity further obstructs the development of vertical ties and an exchange of 
resources and ideas.  
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8.4.2 Empirical research 
The research findings also have some important implications for future research, at the micro- 
as well as macro-level.  
 
Macro-level research approaches have the advantage of being able to use more or less readily 
available homicide data, and substantial variation therein, to test their assumptions 4 . 
Nevertheless, they are limited by abstract boundaries that do not necessarily reflect these 
assumptions, and abovementioned continued focus on violent people as rational-actors. These 
approaches often conceive of homicide rates as reflecting violent people rather than violent 
interactions. The often found correlations between inequality and violence suggest more 
unequal societies have more violent interactions, not more violent people. An issue that is 
reiterated by this study. Macro-level studies should thus focus more often on how people’s 
interactions, over and above aggregate community or individual attributes, make this violence 
possible. Of course, indicators of people’s actual interactions and relationships are harder to 
come by. It is difficult to think of objective, i.e. not based on survey methods, macro-level 
indicators that could reflect these interactions. Nevertheless, network theory, in a world of 
increasingly available data and growing awareness of complexity, is a promising area of 
methodological innovation. Data as diverse as email traffic and mobile phone GPS locations can 
be incorporated as indicators of interactions in network studies. The limitations of aggregate 
boundaries can be overcome by using surveys that question people on their actual social 
relationships and evaluating how these relationships reflect aggregate boundaries. Researchers 
have for a long time now used large-scale surveys to evaluate people’s actual interactions and 
relationships, and the diversity of their personal networks (Lin, 2002; Wellman, 1999), but these 
have not frequently been related to differential levels of violence.  
 
In all, little evidence emerges for social disorganisation perspectives that assume people’s 
relationships can mitigate connections between inequality and violence by instilling control 
mechanisms. Researchers should focus on actual relationships rather than their effects. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, research that has looked at these relationships often finds strong ties in 
violent communities (see 2.3.2.2). Anomie theories have rarely been tested empirically as 
Chapter 2 argued (see 2.3.1.1). First of all, it is difficult to measure the discrepancy between 
                                                          
4 The institutional context of Venezuela makes macro-level research extremely difficult. Homicide data 
are not officially available, and few representative surveys are done, limiting knowledge of the macro-
level correlates of violence in this context.  
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structural opportunities and cultural expectations that are said to generate motivations to 
engage in violence. An approach that looks at how inequality is reflected in people’s actual 
relationships, rather than income differences might shed more light on these perspectives. 
Findings should perhaps not be interpreted in terms of providing people with motivations, but 
in terms of generating meaning in interactions. Using different dependent variables, such as 
levels of gang membership rather than homicide rates might also provide interesting findings, 
as this thesis shows that aggregate discrepancies between opportunities and expectations 
better explain the attractions of violent identities than violence itself.  
 
This thesis suggests the type of deadly violence that was evaluated here may be different to 
violence we know most of in different contexts, a violence between people that know each other. 
Further this type of violence was also shown to have important reverse effects. Macro-level 
studies should thus incorporate indicators for previous violence and distinguish between 
different types of violence, such as armed and non-armed violence, or where possible, gang-
related and non-gang-related violence. More efforts need to be made to conceptualise the 
absence of formal social control. Legal cynicism perspectives offer interesting potential here, 
but they are also reliant on survey measures, where people’s attitudes towards the legitimacy 
of the law can be measured. This research also showed the importance of qualitative data that 
offer a much deeper understanding of aggregate indicators. Macro-level studies can also be 
accompanied by qualitative work that offers a historical understanding of how inequalities are 
expressed in people’s interactions and relationships.  
 
Micro-level studies on violence are limited by difficulties in observing actual instances of 
violence, which are relatively rare and almost per definition hidden. The variation in homicide 
rates that is available at the macro-level is more difficult to obtain at the micro-level, as even 
the most violent people are violent only a minority of their time (Collins, 2009). These studies 
are often necessarily reliant on individual-level measures of past violence, which lend 
themselves better to rational-actor explanations that look at how violent individuals differ from 
non-violent individuals. This thesis shows that, in looking at these individuals’ actual interactions 
and relationships, few individual differences emerge between people that had involved in 
violence and those that had not, suggesting overall relational structures might better explain 
violence than individual attributes. This is an important contribution that needs to be explored 
in further detail and with much larger samples. Previous research of the personal networks of 
prisoners in Holland (de Cuyper et al., 2013) and adolescents in a Maryland neighbourhood 
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(Roman et al., 2012), equally found few structural network differences between people involved 
in violence and others.  
 
Looking at violence as an interaction is methodologically and conceptually challenging, but this 
thesis suggests more work needs to be done to understand why individuals engage in violence 
at some times, but not others, and that an understanding of these interactions can truly advance 
research on violence. This thesis has shown the promises of personal network methods in 
understanding how people’s interactions and relationships reproduce inequalities, and can also 
be conducive to violence. Personal networks allow for exploring people’s relationships as 
concrete source of their opportunities, ideas and behaviours. These network measures give us 
an indication of respondents’ interaction patterns as a whole, but in this particular exercise I 
cannot distinguish their violent from non-violent interactions. Other network researchers have 
shown increasing interest in the study of so-called negative or conflictive interactions and 
relationships (Everett and Borgatti, 2014). Future research could explore how a personal 
network methodology could incorporate negative, or in this case violent, interactions. In this 
study, it was difficult to get people to explore their violent relationships in detail. More in-depth 
interviews, which focus specifically on these interactions, justifying why it is important, i.e. not 
to judge these people, but to see why they were violent on this particular occasion and not 
others, might offer respite here. This type of study should also be able to ensure anonymity not 
just for the respondents, but also their contacts. Many people were opposed to naming these 
people because I would perhaps be able to identify them. These contacts could be identified by 
initials or nicknames.  
 
In all, little evidence emerges for individual-level social control perspectives that assume strong 
ties can keep people from violence. These perspectives should look at how they can incorporate 
violence as social control, by exploring more carefully the interactions in which violence occurs. 
They should also make a distinction between deviant and non-deviant ties, and evaluate how 
the relative strength of these different types of relationships might make violence more likely. 
Individual-level research on strain and relative deprivation perspectives is limited by having to 
rely on measures of motivations after the violence has occurred. The true spirit of relative 
deprivation theory entails measuring a subjective feeling of deprivation, and a comparison to a 
reference group. These are both difficult to materialise, on top of the difficulties in measuring 
violence. It is difficult to see how truly accurate measures that measure deprivation before 
violence may be obtained beyond experimental research designs in a laboratory environment. 
Nevertheless, this thesis made an important contribution by measuring deprivation in 
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comparison to people’s actual interaction groups. Future research could replicate this strategy 
and also explore this further by incorporating people’s violent interactions and relationships and 
evaluating whether they might feel relatively deprived in these particular interactions or in 
comparison to these people.  
 
This thesis also found some important gender differences that were not explained very well by 
traditional perspectives and need to be paid much more attention in the literature. Further, just 
like macro-level research, micro-level research should make a distinction between different 
types of violence, importantly between violence that occurs in relationships and violence that 
does not. It should also look at how violent interactions shape future interactions. Whole 
network approaches are promising here. Papachristos (2007) for instance was able to evaluate 
how violence spreads between gangs using gang homicide data in Chicago. This thesis also 
showed the importance of qualitative data to interpret these findings. A mixed methodology has 
many benefits that can be taken advantage of in future research.   
 
Having engaged with malandros and come to see them as intelligent and capable actors, I also 
see particular potential for action research approaches. These types of approaches engage in a 
problem identification with respondents as capable actors, empowering them to take control 
and work towards transforming their own realities. Arguably malandros themselves are the 
people that can shed most light on their conditions and should also be urged to take 
responsibility for ending the violence. Having them take responsibility may also have an 
empowering effect, addressing the existential meanings they find in engaging in el malandreo. 
8.5 Limitations 
This study was exploratory and hypothesis-generating rather than representative and 
hypothesis-testing. I wanted to explore the connections between inequality and violence in 
Venezuela and did not have the means to conduct a fully representative study. Venezuela’s 
institutional context also shaped the research approach and consequent findings as discussed in 
much more detail in Chapter 4. I originally wanted to select two violent sectors where I was 
hoping to conduct personal network interviews. Nevertheless, due to the unavailability of 
homicide data at the neighbourhood level, I had to rely on a qualitative research phase to select 
neighbourhoods where I was then going to do further research. This approach did not work, as 
people kept directing me to different neighbourhoods that were more violent, which led me to 
do interviews in hospitals and a prison in Cumaná. Prison would probably have offered better 
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access to malandros than hospitals, as many malandros that get shot today are killed instantly 
(see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 p.99) but I was only allowed to enter prison in Cumaná.  
 
In the end, this approach helped me gain an understanding of how violence is normalised in 
certain neighbourhoods, and also that neighbourhood-level mechanisms might not be as 
important in the production of violence as is the more general absence of formal institutions. 
Nevertheless, this also led to a small and very diverse sample that completed the semi-
structured network interviews, which limits my ability to draw firm conclusions. Triangulation 
with qualitative data was important in supporting these findings. Further, the personal networks 
collected here are not of the same size, making it more difficult to compare their characteristics. 
This exercise wanted to explore what network data could tell us about different theoretical 
concepts and did not restrict people to naming a certain number of contacts. Future exercises 
could collect networks that are of the same size so the effects of structural network variables 
can be more confidently evaluated. Although this needs to be considered carefully, as setting a 
limit on the number of people respondents can name could affect the diversity of the network, 
and ensuring people’s contacts are sampled from a variety of different contexts. Future research 
could repeat this exercise with larger and more representative samples, although the advantage 
of this sample was that it included many people that had engaged in a variety of violent events.  
 
Further, where personal networks allow us to look at people’s relationships as concrete 
reflections of their opportunities, ideas and behaviours, they are still a selective measure of the 
diversity of people’s relationships. They still see people’s relationship as a personal attribute and 
tell us relatively little of the overall structure of relationships. Whole network approaches that 
look at interactions within a defined boundary are better suited to evaluate the spread of 
information and also violence.  
 
It is difficult to appreciate whether these findings can be extrapolated beyond the Venezuelan 
context, although the similarities with gang violence in the US and also Brazil suggest these 
findings are generalizable to gang violence in different contexts. Nevertheless, because this 
thesis focused on deadly violence, the question of whether and how inequality relates to 
everyday violence, a violence that more often occurs between people that know each other, 
remains unanswered. It may well be that individual motivations or an absence of informal social 
controls better explain this type of violence. However, a focus on the actual interactions in which 
this type of violence –a violence between people that know each other and is thus arguably even 
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more subject to the characteristics of these relationships– occurs can also help us understand it 
better.  
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Table 3 Main profession of respondents by sex, and average reported income (N=45) 
 
 
 
Sector 
Male (n) 
Female 
(n) 
Total N 
(%) 
Average 
Income 
(VEF) 
     
WAGED 9 3 12 (27%)  
Skilled Public 2 1 3  5,433 
Skilled Private 1 - 1  12,000 
Unskilled Public 4 1 5  3,680 
Unskilled Private 2 1 3  3,667 
     
UNWAGED   33 (73%)  
Unskilled labour 4 1 5 4,180 
Informal /self-employed 10 3 13 9,390 
 (Moto)taxi/messenger 2 - 2 11,000 
 Barber 1 - 1 8,600 
 Stall owner/Street vendor 4 3 7 6,870 
 Artist 1 - 1 25,000 
 Malandro 2  2 NA 
Non-remunerated 8 7 15 (38%) NA 
 Prisoner 3 1 4 NA 
 Student 2 3 5 NA 
 Nothing 3 3 6 NA 
     
 Total 31 14 45 6,496 
 
Table 4 Respondents’ perceptions of quality of life (N=45) 
 
N Average Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Average Quality of life 
45 5.6 0.0 10.0 1.8 
Average quality of life 
five years ago 
 
35 
5.4 0.0 10.0 3.0 
Average quality of life 
now – 5 years ago 35 0.5 -7.0 5.0 3.0 
 
Table 5 Indicators of respondents’ involvement in and attitudes towards violence 
 
N Average Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Composite violence 
indicator 
45 1.8 1.0 3.6 0.8 
Self-control 42 3.8 1.9 5.0 0.9 
250 
 
 
 
Beliefs in the legitimacy 
of violence 
35 2.3 1.0 4.4 1.0 
 
Table 6 Average composition of respondents’ personal networks according to type of relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Average composition of respondents’ personal networks according to gender and average 
age of alters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Average composition of respondents’ personal networks according to living area 
 
Average Min Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Living area     
Higher-class area 4% 0% 65% 13% 
Middle-class area 8% 0% 40% 11% 
Satellite City 9% 0% 43% 11% 
Barrio 63% 0% 100% 27% 
Prison/street 2% 0% 50% 8% 
Other city 8% 0% 59% 11% 
Other country 1% 0% 15% 3% 
Unknown 1% 0% 13% 4% 
     
Characteristics Average Min Max Standard 
Deviation 
     
Partners and children 6% 0% 36% 8% 
General family 46% 17% 85% 15% 
Neighbours 12% 0% 47% 11% 
Colleagues 13% 0% 39% 12% 
Friends 19% 0% 58% 14% 
Other 5% 0% 25% 6% 
 Average Min Max Standard 
Deviation 
Gender     
Proportion Males 52% 16% 79% 14% 
Proportion Females 48% 21% 84% 14% 
     
Homophily 55% 16% 79% 13% 
     
Average Age     
Average Age 37 27 53 6 
     
Homophily 6% 0% 44% 8% 
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Homophily     
Same type of area 63% 0% 100% 26% 
 
Table 9 Average composition of respondents’ personal networks according to professional sector 
of alters 
 
Average Min Max 
Standard 
deviation 
WAGED 33% 4% 82% 20% 
Public sector skilled 2% 0% 20% 4% 
Private sector skilled 7% 0% 35% 9% 
Public sector unskilled 13% 0% 47% 13% 
Private sector unskilled 11% 0% 44% 11% 
UNWAGED 67% 18% 96% 20% 
Unskilled labour 16% 0% 57% 14% 
Informal/ self-employed 19% 0% 50% 13% 
Non-remunerated 15% 0% 42% 11% 
Student 15% 0% 42% 11% 
Don’t know 2% 0% 39% 6% 
     
Homophily     
Profession 16% 0% 50% 13% 
Sector 32% 0% 72% 17% 
Waged/ unwaged 69% 14% 96% 18% 
 
Table 10 Average composition of respondents’ personal networks according to average quality of 
life of alters (N=44) 
  
Average Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Average Quality of life 6.0 1.2 9.0 1.8 
Homophily 28% 0% 92% 25% 
 
Table 11 Average composition of respondents’ personal networks according to strength of ties 
(N=45) 
 
Average Min Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Proximity     
Same house 17% 0% 50% 13% 
Same neighbourhood 24% 0% 72% 18% 
Same city 34% 0% 85% 22% 
Other city 24% 0% 93% 24% 
Other country 1% 0% 15% 3% 
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Length of knowing     
Years known 18 7 35 7 
standardised for age 60% 29% 87% 13% 
      
Trust     
Average trust 3.8 2.1 5.0 0.7 
     
Frequency of contact     
Every day 44% 0% 88% 19% 
Every week 23% 0% 71% 14% 
Every month 18% 0% 48% 13% 
Less frequently 12% 0% 43% 12% 
 
Table 12 Average network density (N=45) 
  
Average Min Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Density 
.60 .16 1.00 .23 
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APPENDIX 2. FIELD INSTRUMENTS 
1. Study information sheet 
2. Stakeholder interview guide 
3. Group interview guide 
4. Semi-structured interview guide 
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Invitación de participación en proyecto de 
investigación sobre Desigualdad y Violencia en Venezuela  
 
Usted está invitado(a) a participar en un proyecto de investigación. Antes de decidir si va a 
participar o no, es importante entender los objetivos y metodologías del estudio. Por favor, 
tome un tiempo para leer las siguientes informaciones. 
 
El interés del estudio es en una presumida relación entre 'desigualdad' y 'violencia'. En Venezuela la 
relación entre estos conceptos parece invertida. El país ha logrado importantes avances en términos de 
disminución de la desigualdad de ingresos, mientras que la violencia, en términos de homicidios, ha 
aumentado.  
 
El objetivo principal del estudio es entender esta supuesta paradoja, por medio de entrevistas con 
habitantes de dos áreas del país, Caracas y Cumaná. De hecho, sus experiencias y perspectivas son 
sumamente importante para obtener un entendimiento mas amplio de la desigualdad tanto como la 
violencia. Seria muy agradecida si me daría el permiso para entrevistarle en uno o dos ocasiones. Cada 
entrevista variara en tiempo, según sus respuestas y experiencias, pero no tardara mas de una a dos 
horas en cada ocasión. En la entrevista hablaremos de su contexto familiar, su barrio, su vida diaria y las 
personas que le rodean. Le pediré nombrar algunas personas de su contexto, para poder evaluar la 
diversidad y densidad de las redes personales en Venezuela. Hay algunas preguntas sobre la violencia 
que pueden ser sensibles, se le recuerda que siempre pueda rechazar responder cualquiera pregunta. 
Todo se mantendrá completamente confidencial y nunca se vinculará con sus datos personales. 
 
El proyecto de investigación es parte de la finalización de mi doctorado en Estudios del Desarrollo en la 
Escuela de Estudios Globales de la Universidad de Sussex, Inglaterra. El proyecto está financiado por el 
Consejo de Investigación Económica y Social (ESRC) en Inglaterra. Ha sido aprobado a través del proceso 
de revisión ética de la Universidad de Sussex. Los datos recopilados serán procesados y analizados de 
acuerdo con sus procedimientos estrictos de confidencialidad. 
 
Su participación es totalmente voluntaria y libre. Usted será libre de retirarse en cualquier momento 
durante la entrevista, sin ninguna consecuencia y sin dar razón alguna. Sus datos serán manejados de 
manera completamente anónima.  
Pediré grabar la entrevista para no necesitar tomar notas, usted estará siempre libre de rechazar esa 
grabación. En caso de ser efectuada, la grabación será transcrita para facilitarme el análisis. Las 
grabaciones serán borradas y las transcripciones se almacenarán en cumplimiento con las directrices de 
la Universidad de Sussex. Los datos anónimos serán analizados para mi tesis doctoral, que estará 
disponible al público.  
 
En caso de necesitar más información sobre la investigación, por favor no dude en ponerse en contacto 
conmigo por medio de mi correo electrónico: ellen.vdb@sussex.ac.uk. En caso de cualquier inquietud 
restante, acerca de la forma de levantamiento de la investigación, por favor póngase en contacto con 
Julie Litchfield, mi supervisora principal en la Universidad de Sussex, en su correo electrónico 
J.A.Litchfield@sussex.ac.uk.  
 
Muchas gracias por leer esta información cuidadosamente. Espero que participe en el proyecto y le 
resulte una experiencia útil y estimulante. 
 
  
Ellen Vandenbogaerde 
 
Estudiante en Estudios del Desarrollo  
University of Sussex 
Brighton 
Reino Unido 
 
 ellen.vdb@sussex.ac.uk  
0424 127 1797  
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TITULO DE PROYECTO:  
Desigualdad y Violencia en Venezuela 
    
Estoy de acuerdo en participar en el proyecto de investigación de la Universidad de Sussex. El 
proyecto me ha sido explicado por completo y he leído y comprendido la ficha de información.  
Entiendo que participar quiere decir que estoy dispuesto a ser entrevistado por la 
investigadora y permitiré que la entrevista sea grabada y transcrita. 
Entiendo que cualquier información que dé es confidencial, y que ninguna información que 
revele conducirá a la identificación de cualquier persona en los informes sobre el proyecto, 
tanto por la investigadora o por cualquier otra parte. 
 
Entiendo que mi participación es voluntaria, que puede optar por no participar en una parte o 
la totalidad del proyecto, y que puede retirarme en cualquier etapa del proyecto, sin ser 
penalizado o desfavorecido de ninguna manera. 
 
Estoy de acuerdo con el tratamiento de mis datos personales a los efectos de este estudio de 
investigación. Entiendo que dicha información será considerada estrictamente confidencial y 
se tratará de acuerdo con la Ley de Protección de Datos de 1998. 
 
 
Nombre: 
 
 
 
Firma: 
 
 
 
Fecha: 
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Actores claves. 
 
A aprender sobre tipos, formas y cambios en… 
● La economía informal!  
● La violencia 
● La pobreza 
● El bienestar objetivo – vivienda, educación, pobreza 
● El bienestar subjetivo   
● Las redes sociales 
 
INTRO 
Soy una estudiante de doctorado de la universidad de Sussex en Inglaterra. Estoy investigando 
la relación entre desigualdad y violencia. La comunidad académica puede aprender bastante de 
los cambios recientes en Venezuela. Parece que se han visto cambios muy importantes en 
términos de desigualdad y participación local. Sin embargo,  parece que la violencia está 
subiendo. He elegido dos sitios en Venezuela con diferentes tipos de desigualdad, para 
ayudarme entender estos cambios y procesos. Estoy particularmente interesada en definiciones 
locales de bienestar y desigualdad, y si pueden ser relacionados con diferentes tipos o formas 
de violencia. En los siguientes meses voy a hacer entrevistas en las comunidades de Sucre y 
Cumana.  
 
Usted, como experto/a / especialista en […]  me puede ayudar muchísimo a entender estas 
comunidades. Espero que me puede dar un poco de su tiempo. 
Quisiera recordar la entrevista porque se me hace difícil  anotar todo por completo. Este se va 
transcribir, se le puede enviar la transcripción para que revise cualquier cosa. 
Su participación es totalmente voluntaria y libre. Usted será libre de retirarse en cualquier 
momento durante la entrevista, sin ninguna consecuencia y sin dar razón alguna. Sus datos serán 
manejados de manera completamente anónima.  
 
PREGUNTAS 
 
Cuál es su oficio aquí? Cuánto tiempo lleva aquí? …  
 
Perfil de la comunidad.  
MATRIZ población -  
● Composición de viviendas (jefatura masculina/ feminina) Viviendas complejas o 
nucleos? 
● Infraestructura,  
● Ingresos (por genero), mayores formas de empleo /ganarse la vida en esta comunidad/ 
barrio? (diferencias por genero!?) ¿qué actividades?  
● Migracion (afuera? por trabajo?) 
● Comunicaciones - television, periodicos,  
● grupos etnicos? Migration?  
● identidad? 
 
○ Bienestar en la comunidad?  
● Hay una cualidad de vida buena en la comunidad? ¿Como definieras cualidad de 
vida? Que puede impedir la cualidad de vida? Como se compare a otros 
comunidades?  
● Pobreza? Como se manifiesta la pobreza?   
● Comparaciones por tiempo y espacio! Comparado a otros comunidades 
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● Como ha cambiado la cualidad de vida? La pobreza?  
● futuro??? 
 
○ Problemas? 
● ¿Cuales son las problemas en la comunidad local?  
● ¿Como han cambiado?  
● ¿Hay un problema de violencia?  
Los cuales tipos o formas de violencia? P.e. violencia familiar, de genero, 
criminalidad, delitos menores, jovenes, antisociales, hurto, robo, 
secuestro, homicidios, violencia en las escuelas, jóvenes... 
adonde occuren?? en la calle?? cerca de que?? 
ORDENAR segun prevalencia y importancia (impacto?)  
○ ¿Como se compare con otras comunidades, el resto del pais?  
○ ¿Ha cambiado en los ultimos 2, 5, 10 años? Ha disminuido o crecido? ¿Otros 
formas / tipos?  
○ ¿Cuales son las causas de la violencia? ¿Quien son los autores?  
○ ¿Brechas importantes?  
● ¿Los cuales son los grupos sociales en la comunidad? P.e. segun edad, genero, 
jerarquía social, afiliación política, bienestar económico...   
● ¿Hay gente excluida de acceso / cualquier proceso en la comunidad?  
● ¿Ha cambiado? 
● ¿Tejido social de la comunidad? ¿Cohesion comunitaria? ¿Hay conflictos?  
● ¿Como difiere la comunidad de comunidades alrededor, y el pais?  
● ¿cuales son sus grupos referenciales? Las limites fronteras sociales son permeables? 
hay oportunidades para la movilidad social? la gente puede mejorarse? 
● ¿diferencias / exclusion son justos??? 
 
○ ¿Instituciones?  
● Cuales instituciones comunitarias existen aqui en la comunidad? ¿Civiles? 
¿Estadales? P.e.. consejo communal, religiosas, segurdidad, vecinales, jovenes 
neighbourhood watch, youth groups… 
DIAGRAMA INSTITUCIONAL  
● ¿Quien participe, quien no participe?  
● ¿Como la gente contribuye/ influye/ actua sobre estas organizaciones?  
● Que podria prevenir / impedir que inversiones y servicios publicos alcanzan hasta 
los mas pobres y vulnerables? hay razones relacionadas con etnicidad, genero, 
agenda politica o isolacion geografica?  
 
Muchisimas gracias por su tiempo. Les enviare la transcripcion de la grabacion para que se puede 
revisar. Cualquier pregunta, por favor contactame!  
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Grupos focales.  
[2-12 participantes. Homogéneo según edad, sexo, ingreso, afiliación política.] 
 
Soy estudiante de doctorado en la universidad de Sussex en Inglaterra. Estoy 
estudiando Venezuela porque en los últimos años se han implementado cambios muy 
importantes en este país, de los cuales nosotros en otros países también podríamos 
aprender muchísimo. Estoy enfocándome particularmente en comunidades de Catia y 
Cumana para entender como estos cambios han afectado a la gente, y el impacto que 
han tenido en las vidas diarias de la gente.   
 
En este grupo, quiero explorar percepciones locales de bienestar y cambios en estas 
percepciones. También quiero aprender las cuales son los problemas que perciben en 
la comunidad, y las redes y relaciones con las cuales cuentan para su apoyo material 
tal como emocional. Vamos a utilizar algunas metodologías y técnicas distintas, como 
la ordenación, marcación, el dibujo en hojas de papel A4. Les explicaré mientras 
avanzamos.  
 
[XX] está aquí para ayudarme a facilitar la discusión. Es importante saber que la 
investigación se hace completamente independiente de [xx], para mi tesis doctoral.  Los 
resultados se compartirán con [xx]... Espero que ustedes pueden aprender también.  
 
Por favor, acuérdense que si no estén cómodos con algunas preguntas, siempre tienen 
el derecho para no responder. Estén libres de salir de la discusión a cualquier tiempo y 
sin tener que justificarlo. Todo lo que dicen aquí es completamente confidencial. Sus 
nombres nunca saldrán en ningún informe y ninguna persona podría identificarles.   
Me gustaría grabar la discusión para no tener que tomar notas de todo lo que dicen. 
Estas grabaciones se transcribirán y se destruyeran después. Ni esas 
transcripciones ni las citas que utilizare en mi tesis les identificarán. Utilizare un 
seudónimo por la comunidad y características demográficas generales por las 
citas (como un hombre de mediana edad de xx dice...) 
 
Por favor, firmen ese consentimiento, para demostrar que les he explicado mis objetivos, 
ustedes los entienden y han aceptado participar en la discusión.  Pueden guardar la hoja 
de información para si quieren contactarme en el futuro.  
 
Todo que me queda decir es que no hay respuestas buenas o malas, justas o falsas. Yo 
estoy aquí para aprender de ustedes, ustedes son los expertos!  
 
Por favor respetamos las opiniones de todos aquí presente y escuchamos lo que tengan 
a decir. Hablamos cada uno a su vez. Algunas de las cosas que vamos a discutir pueden 
parecer repetitivos. Tienen paciencia, estoy tratando de los asuntos / temas desde 
perspectivas distintas.  
 
¿Hay preguntas? 
¿Pueden introducirse por favor? ¿Quien es/eres? ¿Cuánto tiempo lleva(s) viviendo 
aquí?  
Alguien tiene problemas con grabar la discusión desde aquí?  
EMPIEZA GRABACIÓN   
 
TEMA PREGUNTAS HERRAMIENTA
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 Primero, me puedes contar un poco sobre su 
comunidad local? ¿Que es la comunidad para 
ustedes? ¿La cual consideras tu comunidad?  Límites/ 
fronteras administrativas,  
o Las cuales son los mayores formas de empleo 
/ganarse la vida?  Hay diferencias por género?  
○ Composición de viviendas/hogares? Jefatura 
femenina o masculina? 
○ Cuales son los diferentes grupos sociales en la 
comunidad? P.e. según edad, genero, jerarquía 
social, afiliación política, bienestar económico/ 
riqueza.  
○ ¿Como ha cambiado en los últimos 2, 5, 10 
años?  
Quisiera utilizar un seudónimo por esta comunidad en mi 
tesis. ¿Cual sea el nombre preferido por la comunidad?  
 
MAPAS DE LA 
COMUNIDAD – 
dibujos, 
identificando 
fronteras y 
ubicaciones 
claves.  
MATRIZ 
HISTÓRICA – 
mas útil con 
participantes 
mayores (fecha / 
evento / impacto 
en la comunidad)  
 
 EL BIENESTAR SUBJETIVO / CUALIDAD DE VIDA  
 ¿Como definiera(s) el bienestar, o una buena 
cualidad de vida?   
Lista de puntos/criterios que definen la cualidad de vida.   
○ Ordena estos artículos según IMPORTANCIA. 
Cual porcentaje de la comunidad tiene acceso a 
estos criterios? Como difiere según diferentes 
grupos en la comunidad? Hay alguien excluido 
localmente? Proporción de viviendas/ individuos 
en cada categoría. MARCAR 
○ Ordena la comunidad en cada de estos criterios. 
MARCAR  
○ Comunidad comparada con comunidades 
vecinas y el país? 
○ ¿Como ha cambiado en los últimos 2, 5 , 10 
años? Los criterios mismos han cambiado? 
Algunos están mas importantes hoy que antes? 
¿Porque? La gente ahora esta mejor o peor? 
¿Porque? 
○ Futuro y situación ideal? A que aspira la gente??  
 
MARCAR / 
ANOTAR 
(semillas, 
piedras) 
 O 
DIAGRAMA / 
ESQUEMA DE 
CEBOLLA 
 
ESCALERAS! 
 
CRONOLOGIA/ 
CRONOGRAMA - 
hoy y hace 2, 5, 
10 años 
 
 SI PARECE DIFICIL, PREGUNTA SOBRE 
○ Ingresos   
○ Empleo  
○ Vivienda 
■  Títulos de propiedad 
■  Agua 
■  Electricidad 
■  Aguas negras / aseo  
■  Material en paredes/  techo/ piso 
○ Transporte  
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○ Educación   
○ Salud  
○ Apoyo emocional  
○ Seguridad  
○ Otros? 
 PROBE. ¿Cree(n) que las oportunidades para la 
movilidad económica y social se han incrementado, 
permanecen igual o han disminuido? ¿Y como vean 
el futuro? ¿Porque y por todos / quien?  
○ ¿Cuales son las secuencias de estos cambios? 
○ ¿Quien o cual(es) grupo(s) han beneficiado 
más? Hay personas o grupos que no han podido 
aprovechar de estas oportunidades o quien han 
sido afectados adversemente? Como y porque? 
○ Que tiene que cambiar para que los pobres 
tendrian mas oportunidades economicas y 
sociales? Es probable?  
 
 ¿Y el malestar, o mala cualidad de vida? ¿Que son 
los problemas en la comunidad?  
Lista de problemas en la comunidad.   
○ ¿Los cuales estan mas problematicos?   
○ ¿Cual porcentaje de la comunidad esta afectado 
por cada uno/a? ¿Diferentes grupos estan 
afectados distintamente?  
○ Estos problemas han cambiado en los últimos 
años o han permanecido igual?  
○ ¿Las cuales son sus esperanzas y miedos por el 
futuro? 
○ Analísis de causa-efecto. ¿Que causa estos 
problemas, o algun problema en particular?   
○ DIBUJOS - hombre/ mujer pobre  
○ ¿Soluciones? ¿Las cuales de estos problemas 
pueden solucionar ustedes y para las cuales 
necesitan ayuda/ apoyo externo? 
¿Responsabilidades? ¿Quien tiene la 
responsabilidad para resolver estos problemas? 
¿Como la gente maneja / hace frente a estos 
problemas / crisis? ¿Es posible salir de la 
pobreza?  
 
CLASIFICAR / 
MARCAR / 
ANOTAR  
 
 
 
DIAGRAMAS 
VENN / 
CIRCULACIÓN 
(Tamaño de 
círculos según 
nivel de 
importancia, 
círculos mas 
grandes=problem
as mas 
importantes) 
 VIOLENCIA/ SEGURIDAD  
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 SI LA VIOLENCIA ES UN PROBLEMA. ¿Como definas 
la violencia? ¿Cuales tipos de violencia hay en la 
comunidad?   
○ ¿Cual tiene peor impacto? ¿Cual ocurre mas?  
○ ¿Como ha(n) cambiado?   
○ Como compare con otras comunidades, el pais 
en general?  
○ ¿Hay diferencias por temporada? ¿Mas violencia 
en feriadas? ¿Armas? 
○ Cuales son las causas de diferentes formas de 
violencia? VENN/FLOW   
○ ¿Efectos de la violencia? ¿Quien son las 
victimas? ¿Victimarios? ¿Quien sufra mas? 
(edad, grupo social, edad) 
○ ¿Estrategias  a corto, medio y soluciones a largo 
plazo?  
IMPACTO Y 
FRECUENCIA  
 
CRONOLOGÍA / 
SECUENCIA 
TEMPORAL - 
antes, ahora, 
futuro  
 
ARBOL 
PROBLEMATICA 
(problema en 
tallo, causas en 
raices, efectos en 
ramas)  
 ¿Como definieras seguridad y/o inseguridad? 
¿Riesgo? 
Elementos claves / constitutivos. ¿La comunidad esta 
segura?   
○ ¿Algunos individuos/viviendas están mas 
seguros que otros?  Cuales factores hacen que 
algunos/as esten mas arriesgados/as?   
○ Que tan seguro/a se sienten en la comunidad? 
En sus casas? En las calles? La inseguridad ha 
mejorado o peorado?  
○ Como ha cambiado?  
CLASIFICAR / 
MARCAR / 
ANOTAR  
 
MAPAS DE 
SEGURIDAD - 
ubicaciones 
claves adonde 
gente tiene miedo 
de irse  
 
 COHESION SOCIAL / EXCLUSION  
 ¿Como definieras la cohesion social? ¿El tejido 
social?  
¿Hay mas o menos sentido de pertenencia? Unidad 
social? La confianza? Porque?  
○ ¿Cuales son las causas de confianza/ 
disconfianza? Miedo?  
○ ¿Hay conflictos entre alguna gente / grupos en la 
comunidad? ¿Cual(es) gente / grupos? Porque? 
○ ¿Han incrementado, disminuido o siguen igual? 
¿Porque? ¿Como? 
○ ¿Alguien se beneficia / aproveche de conflictos?  
○ ¿La situación puede cambiarse? ¿Como? 
CLASIFICAR / 
MARCAR / 
ANOTAR  
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 ¿Hay gente/ grupos en la comunidad excluidos? 
¿Mal vistos?  
○ Quien son los mas excluidos, socialmente o 
economicamente aislados?  
○ Hay diferencias en poder entre los incluidos y los 
excluidos? Porque? Que hace unos mas 
poderosos que otros? Cual es el origen de 
influencia de estos grupos (p.e. tamano del 
grupo, conexiones con elite en poder, 
importancia economica?)   
○ Cual es el impacto de exclusión? being left out? 
 
ORDENAMIENT
O de distintos 
tipos y causas de 
exclusión  
 
 Hay gente excluida de participación  activa en la vida 
de la comunidad o el tomo de decisiones?  
 
○ Como se hacen  decisiones importantes en la 
comunidad? como la gente puede influir estas 
decisiones? Los cuales grupos tienenn enos 
influencia y porque?  
○ Como ha cambiado? H Basis de exclusion?  
○ Es posible por los excluidos hacerse incluido?  
Cual probable es que van incluirse?  
 
 
 REDES FORMALES Y INFORMALES  
 Las cuales instituciones y asociaciones formales y 
informales estan importantes en sus vidas? 
● Cuales son las institituciones  formales, 
informales, de gobierno, estatales, civiles, de mercado, 
mas importantes? 
● Hay Misiones en esta comunidad?  
● Confianza? Eficacia?  
● Evaluación - Cuales son sus impactos positivos 
o negativos sobre la comunidad? Porque? Ejemplos? 
MAPAS 
INSTITUCIONAL
ES (tamaño de 
círculos según 
importancia, 
centro -> 
periferia) POR 
integración en la 
comunidad,  
MARCAR según 
importancia,  
 ¿Le(s) parece que puede(n) influir / controlar estas 
instituciones?  
○ Hay grupos en la comunidad que tienen mas 
influencia? Hay personas que quedan excluidos?  
 
 A las cuales personas o redes puedes recurrir para 
solucionar sus problemas?  
MATRIZ DE RECURSOS 
○ Mercado, gobierno, familia, amigos etc. 
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El cuestionario se enfoca en sus / tus relaciones. Nuestras relaciones son muy importantes, 
nos enseñan muchas cosas y  satisfacen nuestras necesidades básicas de apoyo y soporte.  Le 
/ te pediré nombrarme las personas que están un su / tu vida ahora, o que han sido 
importantes para usted / ti en su / tu pasado. Solamente necesito el nombre de esas personas 
para que me pueda(s) responder otras preguntas sobre ellas, su sexo, edad aproximada, 
trabajo, residencia, donde les conoció/iste y cuantas veces las ve(s). Anotamos estos nombres 
en un papel que guardara(s) usted/ tu, no son importante para mi, de hecho saldrán como 
contacto 1, 2, 3, etc. Igual que usted / tu saldrá(s) completamente anónimo/a, un sujeto x, y, 
z del estudio. Ni usted / tú, ni las personas que me nombra(s) jamás podrían ser identificados. 
S/tus derechos de anonimato como sujeto de estudio son fundamentales para mi, tanto como 
para mi universidad y sin estas garantías nunca obtendré mi grado.  
 
Otra parte importante del cuestionario se enfocara en tus/sus experiencias de violencia. 
Recuerde/a que es completamente confidencial, y nunca será posible identificarle/te. Se le 
/te agradece su / tu mayor honestidad para poder entender la situación que vive Venezuela y 
lograr aportar, sea minúsculamente, a cambiar sus realidades. Si algunas preguntas le/te 
parecen demasiado íntimas o difíciles siempre puede /s rechazar responderlas, diciendo que 
no sabe(s) la respuesta o no quiere(s) responder. Para el análisis será mucho mas útil que NO 
responda(s) a que sea(s) incompleto/a o deshonesta su respuesta.   
 
No hay respuestas falsas o erróneas, usted / tu es / eres el experto en lo que vive(s). Yo estoy 
aquí para aprender de su / tu vida diaria. Algunas preguntas pueden parecer molestas o 
repetitivas, por favor tenga/ ten paciencia, todas son importantes de una u otra manera para 
lograr el entendimiento de la realidad Venezolana. No obstante, si hay preguntas que no 
tienen sentido, por favor no tenga/ s duda en decírmelo para una aclaratoria. 
 
Quiero grabar la entrevista para no tener que tomar notas, las cuales siempre estarán 
incompletas y además demoraran la entrevista. Transcribiré la grabación para después 
borrarla. En esta transcripción nunca pondré su/tu nombre, será completamente anónima y 
utilizada únicamente para el análisis. Nunca podrá/ podrías ser identificado/a. Su / tu nombre 
nunca será grabado ni transcrito. Esta(s) de acuerdo con esa grabación?  
 
DEMOGRAFIA. 
 
En primer lugar, le / te haré algunas preguntas generales para poder clasificarle/te.  
 
1. SEX. Sexo. 
1. Masculino 
2. Femenino  
 
2. EDAD. Cuantos años tiene(s)? 
 
3. ANO. En que año y donde nació/iste?  
 
4. RA. Según sus / tus rasgos físicos, ascendencia familiar, cultura y tradiciones se / te 
considera(s): 
1. Negra/negro 
2. Afrodescendiente 
3. Moreno/morena 
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4. Blanca/Blanco 
5.  Otra ¿cuál? 
 
5. CONYUGAL. Su / tu situación conyugal actual es: 
1. Unido(a)  -> 7 
2. Casado(a) -> 7 
3. Soltero(a) -> 6 
4. Separado(a) de unión o matrimonio -> 6 
5. Divorciado(a) -> 6 
6. Viudo(a) de unión o matrimonio -> 6 
 
6. PAR. ¿Tiene(s) una pareja ahora?  No. -> 8 
 
7. PAR1. ¿Cómo se llama su/ tu pareja?  
 
8. PAR_x1. Hay otras parejas o ex-parejas con quien ha(s) tenido contacto en los últimos 2 
años? ~Cuanto tiempo tuvieron juntos, hace cuanto? 
 
9. HIJ_x1. ¿Tiene(s) niños/as? ¿Hijastro/as? ¿Cuantos? ¿Me puede(s) nombrar los mayores 
de 15 años? ~¿Con quien?  
 
VIVIENDA/ SECTOR.   
 
Ahora haré algunas preguntas sobre su/tu vivienda y el sector donde vive(s).  
10. SECT. ¿Cómo se llama el sector donde vive(s)? (Donde duerme(s) normalmente?)  
 
11. HOG. Cuantos hogares hay en su/tu vivienda?  
 
12. HOG_x1. ¿Cuántas personas viven en su/tu hogar [vivienda??]? Me las puede(s) 
nombrar? 
  
13. JEF. ¿Quien de ellas es el jefe de hogar? 
 
14. CUART. ¿Cuantos cuartos hay? (¿ Con quien compartes un cuarto?) 
 
15. PAG. La vivienda es: 
1. Propia pagada totalmente 
2. Propia pagándose -> cuanto pagas? 
3. Alquilada  -> cuanto pagas? 
4. Prestada 
5. Cedida 
6. Otra  
 
268 
 
 
 
16. VIVCOND. ¿Y la vivienda es en mejor, peor o igual condición que la de tus vecinos? Y del 
resto del sector? ¿Porque? 
 
17. VECX. ¿Conoce(s) algunos de tus vecinos? Me puede(s) nombrar los con quien tenga(s) 
mas contacto o que sean mas importante para usted/ti? (máximo 5) 
 
18. SECTTIEMP. ¿Cuanto tiempo tiene(s) viviendo allí?  
 
19. OTRSECT. ¿Ha(s) vivido (o tiene(s) vivienda / habitación) en otros sectores, barrios o 
ciudades? ¿Cuándo, cuanto tiempo? 
 
20. OTRSECTCONTX. ¿Todavía tiene(s) contactos, familia o conocidos allá? ¿Como se llaman?  
 
21. CONFSECT. Hablando de la gente de tu / su sector en general, ¿diría que la gente de tu / 
su sector es: 
ESCALA A.  
1. Muy confiable  
2. Algo confiable  
3. Poco confiable  
4. Nada confiable 
 
22. Pensando en tu sector, diría(s) que en los últimos 10 años, la… 
ESCALA I.  
1 Aumento mucho 
2 Aumento poco 
3 Se mantuvo 
4 Disminuyo poco 
5 Disminuyo mucho 
A.  Confianza entre vecinos 
B.  Participación en actividades para mejorar el sector (p.e. recolección de basura, 
construcción de canchas) 
C.  Convivencia 
 
23. Ahora le voy a leer una serie de frases, por favor dígame si está(s) de acuerdo, o en 
desacuerdo con cada una de ellas. 
ESCALA B. 
1. Muy en desacuerdo 
2. Algo en desacuerdo 
3. Ni en acuerdo ni en desacuerdo 
4. Algo de acuerdo 
5. Muy de acuerdo 
 
A. Me siento parte de mi comunidad  
B. Los vecinos ayuden a vigilar el barrio 
C. Conozco la mayoría de mis vecinos por nombre  
D. Las personas estén dispuestas a atestiguar contra otro cuando lo han visto o 
saben de su participación en un hecho delictivo.  
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E. Un vecino ayude a otro  
F. Los vecinos intervengan en una pelea conyugal  
G. Algún vecino regañe a alguien que esté escribiendo en las paredes de una casa o 
edifico del barrio 
H. Alguien llame a la policía si escucha una pelea callejera 
 
24. CONCOM. ¿Hay un consejo comunal en su/tu sector? ¿Como se llama? 
 
25. CONCOMPART. ¿Participa(s) en sus reuniones? 
ESCALA C.  
1. Nunca 
2. Casi nunca 
3. A veces 
4. Casi siempre 
5. Siempre 
 
26. CONCOMOP. ¿Qué opina(s) sobre el trabajo que hacen en tu / su sector? 
  
CONTEXTO FAMILIAR.  
 
27. FAMX. Ahora le pediré nombrar sus/tus familiares más importantes. Me puede(s) 
nombrar los con quien tenga(s) mas contacto o que sean mas importante para usted/ti? 
(máximo 5) 
 
 PADR_x1. Padres / padrastro(s) / madrastra(s) 
 HERM_x1. Hermanos/as (mayores de 15 años)  
 ABU_x1. Abuelos que estén vivos o han muerto en los últimos 2 años. Si muertos, que 
hicieron de trabajo? 
 TIO_x1. Tios/as con quien mantienes contacto o los/ las que sean mas importantes en 
tu vida personal 
 PRI_x1. Primos/as con quien mantienes contacto o los/ las que sean mas importantes 
en tu vida personal 
 
EDUCACION / CARRERA. 
 
Ahora haré algunas preguntas sobre su/tu educación y carrera.  
 
28. EDU. ¿Cuál fue su/tu último grado, año o semestre aprobado y de qué nivel educativo: 
1. Ninguno 
2. Inicial (preescolar)     
3. Primaria (1-6)  Grado __ 
4. Secundaria (1-5), (6) Año__ 
5. Técnico superior     Año __ Semestre __ 
6. Universitario  Semestre __ Trimestre __  
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29. ESC. ¿Cual escuela? ¿Sector? Publica / privada / misión? 
30. LIC. ¿Liceo? ¿Sector? Publica / privada / militar? 
31. UNI. ¿Universidad? Publica / privada / militar? 
 
32. EDUP. Si universidad / técnico superior, que carrera y porque la escogió(iste)?  
 
33. EDUX. Me puede(s) nombrar unas personas con quien estudio/aste, sea en el liceo o la 
universidad. Con quien ha(s) tenido contacto en los últimos 2 años. 
 
TRABAJO/ INGRESOS. 
 
34. TRAB. Esta(s) trabajando? [estuviste trabajando antes de entrar en la cárcel / hospital?] 
 
 Si no trabaja, porque? Es difícil encontrar trabajo en su/tu ocupación? Mas difícil 
que hace 5 / 10 años? ¿Como se/te mantiene(s)?  ¿droga?  
 Si trabaja - en que ocupación? Cuando empezó/aste a trabajar? Donde esta 
ubicado? Tipo de empresa. Como conseguiste el trabajo? Era difícil? 
 
1. Empleado(a) en el sector público 
2. Obrero(a) en el sector público 
3. Empleado(a) en empresa privada 
4. Obrero(a) en empresa privada 
5. Trabajador (a) por cuenta propia (que no tiene empleados ni obreros) 
6. Miembro de cooperativa 
7. Trabajador en sociedades de personas 
8. Ayudante familiar no remunerado 
9. Servicio doméstico 
 
35. TRABX. ¿Me puede(s) nombrar algunas personas con quien trabaja(s)? Las personas con 
quien mas interactúa(s)? (máximo 5) 
 
36. INGROTR. Tiene(s) otros fuentes de ingresos? Recibió/iste ingresos el mes pasado por 
alguno de los siguientes conceptos y cuánto: 
1. Trabajo Bs. 
2. Renta Bs. 
3. Pensión  Bs. 
4. Jubilación Bs. 
5. Becas de origen público o privado  Bs. 
6. Seguro de paro forzoso Bs. 
7. Pensión alimentaria Bs. 
8. Misiones  Bs. 
9. Otros Bs. 
10. Ninguno Bs. 
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37. INGR. ¿Cuánto recibió/iste en total como salario, en todos sus/tus trabajos el mes 
pasado (o último mes que trabajó)? 
38. SEGSOC. Incluye algún ticket de alimentación / Cestaticket? Seguro? 
1 = Instituto Venezolano de Seguros Sociales (IVSS) 
2 = Instituto de Prevención Social (IPASME, IMPREABOGADO, IPP, etc.) 
3 = Seguro médico privado 
4 = No tiene Plan de Seguridad de Atención Médica 
 
39. INGRFAM. Ingresos del hogar, aproximadamente?  
 
40. ALC. El ingreso del hogar…  
1. Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar 
2. Les alcanza justo, sin grandes dificultades 
3. No les alcanza, tienen dificultades 
4. No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades 
5. No sabe 
 
41. ECOMEJ. La situación económica de tu hogar ahora esta mejor que hace 10 años, igual o 
peor? Mucho o poco?  
42. ECOCOMP. La situación económica de tu hogar es mejor, peor o igual en comparación 
con los otras hogares en tu sector? Mucho o poco? 
 
43. TRANS. Tienes medio de transporte? Como te trasladas? 
44. COMP. Tienes (acceso a) una computadora?  
 
OCIO. 
 
Las próximas preguntas quieren entender mejor que hace(s) en su /tu tiempo libre.  
 
45. OCIO. Que haces en una semana normal cuando no esté(s) trabajando? Cuales sitios 
visitas? Adonde socializas? Plazas/ centros comerciales? Parques? Bares? Fiestas en el 
barrio? 
 
46. COMPX. Con quien te gusta salir o compartir (p.e. un espacio publico, para hablar, comer 
o tomar algo)?   
 
47. PART. En la escala E, con que frecuencia participa(s) en… 
A. Actividades recreacionales / deporte  
B. Fiestas en el barrio 
C. Una iglesia 
D. Reuniones del Consejo Comunal 
E. Actividades de un centro Juvenil / Estudiantil / Cultural / Voluntario 
F. Un grupo a través de internet 
G. Otro? 
1. Nunca 
2. En muy pocas ocasiones 
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3. Más o menos una vez al mes 
4. Más o menos una vez en la semana 
5. Casi todos los días 
 
48. Si A, C, E. Parte de un grupo formal? ¿Como y cuando ingresaste? ¿Donde y cuando se 
vean?  
49. ¿Quién son otros miembros con quien te llevas bien? 
 
50. Todos necesitamos personas con quien discutir asuntos importantes.  Con quien has 
discutido asuntos personales importantes en los últimos 6 meses? (5 máximo)   
 
51. Ves la televisión? Cual? Frecuencia? 
52. Lees los periódicos? Cual? Frecuencia? 
53. Radio? Cual? Frecuencia? 
54. Internet? Frecuencia?  
  
55. Hablando en general, ¿dirías que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que 
uno nunca es lo suficientemente cuidadoso en el trato con los demás?  
 
1 Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas 
2 Uno nunca es lo suficientemente cuidadoso en el trato con los demás  
 
56. ¿Qué tan ciertas son las siguientes afirmaciones? 
ESCALA D.  
1. Para nada cierta 
2. Algo Cierta 
3. Bastante Cierta 
4. Completamente Cierta 
 
a. Me llevo bien con las personas con las que tengo contacto.  
b. Considero cercanas a las personas con las que me relaciono.  
c. La gente que me rodea se preocupa por mí.  
 
 
BIENESTAR SUJETIVO. 
 
Seguimos con algunas preguntas sobre tus / sus percepciones de bienestar. 
 
57. RESP. Cuando te sientes respetado? Que es el respeto / poder para ti? Hay veces cuando 
la gente te falta respeto?  
 
58. ¿En qué medida siente que la gente lo trata con respeto?  
59. ¿En qué medida siente que la gente lo trata injustamente?  
ESCALA C.  
1. Nunca 
2. Casi nunca 
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3. A veces 
4. Casi siempre 
5. Siempre 
  
60. Imagínese una escalera de diez escalones, donde arriba están las mejores condiciones de 
vida que pueda imaginar y abajo las peores: 
DIBUJO DE ESCALERA 
Mejores condiciones de vida que pueda imaginar  10 
          9  
         8   
        7    
       6     
      5      
     4       
    3        
Peores condiciones de 
vida que pueda imaginar 
  2        
 1         
0          
 
 
A. ¿Quién esta arriba? ¿Quien esta abajo?  
B. ¿Dónde te ubicarías ahora?  
C. ¿Dónde te ubicaste hace cinco anos?  
 
61. ¿Crees que tus oportunidades de mejorar su nivel de vida son hoy día, mejores, iguales o 
peores que las que tuvieron sus padres? 
 
62. ESP. ¿Que son sus / tus expectativas y esperanzas para el futuro?  
 
 
VIOLENCIA/ VICTIMIZACION 
 
Ahora, quiero hacer algunas preguntas sobre la violencia. Primero, pensando en la violencia 
en tu sector. 
 
63. SECTVIO5. En los últimos 5 años, la violencia en [sector] ha aumentado, disminuido, o 
sigue igual? ¿Mucho o poco?  ¿Porque?  
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64. SECTVIO10. Y en los últimos 10 años, ha aumentado, disminuido, o sigue igual? ¿Mucho 
o poco?   
65. SECTVIOCOM. Y la violencia en tu sector es ¿Igual, mejor o peor que en otros sectores de 
Catia? ¿Caracas? ¿El resto del país?  
66. SI DICEN QUE HAY VIOLENCIA ¿Que tipos / formas? ¿Con que frecuencia?  
 
Las próximas preguntas tocan sus/tus propias experiencias de violencia.  
Estas preguntas pueden ser sensibles, se le recuerde que esta siempre libre de rechazar 
responder cualquiera pregunta. 
 
67. PEG. En escale E, ¿Con qué frecuencia te pegaban para corregirte cuando niño/a? 
68. ¿Con qué le pagaban más frecuentemente cuando era niño/a? 
1. Con la mano 
2. Con una chancleta 
3. Con una vara, faja o correa 
4. Con cualquier objeto duro 
5. Con todo lo anterior 
 
69. PEGX. Quien le/te pegó?  
 
Victimización 
 
Ahora quiero saber si en alguna ocasión has sido victima de un delito grave.  
 
70. ASA. ¿Ha(s) sido asaltado (golpeado, empujado o pateado)?  
71. DISP. ¿Te / Le han disparado con un arma de fuego? 
72. SECU. ¿Te / le secuestraron (llevaron y mantuvieron cautivo contra su voluntad)? 
73. ROB. ¿Te / le robaron? 
 
74. VICT. Me puedes contar un poco mas de la (ultima) situación? Que pasó? Cuando y 
donde pasó? Utilizaron armas (Ejemplo: Botella, vidrio, cuchillo, manopla, líquido, o 
cuerda, fuego?) Necesitaste atención medica? Cuantos victimarios había? 
 
75. VICTX. ¿Conocías a los victimarios? Me les puede(s) nombrar? 
 
76. MUEVIOX. Alguien que conocías murió por violencia? Me le puede(s) nombrar? Cuando, 
que pasó? 
 
77. (RPQ Questionnaire)  
 
En algunas ocasiones, la mayoría de nosotros, incluso yo, nos sentimos molestos o hemos 
hecho cosas que quizás no deberíamos haber hecho. No le/te voy a juzgar por sus/tus 
respuestas, es importante que trata(s) de ser honesto/a. Recuerda que todas sus respuestas 
son completamente confidencial y nadie aparte de yo les vera. No pase(s) mucho tiempo 
pensando las respuestas, sólo señale/a lo primero que haya(s) pensado al escuchar la 
pregunta.  
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¿Con qué frecuencia? 
 
A. Has gritado a otros cuando te han irritado -> Quien 
B. Has tenido peleas con otros? (o sea que has pegado, golpeado, empujado, apuñalado 
o pateado a otros, para mostrar quien era superior o para defenderte?) -> 
Quien  
C. Has dañado cosas porque te sentías bravo / molestado  
D. Has hablado mal de otra persona?  
E. Has llevado un arma blanca o de fuego al salir por la calle?  
F. Has disparado contra alguien?  
G. Has participado en tiroteos o peleas de bandas?  
H. Has usado la fuerza y/ o una arma para obtener dinero o cosas de otros?  
1. Nunca 
2. Casi nunca 
3. A veces 
4. A menudo 
5. Siempre 
 
78. ¿Me puede(s) contar un poco mas de la primera vez que ocurrió? ¿Y la última vez?  
 
a. Cuando y donde pasó? Fecha, calle/ fiesta/ casa… Había otra gente presente? 
b. Utilizaron armas (Ejemplo: Botella, vidrio, cuchillo, manopla, líquido, o cuerda, 
fuego?) 
c. Necesitó atención medica?  
 
79. En escala E, Con que frecuencia toma(s) alcohol?  
80. En escala E, Con que frecuencia consume(s) droga?   
 
 
81. Ahora, voy a leer unas oraciones / frases, indícame por favor que tan típico son de ti. 1 
equivalía a «extremadamente atípico / incaracterístico de mí» y 5 era «extremadamente 
característico en mí». Si te molestas rápidamente, seria 5, si no te molestas rápidamente 
será  
 
A. Ante un problema, yo sé cómo controlarme para no pelear  
B. Me molesto rápidamente, pero se me pasa enseguida 
C. Si se me provocan lo suficiente, puedo llegar a golpear a otra persona 
D. Frecuentemente no estoy de acuerdo con la gente 
E. En ocasiones siento que la vida me ha tratado injustamente 
F. Parece que siempre son otros los que consiguen las oportunidades 
G. Cuando la gente no está de acuerdo conmigo, no puedo evitar discutir con ellos 
H. Me pregunto por qué algunas veces me siento tan molesto por algunas cosas 
I. Mis amigos dicen que discuto mucho 
J. Ante un conflicto o desacuerdo serio con mi pareja, puedo explicar mis razones sin 
enojarme. 
K. Hay gente que me agrede hasta tal punto que llegamos a pegarnos 
L. Algunas veces me molesto mucho sin razón 
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M. Tengo dificultades para controlar mi carácter 
N. Cuando me lastiman, creo que lo hicieron a propósito. 
 
82. Hay personas a cosas que te molestan? Todos tenemos relaciones difíciles. Quien 
desagradeces? Tienes culebras o enemigos? Quien se comió la luz contigo? 
 
83. Ahora le voy a leer otra serie de frases, por favor dígame si está(s) de acuerdo, o en 
desacuerdo con cada una de ellas. 
ESCALA B. 
 
NO7. Si las autoridades fallan, la gente tiene el derecho a tomar la justicia por su propia cuenta. 
NO9. La policía tiene el derecho de detener jóvenes que considere sospechosos por su aspecto 
físico. 
AC6. Una persona tiene derecho a matar para defender a su familia.  
AC7. Una persona tiene derecho a matar para defender su casa o propiedad.  
AC8. El tener un arma en la casa, hace que una casa sea más segura.  
AC9. Portar un arma hace que una persona esté más segura.  
AC10. Los niños de la calle deben ser recluidos en instituciones penales.  
AC11. A uno le molesta cuando matan a alguien en una pelea que él mismo empezó. 
 
ALTER PREGUNTAS.  
 
Viendo la lista de personas que hemos construido.  
 
84. Hay alguien importante para ti que ya no esta en la lista?  
 
85. Quien de ellas respetas mas? 1 a 5.  
86. Con quien te comparas? Con quien identificas? Quien te da sentido de pertenencia? 
87. De quien te pones celosa/o??? Porque?  
 
88. En un tiempo de crisis, tendrías alguien para prestarte dinero? 
89. Quien gane mas que 16,000 bolívares mensuales, o sea 3,500 semanales? Si nadie, 
conoces alguien que gana mas? 
90. Si no hay nadie… Conoce(s) alguien… 
 En el [Este / Oeste] de la ciudad?   
Que tiene educación universitaria? 
91. Quien tiene una moto? (carro??) 
 
92. Con quien discutas política? 
93. ¿Conoces alguien en el consejo comunal? i.e. hablaron si se encontraron en la calle o el 
supermercado.  
Si no hay consejo comunal, ¿conoces alguien que participa en un partido político? 
 
94. Quien pertenece a la misma iglesia / profesión / grupo …? 
 
95. Quien has visitado en sus casas en los últimos 3 meses? Y quien te ha visitado a ti en tu 
casa? 
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96. A quien puedes recurrir para … (Tienes alguien a) recurrir para  
a. Ayudar con un trabajo en casa, por ejemplo llevar muebles, pintar una pared, 
mudanza 
b. Arreglar tu moto/carro 
c. Ordenador  
d. Cuidar tus niños? 
e. Ayudar cuando te encuentras enfermo/a, a hacer tus compras o diligencias?  
 
101. No importa que tan bien dos personas se entienden, hay tiempos cuando no están de 
acuerdo con decisiones mayores, se fastidian de algo la otra persona hace, o no más tienen 
desacuerdos o peleas. Con quien tienes desacuerdos, discusiones o peleas, o quien te fastidia 
a veces?  
 
Como resuelves estos conflictos? También usan muchos modos diferentes para tratar de 
asentar sus diferencias. Voy a leer una lista de algunas cosas que usted y la otra persona 
podían haber hecho cuando tuvieron una disputa, quisiera que primero me diga para 
cada una cuántas veces lo hizo en el año pasado. Normalmente todas las personas 
enfrentan conflictos y existen diferentes maneras de afrontarlos. A continuación le voy a 
leer formas de manejar conflictos. Quisiera que me indicara con qué frecuencia usted las 
utiliza. 
1 Discutió el asunto calmamente 
2 Consiguió información para defender su lado de las cosas 
3 Trató de traer alguien para ayudar a asentar las cosas 
4 Insultó o mal habló de la otra persona 
5 Negó a hablar del asunto 
6 Pisoteo afuera del cuarto o de la casa 
7 Lloró  
8 Hizo o dijo algo para fastidiar a la otra persona 
9 Amenazó a pegar o tirar algo a la otra persona 
10 Tiró o quebró o pegó o pataleo alguna cosa 
11 Tiró algo a la otra persona 
12 Empujó o trató de agarrar a la otra persona 
13 Dio una palmada a la otra persona 13. Pataleo, mordio o pegó con el puño 
14 Pegó o trató de pegar con algo 
15 Golpeó a la otra persona 
16 Amenazó con un cuchillo o una pistola 
17 Usó un chuchillo o una pistola 
 
97. En la escalera de diez escalones que utilizamos antes,  donde arriba están las mejores 
condiciones de vida que pueda imaginar y abajo las peores. Me puedas indicar ¿Dónde 
ubica las condiciones de vida de cada una de estas personas? 
 
98. En una escala de 1 a 5, adonde 1 es nada y 5 es mucho, cuanto confíes en esa persona? 
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1 – Nada de confianza 
2 
3 
4 
5 – Mucha confianza 
 
 
96. Para la última pregunta quiero saber las relaciones entre las personas que me nombraste. 
Esto es para poder evaluar la densidad de tu red.  
-1= se conocen, pero no se tratan, no se llevan bien 
0 = no se conocen 
1= se conocen de cara, pero no es probable que hablan cuando no esté(s) 
2 = se conocen bien, y es probable que hablan aun cuando no esté(s) 
 
ALTER PREGUNTAS. 
1 SEXO 
1 = masculino 
2 = femenino 
 
2 EDAD  
Aproximadamente, cuantos años tiene… 
3 TRABAJO 
Cual es el trabajo o mayor fuente de ingresos de …  
4 RESIDENCIA 
Donde vive… 
5 RELACION – donde se conocieron? Donde se vean ahora?  
1= familia 
2 = compañero vivienda 
3 = vecino 
4 = compañero trabajo 
5 = amigo escuela 
6= ocio 
7= otro 
 
6 DURACION 
 
Hace cuanto tiempo lo conociste? 
 
7 INTENSIDAD 
 
Con que frecuencia tienes contacto con esa persona? 
1. Casi todos los días 
2. Más o menos una vez en la semana 
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3. Más o menos una vez al mes 
4. En muy pocas ocasiones 
5. Nunca 
 
8 NIVEL DE VIDA 
 
En la escalera de diez escalones que utilizamos antes,  donde arriba están las mejores 
condiciones de vida que pueda imaginar y abajo las peores ¿Dónde ubica las condiciones de 
vida de… 
 
9 CONFIANZA  
 
En una escala de 1 a 5, adonde 1 es nada y 5 es mucho, cuanto confíes en esa persona? 
1 – Nada de confianza 
2 
3 
4 
5 – Mucho confianza 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
